The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933 : factionalism, fratricide and political failure by LaPorte, Norman H.
The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933: 
Factionalism, Fratricide and Political Failure. 
by Norman H. LaPorte 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
to the University of Stirling, Spring 1998. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a case study of the KPD in Saxony between 1924 and 1933. It uses recently 
available documentation in what were formerly East German archives to reconstruct and 
assess the KPD's internal party life and political campaigning in the region. Chapter one 
places the thesis in the context of existing historical studies of the KPD and addresses the 
themes which run throughout the study. These themes concern: the extent to which the 
KPD's political behaviour can be ascribed to its domination by Moscow, the so-called 
"Stalinisation" explanation; the extent to which party ideology could influence members' 
political thought and actions in local settings; and the extent to which the KPD's political 
campaigning at grass roots level could achieve communist political objectives. Chapter 
two then outlines the Saxon economic, social and political developments which provide 
the backdrop for the KPD's activities in the region. 
The main body of the thesis begins by addressing the impact of the "Failed October" of 
1923, which was to have been launched from Saxony, on the KPD. The chapter deals with 
Ruth Fischer's attempt to pursue a policy independently of that set by the Comintern and 
the extent to which the left-wing leadership in Berlin could impose its policies in Saxony. 
Chapter four then looks at life inside the Saxon KPD during the fratricidal factional feuds 
of 1925 to 1928. The following chapter goes on to evaluate the extent to which the Saxon 
KPD's political campaigning during the mid-twenties could. achieve influence on the SPD-
led workers' movement and among the radicalised Mittelstand. Chapter six then addresses 
how the Saxon KPD received the Comintern's ultra-Left policy between 1928 and 1930 
and questions the recent trend in the literature, which points to the policy's largely positive 
reception among the membership. The final chapter deals with the Saxon KPD during the 
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rise of the Nazis and asks whether it was possible to carry out the Comintern's policy of 
treating the left-wing SPD, which was dominant in the region, as the main obstacle to 
Communist objectives in Germany. 
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1. Factionalism, Fratricide and Political Failure: An Introduction. 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the Saxon KPD as a political party during the Weimar Republic. 
The thesis deals with how the Saxon KPD functioned internally and how this affected its 
ability to interact with the wider political environment. The research was made possible 
by the fall of the Ostblock and access to the systematic documentary collection of the 
KPD's records in the former central party archive in Berlin. For the first time the earlier 
studies, which relied upon diaspora documents, can be put in the context of a mass of 
newly available material, which was previously for parteitreu eyes only. The conceptual 
point of departure for this thesis was the question: where did the KPD's centre of gravity 
lie between being Moscow's marionettes or German militants? In other words: to what 
extent could a political line set in Moscow be carried out on the streets of Saxony if it 
did not reflect local conditions experienced by local activists? 
To answer these questions three main areas of investigation have been identified, which 
give the thesis its name: factionalism, fratricide and political failure. Factionalism deals 
with how dissident groupings organised and co-ordinated campaigns to revise the party 
line from left- and right-wing communist perspectives. An assessment will be made of 
what local factors conditioned the differing political dispositions in the Saxon KPD and 
whether the process of Stalinisation was able to uproot local influences on party 
members' political behaviour during the Great Depression and the rise of the Nazis. 
Fratricide refers to the KPD's relations with the wider social democratic workers' 
movement. The one constant in a sea of changing political tides in the KPD's tactics was 
to identify the SPD as the principal obstacle to communist objectives in Gennany. 
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However, political behaviour was not acted out in isolation from the wider SOCIO-
economic environment. The thesis, therefore, evaluates the local conditions which 
disposed the rank-and-file membership towards attaining communist goals in contact 
with the wider workers' movement or in isolation and outright opposition to it. Finally, 
the KPD's political strategy led ultimitely to the party's own decimation following the 
Nazi's Machtergreifung in early 1933. The thesis, therefore, looks for the preconditions 
of the KPD's political failure and how this manifested itself in Saxony. 
Saxony was chosen as the setting of this study not just because of the new possibilities 
for documentary research but also because of the strong pattern of regional 
developments of German socio-economic structures and political systems. There were 17 
Laender in the Weimar Republic: the largest of which was Prussia with a population of 
some 38 million, followed by Bavaria with seven million and then Saxony with five 
million; Thuringia, Saxony's immediate neighbour, housed around one and one half 
million. The smallest Land was Schaumburg-Lippe with 48,000 citizens. Each state had 
diverse patterns of socio-industrial and economic developments, from "old industrial" 
Saxony to the "newly" industrialised areas of Central Germany and the Ruhr. Within 
Saxony there were also sub-regional patterns of development which influenced the 
KPD's political behaviour. Saxony provides a colourful stone in the mosaic of regions 
making up the Weimar Republic: the absence of a social basis for political Catholisism 
meant that the SPD, KPD and later the NSDAP were all represented above their 
average strengths in the Reich. Just as there is no monocausal explanation for the fall of 
the Weimar Republic, and its unstable socio-political compromise, so too is there no one 
template to apply to every regional or local setting. 
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The following reVIew of the literature, and existing explanations for the political 
development of the KPD, is structured to reflect the trends of research and the 
contribution that this study will make. The five subsections correspond to the five central 
themes comprising the investigation of this thesis: What did the KPD's political line 
respond to? What were the consequences of following the Comintem's General Line? 
Did ideology or the local environment determine the KPD's local political behaviour? 
What impact did the KPD's tactics make on the Saxon political system? And what factors 
contributed to the KPD's continuing presence in the Weimar political system? The 
documentary sources are then detailed and an explanation of the methodology used in 
evaluating them is given. Finally, an explanation is given for the structure of the thesis 
and its relationship to the themes under investigation. 
1.2 Trends of Research and New Departures. 
The Stalinisation Thesis and its Critics. 
Reviewing the literature on the KPD's relations with the Comintem in 1983 Hermann 
Weber wrote that: "The history of the KPD as a section of the Comintem is, in a certain 
sense, only to be understood as part of the history of the Comintem." The ECCr 
(Executive Committee of the Communist In~emational) in Moscow, which was 
subordinate to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), could issue binding 
policy directives and expel recalcitrant individuals, groups and ultimately whole 
Communist Parties.1 The debate among those who subscribe to the Stalinisation thesis 
involves identifying the point at which the Comintem acted solely to enforce Moscow's 
1 Weber, H., Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918-1945 (Ertraege der Forschung vol. 198; 
Darmstadt, 1983) p46. 
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foreign policy concerns, disregarding the revolutionary ambitions of its national sections. 
Daycock stress that Soviet foreign policy was decisive in shaping the KPD's policy at all 
times; Weber locates the decisive change in the mid twenties with the CPSU's adoption 
of Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country"; and Weingartner identified the turning 
point in 1928.2 New literature using declassified Soviet documentation has modified the 
debate. Watlin emphasised the change in policy making fOr an open debate and the KPD 
leadership's ability to adapt directives to suit factional predilections to the dominance by 
1928 of the parallel secret meetings between the Comintern and its "foreign" sections.3 
McDermott's assessment of the Comintern's room for interpretation of policy within the 
General Line for national Communist Parties stresses that there was some degree of 
flexibility.4 However, the experience of the KPD indicates that this was only possible in 
issues peripheral to the Soviet Union's central foreign policy concerns.s 
The literature indicates that, from the 2nd World Congress of the Co mint em in 1920 at 
the latest, the General Line for all Communist Parties increasingly failed to account for 
national, let alone regional, peculiarities. Daycock called the KPD a "misplaced" party 
precisely because its objectives were not rooted in Germany but were formulated to 
2 Daycock, D. W., 'The KPD and the NSDAP: A Study in the Relationship between the Political 
Extremes in Weimar Germany 1923-1933' (ph.D .. Dissertation, London School of Economics,1980), 
p317; Weber, Kommunismus in Deutschland, pp47ff; Weingartner, T., Stalin und der Au/steig Hitlers: 
Die Deutschland Politik der Sowjetunion und der Kommunistischen Internationale 1929-1934 (Serlin, 
1970), passim. 
3 Watlin, A., Die Komintern 1919-1929 (Mainz,1993) p185. 
4 McDermott, K., 's talin and the Com intern during the "3rd Period", 1928-1933', in European History 
Quarterly (EHQ) 25 (1995), pp409-29. 
5 The best illustration of this is the KPD's enforced participation in the Nazi and DNVP led referendum 
in Prussia to oust the SPD led government, see Weingartner, Deutschland Politik, p174; Weber, H" 
Hauptjeindsozialdemokratie. Strategie und Taktik der KPD 1929-1933 (Duesseldorf, 1982), pp40f. 
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assist the development of the Soviet state.6 Literature on the KPD's political 
development in Gennany by Flechtheim, Bahne, Weber, Fowkes and Winkler have all 
stressed the party's subordination to the Comintem. The KPD's political lines and 
leadership changed in relation to developments in Moscow and the role of party 
congresses was to confinn a policy already determined by the Comintem.7 The one 
exception to this rule was the rise of the Left Opposition to power in the KPD following 
the so-called "Failed October" of 1923. Having criticised the long-term orientation of the 
tactics formulated by the 3rd World Congress of the Comintem in 1921, the Left 
Opposition used the events in Gennany in 1923 to justify a left-radical policy. However, 
the Comintern was able to overthrow the independent minded leaders within the KPD's 
Left in September 1925 and appoint the Thaelmann leadership which was prepared to 
carry out its General Line.8 Koch-Baumgarten has summarised why there was so little 
resistance, at least within the KPD's leadership, to such Comintem interventions in terms 
of the KPD's own needs: defence of the Soviet Union was increasingly seen as defence of 
a future revolution in Germany; the attraction of the Bolshevik Revolution and the 
Comintern helped to integrate disparate groupings in the membership and among the 
party's supporters; and no split-off grouping, from the KAG and KPD(O) on the right-
6 Daycock, 'Political Extremes', ppI8-19. 
7 Bahne, S., Die KPD und das Ende von Weimar. Das Scheitern einer Politik 1932-1935 (Frankfurt-am-
Main, 1976), pp68-71; Flechtheim, O. K., Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (3rd ed.; Hamburg, 
1986), p264ff; Weber, Haupt/eind Sozialdemokratie, pp63ff; Winkler, H. A., Der Schein der 
Normalitaet. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 1924-1920 (Berlin, Bonn, 
1988), pp417ff; Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republik (London, 1984), 
ppll0ff. 
8 Weber, H., Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik (Gekuerzte Studentenausgabe, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971), pp117f. 
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wing to the KAPD and Leninbund from the party's left-wing, was able to gain significant 
support.9 
Studies of the KPD which ascribe the party's policy to developments in Germany rather 
than to the Cominternset out to identify socio-ecomonic preconditions which could 
validate the party line between 1928-33. Above all this relates to the role played by the 
"social fascist" thesis and the RGO-politik in causing the collapse of the Weimar 
Republic and the failure of the workers' movement to prevent Hitler coming to power. 
The first group of these studies explains the KPD's General Line as a response to the 
actions of the SPD in government. Hennig, Wuenderlich and Weiszt explain the 
acceptance of the "social fascist" policy by the wider communist movement as a response 
to the actions of the SPD in the Reich and Prussian governments. The SPD's involvement 
in the construction of P anzerkreuzer "A" (a so-called pocket battleship) in late 1928 and 
in particular the event of May Day 1929 (Blutmai) , when the SPD-administered police 
force opened fire on illegal communist outdoor marches, were accepted as "proof' of the 
SPD's change from social democracy to "social fascism".lO However, these are too close 
to the Comintern's, and therefore the Thaelmann Group's, interpretation. Although the 
SPD's entry into the Reich government in 1928 did have some impact on KPD policy, 
these studies understate the KPD leadership's efforts to provoke confrontation with the 
SPD and the fact that relations with the SPD throughout the '20s had not been based on 
the party's policies in Germany but changes sanctioned by the Comintem. 
9 Koch-Baumgarten, S., 'Einleitung', in Flechtheim , Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik, p34. 
10 Hennig, E., 'Nachbemerkungen zu einem Aspekt des kommunistischen Tageskampfes gegen die 
Sozialdemokratie', in GeselischaJt, Beitrage zur Marxschen Theorie 6 (Frankfurt/M, 1976), pp292f; 
Wuenderlich, V., Arbeiterbewegung und Selbstverwaltung. KPD und Kommunalpolitik in der Weimarer 
Republik. Mit dem Beispiel Solingen (Wuppertal, 1980), pp57-8; Weiszt, 1., KPD-Politik in der Krise, 
1928-32 (Frankfurt/M, 1976), pp 17f. 
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Wickham's research in Frankfurt-am-Main also explains the KPD membership's 
acceptance, even "welcoming", of the "social fascist" policy in tenns of the political 
consequences of the process of industrial rationalisation. The workers' movement had 
been pushed apart at its foundations leaving no point of common contact for the 
"political innovation" necessary to challenge the General Line. The sociological split in 
the workers' movement produced the political split. Workers could either support the 
SPD, and its toleration of the Bruening government as a "lesser evil" to the inclusion of 
the NSDAP in government, or the KPD and its stance on "social fascism ,,11 Peukert also 
saw the rank-and-file party membership's readiness to accept ultra-Leftism in tenns of 
the separation between the SPD's and KPD's social constituencies: the KPD comprised 
unemployed workers and those not organised in the Free Trade Unions, while the SPD 
organised employed workers who were organised in the trade unions, allowing the KPD 
to treat Social Democrats as the "enemy. ,,12 While political and trade-union membership 
clearly did represent an obstacle to communist influence, these interpretations generalise 
the influence of local relations between the two parties' social basis. Furthermore they 
understate the role of the KPD in splitting the cultural and sports organisations and the 
trade unions in a manner hammering on the split in the workers' movement. 
H.A. Winkler adopted a middle position which held that, although communist policy was 
imported through the Comintern, there was a "structural echo" in the KPD, which 
increasingly organised unemployed and unskilled workers, for a left-radical policy.13 
However, this explanation overlooked the passivity caused by the "social fascist" policy 
11 Wickham, J., 'The Working Class Movement in Frankfurt-am-Main during the Weimar Republic', 
Ph.D. thesis (University of Sussex, 1979), pp28, 188ff. 
12 Peukert,D., 'Zur Sozialgeschicht der KPD', in Kloenne, A. and Vack, K., Zur Geschichte der 
Arbeiterbewegung,4 (November 1978), pp35-7. 
13 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp438-9. 
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because it ignored the immediate and direct interests of the KPD's constituency among 
the unemployed, while continually asserting a factory policy that remained both 
unproductive and unpopular in the party. 
A second grouping of studies details the impact of industrial rationalisation on the 
KPD's factory and trade-union policy. Schoeck's thesis was that the sociological split in 
the workers' movement conditioned the political split. The RGO, which tried to organise 
those workers neglected by the policies of reformism, was a "helpless reflex" to the 
social divisions in the industrial working class. 14 However, Schoeck's assessment of 
communist trade-union policy until 1928 as an attempt to overcome the split in the 
working class neglects the communist definition of "unity": all workers under the 
leadership of the KPD, precluding any genuine co-operation with reformism.1S Schoeck's 
regional studies of the chemical, mining and metal industries in the Ruhr also fails to note 
that, at least in other regions, the split in the working class ran through the KPD.16 The 
RGO-politik served to push the party out of the factories precisely because workers who 
had never been inclined to political organisation remained largely politically passive. 
Indeed, Stolle's case studies in the chemical and metal industries indicate that "mass 
workers" lost the ability to take up industrial action and therefore left the political 
movement, leaving the RGO-politik to be carried out by the small number of skilled 
(metal working) factory Communists who remained in the party in strongholds such as 
14 Schoeck, E. C., Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung. Die Lage der Arbeiter und die Kommunislische 
Gewerkschaftspolitik 1920-1928 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1977), P 179. 
15 ibid, pp19-75. 
16 ibid, pp76-152. 
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S lin 17 o gen and Stuttgart (Borsch). Lucas points out that the KPD, as a party obsessed 
with organisation and discipline, was looking to workers without these traditions or 
inclinations to confonn to the demands of a Leninist party.IS 
Stolle also argues that sociological changes in the KPD's membership constituency 
during the mid-1920s favoured a leftist political policy. However, Stolle adds the 
dimension of parallel changes in the KPD's functionary core, which, after 1924, was 
reconstituted from the left. This meant that in 1928 a "bureaucratic utopian communism" 
dominated the party and introduced a leftist policy.19 Secondly, the "Left-Turn" in party 
policy was a response to the economic conjuncture at the time which enabled the first 
strikes over pay and conditions since 1923/4. These conditions had led to unorganised 
and organised factory workers taking joint action under reformist leadership. The KPD's 
call for "independent strike leaderships", in opposition to the unions' policy of arbitrated 
settlements, at frrst integrated the communist's supporters in the factories. But in the 
second half of 1928, as the movement subsided, the policy flowed into ultra-Left 
isolationism. Attempts were made to broaden the KPD's support among workers who 
did not belong to the SPD-Ied trade unions and "mass workers", but this failed. 20 In 
Saxony it is also correct that radical reformism exercised an attraction on Communist 
workers as well as the unorganised workforce. However, Communist union militants did 
not want an independently organised strike strategy. Their preference was for a policy of 
17 Stolle, U., Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb: Frauen und Maenner, Reformisten und Radikale, Fach und 
Massenarbeiter bei Bayern, BASF, Borsch und in Solingen (1900-1933) (Frankfurt-am-Main, New 
York, 1980), pp245ff, esp. 259-60. 
18 Lucas, E., Zwei Formen von Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Frankfurt/M, 1976), 
p281. 
19 Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik, p262f. 
20 ibid, p264f. 
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industrial militancy from inside the unions. Stolle also overlooks the function of the 
KPD's Stalinisation in installing a functionary core compliant with the Comintern's 
directives and the elimination of democratic channels to influence policy making. 
Finally, Reer-Kleinert has explained the KPD's factory policy in terms of the party's 
entrenched theoretical perspectives. The KPD's "negative fixation" with the SPD centred 
above all on its involvement in the process of industrial-rationalisation. The 
consequences of rationalisation in Germany were interpreted in terms of communist 
impoverishment theory. This held that the social basis for reformism would contract 
while the basis for a revolutionary policy under communist leadership would expand. The 
KPD should, therefore, turn to the unorganised workers, outside of reformist traditions, 
the unemployed and the poorest paid workers and take up a policy of open confrontation 
with the SPD.21 However, this interpretation is also close to that expounded by the 
Comintern. Furthermore, when it became apparent that the unemployed were not an 
active social revolutionary force, the KPD was in no position to independently reappraise 
its policy to any significant degree. To simply say that ideology had closed off reality to 
those making policy overlooks both the crisis within the leadership over the party's 
response to the NSDAP between 1930-33 and the influence of local conditions affecting 
how these policies could be carried out. 
The newly available documentation in the former central party archive confirms that the 
"Left-Turn" came from the Comintern and was drawn into the party's factional struggle. 
Significantly, it also indicates that in Saxony the "social fascist" policy was not 
"welcomed" by party activists but led to a further contraction in the party's membership 
until the Great Depression deepened in 1930. The limitations of the "social fascist" policy 
21 Heer-Kleinert, L., Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt-am-Main, 
New York, 1983), pp282ff,360,375f. 
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on the membership's ability to carry out party campaigns even alienated rank-and-file 
leftists. As Koch-Baumgarten has pointed out, the KPD's policy was an isolation 
strategy, cementing the split in the workers' movement.22 It will be argued in this thesis 
that the policy of organisational isolation was to eliminate the influences of contact with 
the social democratic workers' movement in order to reinforce national level hostilities to 
the SPD, for foreign policy reasons, at local level. 
The Limits of Stalinisation: From the Centre to the Periphery of Communism. 
The imposition of a General Line, which did not reflect opinion inside the KPD, had 
profound consequences for the party's political development. In the period 1924-30 this 
above all meant the KPD's Stalinisation. The term was originally used by the KPD's Left, 
which was involved in factional opposition to the implications of Stalin's policy of 
"socialism in one country" for world revolution.23 Stalinisation meant the removal of all 
aspects of the KPD's ideology, organisation and traditions which could permit opposition 
to Soviet domination. The KPD became a monolithic party in which opposition currents 
came up against a strictly disciplined and centralised party machine. 
Hermann Weber has explained what made the KPD's Stalinisation possible in terms of 
four factors. Firstly, the domination of the party apparatus over the wider party was 
interpreted as a symptom of modem industrial society. However, the early importation 
of party organisation from the CPSU's model must be stressed. Secondly, the KPD's 
inability to find an ideological position by 1924 between social democracy and 
syndicalism. However, by accepting the Comintem's "21 Conditions of Entry" in 1920 
22 Kock-Baumgarten, Einleitung, p5I. 
23 Bahne, S., 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus". Die "ultralinke" Opposition in der KPO', 
in Viertelsjahresheftfuer Zeitegeschichte, 9 (1961) (pp359-383), p360, note 4. 
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the KPD had accepted the principals of Leninism: above all the leading role of the party. 
The dispute centred on the "correct" tactic for a communist party in Germany. The 
KPD's increasing use of one-size-fits-all policies, in a country with such pronounced 
regional and sub-regional particularities, prevented a common tactical denominator being 
found to balance the local equation within the framework of agreed communist 
objectives. Control at the centre had replaced the original concept of a federated party 
structure to maximise local influence by local responses.24 Thirdly, the discrepancy 
between the KPD's revolutionary goals and the non-revolutionary situation in Germany 
was identified as the cause of membership passivity, with the apparatus becoming almost 
the only active element. In Saxony, however, membership passivity was above all caused 
by two factors: inappropriate policy directives which did not relate to local conditions; 
and the power struggle in the party, which burned up the political oxygen necessary for 
wider political work. The more the party line became detached from local realities the 
more passive the membership became. Fourthly, and most importantly, was the KPD's 
dependence on Moscow and the Comintern. At least one third of the KPD's funding 
came from the Comintern. This paid for an expensive party apparatus, press and 
propaganda.25 However, documentation of the Saxon party indicates that the Co mint ern 
was only prepared to fund political campaigns which would have an impact on national 
politics. The KPD was left to fund most of its day-to-day local campaigns from 
members' collections and donations. 
24 Bericht ueber den Gruendungsparteitag der Iwmmunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartaku.sbund) 
yom 30. Dezember 1918 bis 1. Januar 1919 (Reprint: Frankfurt/M, 1978), pp43ff (Eberlein). 
25 Weber, Kommunismus in Deutschland, p66. 
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Weber, endorsing A. Kreigel's observations on the implications of dependence on the 
Comintern, detailed three factors affecting all communist Parties.26 Firstly, democratic 
centralism increasingly placed decision making at the centre, excluding party members 
from influencing policy. Weber, however, tends to exaggerate the extent of the KPD's 
internal democracy between 1919-24 and the ranges of possible development open to the 
KPD.27 Watlin's more recent work also stresses that 1928 marked the final defeat of 
democratic communism 28 These interpretations, however, do not sufficiently stress that 
Stalinisation was a continuation of the process of Bolshevisation, which had begun in the 
early 1920s. Democratic channels of influencing policy and electing leaderships had 
ended by 1925 at the latest. However, this study of Saxony will look at the local 
limitations constraining the process of Stalinisation as a result of local conditions. 
Secondly, a permanent apparatus was constructed to carry out party policy. This, as 
Kreigel's work on the French Communist Party makes clear, represented a "core" group 
of ever loyal functionaries: in the early thirties the damaging effects of the KPD's General 
Line during the rise of the Nazis caused a crisis in the middle and lower functionary 
ranks, manifested in high rates of membership turnover.29 Finally, re-organisation of the 
party on the basis of factory cells was justified with reference to the Bolshevik model of 
a revolutionary party. However, the KPD's re-organisation functioned in practice to 
atomise opposition groups within the party while connecting each party unit to the 
centre. This did not mobilise the KPD for carrying out party campaigns, as was asserted 
by the leadership. The process merely dissipated party energy, was "passively resisted" 
by the membership, and residential organisations (street cells and local groups) continued 
26 ibid, p66f. 
27 Weber, Wandlung, pp8,lO 
28 Watlin, Die Komintern, pI85. 
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to carry almost all political work.30 Each of these factors is connected by the political and 
organisational drive of Stalinisation to create a strictly centralised and disciplined party: a 
monolith with no place to hide for Opposition groups. 
The development of Stalinist control over the KPD did not come to an end by 1929/30: 
the use of these political and organisational methods of control were simply easier to 
implement. However, "latent tendencies" (Reuter) continued to exist in relation to the 
influence of local conditions: that is, where close proximity to left-wing Social 
Democrats in the factories and municipal parliaments continued to outweigh "social 
fascist" ideology. During the rise of the Nazis local conditions often continued to favour, 
at least limited, contact with the local SPD to achieve immediate local objectives. 
Reuter has presented a new thesis on the factional struggle which identifies Thaelmann 
as an "integration figure" around whom opposing factions could unite. Reuter's study 
arrived at this conclusion on the basis of interviews with former KPD members in 
Hannover during the early 1980s.31 However, Reuter's study is geographically limited 
and appears to reflect a memory distorted by official party propaganda which presented 
ThaeImann, like Stalin, as the architect of party unity and technician of party strength. 
These findings do not explain developments in Saxony. Reuter and Daycock also 
described how rank-and-file members were often unable to detect changes in the party 
line from Left to Right in the 1920s and even switched factions during the factional 
feud. 32 In Saxony it is also correct that the leadership wanted to minimise the scale and 
depth of the purges. But persistent opposition to the party line was dealt with by 
29 Bahne, Scheitern, p15f. 
30 Heer-Kleinert, Gewerkschaftspolitik, pp324ff. 
31 Reuter, G., KPD-Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammensteliung der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Hannover, 1982), p92ff. 
32 ibid, p92; Daycock, 'Political Extremes', pp145-6. 
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expulsion. Furthermore, it is unlikely any party activist could have been unaware of the 
internal party power struggle in the twenties which was tearing the KPD apart. 
Ideology or Local Conditions: What Produced the Political Tendencies in the Saxon 
KPD? 
Local and industrial case studies have produced social and economic histories, which 
have broadened and deepened existing knowledge on the development of the KPD. The 
identification of local and regional expressions of radicalism in the workers' movement 
can be traced back to Cohn's contemporary study of the Ruhrkreig (1920) and 
Eliasberg's later work on the same topic.33 However, it was E. Lucas' seminal study 
which identified two forms of workers' radicalism, both of which were housed in the 
KPD.34 Lucas identified a skilled (metal) workers' form of radicalism in the Ruhr town of 
Remscheid. The town's early industrialisation, and the development of a tradition of 
organisation on the left-wing of the SPD and trade unions, conditioned a political 
tendency which was disposed towards a united front tactic involving day-to-day work in 
contact with the wider workers' movement, especially in the trade unions. By contrast 
the neighbouring mining town of Hamborn produced a second type of workers' 
radicalism. Rapid industrialisation, accelerated by the demands of the war economy 
(1914-18), threw up a "new working class", which predominantly comprised workers 
from non-industrial backgrounds, who had been strongly under-represented in the pre-
war social democratic workers' movement. These workers favoured a spontaneous form 
33 Colm, G., Beitrag zur Geschichte und Soziologie des Ruhraufstandes vom MaerziApril1920 (Essen, 
1921), quoted in Winkler, H. A., Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiterbewegung in der 
Weimarer Republik 1918 bis 1924 (Berlin, Bonn, 1984), p373; Eliasberg, G., 'Der Ruhr Kreig 1920', in 
Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte X (1970), pp291-377. 
34 Lucas, Zwei Fonnen, pp249f,28Of (conclusions). 
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of protest over pay and conditions, acting independent of the social democratic organised 
workers' movement. While accounting for nuances as a result of particular local factors, 
subsequent studies have confirmed Lucas's conclusions. The skilled form of workers' 
radicalism in the KPD has been identified among metal workers in Solingen and Stuttgart 
by Stolle; in Rannau by Krause; and by Tampke in the southern Ruhr.35 The second type 
of radicalism has been extended to include chemical workers and dockyard workers in 
addition to miners. Lucas's findings have been confirmed among miners in the western 
Ruhr by Tampke; among dock workers in Hamburg by Ullrich (1914-18); and among 
chemical workers in Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen by Stolle.36 Stolle also concluded 
that when labour market conditions no longer permitted the chemical workers 
spontaneous actions in defense of their pay and conditions, during the period between 
1924-28, they left the workers' movement.37 Fowkes and McElligott have indicated that 
this type of workers' radicalism was present in the movement of unemployed workers, 
which was connected to the KPD during the late '20s and early '30S.38 Interestingly, 
Peukert identified a common denominator for both of these tendencies located within the 
35 Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik, ppI28-223; Tampke, J., The Ruhr and Revolution: The Revolutionary 
Movement in the Rheinish-Westphalian Industrial Region (London, 1979), ppl00f; Krause, H., Zur 
Geschichte der USPD (Glashuetten im Taunus,1976). 
36 Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik, ppI29-223; Ullrich, V., Die Hamburger Arbeiterbewegung vom Vorabend des 
Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Revolution 1918119 (2 vols., Hamburg, 1976). 
37 Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik, pp245ff. 
38 Fowkes, B., 'Communism in Germany during the Weimar Period' (Unpublished paper to Saint 
Anthony's College Oxford, 1991), p15; McElligott, A., 'Mobilising the Unemployed: The KPD and the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement in Hamburg-Altona during the Weimar Republic', in Evans, RJ., and 
Geary, D. (eds.), The German Unemployed. Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment 
from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich (London, 1987), pp228-60. 
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KPD: all party members rejected the "Weimar Compromise" because of the social 
insecurities generated by industrial rationalisation and market dislocation after 1918.39 
Recent research by Weitz explained the appeal of a left-wing KPD policy, which was 
directed against the SPD and its role in the Weimar state, as a product of two separate 
social worlds inhabited by Communists and Social Democrats. The SPD comprised 
employed workers, who were organised in the party's trade unions, social and cultural 
organisations. The KPD, by contrast, comprised largely unemployed workers, who had 
been excluded from the Social Democratic worlds of work and leisure, and lived in older 
more down-at-heel districts. According to Weitz, these factors predisposed rank-and-file 
Communists to the Comintern's post-1928 "left-turn". Weitz places the unemployed 
workers' support for the KPD during the Great Depression in the context of the 
development of the German political economy: a continuation of the imperial legacy of 
state intervention in the economy and social welfare programmes conditioned their 
adoption of Leninist strong state solutions to their problems.40 However, in the "old" 
socio-industrial structure of Saxony there was no such clear division into separate social 
worlds. Even after the onset of mass unemployment Social Democrats and Communists 
came in contact in shared residential districts. Equally, the KPD repelled most of the 
politicised unemployed workers, who had joined the party between 1930 and 1933, by 
continuing to prioritise party campaigning in the factories. Crucially, there was no 
uniform political predilection within Saxon Communism. The three Saxon KPD party 
districts ranged between support for a united front policy in contact with the wider 
39 Peukert, 'Sozialgeschichte', pp35f. 
40 Weitz, E. D., 'State Power, Class Fragmentation and the Shaping of German Communist Politics, 
1890-1933', in JMH 62 (2) (1990) (pp253-97), pp279-86,295-97; Weitz has further developed these 
ideas in, Id. Creating German Commu.nism, 1890-1933. From Popu.lar Protest to Socialist State 
(Princeton, New Jersey, L 997). 
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workers' movement, in Erzgebirge-Vogtland; to a left-wing, or isolationist, political 
tendency in West Saxony. The sub-regional variations in the Saxon KPD's political 
trends indicate that the political tendencies in the KPD were not the result of ideological 
interpretations of national events issued by the ZK (Central Committee).41 After the 
"failed October" and Reichsexekution of 1923, the Saxon KPD's local activists did not 
universally dismiss all contact with the SPD.42 Instead, local Communists responded to 
local Social Democrats as they found them: local conditions outweighed blanket 
ideological political prescriptions. 
To assess these political trends in the Saxon KPD it is therefore necessary to include 
other models of explanation. In explaining the rates of erosion of the SPD membership 
and vote in Saxony Franz Walter's important study applied the analytical framework of 
socio-political milieu to account for pronounced sub-regional variations.43 This research 
demonstrated that where the SPD functioned in a heavily populated industrial region 
which had produced an organisational tradition in the SPD, ADGB (General German 
Trade Union Confederation) and sports and cultural Vereine the strength of attraction 
produced by the milieu held up the SPD's membership and vote, insulating the party from 
the socio-economic shocks which sustained the rise of the Saxon NSDAP. This was 
strongest in Western Saxony and Eastern Saxony, particularly between Leipzig and 
Dresden. However, the Nazi breakthrough was facilitated most rapidly and deeply in 
41 Cf. Schleifstein, 1., Die "Sozialjaschismus"-These. Zu ihrem geschichtlichen Hintergrund 
(Frankfurt/M, 1980), ppI7ff,53ff. 
42 Bahne, S., "Sozialfascismus' in Deutschland. Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs', in 
International Rewiew of Social History (IRSH) 10 (2) (1965) (pp211-45), p220. Bahne wrote that the 
impact of the "Failed Revolution" of 1923 tended to eclipse the pro-contact wing in the KPD associated 
with Heinrich Brandler. 
43 Walter, F., 'Sachsen - ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?', in Politische Viertefjahrshe/t (PVS) 32 
(2) (1991), (pp207-23l); on the construction of milieu, pp215f. 
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southwestern Saxony where the SPD milieu was weakest. This model of explanation has 
been further developed by Szejnmann's study of the rise of the NSDAP in Saxony (1921-
33) and the Saxon SPD's response to it.44 It will be further argued in this thesis that the 
weaker the traditions of organisation in the local SPD and unions the less the 
membership's loyalty to the Reich leadership's official policies, weakening the political 
border between Communist and Social Democratic activists. 
K-H Mallmann's recent study of the KPD has also applied the concept of locally 
produced milieu to explain the KPD as a social movement with its roots in the radical 
socialist traditions of the pre-war SPD. Mallmann challenges the received view of the 
KPD's internal party structure as an elaborate system of top down control. Instead the 
party is depicted as a rich tapestry of locally manufactured threats, as opposed to the 
monolithic Soviet "red" of the Stalinisation thesis.45 This study of the Saxon KPD will 
argue that, although there were local limits to the system of party control facilitated by 
the KPD's Stalinisation, it did produce an omnipresence of representatives of official 
policy, driving the most able members out of the party.46 The political behaviour of the 
Saxon KPD, as detailed in the following thesis, confirms Mallmann's view that the KPD's 
membership comprised a variety of political persuasions, which responded to the world 
outside of the party.47 However, rather than presenting the KPD as the successor 
movement to the hopes and ambitions of the radical socialist wing of the Wilhelmine 
44 Szejnmann, C-C. H., 'The Rise of the Nazi Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933', Ph.D. thesis 
(King's College, University of London, 1994), ppl65ff. 
45 Mallmann, K-M, Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionaeren 
Bewegung (Darmstadt, 1996), pp34ff,44-5. 
46 For Mallmann's rejection of the Stalinisation thesis see especially, ibid, pp54-83,380ff. 
47 ibid, pp385-6; Id. 'Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft. Zur Soziaigeschichte des 
Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik', in Geschichte und Gesellschaft (GuG) 21 (1) (1995) (pp5-
31). 
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SPD, the party's factions will be put in the context of the socio-political environment of 
every day working-class life. Ma11rnann's research identified a vibrant Communist sub-
culture; however, the example of Saxony points to a Diktatorpanei which pumped the 
political line, and the continual changes in it imposed by Moscow, through a party 
membership which could never be fully convinced of an ideology which made 
increasingly little sense to their own political world.48 
A leitmotif of this case study will be to examine the thesis that in an environment where 
it was possible to move towards communist objectives in contact with the left-wing of 
the SPD, a Right (pro-contact) communism was produced. However, where the barriers 
of strong SPD and union organisation, and loyalty to the official party line, excluded this 
possibility the KPD's district parties would incline towards the Left, which advocated 
isolation from the SPD to achieve communist objectives. The underlying question in this 
evaluation of sub-regional political trends in the Saxon KPD is to shed further light on 
whether the Reich KPD's disastrous General Line during the rise of the NSDAP, which 
presented the SPD as communism's "main enemy", was taken up at local level. 
Communist Tactics and their Influence on the Wider political System. 
Historical studies specifically on the KPD's political tactics between 1924-28 have 
received relatively little attention in comparison with the period 1921 and 1923, which 
Angress has detailed as the KPD's Kampjzeit, 49 and the period 1928-33, which has a 
historiography in its own right. The period 1924-28, if not a terra incognita, is a 
48 On the KPD's subculture and intemallife, with almost no analysis of factions and factionalism, see 
Mallmann, Sozialgeschichte, pp165. 
49 Angress, W. T., Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bidfor Power in Germany, 1921-1923 
(Princeton, 1963). 
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landscape of widely uncharted regions. The contribution of part of the following case 
study in Saxony will be to assess the KPD's ability to carry out the united front policy 
between 1925 and 1928 and the ultra-Left isolationist policy after 1928. 
There are good reasons for a lack of national and regional studies of the KPD's tactics 
between 1924 and 1928. These years were dominated by the KPD's internal party feud 
and the Weimar Republic's return to a period of relative political and economic 
stability.50 These factors, it appears, have give this period in the KPD's development a 
sense of less urgency, or attraction, to researchers. The subject, however, has not been 
completely overlooked. Flechtheim and Fowkes have covered the period both in tenns of 
the KPD's internal affairs (Stalinisation) and the party's political campaigning.51 Winkler 
and Watlin have stressed that all tactical changes in the KPD's policies between 1921 and 
1928 did not alter the party's endgoal (ie communist strategy): to "unmask" the SPD 
leadership as allegedly hostile to workers' interests and win over the party's social basis. 
The KPD leadership had no real interest in a genuine united front with the SPD to gain 
improvements in German workers' social and material conditions. 52 It should be noted, 
however, that during the independent policies pursued during Ruth Fischer's leadership 
the KPD did not want to win over Social Democrats, fearing their reformist traditions 
would dilute the KPD's revolutionary fervour. However, even during the KPD's so-called 
"moderate" united front policy during the Campaign to Expropriate the German Princes 
in 1926, Winkler indicates that the KPD's intention was to "draw away the broad mass of 
50 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Cali fomi a, 1991), pI. Lapp notes that the extent of "relative 
stability" in Saxony was more tenuous than in the Reich in general because of the social impact of 
structural economic problems. 
51 Flechtheim, Die KPD, ppl5lff; Fowkes, Communism in Germany, ppllOff. 
52 Watlin, Die Komintern, p-+ 7; On the period 1921-22, Winkkr, Von de, Revolution, pp528-9. 
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workers from the SPD to the KPD. ,,53 What these studies fail to emphasise is that while 
all communist groupings inside the KPD could agree on the endgoal of a revolution led 
by the KPD, it was precisely the question of the tactics, the means to this end, which tore 
the party apart. Goldback has also emphasised the early strong connection between 
Soviet foreign policy and the political role of the united front in Germany.54 Geyer has 
detailed how in the mid-years of the Weimar Republic the united front policy was 
increasingly linked to the defence of the Soviet Union. The creation of a so-called "left-
wing in the workers' movement" meant, in practice, creating a pro-Soviet mood within 
the German working class.55 
Daycock has also demonstrated that the KPD's relationship with the SPD was not 
conditioned by the SPD's political behaviour, but by the stages in the KPD's internal 
party power struggle. The "moderate" political line in 1925/6 was part of the struggle 
against the various ultra-Left factions and the gradual return to a leftist policy thereafter 
was to exclude the influence of the Right and Reconciler factions. 56 Bahne's and 
Herlemann's studies of the KPD in the Ruhr point out that the use of "workers' 
majorities" (ie voting with the SPD) in 1926/7 in Town Halls to achieve concessions, 
especially for the unemployed, did help to extend the party's local political influence and 
to gradually reverse a declining membership. However, Sozialpolitik was always 
subordinated to the objective of attacking the SPD and the reputed "betrayals" of 
53 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p275. 
54 Goldbach, M. L., Karl Radek und die deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen. Ein Beitrag zum Verhaltnis 
von KPD und Komintern und zur Geschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen zwischen 1918-
1923 (Hannover, 1973), ppl00-116, esp. 105-6. 
55 G D 'SowJ'et Russland und die Deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1918-1932'. in Vierteljahrsheftfuer eyer, " 
Zeitgeschichte (VfZ) 24 (1) (1976), pp29-31. 
56 Daycock, Political Extremes, ppI43-4. 
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reformism. 57 In trade union policy Eisner has demonstrated that, unlike in local politics, 
the KPD's return to work within the Free Trade Unions never allowed the KPD to 
recover the level of influence enjoyed before 1923/4.58 
Koch-Baumgarten has aptly summarised the KPD in these years as a party with a strong 
facade masking its limited political influence and internal crisis. The KPD had 
strongholds in Berlin, Central Germany, the Rheinland and Westphalia, North Germany 
and Erzgebirge-Vogtland in Saxony; it had a core of some two million votes in general 
elections; a membership above 100,000; a significant number of local councillors, 
regional and Reich parliamentary deputies; factions in the local trade unions and 
factories; and in 1927 there were 36 daily communist newspapers. However, the KPD 
lacked any decisive political influence; it had an increasingly passive membership; there 
was a high membership turnover and little support from either women or young workers; 
and, last but not least, the KPD was engaged in a fratricidal power struggle. 59 The 
contribution of this study will be to investigate the communist tactical conundrum in 
Saxony. To achieve a high profile campaign the KPD needed an issue of genuine popular 
appeal and the inclusion of the SPD and Trade Union leaderships. However, this was the 
means to a communist end: if the rank-and -file party membership engaged in the issue of 
subterfuge, by taking part in a genuine united front with local Social Democrats on an 
issue of socialist reform, the tactic could be regarded as "working in reverse". In Saxony 
this issue was acute because the parliamentary arithmetic in the Landtag impelled the 
57 Bahne, S., 'Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik' (pp315-55), in Reulecke, J. (ed.), 
Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr. Beitraege zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Rheinland-
Westfalen (Wuppertal, 1974), p330. 
58 Eisner, F., Das Verhaltnis der KPD zu den Gewerkschaften in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 
Frankfurt-am-Main, 1977), p207. 
59 Koch-Baumgarten, Einleitung, p29. 
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left-wing Saxon SPD to look to the KPD's support for a "workers' majority" to continue 
the programme of refonns begun in the early 1920s. 
Hennann Weber's detailed study of the KPD's General Line between 1929-33 has 
become a standard work on Communist strategy during the Great Depression.60 Weber 
identified five constants making up the KPD's central political objectives: (1) first and 
foremost was the defence of the Soviet Union from the alleged threat of an imperialist 
war of intervention; (2) the KPD should seize power by a means of a general strike and 
armed uprising. However, no plans were made for a German revolution; (3) the KPD 
claimed to be the "only workers' party", all others, including the SPD, were part of the 
"fascist camp", led by monopoly capitalism. Even after the NSDAP's political 
breakthrough as a mass party it continued to be seen as an "agent of capitalism"; (4) the 
SPD was the "chief enemy" within the working class; the party had "grown together" 
with an increasingly fascist state: the party's most dangerous component was its left-
wing, which held the working class to the SPD by disguising its "imperialist role" with 
"radical phrases"; (5) the policy was carried into the trade unions using the RGO-politik; 
however, the KPD never finally decided on whether to set up independent Red Unions or 
to work within the Free Trade Unions. 61 Within the framework of the General Line 
Weber identified eight phases (ie seven tactical changes) which continually fluctuated 
between a rigid and more flexible policy in relation to conditions in the Comintern, the 
KPD and the situation in Germany. The dominant role of the Comintern was highlighted 
by Weber in that five of the seven tactical changes were initiated by its intervention.62 
60 Weber, Haupt/eind Sozialdemokratie, is also published with an extensive documentary appendix as, 
Die Generallinie. Rundschreiben des Zentralkommittees der KPD an die Bezirke, 1929-1933 
(Duesseldorf, 1981). 
61 ibid, ppI8-19. 
62 ibid, pp20ff. 
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Weber's study, however, focuses primarily on the policies of the KPD's Reich leadership, 
using a documentary basis of circulars issued by the ZK to the BLs (District Leadership). 
This study will question whether it was possible to maintain a General Line at local level 
which identified the SPD as the "main enemy" during the rise of the NSDAP to power. 
Bahne's study of the KPD's General Line (1928-34) identifies how the policy was in fact 
an "ultra-Left isolation" strategy, functioning to uproot the party from the influences of 
conditions in Germany.63 Bahne delineates the origins of the "social fascist" thesis, as a 
definition of the SPD and communist tactics towards it, as the response of the 5th World 
Congress of the Comintern in 1924 to the final ending of hopes in revolution in Eastern 
and Central Europe.64 Fowkes points out that the KPD's return to this policy in 1928 was 
a justification for a policy decided upon by the Comintern for Soviet reasons of state and 
foreign policy.65 This study will examine how the KPD leadership tried to use ideology, 
party discipline and organisational centralisation to build a Chinese Wall preventing 
contact between the party membership and the wider workers' movement, to shut out the 
influences of German society. However, it will be argued that, particularly during the rise 
of the NSDAP, local conditions remained decisive in determining Communist activists' 
political behaviour. It is correct that "deviation" from the General Line never succeeded 
in having the official party policy changed. However, local party organisations were the 
interface between the official policy and the political setting it was implemented in. The 
adapting of the ZK's directives to meet local conditions was, after all, an indicator of the 
extent to which "social fascist" ideology became a socio-political reality. Negt and Kluge 
observed that the higher communist functionaries went in the party the more insulated 
63 Bahne, Scheitern, p12. 
64 Bahne, 'Sozialjaschismus', p25. 
65 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p146. 
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from reality they became. However, the attachment of ordinary members was "loose and 
brittle" because they could not be isolated from their environment. 66 This research will 
also make the distinction between what Kriegel called an "inner core" of ever loyal 
(higher) party officials and the "outer circles" comprising ordinary members and local 
functionaries.67 
Eve Rosenhaft has researched the KPD's tactics at local level in Berlin. Central to her 
study is the thesis that despite the party's ideological limitations on interpreting the 
political situation, in practice its response was "tremendously vibrant and surprisingly 
responsive to the shifting needs of its actual and potential constituency". 68 This meant 
treating the NSDAP as the "main enemy" in the neighbourhoods which, following the 
onset of mass unemployment, had become the environment replacing the factory as the 
actual location of political conflict.69 Although Rosenhaft saw the KPD's attitude to 
physical violence as "ambivalent", the party is presented as developing a response to the 
NSDAP's penetration of what the KPD believed to be its strongholds after 1929: both 
physical defence (Abwehr) and "ideological discussion" were used to beat back and win 
over the Nazi threat.70 The Berlin KPD's treatment of the NSDAP as the "main enemy" is 
not, however, presented as marking a significant break with the policy of "social 
fascism". Instead the General Line's validity for rank-and-file activists is explained in 
terms of a response to the role of the SPD in government: party members' every day 
66 Negt, O. and Kluge, A., Oeffentlichkeit und Erfahrungen. Zur Organisationsanalyse von 
buergerlicher und pro Ie tarischer Oeffentlichkeit (Frankfurt/M, 1972), pp349, 385-402. 
67 Kreigel, A., The French Communists. Profile of a People (trans: Elaine P. Halperin; Chicago, 
London, 1972). 
68 Rosenhaft, E., Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence 1929-1933 
(Cambridge, 1983), ppx-xi. 
69 ibid, 7ff,18ff,26. 
70 ibid, pl5ff. 
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experience with the SA, the police and the Sozialstaat, which were under SPD control, 
made a united front extending from the Nazis to the SPD seem possible.71 Chapter seven 
of this study will assess the extent to which the KPD responded to mass unemployment 
and the rise of political violence in the neighbourhoods. A counter thesis will be 
presented that the KPD's principal concern was to hold the General Line against the SPD 
at local leveL 
Research by Conan Fischer has added a new and controversial aspect to the 
interpretation of why the KPD adopted a "nationalist policy", in the form of the 
Programme of National and Social Liberation", in 1930.72 Fischer's thesis is that 
working-class nationalism in Germany rose up through the KPD's membership forcing 
the party to adopt it as a political strategy. The KPD's response was reinforced by an 
overlap in the KPD's and NSDAP's electoral and membership constituency which 
intensified their rivalries for the "anti-system" vote.73 
A fundamental flaw in Fischer's argument is that he does not define working-class 
nationalism nor its relationship to the traditional German nationalism of the middle and 
upper classes. The KPD's social basis, especially after 1923/4, increasingly comprised 
unemployed workers, the unskilled and the deskilled members of the working class, who 
had suffered from the failures of the German economy to integrate them into society and 
had adopted the KPD as a vehicle for their rejection of the "Weimar Compromise". 74 
Koch-Baumgarten has underlined the fact that the KPD did not have a German 
revolutionary tradition to draw on, but instead inherited the SPD's earlier role of 
71 ibid, p211. 
72 Fischer, C., The German Communists and the Rise a/Nazism (London, 1991). 
73 ibid, pp39,51-2,1l2f,1l8. 
74 Peukert, 'Sozialgeschichte', p35. 
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representing those outside the bourgeois "nation".75 If Fischer wants to draw a 
distinction between the Weimar state and the Gennan nation, or nationalism and 
patriotism, then this should be made clear and the terms defined. 
Fischer's early articles on the "cross-over thesis" sparked off a debate with Dick Geary 
in the pages of the European History Quarterly. Crucially, Geary pointed out that 
Fischer had omitted the factors which distinguished and separated the NSDAP and KPD 
in their social basis and and political policies.76 In Saxony this is of particular relevance 
because the NSDAP developed on the right-wing of the political spectrum and was 
perceived to be a party of the anti-Marxist political right-wing. It was the parties of the 
Saxon Buergertum which collapsed as the NSDAP expanded into a mass party. Chapter 
seven of this case study will examine the effect these factors had in relations between the 
KPD and the Nazis. 
The KPD and the Saxon Political System. 
The KPD's adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology prevented the party from accepting 
its actual location in the working class.?? Ideology, at least in the upper leadership, 
prevented the KPD from prioritising the interests of its actual social constituency among 
a minority of industrial workers and the unemployed. Instead the KPD held to the dogma 
that it represented the true, or "objective", interests of the whole working class, which 
75 Koch-Baumgarten, Einleitung', p19. 
76 Geary, D., 'A Response to Conan Fischer's "Class Enemies or Class Brothers?''', EHQ 15 (4) (1985), 
pp453-64; Fischer, C., 'Class Emenies or Class Brothers? Communist-Nazi Relations in Germany, 1929-
33', EHQ 15 (3) (1985), pp259-79; Id., 'The KPD and Nazism: A Reply to Dick Geary', in EHQ 15 (4) 
(1985), pp465-71. 
77 Weber, H., 'Zur Ideology der KPD in der Weimarer Republik. Neue Literature', in lnternationale 
wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (IWK) 2 (1985), 
pp203-8. 
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was defined to include significant elements within the lower middle classes. Political 
action, however, was to focus on the factory workforce. The KPD held to a political 
interpretation based on a straight socio-political polarisation: the revolutionary working 
class would increasingly come under the leadership of the KPD and the "counter-
revolution" would come under the dominant influence of monopoly capital. The reality of 
socio-political relations during the Weimar Republic was a fragmentation within and 
between social classes. In the mid-1920s the "special interest" parties of the middle 
classes represented the losers in the post 1924 socio-economic settlement.78 Downward 
social mobility did not lead to Communism, as the KPD claimed, but led, especially in 
Saxony, to a deepening "anti-Marxism". Within the manual working classes industrial 
workers were increasingly divided into interest groups reflecting age, skill and industrial 
branch.79 
Despite the KPD's inability to respond to these developments during the Weimar 
Republic, the KPD acted as a form of political barometer indicating the degree of social 
tension. This study will attempt to explain the Saxon KPD's function within the Saxon 
political system by drawing on Neumann's early definition of political parties.80 Neumann 
categorised the parties of the Weimar Republic into three groupings. There were parties 
of liberal "integration", rooted in the 19th century tradition of a loose association of 
notables, with members and supporters only becoming politically engaged during election 
campaigns. The "modem" parties of "integration" (SPD, Catholic Centre, KPD and 
NSDAP), on the other hand, were characterised by their membership'S continual political 
engagement, organisational co-ordination by a party bureaucracy and an involvement in 
78 Jones, German Liberalism. esp. pp476ff. 
79 Zollitsch, W., Arbeiter zwischen Weltwirtschaftkrise und Nationalsozialismus (Goettingen, 1990). 
80 Neumann, S., Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik (4 edn, Stuttgart, 1977), for the KPD, see, pp87ff. 
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all aspects of social and political life. The SPD and the Catholic Centre Party were 
parties of "democratic integration", whose structure and policies were democratic; the 
KPD and NSDAP were parties of "total integration", whose structures and objectives 
were totalitarian. This thesis will conclude with an assessment of why the KPD was able 
to sustain itself as a political force despite its unresponsiveness to developments in its 
socio-political basis. 
1.3 The Documentary Sources. 
The documentation used in this research comprise two main groupings. Firstly, reports 
made by or for the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, and the wider newspaper sources used 
in these reports. Secondly, the former Central Communist Party Archive (SAPMO) in 
Berlin. The most systematic collection of monthly situation reports on political and 
economic developments in Saxony are located in the national (police) archive in Bremen 
(Staatsarchiv Bremen). These documents are also to be found in the Saxony's Central 
Regional Archive in Dresden (Staatshauptarchiv Dresden), but with significant breaks in 
continuity. These reports are a synthesis of material compiled by bureaucrats in the 
Saxon civil service. Often the sources used are refered to directly. These sources 
principally included a wide range of press cuttings, stray communist documents which 
got into police hands, tip-offs from informers of various quality, and compiled statistical 
data. The Main Saxon Regional Archive in Dresden turns up the magnification on local 
developments. Often reports on the administrative districts and smaller towns (Amts und 
Kreishauptmannschaften) not only report on the political and economic situation, but 
also include the original sources used in the report. Similarly documents in the State 
Archive and City Archive (Staats und Stadtarchiv) in Leipzig help focus more clearly on 
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local developments in Saxony. The national archive (Bundesarchiv) in Potsdam also 
contains a number of reports on Saxony. However, there is considerable duplication with 
the Dresden archive. The National Archive in Koblenz contains a random selection of 
KPD documents. Most helpfully there are two extensive files of documentation on the 
KPD's campaigning in Saxony in 1932 which are largely missing from the central party 
archive. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall general access to the KPD's extensive and systematic 
documentary collection presented the researcher with new material on an old topic. 
Hermann Weber's study of the KPD's Stalinisation went unchecked for almost three 
decades not least because Weber had used the widest available documentary basis and 
had an insiders' eye view enabling a work of veritable revelation. The documentation 
does confirm Weber's central contention that between 1924 and 1930 the KPD was 
above all concerned with the internal party power struggle and factional infighting. 
However, the collection of reports of BL Meetings and reports made by the various 
party divisions charged with party work which issued directives to lower party units, and 
these units' responses, have added a new dimension to the study of the KPD. Above all 
these documents have allowed a study of the limits of Stalinisation in imposing the KPD's 
General Line at local level and made possible a separation of type between the party 
leadership and apparatus and ordinary members and lower functionaries. The greatest 
omission in the documentary collection in the party archive is in the regionalleaderships' 
and party divisions' discussions in the early 1930s. The controversial nature of these 
years during the rise of the NSDAP makes this a regrettable absence. However, at the 
very least a wider range of documentation is available which includes reports from the 
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regional party apparatus about the difficulties experienced at local level in pursuing party 
policy. 
The main problem in this research was arriving at an evaluation of such an extensive 
range of, often newly available, material. The methodology used is empirical: focusing 
the material using a series of questions and answering these question by interpretation in 
the light of information gleaned by studying the secondary sources. The accuracy of 
police reports is judged by comparing them to the wider documentation. A particular 
problem of interpretation does, however, effect the KPD's own records. The KPD used a 
tortuous Parteisprache at all levels of party activity: at closed meetings at all levels of 
leadership; in party circulars; in the press and in party propaganda; and in reports on 
developments inside the party and in political campaigning. The principal criticism of C. 
Fischer's study of the KPD and its relationship with the Nazis and German nationalism 
has been that the KPD's own documentation should not be treated at face value. This is 
not least because words were re-defined in the light of specific Marxist-Leninist 
philosophical concepts (ie the party ideology). German national interest was therefore 
redefined in communist terms: the KPD's leading political role in Germany was taken as 
the basis for a claim to represent the "objective" interests of all working people. 
Wickham's review of Fischer's work pointed out that there was no reason to believe that 
the KPD's own reports should read as a rational account of social and political 
developments. In this respect Wickham writes that: "By 1930 Bolshevisation had 
instrumentalised communist political language, so KPD propaganda served an often 
changing party "line". 81 However, the KPD's internal party records remain a valid and 
rich sources of documentary evidence. Instructions from the ZK and the BLs can be 
81 Wickham, 1., Review: German Communists and the Rise o/the Nazis, by Conan Fischer', in IRSH, 37 
(1992-3), pp414-16. 
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followed into the lower party organisations and the responses from mid and lower 
functionaries traced back up the communist hierarchy. While it is correct that the upper 
party leadership "analysed" the political situation through ideological lenses, the wider 
range of documents often illustrates how party policy failed to motivate the membership 
or to interest the politically active public. A comparison of different sources of internal 
party documentation also enables the researcher to take account of who wrote them , 
what their position in the party was and how the political situation was interpreted by the 
state authorities and the press. It seems unavoidable that a study of the KPD will involve 
a question of interpretation. However, this study of the Saxon KPD sets out to evaluate 
the KPD's documentation on the scales of probability. 
1.4 Thesis Structure. 
The structure of this thesis follows the main documentary basis for the years 1924-33, 
identifying the most important developments in the Saxon KPD. The thesis divides into 
four sections and seven chapters. The main sections on the Saxon KPD reflect the three 
changes in the party's political policy in these years. This chapter has detailed the aims of 
the research project itself by placing this study in the context of existing literature on the 
KPD and identifying the areas of contribution. Chapter two then places the Saxon KPD 
in the social, economic and political context of Saxony. The second section, chapter 
three, deals with the period 1924-25 in which the KPD was dominated by the fonner 
Left Opposition, which rejected the Comintern's united front policy (1921-23). The 
chapter asks whether it was possible to uproot right-wing communism from its Saxon 
strongholds after the so-called "Failed October" of 1923. It also contributes to the wider 
history of the KPD by assessing whether it was possible to pursue a policy independent 
of the Comintern's General Line. Section three evaluates the KPD's return to the united 
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front policy between 1925 and 1928. Chapter four assesses the limitations restricting the 
KPD's Stalinisation in determining the political behaviour of local Communists. Chapter 
five then looks at the ability of the KPD, using the united front tactic, to influence the 
Saxon political system in these years. The fourth, and final, section charts the roots and 
reception of the policy of treating the SPD as a "social fascist" party and its implication 
during the rise of the NSDAP. It will be argued that, in contrast to other studies of this 
period, the Saxon KPD did not "welcome" this tactical approach. Chapter seven then 
deals with the Saxon KPD's response to the rise of the NSDAP between 1930 and 1933. 
It will question whether the KPD on the streets of Saxony was able to maintain a General 
Line which interpreted the SPD as communism's "main enemy" in the face of Nazi 
violence. The change in emphasis from internal party events between 1924-29 to local 
political policy between 1929 and 1933 reflects a change in the documentation. The 
reasons for the absence of an evaluation of the KPD's relations with the NSDAP before 
1930 are twofold. Firstly, it was a minor consideration in these years, on the fringes of 
the internal party debate. Secondly, it is a subject, at Reich level at least, treated in 
specific studies; it would have over-extended this study of the Saxon KPD. 
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2. The Saxon Setting 
2.1 Introduction 
After a long history as a state and an economic region stretching back into the middle 
ages, the modern boundaries of the Saxon state were set at the Congress of Vienna in 
1815.1 Significant territorial losses to the north and west between Erfurt and Eichsfeld 
were the consequence of supporting Napoleon and his continental system, which had 
protected the Saxon textile industry from British competition.2 Throughout the 19th 
century Saxony's economic development brought her into increasingly close political 
association with the Prussian-led grouping of German states. Saxony joined the Customs 
Union in 1834, the North German League in 1866 and finally the Kaiserreich in 1871. 
Saxony covered only three per cent of the surface area of the newly founded German 
nation with eight per cent of the total population. By 1933 the Saxon population had 
reached 5.2 million inhabitants.3 
2.2 The Saxon Economy 
Early Industrialisation 
In economic terms, Saxony's role as the "pioneer land" (Zwahr) of the first phase of the 
German industrial revolution was increasingly surpassed by the heavy industrial centres in 
1 Bramke, W. (verantwortlicher Autor), Hess, D., Dittrich, G., and Rheinholdt, J., unter Mitarbeit von 
Kretschmer, K., Roth, H., and Rudloff, M., Sachsens Wirtschaft im Wechsel politischer Systeme im 20. 
lahrhundert. Strukturelle Entwicklung und soziale Problemfelder vom Ausgang der ersten Weltkrieges 
bis in diefruehen '60er lahren (Leipzig, 1992), p3 (henceforth: Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen) 
2 Gerlach, S., 'Einleitung', in Id.(ed) Sachsen. Eine politische Landeskunde (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, 
1993), p50. 
3 Statistics in Hcyse, W., Das Problem dcr Arbeitslosigkeit in Sachsen, Dissertation (Dresden, 1938), p5. 
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western Germany.4 Resistance to change, the consequence of a lack of raw materials, was 
shown in the 19th century and early 20th century by what Gerlach called Saxony's "very 
constant economic geography. ,,5 Above all this applied to the textile industry. Bramke 
observed that, although the Saxon economy in general was dominated by the textile 
industry, its early dependence on water power located the industry primarily in the 
Erzgebirge and Zittaugebirge.6 The lack of raw materials in Saxony created an early 
dependence on producing finished goods for the export market. In the 19th century 
Saxony's geographic location, at the cross-roads of eastern and western trade, helped 
Saxony infiltrate the world market.7 Equally, joining the Customs Union in 1834 provided 
Saxon industry with access to a larger German market without the restrictions of customs 
barriers.s 
Of crucial importance ill the social and economic development of Saxony was that 
villages were affected as much as cities by industrialisation.9 The development of a close 
association between industrial and agricultural life was most pronounced in the textile 
region which included and surrounded the city of Chemnitz. To a greater extent that any 
4 Zwahr, H., 'Sachsen im Uebergang zum Kapitalismus und im Revolutionsjahr 1830', in Saechsische 
Heimatsblaetter 30 (3) (1984), pl04; Bramke, W., 'Die Industrieregion Sachsens. Ihre Herausbildung und 
Entwichlung bis zum Ende des zweiten Weltkreiges', in Schulze, R. (ed) Industrie im Umbruch. 
Voraussetzung und Verlaufsmunster des regionalen Strukturwandels in europaeischen Vergleich (Essen, 
1993), p299. 
5 Gerlach, 'Einleitung', p49. 
6 Bramke, Industrieregion Sachsen, p294. 
7 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p3. 
8 Zeise, R., 'Die buergerliche Umwaelzung. Zentrum derproletarischen Parteibildung (1830-1871) 
(pp332-80)', in Czock, K. (ed), Geschichte Sachsens (Weimar, 1989), p341; Statistics in Boelcke, W. A., 
'Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte Sachsens', in Gerlach, Landeskunde, p140. In 1847 Saxony housed 
two-thirds of all spindles and looms within the Customs Union 
9 Schlesinger, W., 'Einleitung', in Id. (ed), Sachsen (Stuttgart, 1965), pLVIII; Roellig, G., 
Wirtschaftsgeographie Sachsens (Leipzig, 1928), pp60-62. 
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other Saxon city, Chemnitz's development was interwoven with the surrounding rural 
areas. This was even more acute in the industrial villages of the Erzgebirge.10 The 
ultimate expression of this economic structure was the persistence of cottage industry, 
which was widespread within the textile industry and the manufacture of finished 
products, such as musical instruments and toYS.ll This qualifies the nature of the rapid 
population growth which was generated by the rise of the textile industry: the huge 
average population density was part of a widely dispersed economic structure.12 The 
strong connection between industry and agriculture allowed wages to be held low and this 
in tum inhibited the concentration of industry in large mechanised factories. 13 
Saxony's second most strongly represented economic sector, machine building, was 
originally an adjunct of the textile industry and centred on Chemnitz.14 The impetus from 
the demand for locomotives, which spread the industrial revolution throughout Saxony, 
saw Chemnitz become the second largest centre of the machine building industry by 1871, 
outdone only by Berlin.1S Immediately following the middle of the 19th century, the 
availability of a large workforce and cheap ground rent further extended the machine 
building industry to the flat -land surrounding Leipzig, the area around Dresden, and the 
suburbs of the cities themselves. 16 Leipzig began to produce machines for the printing 
industry and later for the rural economy, while Dresden initially produced sewing 
10 Roellig, Wirtscha!tsgeography, p52. 
11 Gerlach, 'Einleitung', p5I; Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p372. 
12 On the development of the textile cities of Chemnitz, Plauen and Zwickau see Strauss, S., Die Lage und 
die Bewegung der Chemnitzer Arbeiter in der ersten Haelfte der 19. lahrhundert (Berlin, 1960), pilf. 
13 Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p372. 
14 Bramke, 'Industrieregion Sachsens', p302. 
15 ibid, p303; Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p345. 
16 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', pI45. 
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machines and later specialised machines for the tobacco industry.17 Crucially, these 
developments left the industrial structure decentralised in a diversity of specialised 
industries. In Leipzig by 1863 machines were being produced for the printing industry, 
wood-cutting machines, machines for the tobacco industry, the manufacture of industrial 
tools and lathes.18 The division of Saxony into the economic sub-regions of the 20th 
century was becoming apparent by the 1860s: northwestern Saxony was established as a 
leading German machine building region, in contrast to the southwest, where textiles were 
dominant. 
The Saxon Economy in the Kaiserreich 
As a result of political pressure and economic necessity Saxony joined the North German 
League at its foundation in 1871. However, Bramke has called Saxony's subsequent 
economic development a process of "continuity within change".19 While the rapid rise of 
the Ruhr, from a rural region in the middle of the 19th century to one of Europe's largest 
heavy industrial regions by 1914, was conditioned by the close proximity of raw 
materials,20 Saxony's near absence of raw materials almost completely prevented her 
participation in the heavy-industrial revolution.21 This was the key factor tying Saxony's 
industrialisation to the economic structures of the earlier 19th century. The economic 
17 Gerlach, 'Einleitung', p5I. 
18 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', pI47-8; Bramke, Industrieregion Sachsens', p304. 
19 Bramke, op.cit., p305. 
20 Tampke, J., The Ruhr and Revolution. The Revolutionary Movement in the Rheinish-Westphalian 
Region, 1912-1919 (London, 1979), p3. 
21 For details of coal mining in Saxony and its place in the regions industrial development sec, Ruediger, 
B., 'Der Freistaat Sachsen in der Weimarer Republik', in Saeschische fleimatsblaetter 30 (3) (1984) 
(pp138-55), p14lf. 
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consequence was a further proliferation and diversification of existing finished goods 
industries.22 Saxony remained the centre of the German textile industry, employing 30 per 
cent of all Saxon employees in 1882.23 
The machine building industry also increased its share of economic activity and continued 
to diversify production into a range of often highly specialised products. These products 
included cameras and projectors, optical and medical equipment, engineering equipment, 
hygiene and cosmetics articles, machines for the confectionery industry, celluloids and 
silks and, after the tum of the century, electrical motors.24 Although the Saxon machine 
building industry was disproportionately strongly represented in the German economy, 
accounting for 12 per cent of all factories from a population of 8 per cent of the German 
total, the strong interconnection with the textile industry underlines the importance of 
textiles to the Saxon economy: almost 50 per cent of machine production in 1907 was for 
the textile industry.25 This combination of factors which dominated the Saxon economy 
produced certain fundamental characteristics of the region's industrial structure. Saxony 
was dominated by the labour-intensive finishing industries in small and medium-sized 
factories, which had a strong dependence on export markets.26 Economic stability was, 
consequently, tied to the availability of world markets and a supply of cheap labour to 
ensure these products could compete successfully. Despite pronounced sub-regional 
variations, the figures for factory size are revealing. In 1907 the number of workers 
22 Kretzschmar, H., Saechsische Geschichte. Geschichte der Neuzeit seit der Mitte des 16. lahrhunderts 
(vo1.2; Dresden, 1935), p210; Gerlach 'Einleitung', p52. 
23 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', p146; Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon 
Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-1930', Ph.D. thesis (University of California, 1991), pl1. 
24 Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p384; Gerlach, 'Einleitung', p52. Small electric motors actually helped sustain 
cottage industry where one worker could "mass produce" goods. 
25 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', P 147. 
26 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p5. 
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employed in small factories (between one and five employees) was 91.2 per cent of the 
total workforce; 7.6 per cent of the workforce was employed in medium-sized factories 
(employing between five and fifty workers).27 In 1933 small factories continued to make 
up 35.9 per cent of Saxon industry: two-thirds of these were run by a single worker.28 
Saxony was also resistant to the "new" industries of the "technological" phase of the 
industrial revolution which took off in Germany around the turn of the century. It was not 
that the chemical, electro-technical and vehicle production industries failed to enter the 
Saxon economy. They were, however, strongly under-represented in Saxony's industrial 
profile.29 The Saxon economy thus retained its characteristic structure until the Second 
World War, despite the crashing waves of war, inflation, world depression and the Nazi 
economic system.30 Saxony was, therefore, a Mittelstand economy with a more dispersed 
industrial structure than the centres of heavy industry, such as the Ruhr and Central 
Germany. 
Below the regional averages, however, Saxony had pronounced sub-regional 
peculiarities. Roellig's study was the first to identify the existence of the sub-regional 
economic structures in Saxony.31 The first of these subregions was in northwestern Saxon 
stretching between Leipzig and Borna. From the 1870s this area had seen the rise to 
prominence of the metal and machine building industries, the paper industry which 
supplied Leipzig (the centre of the German publishing industry) and coal mining in the 
27 Statistics in Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p403. 
28 Heyse, 'Arbeitslosigkeit', p7. 
29 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', pI59-60; Zeise, R., and Ruediger, B., 'Bundesstaat im Deutschen Reich 
(1871-1917/8)' (pp381-428), in Czock (ed), Geschichte Sachsens, p406.For details of the production of 
vehicles in Leipzig, Dresden and the Chenmitz-Zwickau area, especially Werdau, see Gerlach, 
'Einleitung', p52. 
30 Bramke, 'Industrieregion Sachsens', p305. 
31 Roellig, 'Wirtschaftsgeography', p49ff. 
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Borna area: the result was a more concentrated economic structure. The econonnc 
structure conditioned the industrial structure with large and medium-scale factories 
concentrated in Leipzig, Oschatz, Grimma, Doebeln and Wuerzen.32 These factors made 
northwestern Saxony the most self-enclosed industrial area of the province, with the least 
degree of interconnection with the rural economy.33 
The second of the sub-regions identified by Roellig was the Dresden-Elbe valley area, 
which included the industrial region between Pima and Meissen.34 With little primary 
industry, the Dresden area depended largely on producing finished goods in the textile and 
machine building industries.35 Although Dresden-Bautzen was the ninth most densely 
populated region in Germany, with 346.3 residents per square kilometre compared to the 
Reich average of 140.3, there was a greater interconnection with the surrounding 
countryside than in northwestern Saxony.36 The high average population density masks 
the proliferation of small towns and industrial villages. In 1925 the bulk of the population 
was housed in nine small cities of between 10-20,000 residents and 17 communities of 
between 5-10,000 residents and a dispersion of industrial villages. 37 The economic 
structure conditioned an industrial structure encompassing a proliferation of small 
32 Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p141; Stuade, F., 'Sachsen im Preussisch-deutschen Reich', in 
Saechsische Heimatsblaetter 30 (3) (1984), p170; Zwahr, H., Zur Konstituierung der Proletariats als 
Klasse. Strukturuntersuchung ueber das Leipziger Proletariat waehrend der industriellen Revolution 
(Berlin (East), 1978), p198f. 
33 Roellig, 'Wirtschaftsgeographie', p54. 
34 Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p141. 
35 Schwarzenbach, H., 'Ueber den Kampf der KPD gegen die Gefahr des Fascismuns und fuer die 
Verteidigung der Lebensrechte des deutschen Volkes in Ostsachsen in der Zeit von 1929-1933', 
Dissertation (Berlin (East), 1969), p28. 
36 Statistics in Heyse, 'Arbeitslosigkeit', pp4-5. 
37 Statistics in Schwarzenbach, 'Ostsachsen', p27. 
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factories, especially in the textile industries, and more medium sized factories ill the 
machine building sector.38 
The third area was southwestern Saxony, centring on the city of Chemnitz. This region 
was strongly dependent on the textile industry which in tum conditioned the area's 
industrial geography. Although Chemnitz and Plauen were significant industrial cities, the 
textile industry was widely dispersed throughout the sub-region, most particularly in the 
Zwickau area.39 The census statistics show the Chemnitz-Zwickau area to be the most 
densely populated locality within Saxony, with 499 residents per square kilometre; 78 per 
cent of these residents were employed in the census category "industry and handicrafts" .40 
However, what lay behind the statistical facade is crucial. There was a proliferation of 
industrial villages where even communities of less than 1,000 were involved, at least in 
seasonal or part-time work, in the cottage industries which covered the landscape.41 With 
75 per cent of Saxony's textile industry in this economic area the figures for population 
distribution are revealing: 38 per cent of textile workers lived in communities of less than 
5,000, 20.4 per cent lived in small towns of less than 10,000 and only 17.4 per cent of 
textile workers lived in the two major cities (Plauen and Chemnitz) with a population 
exceeding 100,000.42 The "dwarf' structure of the rural economy in southwestern Saxony 
created a dependence within the farming and peasant communities on supplementing their 
38 Roellig, Wirtschaftsgeography, p50. 
39 ibid, p53. 
40 Statistics in Uhlmann, G., 'Der Kampf der Chemnitzer Werktaetigen unter Fuehrung der KPD gegen 
die Errichtung der faschistischen Diktatur (August 1932 bis Januar 1933)" Dissertation (Karl Marx 
University, Leipzig, 1966), p18. 
41 'b'd 1 1 . 
42 Zahn, A., 'Die berufliche und soziale Gleiderung der saechsischen Bewolkerung in saemtlichen 
Gemeinden mit ueber 5,000 Einwohnem', in Zeitschrift des Saechsischen Statistischen Landesamt (ZSSL) 
76 (1930), pp61-78. 
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income by work in the cottage industries of the textile industry and other home work 
occupations such as the manufacture of toys (from wood).43 This created not only a 
strong socio-economic bond between industrial and agricultural life but placed the 
industrial village in an environment influenced by both rural and industrial determinants. 
H. Fenske goes as far as to state that this led to a dissolution of the boundaries between 
city and countryside.44 The industrial village structure in the textile dominated southwest 
of Saxony is the crucial determinant in the sub-regional pattern of industrialisation, not the 
statistical averages which present a misleading picture of socio-economic relations. 
The Saxon Economy during the Weimar Republic and the Rise of Social Insecurity 
The predominance of the textile industry in Saxony made the regional economy largely 
unable to adapt to the demands of the war economy (1914-18); this was reinforced by a 
lack of raw materials and primary industry. Furthermore the disruption to trade caused 
widespread and significant damage to the Saxon economy. Only the metal industry 
received economic impetus from the demands imposed by the war with the machine 
building industry finally displacing the clothing industry as the second most significant 
sphere of production by the early 1930s.45 This had the result that during the Weimar 
43 In 1907 the Saxon rural economy comprised: 56.4 per cent of rural enterprises were run by a sole 
worker; 30.2 per cent with between two and five workers; and 4.9 per cent with between 6 and 10 
workers; 5 per cent with between 11 and 50 workers; and 2.3 per cent with over 50 workers. For reasons 
unstated these figure add up to only 98.5 per cent. See Roellig, Wirtscha/tsgeographie, p5I. Further, 
Roth, I., Die WirtschaJtsstruktur des erzgebirgischen DorJes (Greifwald, 1938), p138; Heinicke, H., 
Bauerliche Betriebsverhaltnisse in den erzgebirgischen KreishauptmannschaJt Sacwarzenberg, Annaberg 
and Stollberg (Leipzig, 1937), p18; Lobmeier, K., 'Die sozialoekonomische Lage und das Verhalten der 
"alten" Mittelschichten in der Kreishauptmannschaft Chemnitz', Dissertation (Leipzig, 1989), p69. 
44 Fenske, H., Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Parteiengeschichte 
(Frankfurt/M, 1972), p287. 
45 Zeise and Ruediger, 'Bundesstaat', p425. 
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Republic Saxony remained an "old" industrial region dominated by the textile and related 
clothing industries, followed by the metal and machine building industries, and then a 
diversity of local production such as musical instruments and toys in Erzgebirge and 
Lausitz.46 The new, more dynamic, chemical, optical, electro-technical and vehicle 
industries, which weathered the post-war economic storms more successfully, continued 
to be strongly under-represented in the Saxon economy. Consequently, the industrial 
structure continued to be most dispersed and small-scale in the southwest and more 
concentrated in the northwest. 
Despite the relatively slight impact of the First World War on the occupational and social 
structure of Saxony, the gradual process of industrialisation had created shifts in the 
representation of social groups. Between 1907 and 1925 the workforce had increased 
numerically by 33 per cent, reaching 57 per cent of the adult population. The proportion 
of white collar workers, the "new" middle class (Angestellte), rose by 200 per cent, even 
more strongly than the German average, reaching 18.8 per cent of all those in 
employment. Industrialisation had the opposite impact on the "old" independent middle 
classes in small scale-production and distribution, which fell to 13.2 per cent of the 
working population in 1925.47 Although the rural economy had shrunk to only 9.1 per 
cent of the workforce in 1925, it did remain significant, not least because of its strong 
connection with industrial employment in the southwest of Saxony. When the agricultural 
depression hit Germany in the mid 1920s and industrial employment contracted, a double 
blow was given to employment prospects in the southwest of Saxony, creating early and 
widespread political protest. 
46 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', ppll-12. 
47 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p6. 
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Demographic developments in Saxony were also related to the process of 
industrialisation. As the economy expanded between 1843 and 1871 the population rose 
from one to 2.5 million; this was followed by the most rapid phase of industrialisation and 
population growth between 1871 and 1900, when the population reached 4.8 million. 
Thereafter the population curve in Saxony reached a plateau, rising by only 0.4 million 
between 1910 and 1925. The population grew as a proportion of the Reich total until 
1900, then between 1900 and 1933 grew more slowly than the national average. If the 
Reich average is represented by 100 then the Saxon population growth represented in 
1824: 186; 1871: 221; 1900: 260; 1910: 258; 1925: 248.48 However, the wide dispersion 
of Saxon industry conditioned the pattern of residency: the large cities (over 100,000) 
were centres of production but housed only 32.2 per cent of Saxon industry with a total of 
34.9 per cent of the population; for the mid-sized cities (10-100,000) the figures are 20 
per cent to 18 per cent respectively; and for communities of less than 10,000 the 
proportion is 47.6 per cent to 46.3 per cent.49 Behind the high average figure for 
population density and industrial structure lay a pattern of socio-industrial relations 
stamped by the "old" (19th century) mould. 
The process of long-term growth meant that Saxony had a strong degree of homogeneity 
in its social composition. Even in the early period of rapid population expansion from 
1843-1871, 80 per cent was the product of a surplus of births, the remainder coming from 
immigration from the neighbouring rural parts of Prussia, Bohemia and the small 
Thuringian states.50 While the heavy industrial centres of the Ruhr and Central Gennany 
experienced often massive population growth when demand produced by the war 
48 Statistics in Heyse, Arbeitslosigkeit, pp5-6; Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p373. 
49 Roellig, Wirtschajtsgeographie, pp52-3. 
50 Forbcrger, R., Die lndustriellen Revolution in Sachsen 1800-1861 (vol. I ; Berlin (East), 1982), p351. 
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economy drew in a workforce from a wide range of social origins, Saxony by 1916 had 
become a net exporter of labour. These factors kept the population overwhelmingly 
"indigenous" Saxon.51 Saxony remained a predominantly Lutheran state (87 per cent) with 
a Catholic community of some 3.8 per cent, largely living in the Bautzen area. The 
remaining 10 per cent was accounted for by a tiny Jewish population, centred on Leipzig, 
and a strong representation of the militant atheist movement of Free Thinkers who had 
officially left the church. 52 The percentage of the population in employment also rose from 
44.1 per cent in 1907 to 53.9 per cent in 1925. This was largely the result of an increase in 
the longevity of workers and, largely in the textile industry, an increase in the number of 
women in employment.53 Saxony as a region with a high degree of ethnic and religious 
homogeneity did not, however, experience harmonious relations between social classes. 
Instead research by B. Lapp confirms a picture of political polarisation which became 
acute during the economic instability which characterised life under the Weimar 
Republic.54 
Until the First World War Saxon industry had responded moderately to cyclical economic 
fluctuations exhibiting what Bramstedt called a "resistance to crisis". Bramstedt identified 
the reasons for this in the predominance of the export based consumer industries which 
insulated the Saxon economy from fluctuations in the German economy. 55 However, the 
post -war period was characterised by changes in the structure of world demand, 
51 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p6. 
52 ibid, p5. 
53 In 1925 26.5 per cent of the Saxon workforce were employed in the textile industry, of these employess 
47.5 per cent were women see, ZSSL 72/3 (1926{7), p248. 
54 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', pI. 
55 Bramstedt, P., 'Die Krise der saechsischen Industriewirtschaft', in Veroeffentlichung des Verbandes 
Saechsischer Industrieller 67 (Berlin, 1932), pp3-4,8,4lf. 
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production and labour markets, which transfonned the earlier advantages into 
disadvantages. During the Weimar Republic the Saxon economy responded intensely and 
rapidly to changes in demand. This translated into widespread social insecurity for the 
working population who lost their job security, saw living standards eroded, particularly 
after 1929, and were exposed to the ever present threat of unemployment. Economic 
turbulence also adversely effected the Mittelstand economy, particularly after the currency 
stabilisation of the mid 1920s, when a disproportionately high number of firms went into 
liquidation. 56 
One of the results of the First World War was to split up the economic region uniting 
southern Saxony and Bohemia. This put Saxony in competition with a rival producing the 
same goods with currency and wage rate advantages and customs barriers to help 
increase exports and reduce imports. Geographically this also reinforced Saxony's position 
on the periphery of the German economy. 57 More significantly, this pattern was 
generalised on a global scale as the fonner agrarian nations had further developed their 
economies while the war had ruptured the trade of the belligerent nations. Latin America, 
North America, Canada, Japan and China featured among these "newly" industrialised 
textile manufacturing competitor countries. 58 These nations' close relationship with the 
rural economy kept wages low while Saxony, a region whose economic evolution had 
permitted this before 1918, lost its wage advantage as a result of labour legislation during 
the Weimar Republic.59 While Saxony retained outdated work methods and technology 
56 Adler, H., 'Die Wirtschaftskrise im spiegel der saechsischen Konkurstatistik', in ZSSL 78/79 (1932/33), 
pp305-10. 
57 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p7; Heyse, 'Arbeitslosigkeit', p12. 
58 Kabermann, H., 'Die Exportquote der Saechsischen Industrie', Dissertation (Dresden, 1929), p20. 
59 Bramstedt, 'Industriewirtschaft', p30f. For details of local differences see, Gerlach, 'Einleitung', p55; 
Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', p155. 
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the "newly" industrialised countries employed modern methods and machinery.60 
Furthermore, customs barriers were erected internationally and the principle of autarky 
was applied more widely by the many Eastern and Central European states which were 
given national self-determination after the war.61 
While the trend in the "old" industrialised nations was to develop the production of 
capital goods and supply the demand created for machinery in the "newly" industrialised 
nations, Saxony's [mancial weakness prevented a significant degree of structural economic 
adaptation. After Germany's period of inflation (1914-23) banking had been further 
centralised and concentrated. This ended investment by local banks in the local economy 
and was replaced by a credit system based on real value to ensure the return of loans from 
centralised banks. The small and medium scale of Saxon industry meant that it lost out in 
a period of credit shortage to more profitable large-scale industry which also absorbed the 
largest share of foreign loans in the years following the currency stabilisation.62 
Consequently, Saxon industry could not afford to pay for the costly rationalisation of 
production which was the only legal way during the Weimar Republic of reducing labour 
costS.63 Production costs were also increased because of the need to import raw materials 
from both within Germany and abroad and then to pay freight costs again to transport 
finished goods to harbours in northwestern Germany, a factor aggravated by the increased 
dependence on foreign trade.64 These factors produced constant complaints from the VSI 
60 Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p141. 
61 Kabermann, 'Exportquote', p24. 
62 Bramstedt, 'Industriewirtschaft', piS. 
63 ibid, p40. 
64 ibid, P 28f; Heyse, 'Arbeitslosigkeit', pp18-22,25. 
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(Verband Saechsischer Industriellen) about the cost of wages and social benefits, a stance 
which intensified labour-capital conflicts.65 
Certain structural factors served to reinforce the problems of Saxony's export 
dependence. The rise in the machine building industry to second place in Saxony's 
economic activity only further increased dependence on newly industrialised countries 
overseas.
66 Furthermore, the Saxon machine building industry was strongly inter-linked 
with the agrarian economy, which went into crisis in the mid 1920s, and the textile 
industry, which began to stockpile goods by 1928: as the world demand for textiles fell 
and agricultural concerns went into debt, orders for the machine building industry 
declined.67 Changes in the structure of exports also made a marked impact: between 1913 
and 1929 consumer goods had fallen from 54 per cent of all German exports to 44 per 
cent, while production goods had risen from 46 per cent to 56 per cent of all exports.68 
Kabermann estimated that in the same period (1913-1925) Saxony's share of textile 
exports doubled, reaching 60 per cent of the total. 69 
Structural economic problems produced chronic social insecurity and an ever present fear 
of downward social mobility. Even during the era of "relative stabilisation" during the mid 
1920s, unemployment in Saxony peaked above the German average in the down-tum of 
1925/6. The residual benefits of Saxony's industrial structure were felt in an export led 
65 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p16; Adolf, J., 'Dissertationsproject zum Verband Saechsischer 
Industrieller (VSI)" in Bramke, W. (Verantwortlicher Autor), Projekt Sachsen im 20. lahrhundert. 
Politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Wandlung in einer alten Industrieregion. lahresbericht September 
1993 bis August 1994, pp28-41; Social costs per head of population were consistently above the German 
average, see Boelke, Wirtschafts und Sozialegeschichte Sachsens, pp53. 
66 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p9; Kabermann, 'Exportquote', pp53ff. 
67 Kabermann, op.cit., pp53-7; Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p152. 
68 Bramstedt, 'Industriewirtschaft', p16. 
69 Kabermann, 'Exportquote', p36. 
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recovery in 1927, reducing unemployment to the lowest figure in Germany's industrial 
. 70 . 
regIons. However, the Great DepressIOn brought the final blow. The wide range of 
products in the finished goods sector for the export market, almost 30 per cent of which 
entered the North American market in the second half of the 1920s, meant that Saxony 
was hit harder than any other German region as demand fell over the precipice built high 
on the over-production of the post-war years.71 As world demand plummeted, Saxon 
unemployment rocketed: in May 1932 of a workforce of 2.1 million (excluding civil 
servants) only 1.4 million remained in employment; in the consumer industry only 36.5 per 
cent of productive capacity was in use.72 Although Saxony was characterised by a 
relatively high level of unemployment in the second half of the 1920s, its causes were 
different from those that operated in the wider German context. In Germany structural 
unemployment was the result of a wave of industrial rationalisation following the currency 
stabilisation. The creation of stable financial relations placed wage costs back firmly at the 
centre of the profitability question. However, unlike in the late Kaiserreich, markets were 
contracting and the German economy began to stagnate. Equally significant was the 
widening parameters of those at risk from unemployment. In the late Imperial period 
unemployment had mainly affected the young, the old and the unskilled; now skilled 
workers were threatened and their pay rates put under pressure. Furthermore, the "new" 
middle class of white collar workers in the administration of industry was effected by 
70 Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen, p9; Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p142. 
71 Kretzschmar, Saechsische Geschichte, p209; Kabermann, 'Exportquote', p97. Between 1913-28 
German exports fell from 22 per cent of GDP to 16 per cent. This was a consequence of Germany's 
reduced share of world trade which fell from 13.2 per cent to 9.1 per cent in the same period, see Petzina, 
D., 'The Causes and Extent of Unemployment in the Weimar Republic', in Stachura, P. D. (ed.), 
Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany (London, 1986), p40. 
72 Boelke, 'Sozialgeschichte', P 156. 
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unemployment for the first time.73 In Saxony it was other structural economic changes 
which brought about mass unemployment. The aftermath of the war acted as a structural 
axis on which a stable economy was rotated around almost 180 degrees: changed patterns 
of domestic and international supply and demand, "new" competitor nations producing 
with cost advantages, state protection and new technology and a financial weakness 
preventing the monetary means of industrial restructuring, combined to made Saxony's 
export dependence become a handicap to achieving stable socio-economic relations.74 
The Mittelstand was also threatened by the prospect of downward social mobility. The 
inflation robbed the Rentier middle class of their savings thereby destroying their 
prosperity and security. The fact that tax returns per head of population showed a rise in 
income in Saxony, largely on the basis of industrial earnings, only served to accentuate the 
Mittelstand's fear of being subsumed into the proletariat.75 In general the "distribution of 
income in German society (during "relative stabilisation") shifted in favour of those who 
derived their income from wealth or property. ,,76 However, these financial benefits also 
divided the interests of those within the working classes and the lower/middle classes. For 
employed workers living standards rose at the expense of a structurally unemployed 
underclass; among the lower/middle classes unemployment threatened the white collar 
workforce for the first time while their general overall financial gain was in contrast to the 
73 Stachura, P. D., 'The Development of Unemployment in Modern Germany', in Id. (ed.), Unemployment 
and the Great Depression, p7. 
74 Bramstedt, 'Industriewirtschaft', p4lf; Heyse, 'Industriewirtschaft', p27f; Kabermann, 'Exportquote', 
p95f. 
75 Bramstedt, op.cit., p15. Annaul tax returns per head of population in 1925 were 76.1 marks in Saxony; 
the German average was 55.5 marks. In the period 1924-30 the average hourly wage rose from 47pf to 
78pf. 
76 Petzina, D., 'Problems in the Social and Economic Development of Weimar Germany' (pp37-57), p52, 
in Dobkowski and Wallimann (eds.),Towards the Holocaust. 
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structural decline of the "old" middle classes of independent retailers and producers. The 
subsequent currency stabilisation did few favours for many small businesses in Saxony's 
Mittelstand economy: between 1926 and 1933 a disproportionately high figure of 13 per 
cent of all bankruptcies were in Saxony.77 Equally, as spending collapsed during the Great 
Depression, so too did the economic basis of the Saxon artisans and shopkeepers.78 For 
the Mittelstand the economic insecurity of the Weimar Republic could hardly have 
contrasted more with the stability during the Kaiserreich. Geiger's observation that the 
perceived threat to these social groups from" above and below" affected 50 per cent of the 
German population in 1925 holds even more true in Saxony.79 The seeming chaos of the 
Weimar period, hardly surprisingly, intensified a search for particular interest 
representation before consolidating a mass social basis for the political extremes in the 
form of the NSDAP and the KPD. It was this economic instability and social insecurity 
that underlay the political system during the Weimar Republic. 
2.3 The Saxon Political System 
The Imperial Legacy 
From the time of the European revolutions of 1848/9 onwards the vexed question of 
electoral reform was never far from the political centre stage. The entrenched interests of 
the Saxon political elite prevented a smooth process of widening the parameters of the 
political nation. It was this obstacle that the early liberal reformers and then the social 
77 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p18. 
78 'b'd 1 1 . 
79 Geiger, T., 'Panik im Mittelstand', Die Arbeit 7 (1930), pp637-654. 
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democratic movement found blocking their efforts to introduce popular sovereignty. 80 
Saxony's early industrialisation, and the large proportion of working people in the 
population, made the region what Lipinski called the "cradle and classic territory" of the 
social democratic movement.81 This was expressed in political organisation and electoral 
success. Saxony was an organisational centre of the early workers' movement: during the 
1860s prominent Saxon activists, such as Bebel and Liebknecht, were active in founding 
the SDAP, the SPD's forerunner, at Eisenach in 1869; almost one-quarter of the delegates 
at that congress had received their mandate from Saxony. Within Saxony the workers' 
movement focused on Leipzig, the industrial area around Glauchau, Meerane and 
Zwickau and Dresden and its environs. Chemnitz joined these pioneers of social 
democracy in the mid 1870s when the SPD was founded at the Gotha Congress, thereby 
ending the first split in the workers' movement.82 The importance of Saxony to the early 
workers' movement is underscored by the fact that in 1867, four of the SDAP's seven 
Reichstag deputies were elected in Saxony; the party's central organ, Vorwaerts, was 
founded in Leipzig in 1876; during Bismarck's Anti-socialist Laws (1878-1890) of 647 
banned socialist organisations in Germany 156 were in Saxony; and membership of the 
SPD, the trade unions and the associated Vereine was above the German average.
83 
By the mid 1870s the SPD received its highest electoral support in the textile dominated 
areas of Zwickau-Glauchau, Chemnitz and Stollberg and the lowest vote in Eastern 
Saxony. However, by the end of the century Saxony, with the exception of purely rural 
80 Schlesinger, Sachsen, pLXf; Zeise, 'Umwaeltzung', p360; Gross, R., Die politische Geschichte 
Sachsens, in Gerlach, Sachsen. Eine politische Landeskunde, plIO-II. 
81 Lipinski, R., Der Kampf urn die politische Macht in Sachsen (Leipzig, 1926), p5; Gross, op.cit., pll4. 
82 Lipinski, op.cit. 
83 Kretzschmar, Saechsische Geschichte, p208; Schlesinger, Sachsen, pLXV. 
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areas, had turned red en masse.84 The electoral rise of the SPD was so strong that only the 
property and taxation qualifications limiting the franchise for the Landtag excluded the 
SPD from governmental authority. By the end of the 1860s the SPD had entered 
municipal parliaments in a range of cities and industrial villages such as Crimrnitschau, 
Glauchau, Meerane and Werdau.85 Similarly the SPD's vote in Reichstag elections rose 
from 19.7 per cent in 1871 to its peak in 1903 of 58.5 per cent, gaining deputies in 22 of 
the 23 Saxon electoral districts, giving Saxony its epithet as the "Red Kingdom ,,86 In 
Saxony itself the rise in living standards allowed an increasing number of the populace to 
breakthrough the wealth restrictions of the franchise, challenging the Saxon political elite 
on its home territory. In 1877 the SPD entered the Landtag for the first time, with one 
deputy, and began its campaign for an equal and secret franchise. 87 
In contrast to southwestern Gennany, where the ruling elite was prepared to offer 
universal franchise, at least for adult males, the Saxon political elite responded to the rise 
of the SPD by imposing a three-class franchise, modelled on the Prussian system, to retain 
its dominance. In 1896 the Conservative Party, the National Liberals and, unlike its 
Prussian sister party, the Left Liberal Progressive Party, all united in petitioning the 
government for a new restrictive franchise. Crucially for the development of the Saxon 
political system, this disenfranchised some 80 per cent of the population, including a 
significant proportion of the Mittelstand. 88 The new franchise created a peculiarly Saxon 
84 Walter, F., 'Sachsen - ein Stammland der SozialdemokratieT, in Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS) 
32 (2) (1991) (pp207-231), p209. 
85 Zeise and Ruediger, 'Bundesstaaf, pp394-5. 
86 ibid, p401. The remaining one seat was won by the German Reform Party in the Wendisch region. 
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form of floating voter: significant numbers of former Conservative and Anti-Semitic 
voters opted for the SPD on the single issue of the franchise. This was part of a wider 
electoral protest potential which had surfaced in the Saxon political system: during times 
of economic dislocation voters had looked to parties which appeared to voice their 
concerns. During the 1890s the Left Liberal Party failed to address the concerns of its 
constituency among small-scale employers, artisans and peasants who felt politically and 
economically sidelined.89 This translated into a surge of electoral support for Saxon 
political Anti-Semitism, in the form of the German Reform Party, which in the 1893 
Reichstag election won almost 100,000 votes and six seats.90 Although in relation to the 
1890 Reichstag elections there was a clear transfer of votes from the Conservative and 
National Liberal parties to the ~nti-Semitic German Reform Party, the Progressive Party's 
vote almost collapsed.91 However, the German Reform Party also suffered electoral 
defection because of its failure to address the interests of a diverse constituency of 
protesters, creating a search for a new vehicle of protest. 
The SPD, with its prominent campaign for the universal franchise, became the recipient 
of support from those feeling excluded from the political nation. In the 1903 Reichstag 
elections, in which the wider franchise permitted the expression of Saxon grievances, the 
SPD gained support from a significant number of former Conservative and Anti-Semitic 
voters.92 However, Franz Walter has demonstrated that the SPD was subject to electoral 
89 Zeise and Ruediger, 'Bundesstaat', p392. 
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defection in one specific area: Gennan nationalism The SPD reached its political zenith in 
the 1903 Reichstag elections, with 58.5 per cent of the popular vote. However, this fell to 
48 per cent in the Hottentoten Reichstag election of 1907 which placed nationalism at the 
centre of the political stage. Having won 22 of the 23 electoral districts in 1903, the 
number of SPD electoral districts contracted to eight. The average drop in the SPD vote 
throughout Germany was only 2.8 per cent, in Hamburg it fell by only 1.5 per cent to 60.1 
per cent. In Saxony, however, it fell by 10.5 per cent. Furthermore the collapse in the 
SPD's vote was centred on the textile region in southwest Saxony.93 
The intransigent political domination of Saxon Conservatism, which was based on a small 
and declining rural class of landed interests, also fragmented the Saxon middle classes into 
interest groupings. Lapp identified a political fissure running between the "old" middle 
class of shopkeepers, artisans and peasant farmers and the "new" middle class of white 
collar workers and minor civil servants from the political elites.94 Divisions also ran 
through the political and economic elites. From the turn of the 20th century the 
Conservative government placed the burden of taxation on trading, commercial and 
industrial interests, thereby weakening the political ties which held these economic 
interests to conservatism's political exclusion of the SPD.95 The most pronounced impact 
of this development was the foundation of the VSI in 1902 to represent the interests of 
Saxon industry. The VSI and its leading figure, Gustav Stresemann, was committed to a 
strategy using political lobbying to address economic concerns.96 However, Stresemann 
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and the VSI were never able to persuade a majority of the National Liberal Party, which 
feared the SPD's advance, that industry's cause was best served by electoral reform to end 
the Conservatives' monopoly of political power.97 The electoral reform of 1909, in which 
the VSI had played a prominent role, was too minor to shake significant numbers of 
Mittelstand voters from the SPD. Against the most detailed calculations carried out by the 
authorities the SPD rose above the restrictive franchise qualifications of property, income, 
age and constituencies redrawn to favour rural voters. In the 1909 Landtag elections the 
SPD gained 53 per cent of the vote and 25 of the 91 seats. While over half of the SPD's 
vote came from single ballot holders, 26 per cent came from those with three ballots and 8 
per cent from those with the maximum of four ballots.98 Failure to participate ill 
improvements in living standards had a tradition of protest voting in Germany.99 In 
Saxony this was intensified by the impact of the franchise question. In the late Imperial 
period these factors had created a political direction in the Saxon political system 
favouring the electoral rise of the SPD. However, the SPD's role as a vehicle of protest 
did not survive the impact of the First World War and the political and economic 
developments during the Weimar Republic. The SPD itself fragmented into a majority, the 
MSPD, while the left-wing became a party in its own right, the Independent Socialist 
Party (USPD). 
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The Early Years of the Republic 
In October 1918 the Saxon SPD followed the Reich leadership's lead and joined the Saxon 
government under Gustav Heinze, ending its history of political exclusion. However, three 
days after the final announcement of universal suffrage the spread of the council 
movement from Kiel reached Saxony on 9 November. loo The Saxon USPD, in parallel to 
developments in the Reich, joined the Saxon Council of Peoples' Representatives on 15 
November. The new government comprised six ministers equally divided between the 
SPD and USPD, who had been appointed at a meeting on 8 November of the Saxon 
Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in Dresden. 101 The MSPD was predominant in the 
councils of Dresden and Chemnitz, while the USPD was dominant in the Leipzig area. 102 
The Spartacus Bund remained on the political fringes, with a regional stronghold in 
Chemnitz. lo3 This political co-operation between the MSPD and USPD broke down at the 
beginning of January 1919 in Saxony as in the Reich. The Saxon USPD left the regional 
government on 17 January. The rupture was principally caused by the divergence in 
political objectives between achieving socialism through enshrining workers' councils and 
socialisation in the constitution, as advocated by the USPD, and the emphasis placed on 
immediate elections favoured by the MSPD. I04 
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The elections to the Saxon Landtag on 2 February 1919 produced a minority MSPD 
government under Minister President Gradenauer. Interestingly, Gradenauer's election by 
the Saxon Landtag included the votes of individual DNVP and DVP deputies who wanted 
a return to political stability. The DDP abstained as a protest at their exclusion from 
power. The USPD also abstained but resolved to "tolerate" the administration. lOS Within 
the Saxon SPD this began the generation of political waves from the party's right and left-
wings, culminating in the split off of the ASPD in 1926. The minority MSPD 
government's policies mirrored those of the national party, producing a combination of 
factors which added to the USPD's radicalisation in the course of 1919. The Leipzig 
USPD had taken measures to promote participation in the Central German general strike 
of late February and early March, reinforcing its commitment to socialisation and the 
council system.106 The Gradenauer government then decided to impose order and end the 
continued USPD challenge to liberal parliamentary democracy by using the disorder 
surrounding the murder of the Saxon Minister for War, Neuring, on 12 April, to impose a 
state of emergency.107 This began a process culminating in the military suppression of the 
workers' councils in Leipzig, the so-called Noskepolitik. In Saxony the suppression of the 
council movement was carried out under General Mercker, whose troops entered Leipzig 
on the night of 10-11 May. The gulf now created between the MSPD and USPD created 
the preconditions for the MSPD-DDP government in the Landtag .108 
The MSPD-DDP coalition lasted from October 1919 to November 1920. However, party 
political and electoral factors combined to remove the basis of the Weimar coalition. The 
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absence of the Catholic Centre Party, the third party of the Weimar Coalition, from the 
political system in Protestant Saxony, made developments more intense. Firstly, the 
prospect of a coalition with the DDP had never been acceptable to the SPD's left-wing, 
which favoured a more class-based political strategy with the objective of democratising 
the state bureaucracy and dissolving the middle-class citizens' militiaS. 109 This was 
symbolised by Gradenauer's enforced resignation after the Kapp Putsch, which had 
reinforced the 1eft-SPD's desire for more radical policies. At the same time, the USPD 
moved towards participation in a socialist coalition as a defence against the counter-
revolution, as embodied by the military and the rise of the political right.110 The electoral 
decline of the SPD and DDP after the Kapp Putsch reflected a left-right polarisation in the 
German electorate in which the parties in office lost out to their opponents. 111 With the 
right-SPD unable to form a majority administration with the DDP after the Landtag 
elections of December 1920, the path was open for the left-wing to form a socialist reform 
government with the USPD. This was the basis of the Buck-Lipinski government which 
lasted until January 1923. 
Events in Saxony and Thuringia now fell out of step with developments at Reich level. 112 
While the SPD lost its leading influence in national government, a leftist Saxon coalition 
between the MSPD and USPD tried to rebuild a Republic impregnated with socialism in 
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the manner envisaged by left-wing socialists in November 1918.113 The socialist reform 
governments of 1921-1922 were of decisive political impact for the remainder of the 
Weimar Republic, to a significant extent moulding the framework of the party system and 
social conflicts. The MSPD-USPD alliance set out to give Saxony a radical democratic-
socialist stamp by addressing the key issues in order to break what it regarded as the 
bastions of bourgeois socio-political hegemony. This principally involved the 
secularisation of the education system, the democratisation of the Saxon bureaucracy, 
including the related reform of the administration of municipal government, and the use of 
the Laws for the Protection of the Republic act against any challenges to the Republic by 
the extreme Right, from within either the civil service or the political movement. 114 
However, the foundation of the VKPD in late 1920 had now made a political and electoral 
impact in the Saxon party system. The USPD-MSPD coalition had only 40 of the 96 
Landtag mandates, while the VKPD had nine deputies. This placed the success of the 
socialist reform agenda in the Communists' hands. lIS There has been little research into the 
application of the KPD's United Front policy, which came from the 3rd World Congress 
of the Comintern in 1921, at regional level in the early 1920s. The policy was given 
impetus in Germany following the assassination of Erzberger, which occasioned extensive 
discussions between the KPD, USPD and MSPD. Thuringia became the testing ground 
for the KPD's policy of facilitating workers' governments when the regional elections of 
September 1921 produced a left-majority of two seats. In Thuringia, as in Saxony, the 
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drive in the SPD making this possible came from a left-wing faction, which believed it 
would be possible to pursue socialist reforms with the KPD as most communist deputies 
were former members of the Saxon SPD.116 In Thuringia the left-SPD grouped around 
August Froehlich and in Saxony it centred on the Chemnitz Left around Erich Zeigner.1l7 
The KPD's policies, however, became ingrained in the communist conundrum of what 
political tactics to employ: outright opposition to the SPD or limited contact to "unmask" 
it as allegedly hostile to workers' interests. The united front was not aimed at achieving 
the socialist parties' reform agenda but proving the limitations of these parties' political 
parameters. For this reason the KPD's association with the socialist government's reform 
agenda in Saxony and Thuringen intensified a nascent debate on party tactics in the 
KPD.118 
The reunion of the USPD and MSPD in September 1922, forming the VSPD, enhanced 
the standing of the left-wing of the Saxon party. Saxony became a centre of the VSPD's 
left-wing opposition around Max Seydewitz, A. Artz, H. Liebmann and Erich Zeigner.119 
However, it remained the VSPD in the Chemnitz area which most strongly advocated co-
operation with the VKPD. Interestingly, the impetus for co-operation with the VKPD 
from within the SPD was coming from certain state employees, especially primary school 
teachers, rather than traditional proletarian social groupS.120 The USPD in Leipzig had 
been led by anti-Communists such as Lipinski, who had acquiesced in the policy of co-
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operation with the KPD as a "lesser evil".121 Radicals like Curt Geyer, who had gone over 
from the USPD to the KPD, felt compelled to leave the "moderate" Saxon setting for the 
radicalism of Hamburg and Berlin.122 The basis for the right -SPD was strongest in the 
Dresden-Bautzen area and consequently remained the Saxon SPD's strongest proponent 
of coalition with all parties accepting the Weimar Constitution. 123 The formation of the 
VSPD, however, significantly reduced the "Dresden faction's" influence over policy in 
Saxony. 
This reluctant alliance of the political Left in Saxony has been shown by Lapp's research 
on the Saxon Buergertum's response to the socialist administrations of 1921-1922 to have 
significantly contributed to the sharpening of political antagonisms. This polarisation, 
which is central to Lapp's thesis, was also shown in the Saxon party system by the demise 
of the DDP, and its policy of class reconciliation, and the rise of the DNVP in rural areas 
and the DVP in more urban constituencies.124 The socialists' efforts to impose their radical 
reform programme in Saxony helped to create a mood of "class war" even before the 
crisis year of 1923. 
2.4 The Year 1923: The Turning Point 
The impact of the year 1923 on the Saxon and German economy, society and party 
system can hardly be overestimated in explaining the final rejection of the Weimar 
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Republic.125 The socio-economic and psychological impact of defeat in the First World 
War and the tenns of the Versailles Treaty, the rise of organised labour onto the stage of 
national decision making and the inflationary fiscal policies used since 1914 all became 
acute in 1923.126 In the Reich government a cabinet of so-called non-party experts under 
Chancellor Cuno replaced the Wirth administration as the Ruhr occupation became only a 
matter of time. 127 Political conditions in Saxony, however, were different. By March a 
left-wing SPD minority government relied on the KPD's support in the Landtag in the 
hope of accelerating a reform programme.128 The Saxon SPD, in particular its left-wing, 
had been increasingly concerned about the threat to the Republic from the radical Right 
and the central government's reluctance to deal with it. In the hope of rectifying the 
situation, the Saxon SPD adopted a policy of closer reliance on the KPD.129 Ironically, in 
the course of 1923, this created the most favourable possible conditions for the KPD's 
united front policy of winning over radicalised Social Democrats. 
A convergence of factors created the possibility of a "Left Alliance" in the Saxon 
Landtag. At the 4th World Congress of the Comintern in December 1922 Bukharin 
presented the ideological justification for Soviet Russia's need for "tactical alliances" with 
capitalist states. In Germany this obliged the KPD to work for the successful 
implementation of the Rapallo Treaty.130 The Comintern Congress regarded any change in 
relations with Germany as unwelcome. However, the Ruhr occupation brought Russo-
German relations into crisis, interrupting the inflow of German industrial goods required 
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for Soviet economic reconstruction; furthennore, it threatened to move the balance of 
European power further away from Soviet Russia's only ally, Germany, towards the 
strongly anti-Soviet France and Poland.131 The conflict between the German political 
Right's nationalism, which worked in favour of Soviet foreign policy, and the KPD's hopes 
for a German revolution now became acute. The result was that for the first six months of 
the Ruhr crisis the Comintern and all other Soviet agencies played down the issue. Despite 
the obvious implications of the Ruhr crisis it received no direct treatment at either the 
Comintern Congress or the KPD's 8th Congress in late January 1923 after the occupation 
had begun.132 
At the KPD's Leipzig Congress a factionally based dispute, over the definition of the 
United Front policies' advocation of "workers' governments", raged between the party 
majority under Heinrich Brandler and the Left Opposition under Ruth Fischer, Arkady 
Maslow and Ernst Thaelmann. The Left took up a position of outright rejection of the 
KPD's participation in regional governments with the SPD, while Brandler, influenced by 
the situation in his stronghold of southwestern Saxony, favoured its tactical use.133 The 
confluence of certain unique conditions, above all the importance of Germany to Soviet 
state policy and the Bolshevik leadership crisis as Lenin became increasingly ill, meant that 
Moscow only directly acted to preserve the unity of the KPD and to prevent any 
attempted revolution which would threaten the Rapallo treaty.134 This allowed the balance 
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of opinion within the regional KPD memberships to influence the accent placed on the 
party's tactics: the Ruhr became quite different from Saxony. 
In Saxony, the KPD initially reacted to the developments of 1923 by placing greater 
emphasis on the party's demands for a "workers' government" and the creation of the 
extra-parliamentary Proletarian Hundreds and Control Committees. The latter had already 
been part of the KPD's effort to create "Action Committees" which would draw in 
workers who were not KPD members. Communist propaganda stressed joint proletarian 
interests instead of their actual partisan interests. 135 For these ends the Buck-Lipinski 
cabinet was brought down by a KPD motion of no confidence on 30 January 1923 using 
the pretext that the SPD had permitted a voelkisch meeting in Leipzig.136 This began a 
political process in the Saxon SPD which culminated in the victory of the Chemnitz Left's 
policy of co-operation with the KPD. Following lengthy debate in the SPD, a Committee 
of Seven, dominated by the Left around Georg Graupe, Hermann Liebmann and Max 
Seydewitz, appointed Erich Zeigner as Minister President to carry out a programme 
relying on the KPD's official support. 137 For the KPD the terms of their support were 
particularly favourable: its remained possible to criticise the SPD administration, while the 
Proletarian Hundreds and Control Committees received official sanction from the Saxon 
government on 18 March. 138 Saxony and Thuringia became the only German states with 
regional governments officially sanctioning organisations which were banned throughout 
the rest of the country by August. However, it was precisely here that the definitions and 
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intentions of the SPD and KPD differed most substantially. The SPD saw these 
organisations as instruments for the defence of the Republic and, particularly, the Control 
Commissions were viewed as organisations to act against profiteering from the 
inflationary crisis at the expense of working-class consumers.139 For the KPD they were 
organisations of the United Front to create the conditions for revolution by providing 
greater penetration into the unorganised and Social Democratic workers than the trade 
unions or official factory councils offered.140 The fact that this crucial difference was 
known is shown by the refusal of the Leipzig SPD to co-operate with the KPD in the 
Proletarian Hundreds. 141 The Zeigner government's inability to stabilise the crisis in 
Saxony, in the face of the central government's refusal to provide financial assistance, 
meant that the organisations set up to defend the Republic came under increasing 
communist influence.142 The Saxon KPD's United Front tactic continued to enable the 
Communists to gain ground at the expense of the SPD at grass roots leve1.143 
In the Ruhr the policies of the Left Opposition made a significant challenge to the official 
Communist line. The conditions produced by the occupation of the Ruhr were identified 
as a means of creating a "short cut to revolution" (Angress) by the Left.144 Not only did 
the Left openly oppose the official party line but also gave support to a failed putsch 
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attempt in Muehlheim in mid April and in May tried to give a strike over wages in 
Dortmund a revolutionary content. 145 The popularity of the Left in the areas under 
Franco-Belgian occupation was shown at a conference held in Rhineland Westphalia in 
late March when the Zentrale gained a bare majority in support of official party policy.146 
Fears in Moscow concerning the threat to the Comintem policy in Germany and the 
danger of a split in the KPD brought about a meeting of the ECCI in late April. Although 
the reins of restraint were placed around the Left, an agreement was worked out 
sanctioning the continuation of the United Front in Saxony, and forcing the Left to limit 
their agitation to the regions they controlled. This was an agreement which played for 
time rather than resolving the conflicts within the KPD. The co-opting of four members of 
the Left onto the Zentrale, extending it from 21 to 25 members, did nothing to alter the 
balance of forces in the national leadership. 
In the summer of 1923 the KPD adopted the so-called "Schlageter Line", which involved 
efforts to recruit supporters of the far Right by using an appeal to German nationalism. 
The change of policy was motivated by concerns in Moscow that Chancellor Cuno's 
endeavours to reach agreement with the French would bring about the abandonment of 
the Germano-Soviet entente cordiale.147 There is very little evidence of the policy being 
carried out in Saxony. However, at national level the KPD's propaganda continued to 
assert that this policy too was a tactic for revolution in Germany. In parallel to the party's 
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overtures to the supporters of the far Right an "anti-Fascist" campaign was conducted. 
Indeed, in Frankfurt-am-Main, Thuringia and Saxony the KPD was able to enlist the 
support of left-wing Social Democrats, who believed the KPD was acting against the 
threat of fascism. 148 However, at the meeting of the ECCI in May, which adopted the 
"Schlageter Line", there was no mention of revolutionary objectives.149 
In Saxony during the "Schlageter Line" the KPD and SPD were both regarded by the 
right-wing nationalist and Fascist groupings as "traitors" and "internationalists". 
Furthermore, the KPD was involved in numerous cases of breaking up patriotic and 
nationalist events attended by the middle classes. 150 The Zeigner government in Saxony 
during the summer and autumn of 1923 was increasingly focusing on the Left's "common 
enemies": the Reichswehr, capitalists and the political and para-military organisations of 
the far-Right. The purpose of the policy was to unite a diverse basis of support and to 
deflect the KPD's criticisms that the Saxon government's measures against these 
groupings were inadequate. 151 In the Ruhr, however, a small number of local KPD groups 
carried placards with both the red star and the swastika on them; leaders such as Ruth 
Fischer and Remmele were also applauded by joint audiences of the political extremes. 152 
The debate in the communist press with far-Right nationalists brought strong 
condemnation from the SPD's central organ Vorwaerts, but did not adversely affect 
148 Wickham, J., 'The Working-Class Movement and Working Class Life in Frankfurt-am-Main during 
the Weimar Republic', Ph.D. thesis (Sussex University, 1979), pp91-2; Winkler, Von der Revolution, 
p648f. 
149 Weber, H., Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918-1945 (Ertraege der Forschung vol. 198; Darmstadt, 
1983), p91. 
150 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p113. 
151 Pryce, 'Saxony 1923', pp112-47; Gordon, H. J., 'Die Reichswehr und Sachsen 1923', in 
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 11 (1961) (pp677-92), p677f. 
152 Daycock, 'Political Extremes', p82. 
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relations with the SPD in Saxony.153 One explanation for this was the divergence between 
the KPD's nationalist propaganda, which was aimed at the national level, and the policy on 
the ground in Saxony. More importantly still, the KPD was rapidly gaining support at 
local level as inflation and unemployment rocketed in second half of 1923. 
Political conflict between the SPD and the parties of the Saxon middle classes was made 
more acute because the SPD's policies openly undertook to ameliorate the conditions of 
the working classes at the expense of the middle classes, while blaming the crisis on 
capitalists' exploitation of the inflation for profit.154 Lapp has contributed to the 
understanding of 1923 at local level in Saxony by demonstrating how farmers, 
shopkeepers and industrialists were subject to the threat of physical violence should they 
fail to yield foodstuffs or increase wages to compensate for price rises. The government's 
inability to adequately police these disturbances caused widespread panic and feelings of 
defencelessness among wide sections of middle-class opinion. The SPD, as the party in 
government in Saxony, made socialism inseparable from the state of terror and 
persecution of the middle classes in the minds of all those calling for a return to Ruhe und 
Ordnung .155 
The KPD's tactics changed agam ill late September 1923. However, the Soviet 
Politburo's reasons for calling on the Saxon KPD to enter the regional government as a 
springboard to revolution did not in the first instance have their origins in Saxony. The 
immediate trigger was the Cuno government's ending of passive resistance to the French 
occupation of the Ruhr. It was feared in Moscow that the new "Great Coalition" under 
Stresemann, which included the SPD, would now take a western foreign policy 
153 Depleux, National Bolshevismus, p185. 
154 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', pIll. 
155 ibid, p1l8-28. 
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orientation, abandoning the previously good relations with Soviet Russia. 1s6 Using 
declassified Soviet documentation Babichenko has added interesting details to the decision 
making process in Moscow. At a previously unknown meeting of the ECCI on 21 
September, including representatives from the French, Czech, German and Russian 
parties, the KPD's leader, Heinrich Brandler continued to put pressure on the Comintern 
to take revolutionary action in Saxony. Eleven days prior to the ECCrs meeting Brandler 
had written to Radek that the "revolutionary tension" throughout Germany was acute and 
"we [the KPD] should gain the victory and (have) put in hand complete illegal 
preparations. ,,157 However, the crucial details continue to accord with Angress' standard 
work on this topic. The Soviet Politburo appointed a Committee of Four, under Radek, to 
take control of the "German October"; the preparations were regarded as a purely 
technical matter using the party's M-Apparat and Ordnungsdienst rather than relying on 
mass support.1s8 Daycock has also detailed how the KPD avoided relying on the factory 
councils because of their domination by the SPD. 1s9 The Chemnitz Congress on 21 
October, which included a representative section of the organised working class, has 
traditionally been regarded as the decisive factor in making Brandler change his mind and 
call off the uprising to avoid another disaster like in March 1921.160 However, the KPD 
156 Winkler, Von der Revolution, p623; Schueddekopf,Nationalbolshewismus, p131; Angress, Stillborn 
Revolution, p396. 
157 Babichenko, L. Z., 'The Politburo, Comintem and the German Events of 1923', in Novaia I Noveishaia 
Istoriia 2 (1994 (ppI26-40), p128 [personal translation by Ben Fowkes]. 
158 Angress, Stillborn Revolution, pp369ff; Babichenko, op.cit., ppI28-33. 
159 Daycock, 'Political Extremes', p79. 
160 The original interpretation comes from Brandler's own statements, see, Fowkes, B. (trans.), 
'Correspondence Between H. Brandler and I. Deutscher, 1952-59', in New Left Review 105 (1969) (pp56-
81), pp56-7; 'Record of A Discussion with Heinrich Brandler', in, ibid (pp47-55), pp51-3; For recent 
documentary based research ,see, Becker, J. and Jentsch, H., 'Heinrich Brandler. Biographische 
Skizzen(Zeitzeugenberichte', in, lahrbuchfuer Historische Kommunismusforschung (1996) (pp273-95). 
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was only using the Chemnitz Congress to "test the water" because of the imminent 
intervention by the Reich government to depose the Saxon SPD-KPD coalition 
government. Originally a national conference of revolutionary (ie KPD dominated) factory 
councils had been planned.161 Babachenko, with reference to the documentation, indicates 
that although the Chemnitz Conference may have influenced Brandler, it was the Soviet 
advisers who "conducted the orchestra".162 The KPD leadership saw its tactics as buying 
time during which the Action Committees would maintain the "revolutionary tension. ,,163 
On 29 October the Chemnitz Left faction in the Saxon SPD made a joint call with the 
KPD for a General Strike. l64 For future relations between the SPD and KPD at local level 
this joint call was of greater significance than the strike call's failure to hit an echo in the 
workforce. 
During the KPD's period of preparations for the "German October", governmental power 
had largely left the control of the Saxon SPD for the Reich government in Berlin. 
Immediately following the conclusion of passive resistance on 26 September, President 
Ebert authorised a state of emergency, placing executive power with the Reichswehr 
minister Gessler. In Saxony, executive power was handed to the regional military 
commander, General Mueller. This was despite a request by the SPD members of the 
"Great Coalition" in Berlin that the social democratic Minister of the Interior in Saxony, 
H. Liebmann, should assume these powers. 165 The conflict between the Saxon and Reich 
governments now became acute. Disputes between the Saxon regional government and 
the Reich had constantly focused on the Saxon SPD's opposition to the Reichswehr's 
161 Winkler, Von der Revolution, p651. 
162 Babichenko, 'Events of 1923', p140. 
163 'b'd 1 1 . 
164 Dokumente und Materialen, 7 fl, pp469-71. 
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illegal recruitment among far Right groups in Saxony: now this became the regional 
administration's raison d'etre. l66 Chancellor Stresemann, however, was under constant 
pressure from the VSI to depose the Zeigner government.167 Not only was the Zeigner 
government ultimately defenceless against the superior forces of the central 
government;168 it was now deserted by the Saxon KPD, which had abandoned government 
office. The Saxon SPD's call for the KPD to join a government of "Republican and 
proletarian defence" no longer accorded with the KPD's political tactics.169 Thus ended 
the Saxon SPD's policy of trying to recruit the regional KPD for a programme of 
"proletarian unity". It was with some irony that Stresemann, somewhat dubiously, justified 
the overthrow of the Saxon and Thuringian governments which rested on the support of 
their parliaments, by pointing to their association with the unconstitutional objectives of 
the KPD.170 
2.5 The Saxon KPD in the Regional Political System 
Developments in Saxony show that Krause's thesis for the rise of the USPD, which 
accounted for particular patterns of urban development, holds equally true for the Saxon 
KPD.171 The Saxon districts of the KPD all evolved in manners specific to their sub-
regional contexts. The Saxon KPD was divided until 1929 into three party districts, all of 
which closely approximated to the corresponding electoral districts of Leipzig, East 
166 ibid, pi 06. 
167 Winkler, Von der Revolution, p667. 
168 Pryce, 'Saxony 1923', p143; Winkler, Von der Revolution, p655f. 
169 Lapp, 'Political Extremes', pp135-7. 
170 Winkler, Von der Revolution, pp655f. 
171 Krause, H., Zur Geschichte der Unabhaenigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Frankfurt-
am-Main, Cologne, 1975), pp315ff. Krause supplies statistical details of the USPD's electoral impact in 
regional and national elections between 1918 and 1924. 
Page 73 
Saxony and Erzgebirge-Vogtland. The first of these was the district Erzgebirge-Vogtland. 
The administrative districts (AmtshauptmannschaJten) included in this district were: 
Plauen, Oelsnitz, Auerbach, Zwickau, Schwarzenberg, Stollberg, Glauchau, Rochlitz, 
Floeha, Marienberg and Chemnitz. The party district West Saxony included the 
administrative districts: Leipzig, Borna, Grimma, Oschatz, Grosshain and Doebeln. In 
East Saxony the party district included: Zittau, Loebau, Bautzen, Kamenz, Meissen, 
Freiberg, Dippoldiswalde, Pima and Dresden.l72 
During the First World War the SPD local organisation in the sub-region of Erzgebirge, 
which included the city of Chemnitz, was the only SPD organisation to defect to the 
Spartacus Bund. 173 The KPD's membership had taken the "direct route" (Fowkes) to the 
party: from the left-wing of the pre-war SPD to the Spartacus Bund during the war, 
joining the KPD at its foundation in 1918/19.174 The KPD party district in Erzgebirge-
Vogtland in 1919 was already one of the party's strongest organisations, numbering some 
14,000 members. 175 The KPD's vote in 1920 also indicates that it was gaining 
disproportionately strong support in the industrial villages which were based on cottage 
industries and small-scale production as compared with the larger cities.176 However, by 
the November 1922 regional elections the KPD's vote was almost evenly distributed 
all ' f . 177 across SIzes 0 commumty. 
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Following the Saxon trend, the USPD in Erzgebirge-Vogtland voted strongly against 
joining the Comintern. Wheeler noted that in the Central German textile region the vote 
opposing joining the Comintern was 10 per cent of the total USPD's vote in a region 
making up only 5 per cent of the party's membership.178 Voting pattern's confirm that the 
electorate also opted for the Saxon VSPD rather than the VKPD.179 In the period 1919-
1923 southwestern Saxony was an electoral stronghold of the SPD and the KPD, with 
both parties polling above their Saxon and national average figures. However, the sub-
region was not well integrated into the workers' movement of the Free Trade Unions, the 
sporting and cultural Vereine or the political parties themselves.18o Wheeler observed that 
the impetus to join the KPD came from the newly organised and less skilled rank-and-file 
members rather than functionaries who had been active in the pre-war labour 
movement.181 Studies of Frankfurt-am-Main and Solingen, the former a SPD stronghold 
and the latter a KPD stronghold, have endorsed Wheeler's thesis for Germany as a 
whole. 182 Erzgebirge-Vogtland modifies Borkenau's "radical discontinuity" thesis, 
according to which the "new" working class in heavy industry who had been under-
represented in organised labour, joined the KPD.183 In southwestern Saxony a socio-
political environment was created in which the ties securing the SPD's political 
predominance were weaker than in more concentrated industrial structures: this allowed 
178 Wheeler, R. F., Die USPD und Die Internationale. Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der 
Revolution (Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Vienna, 1976), p254. 
179 StIFS, Nr.45, pp404-5. 
180 Walter, 'Stammland', pp215ff. 
181 Wheeler, USPD, p239-45. 
182 Wickham, 'Working Class Movement', pp3-4; Wunderlich, V., Arbeiterbewegung und 
Selbstverwaltung. KPD und Kommunalpolitik in der Weimarer RepubUk. Mit dem Beispiel Solingen 
(Wuppertal, 1980), p34. 
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the expression of a radicalisation on the Right and Left of the political spectrum, 
motivated by economic hardship. The wider expression of this environment was the 
tradition of protest voting from the late imperial period.184 It will be argued in this study 
of the Saxon KPD that in this environment a right-wing political tendency in the KPD 
developed the belief that it could achieve communist objectives in contact with the wider 
workers'movement. 
A factor which had limited the anchoring of the SPD in southwestern Saxony was the 
disinclination of textile workers to join the workers' movement. The industry's high 
proportion of female employees further accentuated this trend. 185 In 1925 70 per cent of 
Saxony's textile workers were no longer represented in works' councils by the Free Trade 
Unions. 186 However, in the face of the same problem, the KPD failed to anchor its vote in 
these localities. Until 1923/4 the KPD had been the principal beneficiary of a trend of 
protest voting. But after the crisis of 1923 the direction of protest voting switched from 
left to right. In what was largely an environment influenced by both rural and industrial 
factors the NSDAP was able to make its earliest and most penetrative impact on these 
protest voters. 187 Geary has also given the specific example of Chemnitz, and its "unusual" 
183 Borkenau, F., World Communism. A History of the Communist International (2 edn.; Michigan Ill., 
1962), p142. 
184 For an analysis of Saxon electoral trends during the late imperial period see, 'Die Wahlen zum 
Deutschen Reichstag im Koenigreich Sachsen', editorial, in ZSSL 78/9 (1932/3), ppI71-300. 
185 On women see, Tipton, F.B., Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany During 
the 19th Century (Middletown, Conneticut, 1976), pp30-38. 
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(pp87-111) pl08. 
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industrial structure, to show that some early KPD voters transferred their allegiance to the 
NSDAP at the end of the Republic.188 
In 1919 the membership of the KPD district East Saxony (Dresden-Bautzen) was 
6,555.189 However, the domination of the local party organisations by Otto Ruhle's 
"syndicalist" tendency meant that the membership collapsed as a consequence of the purge 
of left-wing Communists by Paul Levi in late 1919.190 East Saxony was the heartland of 
the right-wing of the Saxon SPD.191 Not only was the rise of the KPD restricted but the 
USPD failed to make significant headway until the 1920 Reichstag elections indicated the 
extent of disillusionment with the SPD's Noskepolitik. In these elections the right and left-
wings of the local USPD stood separately: the left-wing gained 1.9 per cent of the vote 
and the right-wing 9.4 per cent.192 The USPD's successes were evenly distributed over all 
types of communities, with the exception of small rural areas, which held 
disproportionately to the MSPD. 193 The SPD membership, especially in the industrial 
villages between Dresden and Meissen, was firmly tied to the workers' movement, not 
only in the party and trade unions but also in the social and cultural Vereine. 194 The more 
concentrated industrial structure, with a strong representation of the machine building 
industry, favoured the anchoring of the SPD socially and politically. 195 The creation of the 
VKPD in December 1920 did not bring a mass base to the KPD: membership rose from 
188 Geary, R., European Labour Protest 1884-1939 (London, 1981), p165. 
189 Weber, Wandlung, p378. 
190 Koch-Baumgarten, 'Einleitung', in Flechtheim, Die KPD, pp16,23-4. 
191 Hausmann, 'Gescheitertes Experiment', pp275ff. 
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1,000 in 1920 to 5,349 in 1923.196 The KPD's electoral breakthrough was equally 
restricted: the party's vote rose from 1.2 per cent in the June 1920 Reichstag election to 
8.4 per cent in May 1924.197 The sub-regional patterns of political socialisation and socio-
economic development had created a strong barrier to the development of the KPD. It 
will be argued in this thesis that where the KPD was weak the party apparatus was more 
able to dominate the party's local political evolution. 
The district party organisation of the KPD in West Saxony was initially included in the 
party's Central German district. The foundation of the West Saxon KPD in 1920 coincided 
with the party's first electoral participation.198 The importance of the machine building 
industry and the textile and related clothing industries in Leipzig did not favour the 
defection of a left-wing of the USPD to the VKPD. Wheeler's study of the social and 
economic reasons for the left-right division of the USPD in the metal trades points to the 
specific branch of production.199 The pro-Comintern metal workers in Solingen were 
employed in small factories producing high quality cutlery for a declining export 
market. 200 Leipzig, however, was the one Saxon region which had reacted to changing 
patterns of national and international supply and demand by orienting the machine industry 
to the manufacturing goods sector.20t D. McKibbon has detailed how the demands of the 
war economy increased the prominence in the local SPD of radicalised metal workers in 
196 Weber, Wandlung, p378. 
197 StJFS, Nr.44, pp425-6; ibid, Nr.46, pp404-5. 
198 Ruediger, 'Freistaat Sachsen', p143. 
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Republik', in Gesellschaft. Beitraege zur Marx'chen Theorie 5 (1976) (pp257-77), p270. 
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the machine building industries as the more moderate printing and publishing workers 
declined in influence.202 The USPD won a landslide victory in the December 1917 city 
council elections, taking 74 per cent of the third-class vote. McKibbon examines 
subsequent developments, presenting the USPD's consolidation of control over the SPD 
apparatus as political opportunism: moderate socialists like Lipinski followed radicals like 
Curt Geyer into the USPD in order to retain their political positions.203 What McKibbon 
has identified here is the origins of the right USPD party organisation in Leipzig. 
In addition to the industrial influences on political dispositions, the West Saxon sub-
region was strongly integrated into the social democratic subculture of Vereine as well as 
union and political membership. A consequence of this was a stable membership.204 In 
West Saxony the tendency towards political organisation was further accentuated by the 
largely urban pattern of industrial development. The weakness of support for joining the 
Comintern was also reflected in the electoral results of the USPD in the 1920 regional 
elections: the right USPD polled 25.9 per cent and the left 7.6 per cent. This was 
parallelled at the party political level with almost all members of the Leipzig USPD 
returning to the VSPD in 1922.205 Despite the clear restrictions placed on the expansion of 
the KPD in West Saxony, the "indirect route" (Fowkes) to the KPD through the left-wing 
of the USPD did permit a communist impact on the political system. The Leipzig KPD in 
1921 organised 14,000 members; when the union with the left-wing of the USPD became 
202 ibid, pp430ff. Note: the textile and clothing industries are taken as a statistical neutral because of the 
high numbers of female employees. Here McKibbon clearly underestimates the political influence in the 
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electorally detectable at the regional elections of 1922 the KPD gained 12.1 per cent of 
the popular vote. In the May 1924 Reichstag elections the KPD vote peaked at 15.7 per 
cent.206 However, the KPD's real breakthrough followed what can be called the third, and 
most prolific, route to the KPD: the impact of structural unemployment after 1923/4. In 
this environment the KPD's attacks on the role of trade union and SPD functionaries 
increasingly isolated the party from those workers it set out to proselytise. In tum, the 
KPD's inability to set the political agenda forced the membership away from the wider 
workers' movement and into a left-radical communism which lived politically in isolation 
from and opposition to the social democratic workers' movement. 
The social, economic and political context outlined in this chapter will provide a 
backdrop for the main theatre of the thesis, which sets out to explain why the KPD 
behaved differently in the three Saxon party districts. The following chapters will argue 
that, although the Comintern set a General Line without regard to the particularities 
pertaining to Germany, and the "Stalinised" KPD leadership was increasingly able to 
control internal party life, local conditions as experienced by the membership coloured 
their political complexion. In other words: specific every-day experience rather than a 
uniform ideology produced a communism rooted in the wider workers' movement or 
isolated from it. As the organisation and ideology of the KPD was constant throughout 
Saxony, and Germany, the structure of party militants' every-day-life will be assessed as 
the variant in the equation, which produced the differing political tendencies and party 
strength of Saxon communism. 
206 StJFS, Nr.45, pp404-5. 
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3. Stalinisation by a Different Name: Ruth Fischer, Left-Wing 
Communism and Saxony. 
3.1 Introduction: The Ruth Fischer Era in the KPD. 
The year 1924 brought the final rise of the Left Opposition in the KPD into the leadership. 
The Left in the KPD, around Ruth Fischer, Arkady Maslow, Ernst Thaehnann, and figures 
such as Werner Scholem, Karl Korsch and Arthur Rosenberg, had consistently disputed 
the united front policy, which had been adopted at the 3rd World Congress of the 
Comintern in 1921. The KPD's left-wing in 1924/5 set out to exploit the impact of the 
"Failed October" to change the Communist Party's tactics in Gennany.1 The events in 
Germany during 1923 and their aftermath, however, were tied into the factional struggle 
in the CPSU as leading figures manoeuvred for position. New research has documented 
the CPSU's decisive role in the formation of policy in Germany throughout 1923.2 
However, the internal party feud was not an objective debate on the actual causes of the 
"October Defeat". The "old leadership" in the KPD, around Heinrich Brandler and August 
Thalheimer, were associated with Radek and his patron Trotsky. The new alliance 
between Stalin and Zinoviev meant that Brandler became the scapegoat necessary to 
sideline Trotsky, absolve the Comintern of responsibility for a policy failure and to enable 
a friendly leadership constellation in the KPD. 3 Initially it appeared that the Comintern 
would continue to hold the support of a majority of the KPD's Zentrale. In the course of 
November 1923 a so-called Centre Group split of from the Brandler leadership: the 
1 For a discussion of the relationship between the KPD and the Comintern, Weber, H., Kommunismus in 
Deutschland 1918-1945 (Ertraege der Forschung vol.l98; Darmstadt,1983), p46f; Watlin, A., Die 
Komintern, 1919-1929 (Mainz,1993), pp50ff,65. 
2 Babichenko, L. Z., 'The Politburo, Comintern and the German Events of 1923', in Novaia i Noveishaia 
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national leadership of this faction was characterised by its declaration of unconditional 
support for the Comintem's statements on the situation in Gennany.4 However, during 
early 1924 it became clear that the collapse in the KPD after 1923 had facilitated the Left's 
independent rise into the party leadership. It quickly became clear that the KPD leadership 
would take the Comintem's leftist rhetoric far beyond what was wanted in Moscow.5 
In Saxony there were very specific reasons for the intensity of the factional struggle: the 
region had been the centre of the united front policy and the stronghold of the Brandler 
leadership. The Left asserted that the German revolution should not have been attempted 
from Saxony, with its Mittelstand economic structures. Instead, the strongholds of the 
Left, in Berlin, Wasserkante and Rheinland-Westphalia, which housed a heavy industrial 
economic structure, were claimed to make up the matrix of proletarian revolution.6 
Between 1924 and 1925 the KPD's left-wing challenged the party's ideological profile and 
the cohabitation of different communist tendencies in the Reich leadership, which had 
characterised the previous period.? Each faction in the KPD took its ideological 
predilections from a diversity of socio-economic and local political influences. The Left 
wanted to jettison the influences of local conditions on communist political behaviour, in a 
country with strongly regionalised patterns of development, and create a monolithic party 
under the slogan: "Bolshevik Unity". The KPD's right-wing represented an off-shoot of 
radicalised workers who had been organised in the pre-1914 German workers' movement. 
4 Weber, H., Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik (Gekuerzte Studentenausgabe, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971), pp56ff. The Centre Group's thesis on 
the events in October 1923, however, did not represent the views of a united grouping. 
5 Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republik (London, 1984), ppllOff. 
6 Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen des 9. Parteitages der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Berlin, 
1924), ppl12-7,128-64. 
7 Weber, Wandlung, p58. 
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This political tendency in the KPD reflected a fusion of Luxemburgism and Leninism: a 
desire for contact with the wider workers' movement to win over its left-wing for 
communism, but with a Leninist emphasis on the role of the party. The KPD's right-wing 
was above all prominent among trade-union activists and councillors in the municipal 
councils: areas of contact with the SPD. This branch of German communism did not want 
to create an organisational division within the working class, in the form of separate 
communist trade-unions or auxiliary organisations.8 The Left, by contrast, advocated a 
policy of independent organisation from the social democratic workers' movement, using 
separate trade unions and auxiliary organisations. Isolating the KPD's membership from 
the "reformist" influences of the SPD took precedence over creating a wider interface on 
which to win over workers for communism.9 The Left's policy in 1924/5 of "organising 
the revolution" focused on the KPD's agency in "making the revolution" by politicising 
the whole party: the party was to be viewed as the generator of revolution and not merely 
the cable through which the charge would run. IO The Left's main base of support, among 
unemployed workers, also eased the policy of isolation from the social democratic 
workers' movement, from which they felt excluded. I I The Centre Group was essentially an 
artificial product of the impact of the "October Defeat" and the power struggle in the 
communist movement. The faction largely comprised functionaries in the party apparatus, 
who increasingly looked towards Moscow's forms of organisation and leadership to bring 
8 Schoeck, E. C., Arbeitsiosigkeit und Rationalisierung. Die Lage der Arbeiter und die Kommunistische 
Gewerkscha/tspolitik 1920-1928 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1977), pp24-8. 
9 Weber, Wandiung, ppI6-17. 
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Berlin, 1967), P 135. 
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revolution to Gennany.12 The faction split in the spring of 1924 when Remmele, Ernst 
Schneller and Wilhelm Koenen joined the Left after the 9th Party Congress, while others 
under Meyer continued to oppose the new Left leadership.13 
Saxony had become the epic entre of the factional feud in the KPD: more importantly the 
fault line which ran through the KPD, on the tactics for a revolutionary party, were acute 
in this region and had their roots in specific local political and economic conditions. This 
chapter addresses two fundamental questions about the KPD's political development. 
Firstly, to what extend could the KPD under Ruth Fischer set a political policy in 
Germany independently of the Comintern? And secondly, could a left-wing communism 
be imposed on the Saxon KPD if this did not accord with the every-day experiences of the 
local party activists? The view that the events in Saxony in 1923 produced a universal 
ideological rejection of all contact with the SPD, in the form of an inherent left-wing 
political trend, will be disputed and a counter explanation given to explain the differences 
in the Saxon KPD.14 
3.2 The Introversion of the KPD. 
The Situation in Saxony 
The events of 1923 made an impact on all of the parties in the Saxon political system The 
social consequences of the hyper-inflation between 1922-23 and the deflationary policies 
to achieve the ensuing currency stabilisation, further weakened the glue holding the 
12 Weber, Wandlung, p89ff. 
13 ibid, pp17;60-1; Weber, Kommunismus in Deutschland, p98. 
14 Stolle, U., Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb: Frauen und Maenner, Reformisten und Radikale, Fach und 
Massenarbeiter bei Bayern, BASF, Borsch und in Solingen (1900-1933) (Frankfurt-am-Main, New York, 
1980), pp260ff. 
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middle-class electorate to the traditional middle-class parties, the DDP, DVP and 
DNVP.15 The Mittelstand structure of the Saxon economy and the high representation of 
the independent "old" middle classes made the region an early political indicator of the 
national trend towards the rise of "special (economic) interest" parties.16 However, if the 
economic policies of the Weimar Republic's early years had produced social fractures 
within middle-class opinion, then the year 1923 in Saxony had reaffinned hostilities to the 
socialist refonn agenda of the Saxon SPD.17 The events of 1923 also pushed the SPD 
towards a more class assertive policy. At the SPD's National Congress in Heidelberg in 
1925, delegates accepted a policy prohibiting coalition at national level with the parties of 
the middle class. The centre of this drive to the left, which placed the creation of 
socialism above loyalty to the bourgeois Republic, was in the Saxon SPD.18 In Saxony, 
however, the tensions produced by the policy of relying on the KPD's support for socialist 
reforms, produced a strong counter reaction in the party's Landtag faction. The 
Sachsenkonflikt, an internal party debate on the SPD's attitude to coalition government, 
15 Jones, L. E., 'The Dissolution of the Bourgeios Party System', in Bessel, R. and Feuchtwanger, E. 1. 
(eds.), Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany (London, 1981), (pp268-288), 
p271. 
16 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Call forni a, 1991), ppI69f,207f. 
17 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p200. 
18 Fowkes, B., 'Defence of Democracy or Advance to Socialism? Arguments Within German Social 
Democracy in the mid 1920s'(pp247-64), in Dobkowski, M. and Wallimann, I. (eds.), Towards the 
Holocaust. The Social and Economic Collapse o/the Weimar Republic (New York, 1983), pp250ff. 
Although the SPD remained out of the national government in the mid 1920s, its votes allowed 
Stresemann's foreign policy while the various governing coalitions relied on the support of the parties of 
the middle classes.tOr domestic policy, see, Kolb, E. The Weimar Republic (trans. Falls, P. S.; London, 
1988), pp5lff. 
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culminated in the split-off of the Saxon SPD's right-wing. 19 Of the SPD's 40 deputies in 
the Landtag, 23 of them, under the leadership of Max Held and Karl Bethke, broke party 
discipline by heading a Saxon Great Coalition, which included DDP and DVP ministers. In 
April 1926 the tension between the Saxon SPD's party machine and membership and the 
recalcitrant right-wing of the Landtag faction culminated in the latter's expulsion. The 
ASPD was founded as a separate political party, which advocated class compromise 
through coalition politics as the best means to represent working-class interests.20 Not 
only did the Saxon SPD's left wing disagree, but the so too did the electorate: the ASPD's 
real significance was in winning four seats in the 1926 Landtag election and facilitating an 
essentially middle-class regional coalition government, which lasted until 1929.21 Despite 
the Saxon SPD membership's move to the left after 1923, the new Left Zentrale in the 
KPD wanted to ignore regional peculiarities in determining political behaviour and create 
an ideologically driven communist party. 
The KPD's left wing, from their new vantage points in the party leadership, was not 
interested in local differences in the Saxon SPD, which influenced the KPD's relation to 
the wider workers' movement. Instead, the events of 1923 were to be used as a validation 
of the KPD's rebirth from the ashes of "defeat" as an ideologically left-radical communist 
party: the way to becoming a "truly" revolutionary party was by stressing the KPD's 
19 Vossen, S., 'Der Sachsenkonflikt' (pp263-72), in, Grebing, H., Mommsen, H. and Rudolf, K. (eds.), 
Demokratie und Emanzipation zwischen Saale uns Elbe. Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung bis 1933 (Essen, 1993). Winkler, H. A., Der Schein der 
Normalitaet. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 1924-1930 (Berlin, Bonn, 1988), 
ppI95-202,327-331; Hunt, R. N., German Social Democracy: 1918-1933 (Yale, 1964), pp211-21; Lapp, 
'Political Polarisation', ppI44-67. 
20 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', ppI44-50. 
21 Fenske, H., Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Parteiengeschichte (Frankfurt-
am-Main, 1972), p298. 
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profile as a party without connection to the traditions and tendencies of social 
democracy.22 The intensity of the attack on the "old order" in the KPD, and the role of the 
Saxon KPD in 1923, forced even the chameleon tendency, of ever adaptable functionaries, 
to defend their part in recent events. Sigrid Raedel, a leading Saxon functionary, pointed 
out that: "Saxony tried out the practical question (of revolution) and is now being 
punished for it."23 It was widely acknowledged in the Saxon KPD that: "The Saxon 
question had become the central question of our party's tactics while the Ruhr has become 
a secondary question. ,,24 In other words relations with social democracy was the central 
issue, while the overtures made to the far right, during the "Schlageter Line" in the Ruhr 
in 1923, was omitted from the debate. 
At the District Party Congresses, which elected delegates to the Reich Party Congress, 
the Saxon KPD divided across the factional spectrum While other party districts, such as 
the Ruhr, went over to support of the Left, Saxony, the centre of the internal party dispute 
on tactics, did not want to abandon all that had gone before.25 In West Saxony, despite 
considerable debate on trades union policy (ie the formation of independent communist 
unions), Maslow secured a landslide victory for the Left's interpretation of the "October 
Events" and the re-formulation of relations with the SPD. From 67 delegates the Left 
22 For extensive details see, Angress, W.T., Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bid/or Power in 
Germany, 1921-1923 (Princeton, 1963), pp28lff. 
23 SAPMO (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR) I 3/8/14, Protokoll vom 
Bezirksparteitag Ostsachsen 15-16.3.1924, B1.9. 
24 SAPMO, 13/9/57, Resolution der Mitte, Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland 15-16.3.1924, B1.83. 
25 For the Ruhr, where the district party congresses were a "precursor" for the "left turn" sanctioned by the 
9th Reich Party Congress see, Herlemann, B., Kommunalpolitik der KPD im Ruhrgebiet 1924-1933 
(Wuppertal, 1977), p27ff. 
Page 87 
received 63 votes, the four opposing votes coming from the Centre Group.26 The Centre 
Group was not a united faction, although it voted on a factional slate: it housed both 
Rightists, who wanted to retain influence in the KPD, and Comintern-loyalists, whose 
leading regional figures were in contact with Stalin and Zinoviev. In East Saxony it was 
the latter grouping who dominated the district party. The Centre Group's leading district 
functionaries set out to "demonstrate" that the Comintern's united front policy had been 
correct, but the KPD's "application" of it had been at fault. All leading regional figures in 
the KPD knew that the Comintern had instructed the KPD to enter the Saxon SPD-led 
government in autumn 1923; however, to openly state this was treated as sacrilege. Hom's 
speech stressed the KPD's policy was only to "unmask" the SPD and thereby increase the 
KPD's mass base.27 Sigrid Raedel defended the Comintern's policy by putting forward the 
view that to abandon all aspects of the united front, as advocated by the Left, would turn 
the KPD into a sect.28 During the debate at the District Party Congress the Centre Group 
repeatedly asserted that its platform had the Comintern's explicit backing. Hom indicated 
that the Comintern was calling for party "unity" on the basis of a leadership coalition 
between the Left and Centre, which would then carry out a leftist variant of the united 
front policy, stressing the united front from below and outright propaganda attacks on the 
SPD leaderships at all levels. Hom quoted a letter from Zinoviev to Wilhelm Koenen, a 
leading Comintern-Ioyalist in the Saxon KPD, which stated that: "Without the Centre 
Group the Left cannot work and govern the KPD.,,29 The fact that the Left had no 
intention of tempering their challenge to party policy by entering a leadership coalition 
26 SAPMO, I 3/10/106, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 8-9.3.1924, Bl.l6ff. The Zentrale's speaker for 
the Centre Group was Remmele. 
27 SAPMO, I 3/8/14, Bezirksparteitag Ostsachen am 15-16.3.1924, B1.7(Horn). 
28 ibid, B1.9(Raedel). 
29 ibid, B1.7, 11 (quote)(Horn). 
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brokered by the Comintem was made clear by the Left's representative at the East Saxon 
district Party Congress. Arthur Rosenberg stated that: " World revolution was now 
unstoppable. The Left would not be held back by representatives of other views. ,,30 The 
district party was also infonned that a purge of the Left's opponents in Berlin had already 
begun.31 The District Party Congress finally accepted the Centre Group's resolution 
against that of the Left by a margin of 43 votes to 34; the political leadership went to 
Renner who represented the Centre Group.32 
In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the other Saxon party district, the Centre Group included both 
Right Communists, who wanted to retain influence on party policy to limit locally the 
impact of a "left-tum" in the Reich party, and Comintem-Ioyalists. Fritz Heckert's speech 
for the Centre Group at the District Party Congress represented a clear defence of the 
Comintem's position: 
The party had wrongly believed that it could take the left-wing of the SPD on the 
way to revolution. We should not have made refonnist calls for bread and benefit 
from the Landtag because this awakened democratic illusions in the masses ... 
Social Democratic workers thought the KPD had come onto their own territory 
and that extra-parliamentary struggle had become unnecessary.33 
The Centre Group's resolution called for the Comintem to "show its brother parties the 
way" and stressed that the KPD's "false application of the united front", not the policies 
decided at the 3rd and 4th World Congresses of the Comintem, had led to defeat. 34 
However, the real significance of the District Congress was the continued influence in the 
30 ibid, BI.I0(Rosenberg). 
31 ibid, B1.11(Raedel). 
32 'b'd I I . 
33 SAPMO, 13/9/57, Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 15-16.3.1924, B1.12. 
34 SAPMO, 13/9/57, Resolution der Mitte, B1.83. 
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district of the Right. The Brandler-Thalheimer Group had officially only four delegates out 
of 52. However, the delegates voted for Siewert as Political Secretary and Kuehn as 
Organisational Secretary: thus two leading members of the Right retained the two most 
important positions in the district party.35 Furthermore, Paul Boettcher, Communist 
Finance Minister in the Saxon government of October 1923, was placed at the head of the 
list of Reichstag election candidates along with Max Hoelz, another right-wing 
Communist.36 Behind what was a seeming landslide majority vote for the platform of the 
Centre Group, gaining 41 votes to seven for the Left and four for the Right, Erzgebirge-
Vogtland remained a stronghold of the Brandler Group.37 The Zentrale in Berlin 
immediately made its position clear stating that: "It is impossible to elect comrades 
holding such views into leading positions. ,,38 
By the 9th Reich Party Congress in April 1924, 19 of the 26 district party leaderships 
were led by the Left. Two of the seven districts which had rejected the Left's position 
were in Saxony, placing the region in conflict with the new national majority. Local 
factors had influenced the political perspectives of the Saxon district party organisations. 
West Saxony, which in line with the majority of district parties throughout the Reich had 
moved to the Left, had been unable even in a period of acute social breakdown, to 
significantly penetrate the SPD's core constituency. The left functionaries who rose into 
the party apparatus after the collapse following 1923 blamed the KPD's failure to cause a 
revolution starting in Saxony on the united front tactic's seemingly mistaken policy of 
contact with the SPD. These developments have been explained at national level as part of 
35 ibid, Bericht ueber den Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 15-16.3.1924, B1.77. 
36 Weber, Wandlung, p60. 
37 SAPMO, I 3/9/57, Resolution der Linke, B1.84; Resolution der Gruppe Brandler-Thalheimer, ibid, p85. 
38 ibid, Bericht ueber den Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 15-16.3.1924, B1.77. 
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the KPD turning in on itself and looking to "substitute actions" in the absence of a 
I . 39 revo utlonary movement. 
In the decentralised industrial structure predominant in the south-west of Saxony, in 
Erzgebirge, Vogdand and the Chemnitz-Zwickau textile area, political and economic 
factors combined to assist the KPD's breakthrough. The organisational tradition in both 
the SPD and trade unions was much more weakly developed and the local SPD was 
strongly left oriented, disposing it to co-operation with the local KPD.40 This produced a 
breach in the SPD's organisational wall through which the united front tactic could recruit 
Communist membership and sympathy. The united front tactic may not have produced a 
revolution in Saxony but it had produced at district level a mass party with a vote and 
membership which held up much more strongly throughout 1924 than in the Left's 
strongholds of Berlin, the Rheinland-Westphalia and Wasserkante.41 District activists had 
no immediate incentive to abandon a tried and tested tactic which had widened the district 
party's influence. In East Saxony, with the exception of the southern areas in the 
administrative districts of Freiberg and Dippoldiswalde, which were in Erzgebirge, the 
strength of the SPD in the industrial centres had strongly limited the KPD's 
breakthrough.42 The district communist leadership attributed the resilience of the local 
SPD to the strength of the socialist tradition in the sub-region and the SPD's well 
organised party and press apparatus, which contrasted to the KPD's organisational and 
financial weaknesses.43 The traditional presentation of Saxony as a centre of right-wing 
39 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p118; Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik, p262ff. 
40 Klenke, D., Die SPD Linke in der Weimarer RepubUk (vol.1; Munster, 1987), pp374,404. 
41 Statistical details in Weber, Wandlung, pp359-94. 
42 On East Saxony as a stronghold of the right-wing of the Saxon SPD see, Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', 
p154. 
43 SAPMO, I 3/8/23, Protokoll der Bezirksleitungsitzung (BLS) vom 19.5.1924, Bl.27. 
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communism must, therefore, be modified to take account of the division of political 
tradition and socio-industrial development which divided the southwest of the region from 
the northwest to east. It became increasingly clear, however, that in power the Left had no 
more interest in making concessions to regional factors than the Comintern had in 
conceding to the Left's calls for national variations in the General Line. This set the stage 
for the new Zentrale's conflict with the Saxon party and the Comintern. 
Immediately after the District Party Congresses, which were held in the course of 
February 1924, Zinoviev warned the Left that the Comintern would not countenance a 
rejection of the united front tactic.44 However, at this early stage in the dispute with the 
Comintern, Ruth Fischer was able to unite the Left in its factional objective of dominating 
the party apparatus and implementing a policy of isolation from and outright confrontation 
with the SPD.45 With a threefold majority of Left delegates over the Centre Group at the 
KPD's 9th Reich Party Congress in April 1924 the stage was set for the official adoption 
of the programme of the former Left Opposition. 
At the KPD's 9th Congress the Comintern demanded that the KPD's policy resolutions 
did not conflict with the central thrust of its international policy. Principally this meant 
that the KPD's left-wing was told to abandon its advocacy of independent communist 
trade unions and to continue the united front, albeit with the emphasis from below (ie only 
with the SPD's rank-and-file members). To ensure the implementation of the Comintern's 
policy Zinoviev called for the inclusion of the Centre Group in a leadership coalition. 
However, Ruth Fischer sanctioned none of these demands.46 These issues remained the 
44 St.Ha.D., (Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden), MdI,Nr.11126, Kaempfer, Nr.60, Beilage, 14.5.1924.,"Zur 
Lage in der KPD"., (Zinoviev; written in 3.1924), Bl.189. 
45 Weber, Wandlung, pp63-4. 
46 ibid, p63. 
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central areas of conflict between the KPD's new Zentrale and the Comintern until the 
"Open Letter" of the 1st of September 1925, which ousted the Fischer leadership and 
imposed the Comintern's General Line. The Comintern's intention of using the Anglo-
Soviet Trade Union Commission, set up in April 1924, to combat concerns about British 
foreign policy in China, brought mounting pressure on the KPD to desist from 
ant agonising the national section of the Socialist International of Trade Unions in 
Germany.47 Soviet foreign policy required as influential a Communist Party in Germany as 
possible, not an ultra-Leftist sect under the party's Left.48 As the priority of Soviet state 
policy could not be openly stated, Moscow developed a pseudo-revolutionary rationale, 
which stressed the importance of the united front policy for all communist parties. At this 
stage, however, the Left in the KPD did not rely on the Comintern for its majority 
position in the KPD and continued to reject a return to the united front policy. The left-
wing of the SPD, which at local level was most disposed towards limited co-operation 
with the KPD, continued to be regarded as the greatest threat to the purity of communist 
policies in Germany.49 
The KPD's 9th Congress defined the party's central objective as "organising the 
revolution" in the shortest possible time. This required: 
A complete break with the ideology of the past period, when the false application 
of the united front tactic filled the party with the feeling of weakness and when the 
KPD saw itself as a party among others. The KPD is the party of the 
47 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p424. 
48 ibid, pp423-4; Flechtheim, Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (3 edn.; Hamburg, 1986), ppI65-6. 
49 Bericht ueber die Verhandlungen des IX Parteitages. Abgehalten in FrankfurtlM vom 7. bis 10. April 
1924, (Berlin, 1924) [hereafter: Bericht.9.Parteitag], pp112-1l7,128-64. 
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proletariat. .. the party must be made uniform. Its leadership must be uniform, its 
ideology made uniform, its structure made uniform.50 
During the Fischer-era it became clear in Saxony that this assertion of uniformity meant a 
purge of all those who disagreed. The term used in the quest for a monolithic party was 
Bolshevisation, whereby party discipline was invoked to legitimise "liquidating" factional 
opposition and the party's re-organisation on the basis of factory cells was to provide the 
organisational structures to channel the Left's agenda, with the minimum of resistance, 
from the Zentrale to the lowest cell. The adoption of ultra-Leftism in the KPD was 
undertaken during a period of a rapid social and economic stabilisation, which weakened 
the appeal of the Left: both the party membership and functionary core contracted as the 
crisis of 1923 ebbed.51 
Imposition of Left Leaderships in Saxony 
When the Fischer Group took control of the central party apparatus at the 9th Congress it 
was able to act against the recalcitrant districts. 52 The resistance of the Centre Group in 
East Saxony was relatively weak and short lived. As the Left had co-operated with 
Zinoviev at the 5th World Congress of the Comintem, the Comintem-Ioyal component of 
the Centre Group, mistakenly, thought that its cause would be best served by cooperation 
with the Zentrale at district level. With the co-operation of the district apparatus, the Left 
Zentrale was able to hold a District Party Congress in June, which finally gave East 
Saxony's support for the decisions of the 9th Reich Congress. The BL was placed under 
the leadership of Schneider and Gaebel, freeing Sigrid Raedel and Ruddolf Renner for 
50 ibid, pp334ff. 
51 Weber, Wandlung, ppI8-9. 
52 Details of the Districts outwith Saxony, Weber, ibid, pp74-84; Flechtheim, Die KPD, p 159. 
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work in the Reich apparatus.53 However, developments in Erzgebirge-Vogtland were 
complicated by the continued occupation of the district apparatus by the Brandler faction, 
under Siewert and Kuehn.54 When the ZA met on the 20th of May, the first meeting after 
the 9th Congress, only Erzgebirge-V 0 gtland continued its opposition to the Ze ntrale. 55 To 
purge the leadership associated with implementing the Brandler policy in 1923 the 
Zentrale sent Paul Schlecht into the district to prepare a palace coup and install a new 
left-wing leadership under the Berzt Group.56 This was finally achieved at the District 
Party Congress in May 1924 which endorsed the resolutions of the 9th Congress.57 The 
Left had already made clear its refusal to compromise at district level. At the District 
Congress in March it was stated that: "Oilly through the whole party's orientation on the 
basis of the Left, under a united Left leadership, can the KPD overcome the present crisis 
and become a real communist party. ,,58 The Right stronghold of Erzgebirge-Vogtland was 
now placed under a Zentrale-Kommisariat: a leftist BL was imposed in a stronghold of 
right-wing communism; its function was to root out all dissent to the policies of the Reich 
leadership. 
53 SAPMO, 13/8/15, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Ostsachsen am 21-22.6.1924, B1.1;12-13. Renner and 
Raedel continued to work in the party apparat after submitting to party discipline. 
54 SAPMO I 3/9/57, Bericht ueber den Parteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland, B1. 77. For details on the 
factionally bases debate on party policy, SAPMO, I 3/9/57, Protokoll. Bezirksparteitag am 15-16.3.1924, 
B1.1-51. 
55 Weber, Wandlund, p77. 
56 ibid, pp77-8. 
57 SAPMO, I 3/9/58, Kaempfer, Nr.65/7Jg, Beilage, 20.5.1924, B1.8. 
58 SAPMO, I 3/9/57, Resolution der Linke am Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 15-16.3.1924, 
Bl.84. 
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The 5th Congress of the Comintern and the Fischer Gambit. 
The Left Zentrale had a prominent Achilles heel: only the "ultra-Left" around Scholem, 
Katz and Rosenberg and a minority in Fischer's own faction were prepared to come into 
open conflict with the Comintern. The assertion of independence in policy making at the 
9th Reich Congress would therefore have to be tempered with the need to hold together 
the diversity of groupings which comprised the KPD's former Left Opposition. Ruth 
Fischer was already involved in efforts to prevent the publication of material detailing the 
disagreements between the Left Zentrale and the Comintern.59 The Left, while in fact 
continuing to challenge the legitimacy of the Comintern's United Front policy,60 now 
informed not only the wider party membership but also the Left factions' district level 
factional adherents that it was implementing Comintern policy. 61 
At the 5th World Congress of the Comintern Fischer's tactics aimed at holding the unity 
of the German Left. Instead of carrying the policy of "mobilisation from below" into the 
Comintern's World Congress and blaming the "failed October" in Germany on the 
Comintern and its united front policy, as Bordiga and the Italian "ultra-Left" did, Ruth 
Fischer and the German delegation co-operated with Zinoviev against the Right in France 
and Czechoslovakia and the "ultra-Left" in Italy.62 Retaining the leadership of the KPD 
became central to Fischer's strategy. Ruth Fischer was aware that Bolshevik: uniformity 
meant the Comintern's "international" tactic had implications for the KPD's domestic 
German political line. For this reason the "Fischer-gambit" began whereby the uppermost 
59 Weber, Wandlung, p67. 
60 The challenge to the United Front is made clear in Die International during the fIrst half of 1924, see, 
Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p123. 
61 SAPMO, I 3/9/58, Kaempfer, Nr.65/7Jg, Beilage, 20.5.1924., "Die angenommene Resolutionen", B1.8. 
62 Weber, Wandlung, pp81-3. 
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leadership under Fischer and the ultra-Left played for time in the hope that the Left's 
policies in Germany would be justified by events. This was the policy which became 
known as "double bookkeeping": its prospects of success ultimately lay in the outcome of 
the power struggle in the CPSU, which at this point seemed far from clear cut. The 
resolutions adopted at the 5th Congress of the Comintern, as they were refracted through 
the Left-Zentrale, were transmitted throughout the KPD into the party's grass-roots. The 
Saxon KPD, as a centre of Right Communism, became absorbed in a paralysing factional 
struggle over the correct policy for a communist party and its relationship with the wider 
social democratic workers' movement. 
My Enemies Enemy is my Friend: The Fischer Leadership Purges "Trotskyism" in 
Saxony. 
After the "failed October" of 1923 the Fischer Zentrale was able to exploit the "anti-
Luxemburgist" mood within leading functionaries in the Centre Group and the Left to 
purge the Right faction. In the course of 1924 some 60-70 per cent of all full-time 
functionaries in the KPD were purged. 63 This momentum was channelled into a campaign 
against "Trotskyism. ,,64 In the Soviet Union this campaign was part of the Stalin-Zinoviev 
axis's campaign to oust Trotsky from influence in the Politburo. The campaign was 
intended to be parallelled by the removal of the "ultra-Left" (ie the most independent 
minded Communists) in the European Communist Parties.65 However, in Germany the 
63 ibid, p74; Fowkes, German Communism, pI22. 
64 Weber, Wandlung, p89ff. 
65 ibid, p90. 
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Left exploited Trotsky's association with the party's "old leadership" under Brandler, to 
eliminate Right-communism and its influence in the KPD.66 
After the Zentrale adopted the campaign against Trotsky, the district party apparatus was 
instructed to implement the purge.67 The Saxon district party press also openly sided with 
the Stalin-Zinoviev faction in the CPSU.68 Despite concerns that an "ideological" debate 
would paralyse party work the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogdand decided that the campaign 
would prevent the membership being taken by surprise if the CPSU suddenly ousted 
Trotsky.69 The BL then organised "Trotsky or Lenin" conferences, at which a vote was 
taken and a propaganda tirade made against "Trotskyists" in the form of the Brandler 
faction. These conferences were then reported in the regional press.70 The BL's ability to 
purge local activists was made dependent on "demonstrating" breaches of party discipline. 
However, the ECCI at the beginning of 1924 had made it clear that should the leading 
members of the Brandler faction be purged, the Comintern would intervene to reverse the 
KPD's decision. This was not least because the Right had acted as loyal Comintern 
members and their role as scapegoats today could easily become that of party leaders 
again tomorrow. 71 
The campaign against Trotsky, which peaked during the winter of 1924/5, took on its 
greatest dimensions in Saxony in Chemnitz and Doebeln where the Brandler faction 
66 ibid, p89 and note 178. 
67 Staatsarchiv Bremen (Sta.B.) Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht ueber die politische und wirtschaftliche 
Lage im Freistaat Sachsen (Januar 1925) (henceforth: Monatesbericht). 
68 H.Sta.D., MdI,Nr.11125, B1.61., Halbwochenbericht (henceforth: HWB), Nr.1, Dresden am 6.1.1925. 
69 SAPMO I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 24.11.1924, B1.237. 
70 SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 19.1.1924, B1.7-8. In the Ruhr there was opposition to 
any such purge on the grounds that it would make the KPD a sect and would involve the loss of 
prominent leaders such as Zetkin, Pieck, Eberlein and Radek, Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, pp61-2. 
71 Watlin, Die Komintern, p74. 
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continued to have strong support.72 The main political speeches, somewhat ironically, 
attacked Trotsky's "unacceptable role in the Comintern. ,,73 Leading functionaries, such as 
Ernst Schneller, made speeches concerning the world political situation and the "party 
debate" which associated Trotsky with policies which would "always" lead to failures like 
in October 1923.74 Where district conferences, such as in Doebeln, continued to show 
strong resistance to the Zentrale's position, the BL sent representatives into membership 
meetings to eliminate the base of support for "Trotskyism".75 In the Chemnitz sub-district 
the Zentrale set up special courses to create an "elite of functionaries" to represent the 
party line at public meetings: a strategy which clearly reflected the difficulties experienced 
. h l' 76 carrymg out t e po ICy. 
The main immediate impact of the campaign against "Trotskyism" was a membership 
exodus which received considerable attention in the middle class and SPD press. 
However, the KPD presented the defection of Communist local councillors to the SPD as 
a "welcome purification" of the party.77 The long-term impact of exploiting the power 
struggle in the CPSU to reinforce factional domination in the KPD had a twist of bitter 
irony: Ruth Fischer had unintentionally contributed to the sidelining of Trotsky 
throughout the Comintern and narrowed the basis of opposition to Stalin's policy of 
"socialism in one country" in the second half of the 1920s.78 
72 SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 19.1.1925, B1.17-18., 
73 SAPMO I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 24.11.1924, B1.237. 
74 SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 19.1.1925, B1.17-18. 
75 'b'd 1 1 . 
76 St.Ha.D., MdI,Nr.11125, HWB, NrA, Dresden am 16.1.1925, B1.70. 
77 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht (January 1925). 
78 Weber, Wandlung, pp96-8. Weber stresses the KPD's struggle against its own traditions. However, this 
overstates the currency of an identifiable Luxemburgist opposition to the dominant ideological position on 
the role of a Leninist party. 
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3.3 Ultra-Leftism on the Streets of Saxony. 
The Workers' Block? 
The first thread pulled by the Comintern in the tapestry of Gennan left -Communism, 
which would finally unravel Ruth Fischer's policy objectives, was the Left's agreement to 
carry out the policies of the 5th Comintern Congress. The 5th Comintern Congress, 
despite it radical rhetoric, wanted a de facto return to the united front policy, which ran 
parallel to the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy.79 The new Zentrale, and its policy of 
Bolshevisation, however, were committed to a headlong dash to re-mold the KPD as an 
ultra-Leftist revolutionary party in strict isolation from the "reformist influences" of the 
social democratic workers' movement. To make any concession to the policies carried out 
by the "old regime" in the KPD was regarded as sowing the seeds which could grow into 
a challenge to the new leadership in the party. In the areas of Saxony which had continued 
to carry out a policy of contact with the wider workers' movement, above all in 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the party leadership was involved in efforts to oust those 
responsible.80 
In October 1924 the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland met to discuss the Zentrale's directives 
on party policy. While making verbal concessions to the Comintern Congress' policy for 
its national sections, the KPD leadership continued its policy of confrontation and strict 
demarcation from the Saxon SPD. The KPD's extra-parliamentary tactic went under the 
slogan of "The Workers' Block", which was published in the party press in mid October 
79 Claudin, F., The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominform (London, 1975), pp145f. 
80 For details of the Right's factional organisation, SAPMO, I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 
20.l0.1924, Bl.I98-9; For continued support for Brandler's policies among functionaries, SAPMO, I 
3/3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 24.9.1924, Bl.183. 
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1924.81 The "Workers' Block" slogan called for a united front under communist leadership 
to "take up struggle against Social Democracy and the bourgeoisie. ,,82 The debate in the 
BL initially focused on defining what policy would mean in practice and the implications 
of the return of the term "united front". Consensus was eventually reached around Heine's 
position that: "The united front meant co-operation only with the workers in the factories 
against the SPD- Buergerblock government in Saxony, under communist leadership. ,,83 
The organ (ie organisational form) of the united front policy, the transmission belt to 
communism, was less easily resolved. One section of the BL believed that the policy of a 
"Workers' Block" came from an unnecessary feeling of weakness and overshadowed the 
central strategy of destroying the SPD. Agreement, however, finally crystalised around the 
concept that the organ of the united front would be "born in struggle" and that the 
emphasis should be placed on a united front under the KPD's leadership without 
concession to the SPD.84 The BL had in practice continued the "social fascist" line of 
organisational separation from the SPD to the point of disregarding even the so-called 
communist "Unity Committees", which had played such an important role in 1923, while 
issuing a slogan for non-Communists to come to the party. Left-wing communists 
remained hostile to contact with the SPD's left-wing activists out of concerns that this 
would dilute the ideological predilections of the district party still further to the "right". 
Instead of bringing the KPD's membership into direct contact with left-wing Social 
Democrats, the BL preferred to use only the so-called "Red Days" and delegations to 
81 Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p59ff. Herlemann details a functionaries' meeting which concurred with 
the Comintem's position that the time was no longer ripe for revolution. In The Erzgebirge-Vogtland BL 
the "Workers' Block" was an adaptation of Comintem policy to the Zentrale's ideological position. 
82 SAPMO, I 3/9/59, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.10.1924, B1.192. 
83 ibid, B1.193. 
84 SAPMO, I 3/9/59, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.10. 1924.,Bl.193-4(Debate: esp. Heine and Benzel). 
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communist congresses using the name "workers' congresses".85 Although the "Workers' 
Block" was merely a platform for agitation and propaganda, the Left in the BL followed 
up any "move to the right" with the clear message that the policies of 1923 would not be 
permitted and that those attempting to establish a rapprochement with the SPD and treat 
it "like a workers' party" would be disciplined.86 
Under the Fischer leadership the communist movement's concept of "revolutionary 
discipline" (ie subordination to decisions made by higher party authorities) was being 
exploited in the interests of the Left's domination of the party.87 To serve this purpose 
Scholem (head of the Orgburo) and Ruth Fischer compiled detailed reports on the factions 
in the RKP, Comintem and KPD.88 In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, even before the adoption of 
the "Workers' Block" policy, the Right were reconstituting their faction locally. At an 
Extra-Ordinary Functionaries' Conference in Chemnitz on the 11th of September Bertz 
reported that the Right were not only organised and active in Doebeln, but that Brandler 
supporters had re-taken the leadership of Chemnitz and the sub-district had consequently 
lost the confidence of the Zentrale. Bertz's proposed action in Erzgebirge-Vogtland to 
remove the remaining two Right members of the BL. The ostensible issue was the so-
called "Case of Basil and Borowsky": two prominent regional functionaries who were 
corresponding with Brandler, who had been called to Moscow, on the situation in the 
85 For Northern Bavaria see, Neuhaeusser-Wespy, U., Die KPD in Nordbayern 1919-1933. Ein Beitrag 
zur Regional und Lokalgeschichte des deutschen Kommunismus (Nuemberg, 1981), pp133-5. 
86 SAPMO, I 3/9/59, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.10.1924, B1.193. For BL members, such as Benzel, 
even this was an unnecessary admission of weakness. Benzel stated that the KPD was "strong enough to 
use the slogan, 'destroy the SPD"'. 
87 Weber, Wandlung, pp78-9. 
88 SAPMO, 13/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.10.1924, Bl.I98-9. 
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KPD by couriers in the Comintem apparatus.89 The affair in fact illustrates the limits on 
the BL's ability to purge prominent regional dissidents for "private opinions" so long as 
they represented the party line in public. Although a significant minority of the BL voted 
to remove Borowsky from his post as editor of the district party paper, der Kaempjer, the 
motion was rejected by 10 votes to 8 on the grounds that Borowsky had always "faithfully 
represented the party line" and had not acted to organise factional activity. However, Basil 
in his capacity as a trades union functionary, had represented the Right's factional position 
instead of the official party line at a district conference on union policy. This resulted in a 
unanimous vote to relieve Basil of his party functions. The only remaining prominent 
right-wing functionaries used by the district apparatus were now Siewert and Borowsky.90 
The Left's constant complaints that right-wing activists were making a difficult situation 
worse, was also shown in a key stronghold of the Right: in the factories almost all 
functionaries remained loyal to Brandler and new reliable functionaries, who would carry 
out the Left's policies, were almost non-existent among grass roots party activists.91 Local 
Communist activists in this part of Saxony continued to respond to the local rank-and-file 
SPD on the basis of what would serve the interests of radical workers best, rather than 
ultra-Leftist ideological proscriptions. Where contact for immediate communist objectives 
was possible, local militants continued to exploit such opportunities. One such example 
was in Limbach, a communist stronghold in the early 1920s. In May 1924 the KPD and 
SPD voted together in the Town Hall in order to supply striking miners with food at the 
expense of the municipal budget. This was viewed as more productive than the Left's 
89 H.Sta.D., MdI, Nr.I1124, Staatspolizievervaltung (henceforth: SPy) den 18.9.1924, B1.94; SAPMO, I 
3/9/66, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 21.7.1924, B1.88ff. 
90 Details of the "Case of Borowsky and Bassile" in, SAPMO, I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 
8.9.1924, B1.141-152. 
91 SAPMO, 13/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 24.9.1924, B1.183. 
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policy that all co-operation with the SPD in local parliaments misled workers' about the 
SPD's "true" role.92 
Kommunalpolitik: A Stronghold of the Saxon Right. 
At the beginning of 1924 all political policy was detennined by the "social Fascist" thesis, 
which rejected any co-operation with the SPD under the slogan "we do not do 
parliamentary 'work', but only use it for agitation and the disorganisation of the bourgeois 
state. ,,93 During the "ultra-Left" phase of parliamentary obstruction, from the Reichstag to 
Town Halls, all issues were used only to reinforce the "social fascist" thesis.94 Initially, the 
disappointments experienced by workers after the hyper-inflation and mass unemployment 
of 1923, increasing short-time employment and the loss of the eight hours day by the law 
of 21 st December 1923, translated into a significant protest vote for the KPD at local 
level. Although the KPD continued to be proscribed between the 23rd of November 1923 
and the 1 st of March 1924, in the tradition of the electoral laws of the Kaiserreich, the 
party was permitted to continue parliamentary work and to participate in election 
campaigns.95 In early 1924 the KPD became the strongest party in the city councils of the 
Ruhr cities of Gelsenkirchen, Herne and Muelheim.96 In Saxony the communal elections 
of 13th January produced a significant upswing for the KPD on this protest wave. The 
KPD's vote reached 16.5 per cent for Saxony as a whole, the SPD's share of the vote 
contracted to 27 per cent. Across the administrative districts the KPD's number of local 
92 H.Sta.D., MdI, Nr.11131, Tatigkeitsbericht Nr.ll , Limbach den 30.5.1924, Bl.ll0. 
93 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p407. 
94 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht (Oktober 1924). 
95 Neuhaeusser-Wespe, Nordbayern, ppI53-4. 
96 Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p28. 
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councillors in relation to that of the SPD was: in Bautzen 113 to 801; in Dresden 256 to 
1,580; in Leipzig 499 to 1,116; in Chemnitz 553 to 842; and in Zwickau 388 to 700.97 The 
KPD presented this in its party press as a "strong political revival in the work force". 
However, with characteristic ambiguity and contradiction, subsequent sentences in the 
same press articles and internal party circulars described how the "failed October" and the 
period of illegality had paralysed party activity. 98 In reality the municipal elections 
indicated the change in the direction of political affiliations during the Weimar Republic: 
the political left (SPD-KPD) lost its post-1918/19 electoral majority, and for the first time 
since the birth of the Republic the city councils in Leipzig, Dresden and Zwickau had a 
buergerlich majority.99 The impact of the events of 1923 on the Saxon political direction 
was also indicated by the Reichstag elections of May and December 1924, when the 
parties of the middle classes took absolute electoral majorities in the three Saxon electoral 
d· . 100 IStnctS. 
In Saxony the "social fascist" propaganda also continued to come up against the reality of 
an often entrenched SPD, with local party organisations which were dominated by the 
party's left-wing. Where the border between left-wing SPD and KPD local groups was 
eroded by every day contact, the BLs found greatest difficulty in avoiding organised co-
operation between the two parties. This took the fonn of Communist councillors electing 
socialist Buergermeister and "left presidiums", which sanctioned tactical voting 
97 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen (henceforth: StJFS), Nr.46, p458; B.a.P. 
(Bundesarchiv Potsdam) RKO 15.07, Nr. 243/l,B1.60ff. 
98 SAPMO, I 2/2/5, Protokoll der Sitzung der Zentrale mit den Vertretem den drei saechsischen Bezirken 
am 25.2.1925, B1.34,38,44. 
99 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p173. 
100 Falter, J., et. aI. Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik: Materialen zum 
Wahlverhalten, 1919-1933 (Munich, 1986), pp69-70. 
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agreements between the local SPD and KPD. In the party district Erzgebirge-Vogtland 
this centred on Doebeln and Oelsnitz, in the district of West Saxony this took place in 
Borna and in East Saxony in Freiberg, in the areas which were part of Erzgebirge.10I In 
Freiberg the extent of opposition to the official party line had become so pronounced that 
a Kommissar was appointed to supervise work in the 10cality.l02 The Zentrale, which 
received detailed reports on all areas of party work, tried to tighten its grip on communist 
activities in the municipal councils through the BL. The latter obliged UBLs to control the 
political line in the Town Halls using the "organisational method" of holding Local Group 
and Working Group meetings, which all deputies had to attend. The system was based on 
drowning out the communal deputies at meetings flooded with local leftists. 103 
The centres of resistance to the new Zentrale were Erzgebirge-Vogtland and the corner 
of East Saxony which belonged to Erzgebirge. In East Saxony the impact of 1923 had 
decimated the functionary core causing concern about the district party's ability to reverse 
the abrupt decline in the KPD's influence.104 In Erzgebirge-Vogtland, however, the Left 
leadership, which had been imposed on the district by the Zentrale, faced a well organised 
and active Right faction which continued to dominate the party's work in the local 
parliaments. l05 Even in the Left's Saxon stronghold of West Saxony, the Right faction's 
campaign against the political line of the new Zentrale did gain considerable support 
101 SAPMO, I 2/2/5, Protokoll der Sitzung der Zentrale mit den Vertretern den drei saechsischen 
Bezirken am 25.2.1925, B1.34-44. 
102 SAPMO, I 2/2/5, Besprechung der Zentrale mit den Pol. und Gewerkschafts-Sekretaeren vom 
25.2.1925, B1.1l8. 
103 This process is detailed in, SAPMO, I 3/8/33, Bericht vom Unterbezirktag der Oberlausitz, Ostsachsen 
am 18.1.1925, B1.58-9. 
104 SAPMO, I 3/8/33, Bericht ueber die Bezirkskonferenz des Bezirks Ostsachsen am 11.1.1925, B1.60f. 
105 Details on the factional organisation of the Right, see, SAPMO, I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland 
am 20.10.1924, Bl.I98-9. 
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among activists at grass roots level, for example at membership meetings in Leipzig.106 
However, the documentation shows that in northwestern Saxony the Right were unable to 
cause widespread difficulties for the BL. In communal politics this was due to the BL's 
ability not only to pack the Communal Advisory Councils with Leftists, but also to 
reconstitute the district apparatus with factional appointees.10? 
After Left BLs were imposed on Erzgebirge-Vogdand and East Saxony during the course 
of the summer there was a renewed drive to end all local parliamentary contact with the 
SPD.108 Party schooling courses aimed at the UBLs failed to regulate local policy,t°9 not 
least because of a lack of functionaries prepared to carry the leadership's policy.1l0 The 
BL made further efforts to impose its communal policy by having meetings of the Right 
communal deputies factions attended by members of the district party apparatus and 
chairmen of local party groupS.111 As these organisational measures failed to end 
resistance from local functionaries, and the disappointing results of the December 
106 SAPMO, I 3/10/117, Bericht ueber die Unterbezirk Mitgliederversammlung vom Gross Leipzig. Betr. 
die Angelegenheit Harry Kuehn und Paul Boettcher, vom 24.11.1924, B1.40-42. Until a representative for 
the Zentrale used party discipline to enforce the party line a vote for the independent activity of Right 
communists was accepted by 112 votes to 85. 
107 SAPMO, 13/8/16, Bericht der Vertreter Westsachsens. Bezirksparteitag am 4-5.4.1925. Ostasachsen, 
B1.30. 
108 SAPMO, 13/9/58, Bericht vom Bezirksparteitag 23-24.8.1924 Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Mitteilungsblatt 
an die Ortsgruppen und Betriebszellen der KPD im Erzgebirge-Vogtland,ende August 1924, B1.1lf; 
SAPMO, 13/8/15, Bezirksparteitag am 21-2.6.1924. Ostsachsen, B1.9. 
109 H.Sta.D., MdI,Nr.11125, B1.146-7., HWB, Dresden, den 8.4.1925. 
110 SAPMO, 13/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 30.3.1925, B1.96. 
111 H.Sta.D., MdI, Nr.11131, Mitteilungsblatt an die Ortsgruppen und Betreibszellen der KPD in 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland, Nr.3. Anfang August 1924, B1.84; SAPMO, I 3/8(27, KPD Ostsachsen. An die 
Zentrale der KPD. Politischer Bericht fuer die Zeit vom 16.9.1924 bis 1.10.1924, B1.315. 
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Reichstag elections gave further impetus to an increasingly well organised Right faction, 
the leadership acted more vigorously to oust its opponents.112 
In a whole range of city councils throughout southwestern and central Saxony, including 
Chemnitz, Doebeln, Freiberg, Freital, Babenau, Hartha, Kirchberg, Oelnitz i. V. and 
Oelsnitz i.E. and Heidenau, local KPD factions continued to elect "left presidiums" and 
SPD Buergermeister into 1925.113 The BL now set out to use sub-district conferences and 
meetings of local groups to impose the official party policy. In Freiberg, in East Saxony, 
this process was complemented by articles in the local press lambasting the "false" policy 
in local councils. The KPD's four deputies finally went over to the SPD parliamentary 
faction, which was controlled by a left-wing local party. The former Communist deputies' 
own statement stressed that, although the SPD's right-wing should be fought against, it 
was possible to go "part of the way" with the party's left-wing. The KPD followed up the 
defection with public meetings which insisted that outright hostility towards the SPD was 
the only revolutionary policy.114 In the smaller town halls of Soernewitz and Brockwitz, in 
the Meissen area, the BL was able to impose its position of strict opposition to the SPD. 
The area's domination by the right wing of the SPD made the process of imposing central 
control easier.115 At a Sub-District Congress in mid January, which dealt with "deviation" 
in Pirna, the newly appointed local leadership stated that the KPD was not an "appendage 
of the SPD", the "left presidiums" should consequently be broken up and that 
Communists should not be "duped" by leftist phraseology from the so-called left-wing 
SocialistS.116 
112 Weber, Wandlung, p79; For the Ruhr, Heriemann, Kommunalpolitik, pp60-1. 
113 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht (Februar 1925). 
114 SAPMO, 13/8/27, Politischer Bericht fuer Januar 1925, B1.329. 
115 'b'd 1 1 . 
116 SAPMO, 13/8/33, Bericht vom Unterbezirktag der Oberlausitz. Ostsachsen am 18.1.1925, B1.58. 
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The strength of the Right in Erzgibirge-Vogtland, however, made this area the focus of 
resistance in Saxony. In Doebeln the city deputies' faction decided to use a "United Front" 
policy with the SPD and in January 1925 elected a "left presidium". The pro-Zentrale 
functionary, Birnbaum, was then called to a meeting of the BL to report on events. 
Consequently, a sub-district conference was held and followed up in the smaller localities 
with membership meetings.1l7 Significantly, delegation to the sub-district conference 
included many hand picked delegates who supported the Zentrale's line.118 This ensured 
that, despite strong resistance from the Doebeln local party leadership, which had the 
majority of the local party organisation behind it, the upper leadership was able to prevent 
speakers presenting oppositional views. These methods of organisational control enabled 
the BL to gain a majority resolution against the city deputies' faction by 54 votes to 16.119 
Importantly, the main speech, made by Ernst Schneller, concentrated on world political 
events and connected these to the allegedly hannful role of Trotsky in the Comintern, the 
RKP and in the KPD itself.120 At the following membership meeting, organised by Heine, 
the BL used "worker comrades" (ie its own appointees) to impose a vote in favour of the 
Zentrale's political line by 35 votes to 14.121 In the more outlying local groups, such as 
Geringswalde, where the Right had openly spoken against the party line, the BL sent 
functionaries into membership meetings to ensure compliance with the upper-
leadership. 122 
117 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12.1.1925, Bl.lO. 
118 ibid, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 19.1.1925, Bl.17-18. 
119 ibid, B1.18. 
120 ibid, B1.16-17. Schneller was the Zentrale sectretary and responsible for communication between the 
uppermost leadership and the district. His role here indicates how seriously the issue was taken in the 
KPD. 
121 SAPMO, 13/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 9.2.1925, B1.39. 
122 ibid, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtlandam 12.1.1925, Bl.lO. 
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In Oelsnitz i.V. a Working Area (Arbeitsgebiet) conference was used in January 1925 to 
break up a "left presidium" of nine Communists and four Social Democrats. The district 
functionary, Mueller, presided over a vociferous dispute which was conducted as part of 
the party's "Leninism or Trotskyism" feud. The final resolutions then showed support for 
the BL, the Zentrale and the Comintern, while rejecting "Trotskyism" (ie opposition to the 
Zentrale's line ).123 Following the leadership's prescribed path the "left presidium" was to 
be broken up using a parliamentary motion relating to the conditions of the unemployed to 
"unmask" the SPD and give occasion for withdrawing from the presidium This was then 
to be complemented by meetings in factories to explain the KPD's actions. 124 The 
apparatus was being used to ensure that the KPD remained isolated from the influence of 
Social Democrats, in particular the SPD's left-wing which was defined as the KPD's "most 
dangerous enemy". In the first quarter of 1925, 57 communal deputies in Saxony left the 
KPD, almost all of them defected to the SPD.125 To maintain its factional domination of 
the Saxon party the BL's had expelled the activists who knew the local conditions best 
and had enthusiastically represented the KPD until 1924.126 The Zentrale's policy of 
ideological uniformity at any price, however, meant that the "functionary flight" was 
I "urif"" 127 treated as a we come p lcatlon. 
123 ibid, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 9.2.1925, B1.40-1. 
124 ibid, B1.41. The voting was 11 to 9 in favour of the BL's motion. 
125 Weber, Wandlung, pp79-80; Details on individual town halls in, H.Sta.D., MdI,Nr.11125, HWB, 
Dresden am 8.4.1925, Bl.I46-7.; Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, (Monatsbericht Februar 1925). 
126 'b'd 1 1 . 
127 'b'd 1 1 . 
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Continuous Campaigning or Communist Collapse? 
During 1924 the Fischer Zentrale asserted that the leftist inflection on policy prior to 
1924, in its strongholds in the industrial centres of the Ruhr, Wasserkante and Berlin, had 
advanced the party's influence.128 However, the regional influence of the KPD in 1923 and 
1924 contradicts the party leadership's assertions. In fact the correlation between the 
KPD's membership and electoral strength indicates that the eye of the storm in 1923 
looked over southwestern Saxony and Halle-Merseburg: the former representing a 
dispersed light industrial structure and the latter a concentrated heavy industrial structure 
stamped by the rapid industrialisation of the First World War. Common to both regions 
was the relative weakness of social democratic organisational traditions which conditioned 
the breach through which communist sympathies could flood. The collapse of the vote in 
the Left's strongholds in Berlin, Waserkante and the Ruhr by the December 1924 
Reichstag election, and the lower and more rapidly contracting membership figures, show 
a protest vote which ebbed as the economy stabilised. 
128 Weber, Wandlung, p77. 
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Table 1: Relative Electoral Strength ofKPD in the May and December Reichstag 
Elections and its Membership in Relation to the Population in Late 1923. 
District % Vote Membership / % Vote Dec 
May1924 Population Ratio (1923) 1924 
Berlin-Brandenburg 15.2 1:144 13.0 
Waserkannte 13.0 1:138 9.0 
Ruhr 20.5 1:214 13.0 
Lower- Rhine 22.0 1:218 16.0 
Upper- Silesia 22.9 1:964* 12.2 
Erzgebirge-Vogdand 19.8 1:55 14.8 
West -Saxony 15.7 1:128 12.5 
East-Saxony 8.4 1:329 6.5 
Halle-Merseburg 25.7 1:46 22.6 
Wuerttemberg 11.3 1:127 8.1 
Thuringia 15.6 1:170 13.1 
* Figures include all of Silesia. Source: Weber, Wandlung: 'Materialien zur Situation der 
KPD', pp359-394. 
The Fischer era was, however, characterised by an ideologically motivated drive to 
infuse the KPD with Leftist ideology, rather than objective political analysis of regional 
developments. At all levels of parliament the KPD abandoned proposals for the 
improvement of workers' pay and conditions, instead focusing on the need for outright 
obstruction in a capitalist system which could not be humanised.129 To the Left 
parliaments became a platform for often theatrical propaganda, which lampooned the 
existing social order. In the Saxon Landtag the Minister President was insulted in the 
129 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p462; For KPD disruption in municipal councils in the Ruhr, 
Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p26ff. 
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KPD's opemng address as a "completely wretched oaf,.130 During 1924 the Left-
leadership viewed elections as a means of "laying down a periphery" of voters which the 
party would then set out to recruit for communism. 131 The results of elections were 
presented as a measure of "how many workers stood behind the KPD", while insisting that 
"with elections alone nothing can be achieved.,,132 The KPD's method of winning the 
support of this "periphery" also involved recruitment campaigns for the party and press 
subscriptions, in which activists went throughout Saxony using issues like the impact of 
government tax and customs policies on the cost of living to attract support. 133 The party 
activists who carried out this party line, however, found that the workers' outside of the 
SPD's organisational enclosure, the so-called "indifferent" members of the factory 
workforce, remained equally unmotivated to become politicised communists. All 
communist factions venerated the factory as the richest seam of proletarian consciousness. 
However, in Saxony the KPD's post-1923 collapse and the new BLs' outright 
confrontation with the social democratic workers' movement only served to wear down 
party workers and marginalise the KPD in its self proclaimed decisive battleground.134 
The KPD limited the use of parliament to enabling the party to reach a wider audience 
when announcing its extra-parliamentary campaigns. Propaganda statements were 
vociferously followed up in the KPD's press, which made wildly exaggerated claims of 
how the party, allegedly mobilised into its smallest cells, followed up these issues in 
meetings campaigns on specific issues among women, youths, rural workers, the white 
130 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p462. 
131 Saechsische Arbeiterzeitung (SAZ), 18.6.1925, "Die Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag". 
132 Kaempjer, Nr.46, 26.4.1924, "Wir werden siegen". 
133 SAZ, 18.6.1925, "Die Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag"; Kaempjer, Nr.46, 26.4.1924., "Wir 
werden siegen". 
134 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht (Dezember 1925). 
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collar and independent Mittelstand, in addition to factory workers. 135 However, these 
claims served only as external and internal party propaganda: the BLs, at least in closed 
discussions, acknowledged that the party's functionary core had collapsed, above all in the 
factories, and that at most one third of the already depleted membership was prepared to 
carry out party work. By December 1924, of the hundreds of factory councillors and 
functionaries who had worked for the KPD until 1923, the leadership now estimated that 
only around 10% of them remained in the party. 136 
The Left undertook to create the internal party architecture to channel their policies into 
the grass roots party organisations and to root out all opposition. The domination of the 
district party apparatus and the re-organisation of the KPD's membership into factory cells 
were conceived of as the flagstones on which the party's Bolshevisation should be built. 
Functionary conferences, which were convened to organise campaigns, were dominated 
by leading district functionaries, and the weight of the district apparatus was used against 
opposition to the party line. Local functionaries' warnings that the Bolshevisation of the 
party was unable to forcibly politicise and motivate the membership were ignored. The 
documentation indicates that the all consuming preoccupation of the Zentrale and the BLs 
had become the internal party factional feud: the actual developments in the Saxon 
political system had been relegated into an ideologically distorted poor second place. The 
Zentrale's ideological tunnel vision, however, made the upper party leadership impervious 
to the impact this had on the KPD's political influence. One leftist functionary stated: "I 
am not satisfied with re-organisation. It demands a lot of work but everything just stays 
135 ibid, Monatsbericht (September 1924); ibid, Monatsbericht (November 1924). 
136 SAPMO, I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 8.12.1924, B1.240-1(Gustav). 
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the way it was before. ,,137 The demands that were placed on these party activists would 
have overwhelmed even the most highly motivated and well organised of parties. The 
focus of party work did, therefore, peak during electoral campaigns, with public meetings 
. h f" 138 Th occupymg t e centre 0 aCtIvIty. e party leadership, however, never adapted 
ideological political concepts to the reality of the period and continued to conceive of an 
integrated strategy of communist campaigns relating to the current central propaganda 
themes. 
In 1924 the clearest example of the KPD's conception of continuous political 
campaigning was its opposition to the Dawes Plan, a package of American financial aid to 
stabilise the German economy. The voelkisch Right in German politics saw the American 
loan as a national indignity, questioning the country's post-war sovereignty. The 
Comintern, however, saw it as an olive branch from the capitalist West, which wanted to 
re-integrate Germany into its economic system through a process of political 
rapprochement: a development which would isolate Soviet Russia in international 
relations. All factions in the KPD could agree that the defence of the Soviet state from 
another war of intervention was necessary: the question was what policy would best serve 
this objective by giving the KPD influence in German political life. The Fischer Zentrale, 
which throughout 1924 continued to insist that there was a revolutionary situation in 
Germany, were concerned by the Dawes Loan's ability to stabilise the economy and 
. 139 I li' al h thereby suppress the working classes' support for revolutIOn. n po tIc terms t e 
137 H.Sta.D., MdI, Nr.l1128, Am 17-18.5.l924 in Gasthaus "ZurLinde" in Chemnitz. 
Funktionaerkonferenz der KPD, Dresden, den 24.5.1924, B1.516. 
138 SAPMO, I 3/9/73, Bl.174, Jahresbericht der KPD. Erzgebirge-Vogtland, pp5-6. 
139 SAPMO, I 3/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 1.9/1924, Bl.130-1; H.Sta.D., MdI,Nr.1l126, 
Kaempfer, Nr.47, 28.4.1924, B1.59-60; For the German workers experiencing "too many of the good 
effects of the Dawes Plan", SAPMO, 13/9/67, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 30.3.1925, Bl.95. 
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KPD's propaganda focused on the alleged parliamentary "united front" in the Reichstag 
enabling the ratification of the Dawes Loan. The Act was passed spanning the votes of the 
DNVP, which split on the issue, to the SPD, whose leadership wanted a return to stability. 
The KPD's prosecution of the campaign against the Dawes Plan demonstrated, however, 
that left-wing communism, during a return to political and social stability, was pushing the 
party leadership away from the party membership as well as the wider electorate. Circulars 
called for convening factory meetings where the factory council was communist 
controlled: resolutions were be taken on the implications of the Dawes Loan and delegates 
elected to a Saxon Workers' Congress. Where this was not possible, factory cells were to 
invite sympathisers to "public factory meetings", which would follow a similar 
programme.140 Local groups were instructed to hold public meetings which should detail 
how the Dawes Loan would effect local communities.141 The campaign was also carried 
out among the unemployed. Prominent functionaries, such as Rudolf Renner, addressed 
meetings of the Committees of the Unemployed on the implications of the "Dawes 
Regime" for Saxony.142 The Saxon KPD also held rallies against the Diktat of the Dawes 
Plan using prominent national Communist Party figures, such as Ernst Thaehnann.143 The 
unemployed were then encouraged to demonstrate in front of factories to show solidarity 
with strikers and to participate in Explanation Squadrons to discourage strike-breaking. 
The presence of the unemployed was also used in front of Town Halls while communist 
motions to provide strikers with food at the expense of the local authority were being 
140 SAPMO, I 3/8(27, An die ZentraIe der KPD. Bericht ueber die Vorbereitung zur Kampagne gegen 
Londoner Pakt, Dresden, Mitte September 1924, B1.318. 
141 SAPMO, I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An aile Ortsgruppen. Dresden, den 16.5.1924, B1.9. 
142 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1727, Monatsbericht (November 1924). 
143 St.Ha.D.,MdI, Nr.I1124, SPY, den 21.8.1824. An das MdI, Dresden, B1.32; SPY, den 26.8.l924. An 
das MdI, ibid, B1.34. 
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discussed. l44 The KPD's press claimed that the Saxon Workers' Congresses had been a 
great success in winning the support of local Social Democrats, Anarchists and 
S d· li £ h' 145 . yn lca sts or t e KPD s programme ; however, there IS no corroborative documentary 
evidence. 
The Presidential Elections of 1925: The Last Stand of Independent Left-Communism. 
The death of President Ebert on the 28th of February 1925 led to the first election for a 
German president; due to the turbulence of political life in 1919 Ebert had received his 
mandate from the National Assembly at Weimar.146 Juergen Falter recently stressed the 
significance of the election of Hindenburg to the presidency, writing that: "it was von 
Hindenburg who at least encouraged if not sustained the creeping deparliamentarisation 
after 1930, a process which finally brought Hitler to power. ,,147 During the presidential 
elections in Germany a division of political interpretations emerged in the CPSU and the 
Comintern following Zinoviev's split with Stalin. The period 1924/5 in the CPSU, 
Comintern and KPD was characterised by active faction building. In February 1925 Stalin 
had attempted to win over Arkady Maslow. However, Maslow saw Stalin's overtures as 
an attempt to isolate Zinoviev, who the German Zentrale believed to be the "last barrier 
preventing the complete Russification of the Comintern. ,,148 However, the presidential 
144 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.11128, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An alle Unterbezirken, Arbeitsgebiete, Ortsgruppen und 
Betriebszellen, Dresden den 4.6.1924, B1.528. 
145 'b'd 1 1 . 
146 Kolb, Weimar Republic, ppI8-9. 
147 Falter, J.W., 'The Two Hindenburg Elections of 1925 and 1932: A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions', 
in Central European History (CEJ--l) 23 (2-3) (1990), p225. 
148 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p442; Stalin's letter to Maslov, Fischer, R., Stalin and German 
Communism. A Study in the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge, 1948), pp531-6; 'Stalin: Ueber die 
Prospcktiven in der KPD und die Boischevisierung', in Weber, Voelker hoert die Signale, p84. 
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elections in Gennany showed that the KPD was only prepared to support Zinoviev if he 
supported their leftis~ even if this subjected their closest ally in the CPSU to intense 
pressure.149 
The debate in the communist movement centred on whether to field an independent 
communist candidate in the second ballot. Stalin held to the more formal and tested 
criteria of aiming to exploit Gennan nationalism to maintain the wedge between the 
Western powers inserted by the Versailles Treaty: the election of Hindenburg was 
identified as the best chance of halting Gennany's "Western-Orientation" under the Dawes 
Loan and reviving the Rapallo Treaty and the status quo ante in international relations. 
Zinoviev, while also paying close attention to Soviet security interests, put the emphasis 
on ending the KPD's isolation in Gennany by sanctioning communist support for Otto 
Braun, the SPD's candidate, in the second ballot. Following the withdrawal of the SPD's 
candidate, Zinoviev favoured backing the candidate of the "Weimar Coalition", the 
Catholic Centre Party's Marx, against the monarchist Hindenburg. This policy squared 
more easily with the Comintern's central policy of International Trades Union Unity.1S0 
Division also ran through the KPD's Zentrale with Fischer, Katz and Thaelmann 
supporting an independent communist candidate. Maslow, however, advocated supporting 
149 On the factional split between Zinoviev and Stalin, Weber, Wandlung, pl08. 
150 Zinoviev's speech to the ECCI-Presidium in early April is discussed in, SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 4.5.1925, B1.142; Weber, Wandlung, pl06f; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, 
pp417-8; Geyer, D., 'Sowjet Russland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1918-32', in Vierteljahrshe/te 
fuer Zeitgeschichte (VjZ) 4 (1) (1976), p25, states that Zinoviev wanted the KPD to vote for Marx in the 
second ballot; Claudin, Communist Movement, p155, states that Stalin saw Hindenburg's presidency as a 
symptom of Germany's will to resist the Versailles Treaty and presumes that foreign policy reasons 
explained this; Eisner, F., Das Verhaltnis der KPD zu den Gewerkschaften in der Weimarer Republik 
(Cologne, Frankfurt/M, 1977), p 173, states that Moscow favoured Hindenburg's victory as this would 
force a change in the SPD's policy. The KPD's immediate use of an "open letter" to the SPD and ADGB 
national leaderships supports Eisner's thesis. 
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the "Republican" candidates to prevent a monarchist presidency.15I These were the first 
significant splits in the groupings which made up the KPD's Left leadership, which led 
later in 1925 to the Comintern's successful deposition of Stalin's opponents. I52 Having 
taken the decision to uphold the KPD's independent presidential candidacy under all 
circumstances, the Fischer leadership then suppressed Zinoviev's speech to the ECCI-
Presidium, which had cautioned against the party's lack of differentiation between Marx 
and Hindenburg, and passed its own policy directives to the BLs. 
The KPD's internal circulars demonstrate that the party intended to make the factories the 
main forum in the presidential elections of 1925. However, the impact of trying to 
conduct the election campaign in parallel to the party's forced re-organisation into factory 
cells had an adverse effect on the ability to perform party work. Party reports on the 
presidential election campaign acknowledged that a lower vote in the city of Chemnitz 
than in the surrounding countryside was due to the vast energy expended on the KPD's re-
organisation. The sub-district party organisations were in limbo between winding down 
the old structures and building up the new structures which would place factory cells at 
the centre of political campaigning. However, the factory cells which had already been 
constructed did not carry out party work which was unrelated to the factory, while the 
traditional use of party organisations in the residential districts was being neglected.
I53 
The resistance of the membership to the KPD's re-organisation on the basis of factory 
cells is illustrated by the fact that of 300 factory cells in the Erzgebirge-Vogtland district 
only some 10 to 20 actually issued factory papers dealing with the first ballot of the 
151 Weber, Wandlung, p106-7; The KPD's presidential candidate would have been Zetkin but her position 
on the party's Right prevented this, see, Voelker hoert die Signa/e, ppl04-5. 
152 Falter, 'Hindenburg Elections', p233. 
153 SAPMO, I 3/9/85, Bericht ueber die Reichspraesidentenwahl am 20.3.1925. Bezirk 9, B1.79. 
Page 119 
election. I54 In recognition of this problem, before the second ballot the district party 
targeted the 35 largest factory cells in an effort to ensure the publication of material: only 
18 of these cells responded. I55 The inability to hold factory meetings dealing with the 
KPD's presidential election campaign also forced the party to address workers outside of 
the factories at closing time. The KPD organised this by printing 3,000 copies of the 
factory paper, Betriebskaempfer, to link conditions in the factories with the election 
campaign. However, even where workers were seen leaving the factory gates after their 
shifts carrying copies of Der Betriebskaempfer there was very limited interest in the 
KPD's meetings. The localleaderships noted that in some cases workers had little time in 
which to catch trains returning to outlying localities. The BLs criticised local activists for 
failing to conduct party propaganda in the manner in which they had been instructed, such 
as using the technique of gathering around speakers to begin a meeting.156 
Despite the problems local groups had as a result of the re-organisation, all party 
members were expected to be actively involved in the campaign.157 The KPD's work plans 
called for a campaign of public meetings and demonstrations beginning on the 15th of 
February which would be conducted in tandem with a recruitment drive to increase 
membership numbers and press sales. Again internal party directives lay plain the great 
difficulties experienced by the KPD in overcoming the membership's "passivity" and lack 
of interest in an election which they believed could not be won.158 Among Right 
154 ibid, Bericht ueber die Reichspraesidentenwahl am 20.3.1925. Bezirk 9, B1.80; SAPMO, 13/10/125, 
An die Zentrale. Bericht des Bezirks 10 ueber den zweiten Wahlgang zur Reichspraesidentenwahl1925, 
B1.15l. 
155 ibid Bericht des Bezirks 9 zum Reichspraesidentenwahl am 26.4.1925, B1.97. , 
156 'b'd 1 1 . 
157 ibid, B1.98. 
158 ibid, B1.97. 
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Communists there was also hostility to a party tactic which would split the vote and hand 
the election to a "monarchist" .159 
After the first ballot the KPD was able to improve work in the residential districts by 
using the Working Area apparatus to mobilise the local groups more effectively.l60 In 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland this was done after the BL realised the necessity of work in the 
residential districts. Gustav pointed out that the SPD was using traditional methods of 
agitation and propaganda on the streets to good effect.161 The Rotfrontkaempferbund 
(RFB), the KPD's para-military organisation to rival those of the political Right and the 
SPD dominated Reichsbanner, made its first contribution to major political campaigning. 
Evening marches were held at which drummers attracted attention, a short speech was 
given and then literature was distributed.162 The role of the RFB as an organisation of 
Tatmenschen, who preferred political work to discussion, was a crucial counterbalance to 
a party submerged in a paralysing factional feud. 163 The KPD also paid increasing 
attention to the content of propaganda literature, noting that too much text served less 
effectively than picture propaganda. l64 The RFB also took the KPD's campaign into the 
more remote areas: above all this meant going into localities which had registered a 
reasonable vote in the first ballot but party meetings and demonstrations had not been 
159 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.4.1925.,B1.99. The BL noted that this conditioned 
the Right's opposition to the party line in Zwickau. 
160 SAPMO, 13/9/85, Bericht des Bezirks 9 zum Reichspraesidentenwahl am 26.4.1925, B1.98. 
161 SAPMO, 13/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.4.1925, B1.99. 
162 SAPMO, I 3/9/85, Bericht ueber die Reichspraesidentenwahl am 20.3.1925. Bezirk 9, B1.79. 
163 Reuter, G., KPD-Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammensetzung der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Hannover, 1982), ppl04ff. 
164) ibid. 
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held.
165 
The KPD's "Rural Sundays" were also included in the election campaign, in 
particular the last Sunday before the election. In West Saxony the cities of Wurzen, 
Grimma and parts of Meuselwitz were targeted after registering small vote increases in the 
first ballot.166 Despite rural workers' lack of enthusiasm for communism, the KPD's 
activities were part of a general development of taking political events into the villages. 
The KPD's regional apparatus was also used in an effort to mobilise the party 
membership. After poor results in the first ballot, conferences and membership meetings 
were organised which emphasised the need for the KPD's "leading role" in "revolutionary 
electoral activity". However, the main criticism of members who had been active in the 
campaign was the frequent late arrival of propaganda material. 167 Functionaries were 
brought together at Party Workers' Conferences at which sub-district leaders detailed 
party policy. The central role of these events was to mobilise the campaign for the second 
ballot. 168 Controllers, who worked on the BL's instruction, were also sent into smaller 
local groups in an attempt to ensure participation in the election campaign.169 
In East Saxony the inability of the district party to motivate party members to carry out 
the campaign was dealt with at a District Party Congress at the beginning of April. This 
was a technique now integral to enforcing the party line. The Zentrale's representative, 
Scholem, gave an ideological justification for the Zentrale's political line which asserted 
that to support the candidate of the "Weimar Coalition" would be to yield to refonnism, 
165 SAPMO, 13/10/125, An die Zentrale. Bericht des Bezirks 10 ueber den zweiten Wahlgang zur 
Reichspraesidentenwahll925, Bl.150. 
166 Sta.L., AH.Leipzig, Nr.2624, B1.51, Leipzig den 20.3.1925; SAPMO, 13/10/125, An die Zentrale. 
Bericht des Bezirks 10 ueber den zweiten Wahlgang zur Reichspraesidentenwahl 1925, Bl.150. 
167 SAPMO, I 3/9/85, Bericht des Bezirks 9 zum Reichspraesidentenwahl am 26.4.1925, B1.97. 
168 ibid, B1.97. 
169 ibid, B1.98. 
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leading to the "liquidation" of the KPD and the strengthening of the counter-revolution. 
The membership was encouraged to view the presidential elections in a "positive 
revolutionary sense" as part of the party's role in "leading the masses".170 Scholem's attack 
was especially directed against the Right, which in southern and southwestern Saxony, 
was issuing secret circulars to organise opposition to the Zentrale's political line. l71 In 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland the BL acted to curtail the Right's opposition in a range of local 
groups, most notably in Zwickau, by carrying out a series of sub-district conferences and 
local group and membership meetings. l72 
The KPD's campaigning continued to concentrate on a divisive tirade against the left-
wing of the Saxon SPD. The BL in West Saxony reported that: 
In the forefront of the (presidential election) campaign was the struggle against the 
"left" SPD and its leftist phraseology ... there is not a Communist left in West 
Saxony who does not see the "left" SPD as the most persistent and dangerous 
opponent. 173 
In the first ballot of the presidential election the KPD explained the SPD's electoral 
advantages with reference to two factors. Firstly, the SPD had already used the slogan 
"Republic or Monarchy" in the last election campaign for the Reichstag in a manner the 
KPD described as "exploiting the masses' instinctS.174 Secondly, the KPD was also aware 
that the SPD's "small daily work" in the trades unions, leading strikes over pay and 
170 SAPMO, I 3/8/16, Protokoll vom Unterbezirksparteitag am 4 u. 5.4.1925 in Freital, B1.21-4; ibid, 
Bezirksparteitag am 4 u.5.4.1925, B1.19. 
171 ibid, B1.21; SAPMO, 13/8/16, Zeitung (unnamed and undated), 'Bezirksparteitag der KPD. 
Ostsachsen', B1.62. 
172 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.4.1925, B1.99. 
173 SAPMO, I 3/10/115, Bericht des Bezirks 10 (Westsachsen), Mai 1925, B1.106; , SAPMO, I 3/10/107, 
'Die Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag', in Saechsische Arbeiterzeitung, den 18.6.1926.B1.12. 
174 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 7.5.1925, B1.137. 
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conditions, and in the co-operative movement, had brought strong support from workers. 
However, the KPD's Zentrale and BLs merely continued to assert that the SPD only 
. d "d' d' 1 d" h k 175 anne to ecelve an rms ea t e wor ers. One factor which did assist the KPD's 
campaign was the SPD Reich Executive's alienation of the Saxon left-wing by dropping 
the party's own candidate in favour of Wilhelm Marx in the second ballot. The KPD used 
this as a justification for fielding Thaelmann as an independent candidate in the second 
ballot against what was alleged to be the candidates of "large scale capital", in a united 
front of capitalists including the SPD.176 The KPD now focused its attacks on Marx's role 
as Chancellor in 1923 and his part in the loss of the "November Gains," including the 
eight hour working day.l77 The SPD's internal struggle over the choice of Marx as the 
"Republican" candidate disillusioned many activists in the regional party and prevented 
them campaigning for an unpopular candidate. This, in particular, reduced the 
participation of the SPD's left-wing and the Reichsbanner in the second ballot.178 At the 
national level the vote for Thaelmann fell in the second ballot: in Saxony it rose by 81,838 
votes reaching 286,001.179 The communist vote was strongest in the Chemnitz-Zwickau 
election district (138,647), followed by Leipzig (82,206) and then Dresden-Bauzen 
(65,148).180 However, in a further confirmation of the political defection of supporters of 
the parties of the "Weimar Coalition", the monarchist von Hindenburg won an absolute 
majority of the vote in Saxony taking 1,333,565 votes to the 977,100 votes taken by 
175 ibid, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 23.3.1925, Bl.94. 
176 SAPMO, 13/8/16, Zeitung (unnamed and undated), 'Bezirksparteitag der KPD. Ostsachsen', B1.62. 
177 SAPMO, I 3/9/68 BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 6.4. 1925.,Bl.99; "Thaelmanns 
Praesidentschaftskandidat der KPD (1925). 'An dis Waerktaetigen Deutschlands!', in, Weber, Voelker 
hoert die Signa/e, pp104-5. 
178 SAPMO, I 3/9/85, Bericht des Bezirks 9 zum Reichspraesidentenwahl am 26.4.1925, Bl.99. 
179 StJFS, Nr.46 (Dresden, 1927), pp425-6. 
180 'b'd I I , 
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Marx.181 Not only did the left-wing of the Saxon SPD feel let down by their national 
leadership's support for a bourgeois political figure, but the overwhehningly Protestant 
population appear to have been disinclined to vote for a candidate who was a leading 
figure in the Catholic Centre party.182 The KPD's press intended to promote this aversion 
to Marx's candidacy by publishing articles on his role in the Catholic "cultural reaction" 
which would lead young people away from the class war.183 With some irony, the left-
wing of the Saxon SPD appears to have voted for Thaelmann, a leader in a party intent on 
destroying German social democracy. However, when it became clear that the continued 
candidacy of Thaelmann in the second ballot had helped split the vote, allowing 
Hindenberg to win, there was not only hostility to the KPD within the social democratic 
work-force but also among many members of the party's own rank-and-file activists.184 
3.4 Moscow's Intervention: Independence Ends. 
The Leadership's Response 
Divisions within the CPSU at the ECCI's 5th Plenum during March and April 1925 had 
allowed the Fischer Zentrale to continue its policy of total opposition to social democracy 
in the presidential elections. However, following the presidential elections a uniform drive 
from Moscow called for the "moderation" of the KPD's policy towards the SPD in the 
181 'b'd I I , 
182 Lapp, 'Political Extremes', ppI87-8. The Catholic enclave of Zit tau did, however, vote overwhelmingly 
for Marx. Lapp also explained this in terms of local good relations between the SPD and DDP. 
183 SAPMO, I 3/8/16, Zeitung (unnamed and undated) 'Bezirksparteitag der KPD. Ostsachsen', B1.62, 
184 Weber, Wandlung, pl07; Mayer-Levine, R., Inside German Communism. Memoirs of Party Life in the 
Weimar Republic (London, 1977), p76; If the nominally Republican BVP had not instructed its Catholic 
constituency to vote for the Protestant Hindenburg, against the wishes of the national Centre Party, the 
necessary vote swing of half a million would probably have seen a victory for the Catholic Centre's and 
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interests of increasing the KPD's influence. On her return from Moscow Fischer 
introduced the policy of "Manoeuvre and Compromise". The policy held that during the 
"partial stabilisation of capitalism" the KPD was to work for partial (ie economic) 
demands in the Trades Unions, to use the United Front policy, including the United Front 
From Above (ie to address the SPD leadership directly), and to use "iron discipline" to 
end all opposition to the Comintern's policy.I85 The KPD's policy change was made public 
in the "open letter" of 27 April to the nationalleaderships of the SPD and ADGB. The 
"Volksblock" tactic, which had been developed by Maslow, consisted of an offer to co-
operate in the Prussian Landtag with the parties of the "Weimar coalition" (the Catholic 
Centre, DDP and the SPD) against the "Reichsblock" of monarchist and nationalist 
parties.186 The new phase in the CPSU's power struggle, which was inevitably also played 
out between Stalin and Zinoviev in the Comintern, obliged Fischer to concern herself with 
heightening the KPD's political profile in Gennany in order to keep the party leadership.187 
The Zentrale stated that in the "dominantly non-revolutionary situation" it was now "un-
Bolshevik" to reject partial demands and every United Front tactic.188 The other relevant 
thesis from the 5th ECCI plenum was to complete the KPD's Bolshevisation. This policy, 
decoded in the light of political practice, meant the sidelining of those Leftists who were 
unwilling to carry out any "moderation" of the party's tactics, and to complete the KPD's 
centralisation. In May 1925 prominent leaders of the ultra-Left were ousted from their 
positions. Arthur Rosenberg was removed from the Berlin BL, Scholem lost his highly 
185 Weber, Wandlung, pp107-8; Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p63, states that Fischer herself pushed for 
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influential position as head of the Organisational Department (Orgburo), and Korsch was 
replaced by Ernst Schneller as editor of Die Rote F ahne.189 
None of the changes in the KPD's official policy declarations, however, meant that the 
Fischer Zentrale had abandoned its raison d'etre: to retain the party leadership and re-
mould the KPD as a left-wing communist party. Furthermore, there remained definite 
limits on how far the KPD leadership would go in its tactical contact with the SPD. The 
Eccrs telegram to the KPD's Zentrale on 27th April was for the toleration of the SPD 
government in Prussia without conditions.19o This represented not only a change in the 
tactic used to "unmask" the SPD's alleged "betrayal" of workers' interests, but was a 
strategic change: the KPD's unconditional support for a minority SPD-Ied administration 
would have removed the main plank of the KPD's propaganda. However, the KPD 
disregarded the Eeers directive, and brought down the SPD-Ied Prussian government 24 
hours after offering to give it a "reprieve". In order to keep the leadership of the KPD, 
Fischer was now forced to walk a political tight-rope between the Right faction which 
believed the party was returning to its political tactics, the "ultra-Left", who rejected 
Fischer's "right-turn", and a grouping within her own faction in Saxony, which saw the 
policy as a "return to Brandlerism". 
The traditional interpretation of Fischer's response to the EeCrs 5th Plenum has been to 
show that her, at least nominal, acceptance of its policy statement for Germany broadened 
the leadership's basis in the ZA.191 The Fischer Group did gain the support of Schlecht and 
Geschke, the earlier Centre Group members Remmele, Pieck, Heckert and Eberlein and, 
with the ECCrs assistance, the "Workers' Left" around Thaelmann. However, the 
189 ibid, ppl09-110; Fowkes, German Communism, ppI26-8. 
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resistance of the "ultra-Left" groupings (ie those opposing the "right-turn") continued to 
hold considerable support at regional level in the Left strongholds of the Ruhr, 
Was serkante , Berlin, West Saxony, Lower Saxony and Pfalz among mid and lower level 
party functionaries. 192 More significantly, the extension of the Left's basis of support in the 
ZA was only possible because of the false belief that the Fischer Group would put the 
Comintern's policies into practice. To maintain this belief the KPD's press claimed that the 
party leadership was implementing the Comintern's policies.193 The Zentrale itself was 
divided into three groupings on the party's left-wing. The first was the group around 
Korsch which was centred on Lower Saxony. This faction rejected the claim that there 
was a "monarchist danger" and refused to endorse a change of policy. Another group, led 
by Hans Weber, only accepted the new tactic when it affected trades union policy; a 
sister-faction under Arthur Vogt was dominant in West Saxony. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland 
the BL expressed concerns about the "dangers" inherent within a "Right-Turn", but did 
not vote against the Zentrale in the ZA for reasons of factional loyalty. 194 The BL's loyalty 
related to its dependence on Ruth Fischer's patronage to retain the leadership in the face 
of an increasingly well organised challenge from the party's right-wing, which centred 
organisationally on Chemnitz.195 
The debate in the Erzgebirge-Vogtland BL on the new party tactics was punctuated by 
references to the "Failed October" of 1923. Spund insisted that the Saxon party should 
192 For the Ruhr, Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p63; For Berlin, SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-
Vogtland am 15.6.1925, Bl.179. 
193 SAPMO, I 3/10/107, SAZ, den 18.6.1925 which reported Ruth Fischer at the District Party Congress 
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not accept the new line because "we have the Saxon experience in front of our eyes. ,,196 
Mapitz described the policy as the abandonment of political principles under the slogan 
"mass party at any price".197 The BL was above all concerned that the post-1923 tactics 
were being abandoned in favour of a return to "Brandlerism" .198 Before the ZA meeting of 
9-10th May, which was to discuss recent political events, Schneller was sent into the BL 
to ensure its approval of the new line. Schneller stated that the KPD's tactics during the 
presidential elections had been based on a "false" analysis of the German political situation 
and that the new tactic was to address the danger of Germany's new "imperial 
monarchism" under Hindenburg. The policy change was presented as a tactical 
revolutionary response to the "monarchist danger" in Germany. However, repeated 
reference to Germany's "Western Orientation" in international relations, and the need for 
wider communist influence to arrest this development, laid bare the Comintern's cause for 
concern. 199 
With the change of tactic the KPD also paid greater attention to the nationalist minded 
lower middle classes, which it defined as part of communism's class constituency. The 
KPD, arbitrarily, proclaimed itself to be the "only party which gathers the opposition of 
workers, the petty bourgeoisie and peasants against the monarchist danger and organises 
them for struggle. ,,200 The Comintern's concerns about Germany's improved relations with 
the West brought with it an echo of the "Schlageter Line" from 1923, which aimed at 
196 SAPMO, 13/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 4.5.1925, Bl.128. 
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stirring up the hornet's nest of ultra-nationalism to repel a capitalist rapprochement.201 The 
KPD's definition of the SPD also responded to the Comintern's policy directive rather than 
any development in Germany. The SPD was re-defined as a "bourgeois workers' party" 
which "held the bugle for the imperialists. ,,202 Implicit in this statement was that the KPD 
was not the only workers' party and that Social Democrats should again be won over for 
communism The Zentrale's post -1923 centralisation of the KPD, under the title 
Bolshevisation, had sidelined concessions to district parties relating to local conditions. 
After the 5th ECCI Plenum, however, the Saxon BLs' refusal to agree to tolerate a 
minority Saxon SPD administration, as had been party policy between 1921-23, forced a 
compromise on the party leadership. The Zentrale conceded that in the event of the KPD 
tolerating a SPD-Ied administration in Prussia, the Saxon KPD could continue its 
campaigns to dissolve the Saxon government coalition between the right-wing of the 
SPD, the DVP and the DDP.203 Before these regional concessions were conceded, the 
district leaders under Bertz had called on joint resistance to the Zentrale's policy. This 
recalcitrance was part of the Left's fear that if another debate on policy went into the 
district membership, the BL would be unable to prevent the Right taking control of the 
party apparatus.204 When the ZA voted on 10 May by 35 to 15 to accept Ruth Fischer's 
concessions to the Comintern, behind a seemingly strong majority lay several regional 
fractures: a factor undoubtedly influencing the decision to abolish the representation of 
201 Daycock, D. W., 'The KPD and the NSDAP: A Study in the Relationship between the Political 
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regional opinion on the ZA later that year and to replace it with a Soviet style ZK (Central 
Committee ).205 
During the important series of meeting in the KPD throughout the summer of 1925, 
meetings of the BLs took place after policy had already been decided: they represented a 
fait accompli rather than a forum for discussion. The BLs were also given the task of 
ensuring that the District Congresses, which informed party workers of policy changes, 
were stage managed by the district party apparatus. This process, however, also continued 
to rely on the attraction of a leftist political rhetoric to keep local supporters of the Left 
on board. At the District Party congress in Erzgebirge-Vogtland on 16-17 May, which 
dealt with the changes in party policy, it was stated that: 
The policy of the SPD and ADGB bureaucracies prepared the way for the 
monarchist danger and in every situation did not only hold the working class back 
from struggle but split, betrayed and actively helped to beat it down ... (to achieve 
this) the SPD tried a seeming opposition against the increasing monarchist 
danger.206 
The policy statement by the BL insisted that there would be no actual co-operation with 
the SPD because the party leadership would reject the KPD's demands. However, the new 
political conditions in Germany were said to require the KPD to "prove" that the SPD 
sided with capital against labour by "unmasking" it before the workforce.207 The limits to 
which Ruth Fischer's Saxon factional supporters would move to the Right had been 
demarcated. The BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland began to feel like a beleaguered left-wing 
communist garrison surrounded by the vastly superior troops of right-wing communism: 
205 ibid, Bl.143. 
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to agree to the "right-turn" felt like agreeing to abandon their territorial claim. However, 
the only road to "victory" in this fratricidal war was to co-operate with the Fischer-
leadership in the Zentrale: if the intra-party conflict went into the district membership 
"defeat" for the BL was certain. 
In East Saxony the District Party Congress finally met in mid June to resolve the policy 
issues arising from the ZA meeting of 9-10th of May. The weakness of the district 
membership enabled the BL to use the district apparatus to filter out any significant 
degree of opposition to the changes in the party line. However, the majority of delegates 
backed a resolution expressing the concerns about any concessions to the SPD, which in 
East Saxony stood as a district giant overshadowing the KPD. The District Congress 
spoke out against any policy of returning to tolerating a SPD regional government, as had 
become policy in Prussia. The East Saxon KPD maintained that the SPD continued to 
support the "monarchist danger" and the party's "seeming opposition and radical phrases" 
were to deceive the workers, in order to hold them back from communism208 However, 
despite these shots fired across the Reich leadership's bows, the East Saxon BL made a 
statement of factional loyalty, which went as far as accepting that the KPD should 
increase its influence by winning over "misled" workers who continued to support the 
SPD.209 
In West Saxony the scale of the rebellion against the change of policy was widespread. 
This party district was the stronghold of the Saxon ultra-Left. In May the BL voted 12 to 
10 against the ZA's resolutions of 9-10 May. Reports from the district apparatus also 
indicate that the "greatest part of the membership is against the ZA's resolution ... most of 
208 SAPMO, I 3/8/17, Zeitung, den 30.6.1925 (unnamed and undated) 'Der Bezirksparteitag Ostsachsen 
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them want to hold to the decisions of the 9th Reich Party Congress. ,,210 To re-impose the 
authority of the Reich leadership Ruth Fischer initiated a process which culminated in the 
deposition of the recalcitrant members of the BL.211 Fischer's appeal to party loyalty had 
called on the ultra-Left to accept the Comintem's policy. The ultra-Left, however, 
continued to place the need of the revolution in Gennany, as they interpreted them, above 
the Soviet Union's foreign policy and need for trade with the capitalist West.212 The 
refusal of the ultra-Left to yield continued despite the sending of an ECCI representative 
into the sub-district conferences and functionary conferences that preceded the District 
Congress.213 
At the District Party Congress Ruth Fischer again tried to win support for the policy 
change by stressing that it derived from the Comintern's political analysis. Delegates were 
told that they must understand the threat to the Soviet state posed by the Locarno Treaty 
and that they: "enormously underestimated ... the importance of the Soviet state, which 
must be placed as the first factor for the existence of world revolution. ,,214 Of some 60 
delegates a core of 14 continued to reject the thesis on capitalist stabilisation, and the 
ebbing of the revolutionary tide required a tactical change in communist policy. However, 
the ultra-Left refused to accept that Soviet foreign policy should force a "right-tum" on 
the KPD's policy in Germany?15 
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The Political Secretary in West Saxony, Stroetzel, also appealed for acceptance of the 
ZA's position by calling on solidarity with the Comintern and stating that conditions in 
other German regions validated the need to modify party policy. Crucially, Stroetzel's 
position pointed out that, although the policy did have elements of the tactics used before 
the "Failed October", they would not be carried out by the "old Brandlerite leadership".216 
In other words the KPD's left-wing would carry out the "right-turn", so long as it retained 
the leadership and was assured that the policy was a temporary concession to 
circumstance. Eventual compliance with the Zentrale's policy was, however, only 
achieved by sidelining the original BL and reconstructing it using closed meetings and 
back-room deals between the inner BL and the Reich apparatus.217 The methods used in 
other Left strongholds in Berlin, Waserkannte, the Ruhr and in Lower Saxony were the 
same form of bulldozing by the party apparatus.218 Only the ultra-Left's solid control of 
the party district of the Palatinate allowed successful resistance to the Zentrale.219 
The documentation of developments in the KPD at this point leave an Alice m 
Wonderland impression of internal party life: nothing was as it seemed. Ruth Fischer 
claimed to represent the Comintern's policies, while in fact her faction was playing for 
time, and, above all, trying to fend off direct Comintern intervention. In the Saxon KPD, 
BLs had been imposed by the party centre without regard to the actual political 
disposition of the local party organisations. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the BL used the 
district apparatus to exclude Right -Communists from the party debate by informing 
membership meetings that only "responsible party workers" would be recognised as 
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d 1 h D· . C 220· e egates to t e Istnct ongress. While the Saxon BLs accepted the "right-turn", at 
least on paper, they continued to purge the local level Right-Communists, who they feared 
could again be placed into influential positions in the party?21 When the KPD's 10th Reich 
Party Congress was convened in July 1925, the seeming domination of the Left over the 
whole party was a veneer which papered over a road map of political disunity and 
division. 
The 10th Reich Party Congress and Electoral Alchemy. 
The Fischer leadership presented the 10th Party Congress, which was held in Berlin 
between the 12 and 17 July, as the "Congress of Bolshevisation", ending the post-1923 
party crisis.222 For the first time in the KPD's history the 10th Party Congress had packed 
the Congress Hall, using the district apparatus, to eliminate the leadership's factional 
opponents. The frequent use of the tenn "Bolshevik unity" at the Congress in reality 
meant the factional domination of the leadership and party machine.223 This was the actual 
explanation for the incumbent party leadership being re-elected for the first time in the 
KPD's history. The 10th Congress, however, also broke with the previous regime of 
cohabitation between tendencies and used the party apparatus to obscure a high degree of 
regional disaffection. 
Initially the ECCI sent a telegram congratulating the leadership on "consolidating" the 
party and having established a "nucleus" pursuing the "correct policy".224 With the 
Congress packed with Fischer's supporters the KPD's conflict with the ECCI took place at 
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the secret sessions which parallelled the official Congress. When it became clear that 
Manuilsky, the ECCI's representative, wanted the tactics used in the Prussian Landtag 
extended to all areas of "mass work" (ie the united front and trades union policy), the Left 
went into open opposition to the Comintem. The conflict focused on two interrelated 
areas. Manuilsky wanted the ZK (which had replaced the ZA) to be enlarged and extended 
to include Zetkin, who was on the Right, and Schuhmann and Ulbricht, who had been in 
the Centre Group after 1923.225 However, instead of appointing the Comintem's nominees 
onto the ZK, Fischer came to an agreement with the ultra-Left around Rosenberg, 
Scholem and Hans Weber. The latter were again included in a Reich leadership which was 
united in maintaining the KPD's independence to continue a left-wing policy in Germany. 
Above all, the KPD's leadership refused the Comintem's request for the construction of a 
large Trades Union Division affiliated to the new ZK, which would have given a leading 
role to right-wing Communists in the factories and unions. Knowing nothing of the 
conflict with the Comintern, the Congress's handpicked delegates endorsed the policies of 
the KPD leadership. This assertion of independence placed the Left in conflict not only 
with the Stalin faction but with their own patron in Moscow, Zinoviev, who had been 
substantially weakened by the KPD's undertakings.226 The Fischer-gambit now reached its 
final stage. 
The central reason that the Fischer Group could not accept the ECCrs conditions was 
that its raison d' etre was to preserve the leadership undiluted and to use this to recast the 
KPD in a leftist mold. The inclusion of the Right and Centre in the ZK, and even more the 
225 The ZK replaced the ZA after the 10th Party Congress. It ended the regional representation of District 
Parties in the national leadership. The ZK was instead modeled on the CPSU organisational model. 
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creation of a Trades Union Division, would be to concede defeat. However, Ruth Fischer 
had used a political rhetoric to integrate her own faction, particularly among mid-level 
regional functionaries, which had tied them to Moscow and the ECCI. The Saxon BLs, 
even those functionaries who advocated resistance to the Comintern's intervention, had no 
knowledge that the inner party leadership continued to assert the KPD's independence 
from the Comintern at closed meetings. The 10th Party Congress no longer served as a 
statement of the KPD's immediate revolutionary ambitions: instead the policy emphasis 
was placed on the party's solidarity with the Bolshevik Revolution.227 However, the KPD's 
attempt to exploit the Bolshevik's own methods of internal party control, using the party's 
apparatus and organisational structure, could not survive a direct challenge from Moscow. 
To use Winkler's expression, the 10th Party Congress had been a "pyrrhic victory" for the 
KPD.228 Events had now so weakened Zinoviev that he could no longer rely on the verbal 
agreements of "his German faction" ?29 
The Saxon KPD and the Comintem's Intervention 
After the return of the ECCrs delegation, under Manuilsky, from Berlin, the Comintern 
decided to assert its domin~ce. Initially, the KPD's Politburo voted by four (Fischer, 
Geschke, Schneller, Scholem) to three (Thaelmann, Dengel, Remmele) not to send a 
delegation to Moscow. However, when the Comintern threatened a complete break in 
relations, the KPD yielded.230 Documentation in the former central party archive indicates 
how rapidly the ECCI was able to unravel the factional loyalties holding together the 
227 Fowkes, German Communism, pp 131-2. 
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Gennan Left once it was known that the Comintern would directly intervene in the KPD's 
affairs. The KPD sent two delegations to Moscow. The first delegation, led by Geschke, 
Schneller and Kuehn, signed a statement dated the 29th of July which accepted the 
Eccrs criticisms of the KPD since the 9th Party Congress and undertook to "struggle 
against" the leadership which had allowed the "system of opposition" to the ECCr to lead 
the KPD into a "crisis ... in which the existence of the party and its relations with 
Bolshevism were at stake. ,,231 When the delegation returned to Berlin the ZK endorsed the 
resolution of support for the ECCr. The only dissenting voices were Hans Weber and 
Scholem, who voted against its acceptance. The ZK then sent a second delegation to 
Moscow with a mandate to comply with the ECCr.232 The second delegation was largely 
concerned with the technical preparations in the KPD which would deal with the 
publication of another "open letter" from the Comintern, changing the party's policy and 
ousting a leadership, which had so recently been, at least ostensibly, re-elected by the 
membership.233 The policy of the KPD in Germany could now be brought into line with 
the Comintern's General Line. 
Gaining the Saxon Party's Acceptance of the "Open Letter" 
The top down imposition of the Comintern's directives now used exactly the same 
channels in the party apparatus which Ruth Fischer had built over the preceding 20 
months. The first stage in the party machine's reorientation of policy was the meeting on 
1 September between the ZK and the political secretaries and editors from the districts. 
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After considerable discussion this meeting accepted the Comintem's terms by a margin of 
42 votes to 7; opposition was largely confined to the ultra-Left and a small part of 
Fischer's own groUp.234 Meetings of the BLs in early September were also reluctant to 
oppose the Comintern: only West Saxony, Hessen-Kassel, Pfalz and Berlin-Brandenburg 
did so. However, with some irony, the reason for the ZK's ability to enforce compliance 
with the new policy was a testament to how effectively Ruth Fischer had re-organised the 
party's channels of direction and control (ie organisational Bolshevisation). The BL in 
Pfalz was the only district which was able to continue in its dissent because the district 
party controlled the district apparatus.235 West Saxony, as a district with a strong ultra-
Left influence in the BL, lost faith in Ruth Fischer's leadership of the party because she 
now appeared to be capitulating to everything the Left had resisted for the last year-and-a-
half. The BL finally voted by 11 to ten to accept the ZK's policy?36 However, a strong 
minority in the BL, and a majority of active members, agreed with Arthur Rosenberg that 
the Comintem should be opposed because: "The Russians want to turn us [the KPD] into 
the tail of the SPD. ,,237 Fischer's policy of trying to hold the Left faction together by 
stating that in Gennany policy would confonn with the Comintem's European policy, to 
keep the "Workers' Left" around Thaelmann on board, while carrying out a policy of 
independent leftism, in accord with what the ultra-Left called for, now imploded. The 
majority of Ruth Fischer's own faction and the ultra-Left now abandoned her. The 
Political Secretary, Stroetzel, as well as the independent minded leftist, Arthur Vogt, 
agreed to Ernst Thaelmann's appointment as party leader. Their compliance, however, was 
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base on the ill founded belief that Thaelmann aimed at uniting all the Left factions in the 
party through political consensus?38 
In Erzgebirge-Vogdand the change of policy shattered the BL's unity between those, 
around Bertz and Spund, who rejected finding a modus vivendi with the new "Comintern-
loyal" ZK, and those such as Ohr, Marga and Gustav, who saw this as a last chance to 
prevent the BL falling into the hands of the Right.239 Ruth Fischer, who appeared in 
person in the BL, called for the district party to accept the Comintem's policies. It appears 
that Fischer's attempt to convince her own faction of the need to return to a policy of daily 
contact with the wider workers' movement, and to win over "oppositional" social 
democratic workers, was a last ditch attempt to retain some influence on the Comintern's 
policy in Germany.240 To achieve the district party's compliance with the new policy the 
ZK again reconstituted the BL, giving the majority of positions to those prepared to 
abandon their reservations. Dissidents in the BL had no possibility of taking their 
grievances into the wider party: a split in the Left would only serve the campaigning of the 
right-wing local activists.241 Schneller, who had abandoned Fischer in order to keep his 
position in the party, informed a meeting of the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland on the 31 
August that a "world political matter", which had tarnished the KPD's relations with the 
Comintern, was about to be detailed in an "open letter" from the Comintern to the KPD's 
membership.242 With the Left's final fracture along regional and ideological fault lines, the 
238 SAPMO, I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS vom 6.9.1925, B1.257(Stroetzel); ibid, B1.258(Vogt). 
239 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 3.8.1925, B1.214-5; SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 31.8.1925, B1.252f. 
240 SAPMO, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtlandam 3.8.1925, B1.216-7. 
241 ibid, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 31.8.1925, B1.251(Schneller). 
242 ·b'd 1 1 , 
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party machine was able to sweep out the voices of principled dissent.243 When Die Rote 
Fahne published the Comintern's "open letter" on 1 September 1925 the KPD's 
compliance with its criticisms was already a foregone conclusion.244 The re-organisation 
of the KPD's internal architecture, under the title of the KPD's political and organisational 
Bolshevisation, had installed a roadway for the ZK juggernaut which reached into the 
district parties: opposition in the BLs was like a pedestrian crossing a motorway. At the 
First Reich Party Conference in Berlin from 31 October to 1 November only 33 delegates 
from a total of 249 opposed the new regime in the KPD.245 Installing the Thaelmann-
Dengel leadership was a formality, giving a semblance of "democratic" legitimation to 
what had in reality been the de facto constellation of political forces in the KPD leadership 
since 20 August.246 
3.5 Conclusion: The Fischer Era and its Significance for the Saxon KPD 
Disappointment within the KPD at the failure of the "German October" provided the 
context for the final rise into the leadership of the Left Opposition. The collapse of the 
KPD's internal party organisation in late 1923 and 1924 assisted the Left's reconstruction 
of the KPD as a strictly centralised party, which used the party machine to sideline party 
dissidents. Saxony, as the "launch pad" for the German revolution, became the centre of a 
dispute in the KPD over its relations with the socialist movement and the correct tactic for 
revolution. However, in Saxony the impact of the events of 1923 did not produce a 
243 ibid, B1.265; For the reconstruction of the BL, I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12.12.1925, 
B1.389. 
244 ibid, BLS am 31.8.1925, B1.255. 
245 Weber, Wandlung, p133. Most oppositional delegates were from the "ultra-Left" plus some of Fischer's 
supporters. 
246 Fowkes, German Communism, p 135. 
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uniform rejection of the united front tactic: the party's influence over political life had been 
increased and a mass membership organised in the Saxon KPD. Local political and 
organisational traditions combined with the pattern of socio-industrial development to 
produce a left -Communism in the more concentrated industrial setting of the Leipzig area 
where the SPD's deeply entrenched organisation offered few prospects for communist 
advancement. In the more dispersed industrial structure of southwestern Saxony, where 
the degree of organisation in the SPD was considerably weaker and Social Democrats 
were more disposed to co-operation with the KPD, local Communist activists remained 
advocates of the united front policy: local conditions outweighed ideological 
interpretations of the alleged role of contact with the SPD in causing the "Failed 
October". In East Saxony the KPD experienced a stunted development: already a weak 
link in Saxon Communism the party declined further between 1924 and 1925. One 
significant consequence of a weak membership was the early ability of the district 
apparatus to stage manage party "debates" more rapidly that in the other two Saxon party 
districts. 
The Left's nse into the national leadership placed the party district of Erzgebirge-
Vogtland in conflict with the new Left Zentrale. The response of the national leadership 
was to progressively erode the previous system of cohabitation between factions. The ZA, 
which had represented regional opinion at national level, was replaced by the ZK: 
regionalism per se was lost in the quest for ideological uniformity. The district party 
apparatus was used to rig the "election" of delegates to District Party Congresses, which 
appointed the BL. However, during the Fischer-era the ability to appoint Kommissar BLs 
did not translate into the ability to carry out a political tactic which local activists could 
not identify with. Instead, the ideology of "organising the revolution", by politicising the 
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membership and the wider workforce, only served to restrict communist political 
campaigning and absorb the membership in a paralysing factional feud on the correct 
tactics for the German revolution. The KPD discovered that workers who were not 
organised in the SPD were not Communists in the making, but were genuinely not inclined 
towards political activism. 
The Left in the KPD did have a majority of support in the KPD nationally: Saxony was 
the most prominent exception. However, among the grass roots membership they tended 
not to be activists, unlike the Right Communists who were inclined to the united front 
policy of contact with the wider social democratic movement. In the period 1924/5 the 
Right continued to carry communist work in municipal councils and politics and in the 
factories. In the factories, the Left's self proclaimed area of priority, the refusal to accept 
that factory workers would only become involved in campaigns of direct relevance to the 
workplace pushed the party away from those it sought to win for revolution. 
The Fischer Zentrale's calls for uniformity in organisation and ideology and the purge of 
opponents differed little from the CPSU's demands for a monolithic party: the policy 
amounted to Stalinisation in all but name, albeit with a contempt for the individual and his 
policy of "socialism in one country". The failure to address these issues is the central 
failure of Fischer's memoirs: they focus on her opposition to Stalin and omit her role in 
attempting to re-mold the KPD as a left-wing communist party using the process of 
Bolshevisation to serve her own factional interests. Fischer also failed to address her role 
in using the campaign against Trotsky, the most strongly internationalist of the 
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Bolsheviks, to purge the Gennan Right and its later consequences for opposition to 
Stalin's "socialism in one country,,?47 
In the figure of Ruth Fischer the Comintem had a rival who, for the first time, played 
Moscow at its own game: Fischer's skills in the art of deception and back-room deals held 
off the Comintern's direct and public intervention for 20 months. The achievement of this 
assertion of independence from Moscow should not be underestimated: it was, after all, 
what the Bolsheviks regarded as the ultimate breach of loyalty. Central to Fischer's gambit 
was to hold together a Left coalition in the KPD until Stalin's policy of "socialism in one 
country" was challenged in the CPSU. However, as all leading Bolsheviks, with the 
possible exception of Trotsky, agreed that the Comintem policy should be uniform for all 
member communist parties, the assertion of German independence met a wall of 
resistance. Once the Comintern felt able to publicly announce its intervention in Germany, 
the independent minded Left leaders were defenceless: the majority of left-wing rank-and-
file Communists and the majority of functionaries in the party apparatus were Comintem 
loyalists drawn to support of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was a tragedy for Gennan 
communism of Greek proportions and a sign of the times that the most significant 
challenge to the domination of policy making by the Comintem came from those who 
themselves wanted to construct a Diktaturpartei. The role of local conditions in 
determining the political behaviour of Communist militants, however, continued to limit 
247 Fischer, Stalin, passim. For a new appraisal of Ruth Fischer's memoirs see, Wieland, K., 
"Totalitarismus' als Rache. Ruth Fischer und ihr Buch 'Stalin and German Communism", in Soellner, A. 
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the totalitarian claims of the KPD's Stalinisation in the mid 1920s. The investigation of the 
limits of Stalinisation at local level is the subject of the following chapter. 
(ed.), Totalitarismus. Eine Ideengeschichte des 20. lahrhundert (Berlin, 1997), reviewed in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung Nr.245, 22.10.1997. 
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4. "Stalinisation" and its Limits in the Saxon KPD, 1925-1928. 
4.1 Introduction 
The Comintern's direct intervention in the KPD's political policy, by means of the "open 
letter" of September 1925, appointed the "Comintern-Ioyal" national leadership under 
Thaelmann. l This finally enabled the, at least formal, re-imposition of the united front 
policy. The "moderation" of the political line in Germany related to the new Stalin-
Bukharin alliance in the CPSU. During the initial phase of Stalin's policy of "socialism in 
one country", Bukharin's policy prescriptions for the Comintern were employed. 
Bukharin's policy principally advocated contact with the wider workers' movement in 
countries where it was still a "significant factor".2 The Comintern's policy drive was for 
its national sections to become mass parties, and significant political forces, by winning 
over Social Democratic workers through the creation of a "left-wing in the workers~ 
movement".3 
Comintern policy was also subordinated to the concerns of Soviet state policy. In 1925/6 
it was still hoped that the Anglo-Russian Trade Union commission could influence British 
foreign policy in China: a central strategic concern for the Bolshevik govemment.4 It was 
standard practice for the Comintern to set the national policy for all Communist Parties 
1 See chapter 3.4 above. 
2 Bahne, S., "'Sozialfascismus" in Deutschland. Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs~, in 
International Review of Social History (IRSH) 10 (1965), pp227-8; Schapiro, L., The Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (London, 1963), p290ff; Deutscher, I., The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky 1921-1929 
(Oxford, 1959), p27lff. 
3 Bahne, 'Sozialfascismus', pp228-9; SAPMO (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massen Organisationen 
der DDR) I 2/2/8, Resolution zur innerparteilichen Lage (Konference der Sekretaer und Redaktor am 16-
17.4.1926), B1.136-139. 
4 Winkler, H.A., Der Schein der Normalitaet. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Repubilk 
1924-1930 (Berlin,Bonn, 1985), pp437-8. 
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by referring to the world political and economic situation.5 The actual constant in the 
equation was Soviet state policy. Gennany's geo-political position ensured that it 
remained a linchpin in Soviet foreign policy in Europe. During the middle years of the 
Weimar Republic, Soviet Russia felt increasingly threatened by the direction of the 
Gennan government in international relations. Under Foreign Minister Gustav 
Stresemann, Gennany appeared to be abandoning the Gennan-Soviet alliance, enshrined 
in the Treat of Rapallo (1922), and becoming increasingly re-integrated in the system of 
Western nations through the Dawes Loan and the Locarno Treaty (1925).6 It was hoped 
that the united front policy would help win support for the Soviet Union among rank-and-
file Social Democrats and trade unionists in order to counteract the "Western Orientation" 
of Gennan foreign policy with an "Eastern Orientation" supported by the German 
workers' movement. Defence of the Soviet Union became an increasingly explicit priority: 
to serve this objective communist campaigning was to take on a high political profile in 
Gennany.7 
However, in the years 1925-28 the KPD's development was not defined by political 
campaigning per se, but by the factional feud in the communist movement. In the CPSU 
the Stalin-Bukharin axis was entrenched in a power struggle with the Joint Opposition, led 
by Zinoviev and Trotsky. The factional feud in the CPSU was parallelled in the KPD, 
5 For the impact of this in Germany 1925-28 see the document series in SAPMO of the ZK (12/2/8) and 
the Politburo (12/1/5). 
6 On the Comintem and KPD's assessment of developments, Daycock, D. W., 'The KPD and the NSDAP: 
A Study in the Relationship between the Political Extremes in Weimar Germany 1923-1933', Ph.D. thesis 
(London School of Economics, 1980), p28f.; For a summary of German foreign policy see, Kolb, E. The 
Weimar Republic (trans. P. S. Falla; London, 1988), ppSlff. 
7 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p429; Geyer, D., 'Sowjetrussland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 
1918-32', Vierteljahrsheftefuer Zeitgeschichte (VIZ) 24 (1976), pp27-8; Daycock, 'Political Extremes', 
p148. 
Page 147 
which shattered into factions on the basis of particular interpretations of political policy in 
Germany and developments in the Soviet Union.8 On the basis of the recently available 
documentation in the former central party archive in Berlin, this chapter will argue that the 
factions in Germany were often regionally much stronger than previously thought and that 
the political disposition of these factions related to the local conditions experienced by the 
KPD's membership. In the period 1925-28 the Comintem was able to intervene decisively 
in affairs of the national KPD. But the KPD's rearguard resistance to Moscow's leaders 
was strongest at grass roots level: as this was the front line of the KPD's "class war", its 
significance cannot be underestimated. The memory of the so-called "Failed October" of 
1923 in Saxony ensured that the region was a centre of the factional feud. 
This chapter sets out to answer questions arising from the existing literature in the light of 
the newly available documentation in the former central party archive in Berlin. Attention 
will be given to the view, originally presented in the memoirs of Rosa Meyer-Levine, that 
the split in the KPD, caused by the Comintem's "open letter", did not penetrate very 
deeply into the party because Ruth Fischer's supporters "jumped ship" and co-operated 
with the new Thaelmann ZK.9 This avenue of investigation will be further pursued to 
establish the applicability to Saxony of Gert Reuter's thesis for Hannover that Thaelmann 
proved to be an "integration figure" capable of uniting the KPD's disparate factions. 10 
Two further question will focus on the Saxon party membership's perception of the 
8 Weber, H., Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik (Kekurzte Studentenausgabe; Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971), p126. 
9 Meyer-Levine, R., Inside German Communism. Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar Republic (London, 
1977), p93. 
10 Reuter, G., KPD-politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammensetzung der KPD der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Hannover, 1982), 
pp87,92f. 
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factional feud. Firstly, is Daycock correct in stating that the rank-and-file membership did 
not notice changes in the KPD's tactics during these years?ll And secondly, to what extent 
is Reuter's observation, based on the recollections of party members, valid, that the 
membership frequently could not identify the factions, enabling switches of affiliation 
across the factional spectrum.12 
Central to this investigation of the KPD's internal party life is the question of the extent to 
which Hermann Weber's "Stalinisation" thesis continues to be useful in explaining the 
party's political development.13 Did the purges of independent-minded party leaders and 
recalcitrant members and the party's organisational Bolshevisation facilitate top down 
control of German communism at local as well as national level? The rival "sociological" 
explanation of the KPD's political developments will also be investigated. Did the KPD's 
"old socialist tendency" gain the upper hand in policy making in the mid 1920s, as Detlev 
Peukert asserts?14 The availability of micro-level documentation detailing the Saxon 
KPD's activities in the mid 1920s, which was unavailable to earlier historians in the 
"West", allows the magnification of investigation to highlight the KPD at grass roots level. 
4.2 The Saxon Left Resumes its Struggle 
The Comintern's intervention in the KPD, using the "open letter" of September 1925, 
installed a national party leadership which would carry out Moscow's policy directives. 
Following its defeat the Left fragmented into its component groups. The Comintern-Ioyal 
11 Daycock, 'Political Extremes', ppI45-6. 
12 Reuter, KPD-politik, pp66-91. 
13 Weber, Wandlung, pp25lff, esp. pp260-1. 
14 Peukert,D., 'Zur Sozialgeschicht der KPD', in Kloenne, A. and Vack, K., Zur Geschichte der 
Arbeiterbewegung,4 (November 1978), p31. 
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"Workers' Left", under Thaelmann, remained in the leadership, while the Fischer-Maslow 
Group and the ultra-Left fell into factional opposition and discord. The ultra-Left, which 
had been the most vociferous in its resistance to Moscow's machinations, now sub-divided 
into smaller denominations with rival theories explaining developments in the communist 
movement. IS The divisions within and between the ultra-Left factions allowed the KPD's 
national leadership to purge the weaker Groups around Katz and the Korsch-Schwarz 
Group, which became known as the "Intransigent Left" (Entschiedene Linke), in early 
1926.16 However, the two most significant factions remained within the KPD during 1926. 
The Fischer-Urbahns Group represented a revival of the Left Opposition. The faction 
comprised largely former leading functionaries from the Fischer leadership; its factional 
significance lay in strong personal connections with the Joint Opposition in the CPSU.17 
The other faction remaining in the KPD was the Wedding Opposition. The faction was led 
by Hans Weber in Pfalz, Willi Koetter in Berlin-Wedding and by Arthur Vogt in West 
Saxony. The faction's significance was in its support among workers in these party 
districts.1S 
In the course of the winter 1925/6 it became clear that behind the seemingly smooth 
transition to the new national leadership and political tactics lay a hornet's nest of regional 
discontent. In the Saxon KPD the reaction to the policy implications of the "open letter" 
varied in relation to conditions in the three party organisations. In Erzgebirge-Vogdand a 
15 Weber, Wandlung, p 120; Bahne, S., 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus". Die "ultralinke" 
Opposition in der KPD', in VfZ9 (1961), p363ff; Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany Under the Weimar 
Republic (London, 1984), p137. 
16 Bahne, 'Die "ultralinke" Opposition', p365; Weber, Wandlung, pp150-1; Herlemann, B., 
Kommunalpolitik der KPD im Ruhrgebiet 1924-1933 (Wuppertal, 1977), p70. Most of the "Intransigent 
Left's" basis of support came from unemployed party members in the Ruhr. 
17 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p431. 
18 Weber, Wandlung, p156f. 
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feud began in the KPD between the Left in the BL and the Right, which, in addition to its 
strength among local activists, now had the ZK on its side. The "Chemnitz Left", around 
Paul Bertz and Heinz Wesche, which had refused to carry out the "right turn", continued 
to exert influence on the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland.19 The "Chemnitz Left's" influence 
grew after the return of the "old leadership", which had carried out the policies leading to 
the events of 1923 and the so-called "Failed October", to leading positions in the Saxon 
KPD. Paul Boettcher was appointed to head the Saxon Regional Executive, which co-
ordinated political campaigns in the region. These developments indicated that the ZK's 
political programme for Saxony, decided in November 1925, had already made 
concessions to the Brandler faction in its Saxon stronghold.20 These concessions marked 
out a significant difference between Saxony and the Reich: while the Right continued to 
be excluded from the national leadership, in Saxony it rejoined the regional leadership. 
The price for the Comintem's removal of the Fischer Group from the ZK was a return to a 
wider coalition of factions in the national leadership and in the BLs. 
At the District Party Congress in Erzgebirge-Vogtland during early December 1925, 
Boettcher was able to have the Comintem's political line unanimously endorsed.21 
However, a dispute emerged between the BL majority and the Right, which had the 
19 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Der Fall Bertz. Polbuero Erzgebirge-Vogtland, B1.53f.; SAPMO I 3/8-10/7 
Ergaenzungen, Mappe 1, An die U nterbezirksleitung Chemnitz. Bezirksleitung, Chemnitz, den 
28.7.1925, B1.301. 
20 SAPMO I 3/9/68, Bezirksleitungsitzung (BLS) Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 31.8.1925, B1.25lff.; SAPMO 
13/8-10/8, Landesvorstand Sachsens am 7.12.1925. B1.79; For the ZK's policy in Saxony see, SAPMO I 
3/9/60, Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926., Resolution zur Lage, Aufgaben und 
Taktik der Partei, B1.25. 
21 SAPMO I 3/9/59, Bericht ueber den Bezirksparteitag in Erzgebirge-Vogtland (Sitzung des Polbueros 
vom 7.12.1925), B1.16. The ZK, however, noted that, "many comrades have not openly expressed their 
views" and that private discussions had established that many functionaries were "horrified" by the return 
of Boettcher. 
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support of the ZK's representative. This centred on the party's attitude to the SPD's left-
wing leaders, which were particularly prominent locally. The BL majority insisted that the 
SPD's left-wing continued to be the KPD's "main enemy" and rejected the position of the 
ZK's representative and the Right, which advocated winning them over, as a return to the 
"failed policies" of autumn 1923. The dispute ended with the district press's editor in chief, 
Schleibs, removal by the ZK. The Left in the BL now felt under siege by the Right, 
grouped around Siewert, Boettcher and Lorenz, which had been planning to take over the 
BL since its factional conference on the 27 September in Chemnitz.22 
The "Chemnitz Left" now set out to use their influence in the BL to oppose the return of 
the Brandler faction to the Saxon party leadership. The Left, which still had a majority in 
the BL, initiated a second, unofficial, party debate on the implications of the return to a 
united front policy in Saxony. The continued control of the district party apparatus by the 
Left allowed the manipulation of the process of delegation to the District Party Congress, 
which had been called to debate the factional and policy changes following the 
Comintern's "open letter" .23 At the District Congress the "Chemnitz Left" was able to 
reconstitute its position as a Left leadership groUp.24 Max Opitz remained Political 
Secretary and Wesche, although prevented from taking the influential position of 
Organisational Secretariat, was elected Agitprop Secretary, by 65 votes to 60. These 
developments were an expression of defiance towards the national leadership, whose 
22 SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 30.9.1925, B1.278; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politi scher 
Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, B1.333. 
23 SAPMO 13/9/73 Bericht vom Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Monat Januar 1926, Bl.261. 
24 This Grouping made a declaration at the District Congress in April, see SAPMO I 3/9/60, Erklaerung 
von Bertz, Opitz und Wesche, Bl.40. 
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express instructions to conform to the ZK's policy directives were ignored.25 While the 
District Congress unanimously endorsed the 6th ECCI-Plenum's resolutions on the 
struggle against the ultra-Left, the "Declaration of the 61", which included the signatures 
of 15 members of the BL, drew attention to the Comintem's undertaking also to struggle 
against the Right.26 The ease with which the "open letter" policy debate had been carried 
out nationally in the autumn of 1925 was proving more difficult to achieve at district level 
when the wider policy and factional implications became clear. The Left in the Erzgebirge-
Vogtland BL, which had gone over to the Thaelmann leadership in order to keep their 
influence in the district, now united with the "Chemnitz Left" in opposing the ZK's policy 
in Saxony?7 
In East Saxony the KPD's organisational weakness continued to make the factional feud 
easier for the party machine to control than in the party's strongholds.28 During the party 
debate following the publication of the Comintem's "open letter", there was little 
factionally organised resistance in the cells, local groups and sub-districts.29 In East 
25 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Bericht yom Bezirksparteitag Erzgibirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.14. The 
ZK's representative was unable to have the well known Right functionary, Siewert, included in the BL, 
despite a call for a "stronger" leadership. 
26 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 10. Parteitag bis 
Oktober 1926, B1.333. 
27 SAPMO 13/9/60, Bericht yom Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.12-3; 
SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 
1926, B1.333. 
28 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS der KPD Ostsachsens am 24.4.1926, B1.30(Schneider); SAPMO I 
3/8{25, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Protokoll der BLS. yom 25.2.1926, B1.8(Boettcher); Also see, Arbeiterstimme, 
23.4.1926, Nr.94 and 24.4.1926, Nr.95. 
29 For the "party debate" in the lower party organisations, SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Bericht 
yom 1.11-15.12.1925, B1.363-5; SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht Yom Unterbezirkstag des Unterbezirks 
Ebersbach und Zittau (undated), B1.14ff.; SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht ueber die Ekki-Brief Diskussion im 
Zellenblock "Universelle"(Betreibe der Zwickauer und Chemnitzer Strassen), B1.42ff; For the discussion 
in the BL, SAPMO I 3/8/24, KPD. 8. Ostsachsen. Bericht von der BLS am 11.11.1925, B1.148ff; At this 
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Saxony at the end of 1925 the problem appeared to be a pervasive lack of motivation to 
take part in party life at all. The leading apparatus functionary, Wilhelm Koenen, reporting 
to the ZK on developments in the BL in late December, complained that the role of the 
Political Secretary, Martin Schneider, and the Organisational Secretary, Gaebel, was so 
weak that: 
For months, especially after the Comintem's letter, hardly a BL Meeting has come 
to a fundamental political position or to a precise position on the political 
tasks ... The comrades feel that the speech and position on the political tasks by the 
ZK made in the BL is virtually a statement of utter rubbish.30 
In order to stimulate the district party into political activity Koenen suggested that Sigrid 
Raedel, another trusted apparatus functionary, be give political control in East Saxony.31 
The process of organisational Bolshevisation, the KPD's re-organisation on the basis of 
cells and the centralisation of the channels of instruction, demonstrated its use in rigging 
the process of delegation to the District Party Congress.32 The Narrower BL, the district 
party's Politburo, now included five "worker comrades" representing large factories, who 
had been appointed by the apparatus: their loyalty to the party line ensured a majority vote 
in favour of the ZK's directives. Koenen actually stated that this built-in compliant 
meeting only Martin Hoop (Bautzen) opposed the theory of "relative stabilisation" and its implications for 
the political line in Germany, see SAPMO I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS. vom 28.12.1925, B1.184ff. 
30 SAPMO I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS. Ostsachsen vom 28.12.1925, B1.184-5(Koenen). 
31 ·b·d 1 1 . 
32 SAPMO I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS vom 28.12.1925, B1.188; ibid, Organisationsbericht. Protokoll 
vom ostsaechsische Bezirksparteitag am 23-4.1.1926, Bl.17-18(Gaebel); In sub-districtZittau there were 
seven local groups and no party cells. In Ebersbach the figures were 161 local groups and nine cells. See, 
SAPMO I 3/8/33, Bericht vom Unterbezirkstag des Unterbezirks Ebersbach und Zittau.,(undated), B1.14-
5. 
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majority in the Narrower BL ensured a "majority over the District Secretaries. ,,33 The 
election of delegates to the District Congress, which was called to discuss party policy and 
factionally organised opposition to it, was easier to manipulate because of the district 
party's re-organisation. 
Although the number of factory cells in East Saxony was extremely limited, a hugely 
disproportionate number of delegates were sent from them to the District Congress in late 
January. From 242 delegates, 95 were from the factory cells, 43 from the street cells, 88 
from local groups and 16 from other residential organisations.34 The ability to send party 
functionaries into smaller units, which broke up concentrations of party dissidents, 
allowed the possibility of hand picking a vastly disproportionate number of compliant 
delegates. In his report on the KPD's tasks in Saxony Rudolf Renner, a senior party 
functionary, was able to state: "Comrades! When we discuss the Saxon Question today 
we must say one thing, that Saxony can again be at the centre of the united front tactic.,,35 
Mter the lengthy debate on party policy after 1923, which blamed the united front for all 
the ills in the KPD, Renner had now made a complete U-turn on the policy prescriptions 
for a "healthy" communist party. At the District Congress only Martin Hoop, a sub-
district secretary in Bautzen, called for a return to the policies decided at the 10th Reich 
Party Congress (ie only weeks before the Comintem's intervention) and reminded the 
Congress of the "failures" associated with the united front policy in Saxony.36 
33 I 3/8/24, Bericht ueber die BLS vom 28.12.1925., Bl.I88(Koenen). 
34 ibid, Bericht der Mandatspruefungskommisssion. Protokoll vom ostsaechsische Bezirksparteitag am 23-
24.1.1926, B1.22. 
35 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Aufgaben in Sachsen. Protokoll vom ostsaechsische Bezirksparteitag am 23-
24.1.1926, Bl. 7 (Renner). Boettcher had originally been asked to make this speach. 
36 Martin Hoop's opposition was not recorded in the Protokoll of the District Party Congress. Renner 
reported on the activities of the leadership in Bautzen in, SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das 
ZK der Partei. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, Bl.429-31. 
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In East Saxony, unlike in Erzgebirge-Vogtland, the "second debate" on the new party line 
presented the ZK with no significant difficulties. At the meeting of the Extended BL on 25 
April, which discussed the policy resolutions of the 6th ECCI Plenum and the Conference 
of District Secretaries and Editors, the East Saxon KPD cooperated fully with the 
majority position of the national leadership.37 The debate on the Russian Question in 
Saxony had penetrated the district party organisations so little that the District Committee 
(Bezirksaus schus s) reported that: 
To some extent the comrades understood the resolution of the Executive on 
prohibiting a discussion on the question of the CPSU's 14th Party Congress in the 
Western European sections of the Comintern as a ban on discussing the Russian 
Question at all.38 
When Rosa Meyer-Levine wrote that: "The split caused by the Comintern's "open letter" 
was on the whole negligible", it appears that this statement was probably based on the 
experience of Ernst Meyer's East Prussian stronghold rather that the wider party picture.39 
The Saxon example indicates that the intensity of the debate on the changes in the KPD's 
policy regionally depended on the strength of the district party organisations and the local 
political disposition of the membership. 
At the Meeting of District Secretaries and Editors on 16 and 17 April in Berlin, it seemed 
on the surface that the KPD had been brought into line with Comintern policy.40 The 
Conference voted by 65 votes to two to accept the policy decision of the 6th ECCI-
37 SAPMO I 3/8/23, An das ZK, Polbuero. Bericht ueber die Erweiterte Bezirksleitung Ostsachsens, 
Dresden, den 25.4.1926, B1.51. The opposition around the UBL in Bautzen was not registered, 
38 'b'd I I . 
39 Meyer-Levine, Inside German Communism, p93, 
40 For details of the final full introduction of democratic centralism in the KPD's organisational structure, 
Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp449ff. 
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Plenum and to condemn the left opposition factions as marginal groupings which intended 
only to weaken the KPD's ability to struggle.41 However, at least in the district 
strongholds of the Left, it was still possible locally to jam the wheels of the party 
machine.42 In West Saxony the Vogt Group's continued popularity among the rank-and-
fue membership, its remaining positions in the BL and among party functionaries, set the 
scene for a furious and enduring turf war.43 
At national level this division of the Left into two factions did weaken resistance to the 
Reich leadership.44 However, the situation in the Opposition's strongholds did not 
conform to this picture. The Vogt Group in West Saxony regarded the reformed Left 
Opposition, under Fischer, Maslow and Hugo Urbahns, as a sister faction, which at local 
level in Berlin and the Ruhr pushed for a leftist policy.45 More important, however, for the 
factional struggle in Saxony, was the deeply entrenched support for the Vogt Group 
among district functionaries and the party membership. The central demands of the Vogt 
Group's factional platform were an open party discussion on the "Russian Question", in 
which it supported the "Joint Opposition's" criticisms of "socialism in one country"; 
ending the top down imposition of policy and the "return" to party democracy; and 
convening the 11th national party congress, which it was hoped would overturn the united 
41 SAPMO, I 2/2/8, Resolution zur innerparteilichen Lage. Sekretaere und Redakteure Konferenz am 16-
17.4.1926, Bl.136. 
42 For the Ruhr see, Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, pp70-1; Bahne, 'Die "ultralinke" Opposition', p371. 
The expelled leaders, Korsch, Schwarz and Schlagewerth, formed the Reichstag faction called then 
"Group of Left Communists", it was the only group to vote against the Berlin Treaty. 
43 Note: the West Saxon faction within the Wedding Opposition will be refered to as the Vogt Group. Not 
only was this the term used in Saxony but it emphasises that the Wedding Opposition was an umbrella 
faction nationally for a left tendency among party members. 
44 Weber, Wandlung, p156; Bahne, 'Die "ultralinke" Opposition', pp362,365. 
4S SAPMO, I 3/10/112, Resolution II (der Gruppe Vogt), B1.402. 
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front policy.46 The return of the Right faction into the Saxon leadership and the re-
introduction of the policies of "1923" produced an ardent defence of leftist policies. The 
Vogt Group insisted that the district membership did not trust the "old leadership" from 
1923, which had made such significant "mistakes" and the new party line had achieved 
little except the illusion that we in Saxony would again have a government with the left 
SPD leaders.47 The ZK's previous assurances that the "open letter's" political line could 
only be carried out with a strong left-wing party leadership, without ideological and 
organisational concessions to the Brandler faction, were seen by the turn of 1925/6 as 
h . 48 empty r etonc. 
In what amounted to an intra-party fratricidal war the ZK set out to mobilise the full 
force of the party apparatus against the Opposition throughout Germany. In Pfalz the ZK 
continued to come up against the barrier of solid and well organised factional resistance 
from the Wedding Opposition, despite an attempt to dilute it by merging Pfalz with the 
neighbouring party district of Baden.49 In Berlin, however, the ability of the apparatus to 
rig the process of delegation to the District Party Congress in July had enabled the ZK to 
46 SAPMO, 13/10/115, Bericht ueber die Taetigkeiten des Bezirks Westsachsen der KPD vom 1.4.1925 
bis 31.3.1926, (Leipzig, 1926), pp6-7, Bl.169; SAPMO, I 3/10/112, Resolution II (der Gruppe Vogt), 
B1.402. 
47 SAPMO, I 3/1 0/112, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1928. Diskussion ueber den Bericht der weiterten 
Exekutive, B1.411(Lau). 
48 The Vogt Group in the BLS of 1.12.1925 continued to submit to party discipline despite a rejection of 
the political line and the condemnation of all opposition to it as "ultra-Left and anti-Bolshevik" because 
this would give the Right the ability to purge their opponents, SAPMO I 3/10/112, BLS. West Sachsen 
am 1.12.1925, B1.341; For the reversal of this submission to party discipline at BL level and the 
intervention to restore the decision making process to the membership, ibid, Resolution II (der Gruppe 
Vogt), Bl.402; For opposition to the use of re-organisation in the purge of leading figures in the 
Opposition in West Saxony and Berlin in early 1926, ibid, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1928. Diskussion 
der Diskussion ueber den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive, B1.409(Vogt). 
49 Weber, Wandlung, p165. 
Page 158 
appoint Wilhelm Pieck, who was already part of the inner core of staunch Comintern-
loyalists, as Political Secretary.50 In West Saxony the ZK intended to eliminate the Vogt 
Group's hold over the district party by organising a further party debate, culminating in a 
District Party Congress, in a campaign to discredit the Opposition as a "betrayal" of the 
Bolshevik Revolution and the Comintern and harmful to party policy in Germany.51 The 
ZK's intention to win over as many rank-and-file leftists as possible was indicated by 
Koenen, the ZK's district Kommissar, who insisted that a "left-turn" would be introduced 
at any moment if conditions changed. 52 The Political Secretary, Max Stroetzel, a former 
member of the Fischer Group who had gone over to Thaehnann's faction, also insisted 
that the KPD needed the ordinary rank-and-file leftist members.53 
The party machine again geared up for the mobilisation of party opinion against the 
Opposition in a process of meetings beginning with an "Information Evening" for Greater 
Leipzig on 30 April.54 Following this meeting apparatus functionaries were sent into the 
cells and local groups throughout the district to make a speech on the 6th ECCI-Plenum's 
political resolutions and elect delegates to the district congress on the basis of support for 
or rejection of the Comintern's political pronouncements. The process of delegation from 
cells and local groups to Working Area, City District and Sub-District Conferences, 
before the final election of delegates to the District Congress, ensured that support for the 
50 ibid, ppI57-8, Pieck received 106 votes against the Left opposition's candidate, Urbahns, who received 
26 votes; Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p141, showing the strong support for the Opposition among 
ordinary party members. 
51 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. Polbuero. An der ZK. Polbuero, Leipzig den 
24.4.1926, Bl.404. 
52 ibid, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1928. Diskussion ueber den Bericht der weiterten Exekutive., SAPMO, 
Bl.412-3(Koenen). 
53 ibid, B1.411 (Stroetzel). 
54 ibid, BL Westsachsen. Polbucro. An der ZK. Polbuero. Leipzig den 24.4.1926, B1.404. 
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Opposition had to be rock solid locally to get through the ever tighter mesh.55 The 
election of delegates also gave disproportionate representation to members organised in 
factory cells, which were in smaller units allowing a tighter control over the meeting's 
agenda. 56 The mode of delegation was also used to filter out the Opposition. In Leipzig, 
the centre of the Opposition, one delegate was to be elected on the basis of ten paid up 
members, in the outlying sub-districts the ratio was reduced to one delegate for every five 
members. 57 Despite all of these organisational advantages in the hands of the ZK, the 
District Party Congress, which had already been delayed since the publication of the "open 
letter" in September, was postponed for a month because of the continued strength of 
resistance. 58 During the debate in the West Saxon party organisations the strength of 
support for the Vogt Group, shown at a factional meeting on 18 May, forced the District 
Politburo to warn the Opposition that: "continued factional work is insufferable in a 
democratic centralist party. ,,59 
Preparations for the District Congress in West Saxony indicated the depth of the split in 
the KPD caused by the "open letter" of September 1925. While the fragmentation at Reich 
level was limited by the defection of many of Fischer's functionaries to the Thaelmann 
leadership, the impact at district level and below was very different. 60 At least in the 
55 ibib, Beschluss der BL ueber die Durchfuerung der Diskussion ueber den Bericht der erweiterten 
Exekutive, B1.426. 
56 ibid, B1.426. 
57 ibid, Protokoll der BLS am 28.4.1928. Diskussion der Diskussion ueber den Bericht der weiterten 
Exekutive. B1.411(Stroetzel). 
58 ibid, Beschluss der BL ueber die Durchfuerung der Diskussion ueber den Bericht der erweiterten 
Exekutive, B1.426. 
59 ibid, BL Westsachsen. An der ZK (Information). Leipzig, den 1.6.1926, B1.437. 
60 Weber, Wandlung, p156f; Meyer-Levine,Inside German Communism, p93, goes as far as stating that 
the split caused by the "Open Letter" was "negligible" because Fischer's supporters defected to the new 
ZK and were allowed to keep their positions. 
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Wedding Opposition's strongholds in Pfalz, Berlin and West Saxony the feud in the party 
went into the lowest party units, paralysing party work.61 The organisational strength of 
the Vogt Group in West Saxony also owed something to the role of Arthur Vogt who 
tried to balance differences within the Opposition using what the BL called a "middle 
course" capable of integrating many functionaries who did not want to risk expulsion.62 
At the District Party Congress, held between 9-10 July 1926 the BL majority was able to 
endorse the ZK's political line, its position on the factional struggle and to have a 
resolution endorsing the CPSU's policy of "socialism in one country". The latter was 
presented to the wider membership as the positive possibility of "independent socialist 
construction" in Soviet Russia as opposed to an abandonment of world revolution.63 
However, the strength of the Opposition throughout the district party was reflected in its 
ability to secure 57 of the 123 delegates elected to the Congress, despite the 
organisational manipulation which was intended to marginalise it as a force at the 
congress.64 With this degree of support for the Opposition it remained necessary to hand 
nine of the 27 positions as BL Secretaries to the Vogt Group. The feared split off of a 
very significant number of party workers was avoided at the cost of leaving the 
Opposition with its positions from the lowest cells to the BL itself.65 Koetter, the leader of 
the Wedding Opposition in Berlin, was able to make the co-speech at the Congress. 
Furthermore, a lengthy 'no confidence' motion in the ZK's policies was submitted for 
61 SAPMO I 3/10/107, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926. Stand der Organisation, B1.34. 
62 ibid, B1.33. 
63 ibid, Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9-10.7.1926, B1.32. 
64 ibid, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926, B1.15. 
65 ibid, Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9-10.7.1926, B1.32. 
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discussion.66 The Opposition's motion rejected the political line set by the 6th-ECCI 
Plenum and its justification on the basis of a "relative stabilisation" of political and 
economic life in Germany. The Comintern's policy statement was dismissed as "un-
Marxist and unsuitable for a revolutionary policy in the Comintern's national parties. ,,67 
The Opposition also expressed sympathy for the expelled Korsch, Schwarz and 
Schagewerth grouping in the Reichstag, which had voted against the German-Soviet 
Trade Treaty. The Vogt Group agreed that the Treaty placed Soviet foreign policy above 
the demands of the German Revolution.68 In a show of solidarity with the "Leningrad 
Opposition" the motion blamed: 
The suppression of debate on the 14th CPSU Congress for the "false" application 
of the united front policy, factionalism, the re-organisation of the ZK and the rape 
of internal party democracy. 69 
The platform of the Opposition concluded that: "This District Party Congress supports the 
Leningrad Opposition from the honest conviction that the KPD can only take on its 
historic tasks if, in the place of the present opportunist course, a clear revolutionary line is 
adopted. ,,70 
The District Congress, however, did mark a turning point in the Opposition's tactics. The 
issue of support for all expelled factions and individual leaders, including Ruth Fischer's 
removal from the ZK and Comintern, split the Vogt Group's vote. Thirty delegates 
66 ibid, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926., Resolution an der Bericht der Bezirksleitung, 
B1.19ff. 
67 ibid, B1.21-2. 
68 ibid, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926. Resolution an der Bericht der Bezirksleitung, 
B1.27. 
69 ibid, B1.25. 
70 ibid, B1.28. 
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belonging to the Vogt Group voted with the BL on the specific question of support for 
expelled factions; their motivation was a fear of expulsion.71 The BL majority now hoped 
that the Opposition had at last divided into "open anti-Bolshevik elements" and "worker 
elements who were essentially loyal to the Party. ,,72 However, the term "worker elements" 
can only be regarded as an weapon in the leadership's propaganda arsenal: the whole 
Opposition was overwhehningly composed of workers. A demarcation line had been 
drawn in the Opposition, but the faction was far from fragmenting in its resistance to the 
re-introduction of the united front policy and the Right faction's return to political 
influence in Saxony. It did, admittedly, signal the need for a more cautious approach by 
the Opposition.73 The Opposition continued to hold the support of the ordinary 
membership and district party workers, restricting the united front policy being translated 
into active campaigning. The continued ability of the Vogt Group to organise its factional 
opposition to the ZK's policies also indicates that, where resistance to a policy was 
sufficiently pronounced, it could continue. The local membership was also in large 
measure able to resiste the atomisation of the party into cells, which were to replace the 
larger and more vibrant residential group meetings.74 
4.3 Saxony and the "Letter of the 700": German Communism Watches the 
International Purge its Internationalists. 
In July 1926 Ruth Fischer's unauthorised return from Moscow and Maslow's release from 
jail generated a surge in the Left Opposition's agitation on the "Russian Question". The 
71 ibid, Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9-10.7.1926, B1.32. 
72 ibid, B1.33. 
73 "bOd 1 1 . 
74 ibid, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926., Stand der Organisation, B1.34-5; SAPMO I 
3/10/115, Bericht vom Bezirk Westsachsen, den 19.11.1926, B1.158. 
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Left Opposition's campaign centred on opposition to the policy of "socialism in one 
country", which was seen as a threat to the Comintern's stimulation of world revolution, 
and support for the Joint Opposition in the CPSU. In early August the leaders of the Left 
Opposition co-operated with the groupings comprising the Wedding Opposition and the 
Korsch-faction within the Intransigent Left, which had already been expelled, to arrive at a 
joint declaration. The immediate response of the ZK was to expel Fischer and Maslow on 
19 August, using the pretext of their contact with Korsch, and to accuse them of 
propagating the slogan "Against Moscow". The public statement of the Opposition 
groups took the form of the "Letter of the 700", whose signatories were still party 
functionaries. The Letter challenged the development of Stalin's personal dictatorship, 
presenting it as a "falsification" of Leninism. 75 However, the case of the Left in the KPD 
was not helped by developments in the CPSU: on 16 October Zinoviev and Trotsky 
admitted they had broken party discipline and withdrew their support for the Left 
throughout the Comintern. Their last ditch attempt to retain their positions of influence in 
the CPSU, however, was unsuccessful: at the end of October Trotsky was ousted from 
the Politburo and Zinoviev was replaced by Bukharin as chairman of the Comintern.76 In 
Germany the KPD leadership also acted against the Opposition. The ZK condemned the 
"Letter of the 700" as a "criminal attempt to split" the KPD and began a purge of those 
who would not submit to party discipline. On 5 September the KPD purged further Left 
Opposition activists. The purge of leading figures was followed up by a "loyalty 
75 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p141. For the division of the Intransigent Left into a radical wing, 
under Schwarz, and a relatively moderate wing, under Korsch, see, Bahne, 'Die "ultra-linke" 
Opposition', p371. 
76 Schapiro, Communist Party, pp290ff. 
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declaration", according to which those refusing to submit to party discipline would be 
expelled from the party. 77 
The expulsion of the leaders of the Left Opposition, and the sidelining of the Joint 
Opposition in the CPSU, dominated internal party life between August and November 
1926.78 In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the Left in the BL was not factionally connected to the 
Joint Opposition in the CPSU, sheltering it from the full force of the factional feud. Only a 
handful of members of the Narrower BL initially refused to condemn Trotsky's and 
Zinoviev's political activities outright.79 The debate on the "Russian Question" was then 
forced through the district party from the cells and local groups to Sub-District, City 
District and Workers' Delegate Conferences, which culminated in a District Party 
Congress on 26 September.80 The district membership's support for Right-communism 
ensured that there would be little objection to party policy. Almost all of the meetings in 
the KPD's lower organisational units accepted the ZK's policy statement unanimously. 
However, efforts to eliminate even the limited dissent of abstaining in the vote further 
charted the development of the KPD's self-image as the party nemine contradicente. 81 
77 Weber, Wandlung, p158f; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp432-3; Fischer, R., Stalin and German 
Communism. The Origins o/the State Party (Cambridge, 1948) pp537ff. 
78 For District Party Meetings dealing with carrying out the actual party campaigns see, SAPMO I 3/9/69, 
Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 16.8.1926, B1.24lff; ibid, 
Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 13.9.1926, B1.267ff; SAPMO 
I 3/9{l3, Politischer Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, 
B1.333ff. 
79 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland Juli-August 1926, B1.320-1. The 
same document is in, Ergaenzungen. I 3/8-10/7, Mappe 1, B1.13ff; SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der 
Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 16.8.1926, B1.241-2. 
80 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland Juli-August 1926, B1.320-1. 
81 ibid, Politi scher Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland Yom 10. Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, 
B1.334. 
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The three localities with any significant dissent, Plauen, Doebeln and the local group in 
Hartha, all had structural features helping to explain the conflict with the leadership since 
the return of the united front policy. In the case of Plauen, high levels of unemployment in 
the textile industry gave a sociological basis to support for the Left. In the autumn of 
1926 12,000 textile workers were unemployed.82 The sub-district of Doebeln had an 
economic structure and pattern of strong organisation in the SPD and trades union more 
similar to the West Saxon party district. The local group in Hartha also used its close 
geographical proximity to the Leipzig KPD to develop organisational contacts with the 
Wedding Opposition. 83 
The party debate at this point had an unexpected tum in Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Although 
the "Chemnitz Left" could accept the ZK's position against support for the Joint 
Opposition in the CPSU, this did not mean that the development of political policy per se 
was disregarded. Initially Max Opitz and Heinz Wesche were actively involved in 
preserving the unity of their faction: not least because of the strength of support for the 
Right among the district membership.84 However, when the District Party Congress, 
which was held on 26 September, failed to take equal measures against the "Right 
Groupings" as against the "Left Groupings", Opitz and Wesche resigned. The district's 
political leadership at the beginning of October then passed to Ernst Schneller, a senior 
functionary in the party apparatus. 85 Schneller's first task was to ensure support for the 
82 ibid, B1.326. 
83 ibid, Politischer Bericht. Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland Juli-August 1926, B1.320. 
84 Paul Bertz also opposed the role of Katz in areas such as Limbach, were there were efforts to set up the 
Spartakus Bund Nr.2. See, ibid, B1.319-21. 
85 ibid, B1.334-5; SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-
Vogtland yom 11.10.1926, B1.285. 
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German and Russian leaderships' position against the loint Opposition and the signatories 
of the "Letter of the 700" in Germany.86 
In East Saxony it was not the Russian Question and the German factional feud which 
were restricting the KPD's political activities, but chronic organisational and financial 
weaknesses.87 During the first half on 1926 Martin Schreiter, the Political Secretary, 
complained that because the ZK had not adequately informed him about internal party 
matters he had first learned about them in the SPD's press.88 While the other Saxon party 
districts were immersed in the factional infighting in the summer and autumn of 1926, the 
East Saxon District Congress did not put the issue on the official agenda.89 The protocol 
of the District Congress only registered a complaint from the delegate of the cell group 
Sachsenwerke that: "The BL has placed too little value on conducting the party 
discussion in the cells. ,,90 In East Saxony only the leadership of the sub-district Bautzen 
actively opposed the party line and the expulsion of Ruth Fischer and Maslow.91 Siegrid 
Raedel, the functionary sent to Bautzen to assess the situation in the wider party 
membership, concluded that: "The intellectual spiritus rektor is Hoop ... (but) he has as 
86 SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Engeren Bezirksleitung Erzgebirge-vogtland vom 1.11.1926, B1.300. 
87 Organisational weakness refers to both the organisation of the party itself and the number of members 
and functionaries. These complaints were made constantly at BL level, see, for example, SAPMO I 
3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das ZK. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, B1.431; A shortage of money restricted 
the prosecution of several campaigns at the one time and led to a system of prioritising certain issues. To 
overcome financial problems "Aujbaumarken" at 1,50M were proposed at the District Congress in 
September see, SAPMO 13/8/19, Antraege zum Bezirksparteitag, B1.4. 
88 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. Ostsachsen vom 10.7.1926, B1.100. 
89 SAPMO I 3/8/19, Einberfuung der Bezirksparteitag zum 11-12.9.1926, B1.8. The official agenda reads: 
The Political Situation and Our Tasks; The Tasks in Saxony; The Forthcoming Elections. 
90 SAPMO I 3/8/19, Antraege zurn Bezirksparteitag, B1.4. 
91 SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das ZK. Dresden, den 9.6.1926, B1.429-30. 
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good as no support behind him. ,,92 The high point of Bautzen's opposition to the party line 
took the fonn of a resolution sent directly to the ZK and the ECCI: the BL's main concern 
was that it would give a distorted impression of the situation in the district. 93 The 
demotion of Schreiter from Political Secretary to Leader of the Department for 
Communal Policies and Gaebel from Organisation Secretary to BL Kommissar in the sub-
district Zittau, reflected more their disbelief in the political possibilities offered in East 
Saxony than the pretext of their excessive caution on developments in Soviet power 
struggle.94 The appointment of Melcher as Political Secretary and Renner as editor in 
chief, both of whom were apparatus functionaries, was a symptom of the district's 
Bolshevisation. Melcher, who had no background in Saxony either politically or 
personally, was appointed through the party apparatus as a compliant pair of hands. This 
development was also reflected in the ZK's directive that Schwarze should take part in an 
eight week schooling course in Berlin to enable him to take over the BL's Organisational 
Department, which, as the dynamic of the KPD's Bolshevisation in the districts, was the 
most important BL department.95 
The eye of the factional stonn in Saxony looked over West Saxony. At Reich level the 
crucial contributory factor in the eventual demise of the Wedding Opposition has been 
92 ibid, BL429. 
93 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. Ostsachsen vom 10.7.1926, BLI0l(Renner). 
94 The "event" in Russia is a reference to the removal of Zinoviev from his position as chairman of the 
Com intern. Zinoviev's name during this period in East Saxony is conspicuous by its absence from all 
documents. For Schreiter's and Gaebel's position during the discussion on the expulsion of Fischer and 
Maslow, see SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Sitzung der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 19.8.1926, 
B1.124-5. For the changes made in the BL, as "recommended" by the ZK, see KPD.8.0stsachsen. BLS am 
15.8.1926., SAPMO I 3/8/25,Bl.I29-32. 
95 SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.0stsachsen. BLS am 15.8.1926, Bl.132. The new Political Secretary told 
district functionaries that as he did not know the political conditions in the district he would consult with 
a commission comprising local district secretaries. 
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regarded as its fragmentation into signatories and non-signatories of the "Letter of the 
700".96 In West Saxony the Vogt Group refused to sign the "Letter of the 700". This did 
not represent a capitulation to the ZK: it was a tactic to maintain the unity of the Vogt 
Group as a faction within the KPD.97 Strong resistance to the ZK's political line continued 
at a Party Workers' Conference on 30 November, which dealt with the party's political 
tasks. The Opposition denounced any communist statement of support for an SPD-led 
regional government or voting with the SPD on matters relating to unemployment benefits 
and opposed the use of the united front policy to win over non-communist workers in the 
preparations for the Congress of Working People, a campaign of meetings organised by 
the KPD which was to culminate in a conference in Berlin in December 1926.98 The ZK's 
use of the "loyalty declaration" against the signatories of the "Letter of the 700" was 
roundly condemned and a resolution was adopted calling for the return of all those 
expelled on the 5 November for refusing to capitulate. Hans Weber, who had signed the 
Letter, was called on to "oppose the ruinous party course still more strongly ... and to 
struggle for the revolutionary Leninist party line. ,,99 That this was no isolated case is 
illustrated in a report sent to the Politburo on the 19 November which stated that: 
It must not be overlooked that they (the Opposition) have the support of the 
leading party workers and of the factory and street cells. Opposition cell leaders 
are distrustful of the present leadership.10o 
96 Weber, Wandlung, ppl64-5. 
97 SAPMO I 3/10/107, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 10-11.7.1926. Weitere Entwicklungen des 
Bezirks, B1.33. 
98 SAPMO, I 3/10/110, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. Polbuero. An das ZK. Polbuero. Leipzig, den 
30.1l.1926, B1.9-10. 
99 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Resolution. Mitgleiderversammlung von Gross-Leipzig. (Ueber den Ausschuss 
Urbahns und Genossen), Bl.515. 
100 SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bcricht vom Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 19.1l.1926, B1.158-9. 
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The report further infonns the Reich leadership that eliminating the Opposition's activities 
would not be possible until the process of re-organisation was completed.I01 The report 
also details how the Vogt Group had been able to paralyse the district party's political 
work from the BL into the local party organisations.102 It was the latter factor which 
demonstrated the actual hold of the Opposition in West Saxony. The factional struggle 
had resulted in the collapse of the BL as the party's district nerve centre: there were no 
discussions between the Secretaries and no weekly co-ordinating meetings; the 
Organisational Division, from which Vogt had admittedly been removed, was unable to 
carry out the reorganisation of the party's infrastructure; the channels for issuing 
instructions and directives on party work were almost completely closed down; there was 
"defective contact" between party cells and no staff of Instructors in the sub-districts; in 
the factories there was a chronic lack of propaganda material.103 The Opposition at grass 
roots level was also continually asserting its right to "proportional representation" in the 
election of delegates to party conferences.104 These developments illustrate the extent of 
the disruption to party work in the manner threatened by Vogt and Burke in JUly.10S If the 
ZK was able to get majority support in all BLs for its policies by the end of October then 
this, at least in the Opposition's strongholds, only reflected the "yes" votes of the national 
leadership's placemen.106 The case of West Saxony demonstrates that the Opposition's 
ability to function within the KPD was much stronger than traditionally thought. 
101 ibid, Bl.159. 
102 'b'd 1 1 . 
103 ibid, Bl.I58-9. 
104 'b'd I 1 . 
lOS SAPMO 13/10/107, Beschluss der Bezirksparteitag. Westsachsen am 9-10.7.1926, B1.32. 
106 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p433. 
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4.4 The 7th ECCI-Plenum and the 11th Reich Party Congress: Changing Demands 
on the Saxon KPD. 
At 7th ECCI-Plenum in November 1926 only one delegate represented the views of the 
Wedding Opposition. IO? With this national picture in mind, Hermann Weber wrote that 
when the 7th ECCI-Plenum met the Left Opposition was as good as beaten: factions 
around Katz, Korsch and Schwan had been expelled, the Wedding Opposition had been 
split and the Left Opposition's main leaders, Fischer, Maslow and Urbahns, had been 
expelled. l08 Control over "international" factional developments and the KPD's national 
leadership were, however, considerably tighter than in the German party districts. The 
ECCI-Plenum was able to confirm Zinoviev's replacement as chairman of the Comintern 
by B ukharin, bringing the Comintern into line with the constellation of forces in the 
CPSU. l09 The purge of Fischer, Maslow and Urbahns was also confirmed after their 
refusal to submit to "self-criticism" and to accept unconditionally the Comintern's policy 
decisions. 110 The decisive event for the internal development of the KPD was the entry of 
the Meyer Group, known as the Reconcilers, into the ZK and therefore also the BLs. The 
Meyer Group's strong endorsement of the united front policy made it essentially the 
respectable face of the Right in the national leadership. The Brandler faction, grouped 
around Boettcher and Froehlich, however, remained outside of the national leadership and 
continued criticism of national party policy. With the Right faction divided, and Meyer in 
the national leadership, the ZK scene was set for a final confrontation with the remaining 
107 Geyer, 'Sowjet Russland', p27. 
108 Weber, Wandlung, p1660 
109°bOd 1 1 0 
110 ibid, p167; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p4350 The pretext for the expulsion of Fischer and 
Maslow on the 19 August was their cooperation with Korsch in the drafting of the "Letter of the 700", see 
Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p141. 
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dissidents on the Left. lll The Soviet leadership, however, felt no indebtedness to Meyer, 
who was immediately discredited in the Soviet press for his previous "right errors".1l2 Of 
equal significance was Thaelmann's retention of the dominant role in the ZK and ability to 
prevent the return of Brandler and Thalheimer to do party work in Germany.l13 During 
the negotiations between the KPD's delegation and the CPSU at the 7th ECCI-Plenum on 
the 22 and 24 December Thaelmann had been in favour of the dissolution of all factional 
groups represented in the ZK. However, because Meyer would not join the leadership 
under these conditions, preventing the so-called policy of "concentration", Stalin imposed 
on Thaelmann the compromise that Bukharin had been unable to achieve; Meyer joined 
the new leadership on the basis of concessions to a political platform which more strongly 
emphasised winning over the left-wing of the SPD for communism.114 Although the 7th 
ECCI -Plenum continued to facilitate the removal of those leftists who organised 
opposition to the Comintern's policy in Germany, Moscow began to adopt a more leftist 
political language. 115 The conclusion of the factional struggle against the Left, and the 
slow beginnings of a more left-wing Comintern policy, gave 1927 its character as a year of 
111 Weber, Wandlung, p166; Meyer-Levine, Inside German Communism, pp108-9; Fowkes, German 
Communism, p142, citing a conference of party workers on 13-14.1.1926 in Die Rote Fahne, 16 and 
20.1.1926; Tjaden, KJ., Struktur und Funktion der KPD-Opposition (Meisenheim am Glan, 1964, plOO. 
112 Weber, H., 'Dokumentation. Zu den Beziehungen Zwischen der KPD und der Kommunistischen 
International', VfZ 2 (1968) (ppI77-208), p205. 
113 SAPMO, I 2/1/52, Beschluss des Polbueros in der Fragen der Genossen Brandler und Thalheimer. 
Berlin, den 7.1.1927, Bl.18. The Politburo meeting accepted the 7th ECCI-Plenum's resolutions but 
"chose" not to permit the return of Brandler and Thalheimer on the grounds this would "not be advisable 
for the KPD". 
114 Watlin, A., Die Komintern 1919-1929 (Mainz, 1993), p76; For Meyer's declaration, Meyer-Levine, 
Inside German Communism, pplll-2. 
115 Winkler, Schein der Normalitael, p435; Daycock, 'Political Extremes', ppI45-6, using the report by the 
Special Commission into the "errors" of the Fischer-Maslow leadership. Thaelmann's own inclination for 
Page 172 
transition. This did not go unnoticed in the KPD. Paul Schlecht, W. Bartels and A. 
Grylewicz made a declaration to the ZK that there had been "a revision of socialism in one 
country ... (which) makes the crusade against all of the Left, especially in the CPSU and 
KPD, hypocritical. ,,116 
The reason for delaying the 11th Reich Party Congress had two causes. Firstly, it was to 
enable the party apparatus to prevent any significant delegation from the Opposition on 
the Left. 117 Secondly, it was symptomatic of the top down imposition of policy that the 
KPD was unable to set an agenda in preparation for a Reich Congress, which dealt with 
party policy, until the ECCI had set the political line for Germany. A ZK circular to the 
BLs stated that until the 7th ECCI-Plenum had dealt with policy in Germany "no 
preparations for the Reich Congress could be undertaken.,,1l8 In January 1927 the KPD 
began its internal discussion on party policy leading to the 11 th Reich Congress. In East 
Saxony no District Congress was held due to the district's financial weakness; instead it 
was proposed that delegates to the Reich Congress would come from the sub-district 
conferences.1l9 In the district party itself there was little factional infighting. However, 
ultra-Leftism had become submerged in the RFB, the KPD's paramilitary organisation, 
which went into open rebellion against the RFB's national leadership and the BL when a 
party functionary, Koenig, was imposed on the Gau leadership without consultation with 
a return to a "left" political line is made clear in the ZK meeting of early August 1926 see, SAPMO, I 
2/2/9, B1.310-15. 
116 SAPMO I 2/1/52, Sitzung der Politburo am 7.1.1927, B1.26. 
117 Weber, Wandlung, ppI69-70. During January and February an "exact check" on the membership was 
used to assist the expulsion of the Opposition. 
118 SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben zum Januar-Arbeitsplan 1927. Dresden, den 
21.12.1926, Bl.157. 
119 ibid, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das ZK. Sekretariat. Dresden, den 1.10.1926, Bl.134. Already in 
Septem ber 1926 the district party leaderships were expecting the annual party congress. 
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the membership. The incident paralysed all party work during January and led to the 
disciplining of the seven member Gau leadership, which was led by Bernard Koch. The 
affair, however, was most significant for the party's ability to inform its members that 
"iron proletarian discipline" in a Leninist party did not permit "democratic" discussion.120 
In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the situation was very different. The city of Chemnitz continued 
to be a stronghold of the KPD's right-wing and represented the centre-point of the 
Brandler faction. 121 The continued strength of support for the Brandler faction in the 
factories, particularly in the metal-working suburbs, can at least in part be explained by the 
ability of Communist union functionaries to win positions in the factory councils using a 
policy of contact and limited co-operation with colleagues in the SPD on issues 
specifically relating to the factories. 122 The KPD also had its deepest penetration of local 
politics in the electoral district Chemnitz-Zwickau, taking almost half the number of 
120 ibid, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das ZK der KPD. Dresden, den 8.2.1927, B1.3-1O; Mter the BL imposed 
its authority on the Gau, RFB the Reich RFB leadership suddenly removed the apparatus functionary 
Koenig whose imposition on Dresden had caused all the trouble. See, ibid, KPD.8.0stsachsen. An das 
ZK. Polbuero. Dresden, den 9.3.1927, Bl.I0f. 
121 From the 245 local groups in Chemnitz 143 were stated to have been "too small" for re-organisation; 
this left 2,169 members or 16 per cent of the total organised into neither factory nor street cells. Of the 
102 local groups which were re-organised into cells there were 181 factory cells, with 2,562 members or 
19 per cent of the total membership. The number of street cells was 259, which amounted to 8,235 
members or 65 per cent of the total membership. The process of delegation to the District Congress 
included 42 per cent of the membership. However, 52 per cent of the discussion was registered as having 
taken place in the factory cells see, SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Bezirksleitung. Stand und Entwicklung 
der Organisation im Bezirk. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12-13.2.1927, B1.4-7. 
122 Although the sub-district trades union divisions were described by the BL as "existing only on paper", 
where communist functionaries were active they did get positive results: in 137 Chemnitz factories which 
informed the leadership of the results of the factory council elections from a total of 724 works councillors 
the KPD had 279, the SPD 259, 149 were non aligned, with the remainder made up of Christian and 
right-wing appointees see, SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Bezirksleitung. Abteilung Gewerkschaften, 
BI.17-18. 
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councillors won by the SPD.123 Here too the policy was for achieving improvements in 
workers' living and working conditions by voting with the SPD where necessary. The 
extent of the local party organisations' co-operation on specific issues with the local SPD 
in town halls, rather using contact only to "unmask" the SPD's alleged alienation from 
workers' interests, brought accusation of "right deviations" even in the mid 1920s.124 
At national level the focus of the factional debate was the return of Ernst Meyer into the 
leadership.125 At the District Party Congress in Erzgebirge-Vogtland, however, the agenda 
was dominated by the issue of whether Brandler and Thalheimer should be allowed to 
d · k' G 126 Th . return to 0 actIve party wor ill ermany. e two most promment supporters of 
Brandler in the Saxon KPD, Boettcher and Siewert, called for his return to Germany to do 
party work. Supported by 43 of the 147 delegates at the District Congress they insisted 
that, "We must give Brandler the possibility of justifying himself and to eliminate the 
ultra-Left falsification of history (ie Brandler's responsibility for the "failure" of 1923)".127 
123 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen (StJFS) NrA6, (Dresden, 1927), pp458-9. In 1926 
the ration of SPD to KPD councillors was 1 :2.2. The KPD's internal report states that the KPD had almost 
parity of communal representation with the SPD see, SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Kompolabteilung. 
Bezirksparteitag. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12-13.2.1927, B1.22. 
124 SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Kompolabteilung. Bezirksparteitag. Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12-
13.2.1927, B1.22ff. 
125 Weber, Wandlung, p 171. Weber tends to over -emphasise the debate on Meyer's return into the 
leadership in Erzgebirge-Vogtland. 
126 Thaelmann's speech on the second day of the Congress stressed that Meyer's return to the national 
leadership was in accordance with the policy of the "concentration of forces" since the Comintem's "open 
letter" and Meyer had rejected "Brandler's policy, the policy of 1923" see, SAPMO I 3/9/61, 'Die 
politische Diskussion auf dem Bezirksparteitag der KPD', in Kaempjer,1 Beilage, NrAl, 18.2.1927, 
B1.54. 
127 SAPMO 13/9/61, 'Die Entscheidung des Bezirksparteitages. Vorbehaltlos auf der Linie des ZKs', in 
Kaempjer, 14.2.1927, B1.46; ibid, 'Politische Lage und die Aufgaben der Partei. Resolution des 
Bezirksparteitages der KPD Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland'; ibid, 'Die politische Diskussion auf dem 
Bezirksparteitag der KPD', in Kampjer, 1 Beilage, NrAl, 18.2.1927, B1.54. 
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The motion was opposed by the Left in the BL who were against the re-introduction of a 
party debate on "Brandlerism", fearing that this could lead to a renewed "right-turn".128 In 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland the use of the KPD's re-organisation on the basis of factory cells to 
enforce the political line came up against the obstacle of factory cells being 
overwhelmingly the domain of Right Communists. Furthermore, while the ZK continued 
to prioritise completing the purge of the independent minded leftists in the party, the 
criticisms of the Right were again able to express themselves in the party press: a 
development of considerable concern to the BL.129 
In Berlin and the Ruhr, which had been centres of the Left Opposition, the party 
apparatus had been able to impose compliant BLs under Pieck and Florin.l3O In West 
Saxony, however, there was continued strong resistance to the imposition of party policy 
from above. This was made evident when 14 members of the street cell "Leipzig-Centre 
5" left the party because of the party apparatus's refusal to accept the adoption of a 
majority resolution supporting the Opposition's position.131 A report sent to the Politburo 
also indicated that this means of eliminating the Opposition did not win the trust of the 
128 SAPMO 13/9/61, 'Die Entscheidung des Bezirksparteitages. Vorbehaltlos auf der Linie des ZKs', in 
Kaemp/er, 14.2.1927, B1.46. The BL also noted that Doebeln was the only district centre of ultra-Leftism. 
Doebeln, however, was upheld as an example for good party work in the communal councils, see, 
SAPMO 13/9/61, Bericht der Kompolabteilung. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 12-13.2.1927, 
B1.22. 
129 SAPMO I 3/9/61, 'Politische Lage und die Aufgaben der Partei. Resolution des Bezirksparteitages der 
KPD Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland', in Kaemp/er, 14.2.1927, B1.46; ibid, "Erfolge, Maengel und neue 
Wege unserer Partei Arbeit", in Kaemp/er, 1 Beilage, Nr.41, 18.2.1927, B1.54; The vote on the political 
resolution at the District Congress was: 84 for the position of the BL majority, 22 for the Right 
Opposition and 11 abstentions. No account of why this does not total 147 delegates is given. 
130 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p436; Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p69ff. 
131 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS. West Sachsen am 26.11.1926, B1.511(Dasecke). 
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ordinary party membership, whom the ZK wanted to win over.132 When the District Party 
Congresses met immediately prior to the Essen Congress the only district to elect a new 
BL with a majority for the Wedding Opposition was Pfalz. To this can be added the very 
strong support for the Vogt Group in West Saxony.133 
In West Saxony the pro-ZK majority had been increased in relation to the last Congress 
in July 1926 from 11 to 19. However, the Opposition was still able to have Koetter make 
a speech on behalf of the Wedding Opposition.134 The return of Meyer into the Reich 
leadership fractured the BL into four factions: a Left faction around Stroetzel emerged in 
addition to the Vogt Group and the pro-ZK majority, which comprised the Right under 
Boettcher and Meyer's factional adherent Georg Schumann, who was appointed Political 
Secretary.135 During the Congress Burke made a direct appeal to Stroetzel to "reject the 
7th ECCI-Plenum's position on the return of Brandler and Thalheimer ... (and) to struggle 
against Schumann, Boettcher and company with the Wedding Opposition. ,,136 The District 
Congress was essentially an exercise in bringing the KPD into line with the resolutions on 
political tactics adopted by the Comintern and excluding the Opposition from influence. In 
West Saxony the majority resolution in support of the national leadership's policies was a 
facade which barely concealed the popUlarity of the Opposition among the membership: it 
had only been achieved by using the force of the apparatus to weight the process of 
delegation against the Vogt Group.137 At the District Party Congress the language used in 
132 SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht vom Bezirk Westsachsen, den 19.11.1926, B1.158-9. 
133 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p436. 
134 SAPMO I 3/10/108, 'Die politische Resolution des Bezirksparteitages', SAZ, 1.3.1927, B1.3. 
135 Schumann had joined the leadership with Meyer see, SAPMO I 3/10/108, 'Der Verlauf des 
Bezirksparteitages', in SAZ, 2.3.1927, B1.4. 
136 'b'd 1 1 . 
137 SAPMO 3/10/108, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 28.2.1927, B1.1-2. 
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the official resolutions began to place a more leftist inflection on the united policy. This 
tactic was not only an attempt to win over those in the Opposition who did not want to 
risk expulsion, it also reflected the ZK's directives on policy. 138 
Winkler has detailed how at the Essen Congress there were constant interruptions during 
the speeches of those who spoke against the position of the ZK majority. Importantly, 
party policy was now characterised by a "left isolationist" interpretation of the united front 
tactic and the SPD's leadership was lambasted for their "support of imperialism" against 
the Soviet Union.139 The Thaelmann Group's control of the proceedings at the Reich 
Congress was so tight and the beginnings of a more antagonistic policy towards the SPD 
so marked, that Meyer later wrote he felt like he was "going to the slaughter" when he 
presented a minority resolution on policy. 140 
Again Soviet foreign policy concerns had influenced the KPD's policy in Germany. The 
collapse of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, which no longer seemed willing or 
able to influence British foreign policy in China, brought with it a more open attack on the 
social democratic workers' movement throughout the Comintern's national section.141 The 
main thrust of the Reich Congress, however, was the elimination of factionalism in the 
KPD under the slogan of an "internal party consolidation".142 The ZK's intention of 
eliminating all factions within the party was made clear when the warning statement was 
fired across the dissident's bows that: 
138 SAPMO 13/10/108, 'Die politische Resolution des Bezirksparteitages', in SAZ 1.3.1927, B1.3; ibid, 
'Der Verlauf des Bezirksparteitages', in SAZ, 2.3.1927. 
139 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp436-7. 
140 Meyer-Levine, Inside German Communism, p119. 
141 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p438; These foreign policy issues are detailed in, SAPMO I 2/1/54, 
Protokoll der Sitzung des ZKs am 1.4.1927, B1.94. 
142 Bericht.ll.Parteitag, quoted in Weber, Wandlung, p173. 
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The party has been tolerant of the Opposition but a Communist Party can only 
exist when it is united, when it recognises the leadership elected at the Party 
Congress. The opposition prevents party work from being done.143 
However, the Thaelmann Group, which continued to be the dominant faction, was aware 
that the newly elected ZK was still far from united: it also included the Meyer Group, an 
assortment of leftists who were discontented with the direction of party policy and even a 
new Left Opposition around Bertz, Gerbig and Paul Maslowski. 144 Furthermore, at district 
level the central importance of the factional struggle had placed senior supporters of 
Meyer and the Right into the BL's. With this in mind a Control Commission was set up 
with the primary function of using the re-organisation of the party, on the basis of factory 
cells and the imposition of "revolutionary party discipline", to serve the further elimination 
of opposition from the Left factions. 145 
4.5 The Year of Comintern Transition and the Saxon KPD. 
In West Saxony Georg Schumann, a member of Meyer's faction, was appointed as 
Political Secretary. The BL also included Boettcher, who had been transferred from 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland, and Arthur Lieberasch, who were on the party's Right. Boettcher 
took up the influential position as editor in chief of the Saechsische Arbeiter Zeitung 
(SAZ), the district KPD's daily paper.146 The role of these appointments to the BL was 
clear: to suppress the Vogt Group's factional activities. However, the collision of factions 
143 "bOd 1 1 " 
144 Weber, Wandlung, p177. 
145 ibid, pp 176-7. 
146 On the inclusion of Boettcher and other prominent members of the Brandler faction in the BL see, 
Weber, ibid, p186" 
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in the BL, and the continued support for the Vogt Group among the membership, jammed 
the wheels of the district party. The District Party Congress in December 1927 admitted 
that the ZK's appointments to the BL that spring had been rejected by the membership and 
as a consequence the BL had been unable to carry out party work.147 
The first stage in setting the wheels of the district party's political work in motion again 
was the reconstruction of functioning departments in the BL. This began with the 
Organisation Department, which gradually restored co-operation between the various 
departments.148 However, it did not achieve the mobilisation of the wider membership for 
work on the basis of the official party line in the cells or residential organisation: for 
example only 105 party members from Greater Leipzig were involved in the October 
recruitment campaign.149 Even more significantly the Vogt Group continued to dominate 
the implementation of party campaigns, such as the campaign against the Saxon 
Buergerblock government in early August. In West Saxony the Vogt Group was using a 
parallel party apparatus to instruct its supporters on the basis of support for the policies 
adopted during the Fischer leadership of 1924/5.150 
Resistance to the official party line continued throughout 1927 on a massive scale. BL 
reports complained that in Greater Leipzig the party line had been "sabotaged" in several 
City District Leaderships and local groups. 151 Sub-District conferences, uniting delegates 
147 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10-
1l.12.1927, Bl.64. 
148 SAPMO 13/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927, Bl.64ff. 
149 On "passivity" in the factory cells see, SAPMO I 3/10/116, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer den Monat Oktober 
1927. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 24.11.1927, Bl.106; For the recruitment campaign, ibid, 
Bl.112. 
150 ibid, Organisationsbericht vom 1.7.l927 bis 15.8.1927, B1.38-9. 
151 ibid, B1.40. 
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from the grass roots party organisations, were able to paper over dissent in Meuschelwitz, 
Riesa and Grimma, but in the centres of the opposition in Wurzen and Borna the district 
apparatus was unable to enforce the leadership's position.152 The widespread "passive 
resistance" to the party's re-organisation on the basis of factory cells was reflected in the 
continuation of membership meetings as the main forum for delegation to the sub-district 
conferences.153 The predominance of oppositional functionaries also caused the collapse 
of the courier system which functioned as the main artery between the BL and the lower 
organisations. 154 
The BL majority set out to use the party apparatus to bring the membership into line with 
official party policy. The apparatus functionary, Baumgaertel, was given the task of 
instructing local party leaderships on the use of "organisational means" (ie manipulating 
the delegation to conferences on party policy) to "overcome differences" with the 
membership on party policy. These "organisational measures" also detailed how to include 
new functionaries in party work, especially from the large factories, and to offer "formerly 
oppositional comrades" the opportunity of returning to the party fold. 155 At this point in 
the KPD's development there appeared to be a divergence from the instructions of the BL 
majority, which comprised leaders who were strongly disposed to the united front policy, 
and the role of the district apparatus, which was encouraging local members of the 
152obOd 1 1 ° 
153 °bOd 1 1 . 
154 ibid, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer Monat August 1927, B1.63. 
155 ibid, Bericht von der Sitzung der Stadtteilleitung "F" am 23.9.1927, B1.97. The call for functionaries 
from the large cells was related to the ability of the leadership to hand pick delegates. The number of 
factory cells in the industrial groups with larger factories in West Saxony were: metal: 44 factory cells; 
transport: 12 factory cells; chemical works: 1 factory cell see, ibid, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer den Monat 
Oktober 1927. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 24.1l.1927, Bl.I03. 
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Opposition in the belief that their day was about to dawn again in the KPD.156 One 
example of these overtures to the Vogt Group was the ZK sanctioned re-admittance of 
Lauschke and Henning, who were expelled in March 1926 for their refusal to abandon the 
independent communist transport workers' union.15? 
In West Saxony the opposition also continued at local level to express solidarity with the 
Joint Opposition in the CPSU. At a membership meeting in Wurzen on the 16 November 
a resolution supporting Trotsky and Zinoviev and opposing any move to expel them from 
the Comintem and CPSU was adopted by 11 votes to 4. 158 The chairman of the local 
RFB, Munkelt, stated that: "It would be outrageous to expel Trotsky and 
Zinoviev ... (because) there would also be expulsions in the KPD for representing a 
different point of view. ,,159 The Opposition also drew considerable attention to the BL's 
refusal to discuss the failure of Comintem policy in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union 
Committee, which the Opposition had consistently interpreted as a main cause of the 
"false united front tactic ... and a return to Brandlerism. ,,160 The Vogt Group's criticisms of 
party policy again became acute with the news that the ZK had adopted Brandler's 
"Action Programme".161 There is no documentation explaining why Meyer was able to 
push the ZK to the right in July 1927, so soon after the KPD's Reich Congress. However, 
the most likely explanation is that the Comintem, under Bukharin, was able to intervene at 
the highest level in the KPD. Meyer's minority resolution at the 11th Congress was now 
156 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Rundschreiben Nr.15. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 25.10.1927, Bl.11-
14. 
157 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht der Betriebszelle Engelsdorf, den 27.9.1927, B1.96. 
158 ibid, Bericht ueber die Mitgliederversammlung in Wurzen am 16.11.1927, Bl.186. Of68 members 
entitled to vote only 17 turned up, with 2 abstaining. 
159 ibid, Bericht ueber die Mitgliederversammlung in Wurzen am 16.11.1927, B1.186(Munkelt). 
160 'b'd 1 1 • 
161 Details in, Watlin, Die Komintern, p76. 
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suddenly adopted by the national leadership.162 During 1927 it appears that the KPD's 
inner core of senior party leaders was gaining and losing the upper hand in policy 
decisions in relation to developments in the CPSU, and that this was sending conflicting 
ripples throughout the district parties and local groups. 
When the District Party Congress met in December 1927, the agenda continued to 
concentrate on ending the factional feud; restructuring the party's organisation on the 
basis of smaller, more malleable cells; and imposing compliance with the official party line: 
in the KPD's Parteisprache this was political and organisational Bolshevisation.163 The 
ZK's domination of the agenda was demonstrated by the constant modifications made to 
the BL's speeches and resolutions, made under the aegis of Walter Ulbricht, which 
necessitated repeated U-turns at the meetings in lower party organisations held in 
preparation for the District Congress.164 In the meetings campaign which discussed party 
policy and elected delegates to the District Congress, the BL majority was able to send a 
functionary into almost all of the lower organisations to represent the official party line. 
The hands on approach in coordinating the party "debate" was intended to allow the BL 
majority to "guarantee the frictionless development of the discussion.,,165 The emphasis 
was also more strongly placed on the election of delegates from the factory cells: even 
weak cells brought together to discuss the party course were to elect delegates 
separately.166 It must be noted, however, that the atomisation of the party membership 
162 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, ppI43-4. 
163 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Material zum Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen. Sekretariat. [Nur fuer 
Mitgleider der KPD]. Leipzig, den 3.11.1927, B1.28-30. 
164 ibid, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Polbuero. Leipzig, den 26.11.1927, B1.54. 
165 ibid, Rundschreiben Nr.15. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 25.10.1927, Bl.11-14. 
166 ibid. The KPD's figures for the participation in the preparations for the District Congress were: almost 
70 per cent of members of factory cells and 17.5 per cent of members in residential organisations. The 
membership organised in factory cells was estimated at between 10-15 per cent in West Saxony, statistical 
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into small units was not a foolproof method of eliminating support for the Vogt Group: 
there was also resistance to the party line among members organised in the factory. One 
such example was the role of the Opposition in the H eiterblick tram workshop in 
Leipzig. Otto Vogt was elected cell Organisation Leader and candidate for the 1928 
factory council elections against explicit instructions to the contrary from the BL.167 
District party records detail three factory cells in Leipzig which adopted the Opposition's 
political platform and requested that Arthur Vogt give the Opposition's speech at the 
District Congress. 168 However, the atomisation of the membership into smaller 
organisational units did increasingly overextend the Opposition's ability to organise 
resistance to the ZK. Well known leading activists in the Vogt Group, such as Otto Vogt 
and Fritz Gerbig, were placed under the intense pressure of going from one cell to another 
to present the Opposition's policies.169 Outside the Opposition's strongholds in the city of 
Leipzig, only one City District in Wurzen remained solidly behind it.170 The district 
apparatus was also able to limit the distribution of the Opposition's policy statements by 
sequestrating leaflets and factional circulars.171 The BL also used the mode of delegation 
to exclude the Vogt Group from the District Congress: in the Opposition's Leipzig 
stronghold one delegate represented 30 paid up members, in the other West Saxon party 
details in, SAPMO I 3/10/116, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer den Monat December 1927. Organisationsbericht 
KPD Bezirk Westsachsen, Bl.193. 
167 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Taetigkeitsbericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen fuer January 1928, BL241. 
168 SAPMO I 3/10/108, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat Leipzig, den 
23.11.1927, B1.49. 
169 ibid, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 23.11.1927, B1.49. 
170 ibid, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Polbuero Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 19.11.1927, 
B1.43. 
171 ibid, Bericht der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgebiete Konferenz am 19.11.1927 der Arbeitsgebiet Boehlitz-
Ehrenberg und Weideritzsch, B1.46. 
Page 184 
sub-districts the ratio was one to ten. l72 In addition to bulldozing by the district 
apparatus, some members of the Vogt Group went over to the more "moderate" BL Left-
faction under Max Stroetzel, known as the "Leipzig Left", which was not aligned to the 
Joint Opposition in the CPSU. The same process took place among supporters of the 
Right in West Saxony, who transferred their support from Boettcher to Georg Schumann, 
in the belief that this would give a louder voice to their concerns.173 
Before the District Party Congress the Opposition extended the factional struggle into the 
so-called "mass organisations", the RH (Rote Hilfe) and RFB. The use of these 
organisations as bases from which to continue the factional struggle was a response to the 
party apparatus's ability to close down so many of the channels of opposition within the 
KPD. The RH is usually identified with the KPD's right wing in that it undertook work to 
gain the party broad sympathy using campaigns ranging from collections for homes for 
workers' children to amnesties for political prisoners. 174 However, in West Saxony the 
Vogt Group was able to win the support of the overwhelming majority of RH members. 175 
During the summer the BL was unable to re-assert its control over the RH at a series of 
meetings with the District Executive because of the solid support enjoyed by the Vogt 
Group.176 The report made to the District Congress in December stated that in the first 
half of 1927: 
172 ibid, Rundschreiben Nr.15. KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 25.10.1927, Bl.12. 
173 Both the Schumann and Boettcher Groups comprised the committee preparing for the District 
Congress but remained separately organised see, ibid, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbuero, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 30.11.1927, B1.55. 
174 Wunderer, H., Arbeitervereine und Arbeiterparteien. Kultur und Massenorganisationen in der 
Arbeiterbewegung 1890-1933 (Frankfurt/M, 1980), pp130ff. 
175 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer den Monat Juni 1927, B1.2-3. 
176 ibid, Bericht fuer den Monat Juli 1927, Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, B1.35. 
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authorities and the Bavarian State government have not been 
entirely co-operative. In fact, a former Bavarian local authority 
spokesperson described relations between the Bavarian State 
government and local authorities as 'stiefmutterlich,.65 This 
relationship has been worsened by economic and financial 
pressures following German unification, the recession and 
economic targets associated with the EMU.66 The Bavarian State 
government has responded to these pressures by shifting a number 
of 'expensive' responsibilities to lower government levels.67 
Bavarian local authorities in turn have had to cope with public 
criticism over unpopular and stringent economic decisions. As a 
result, communication between the Bavarian State government 
and local authorities has deteriorated further. 68 
Apart from disputes between the Bavarian State government 
and Bavarian local authorities over competencies, both levels have 
pursued different objectives. The Bavarian State government have 
focused on the formulation of legal texts for Bavaria, while 
Bavarian local authorities have been occupied with the subsequent 
practicalities of policy obligations. While this sharing of tasks 
makes sense, the difference in perceived objectives has constituted 
a psychological gap between 'instructors' and 'implementors' 
which does not facilitate the policy process in Bavaria. 
h) 'Stiefmlitterlich' - behaving like a 's tepmother'. Comment made by a former 
otticial of the Europabliro der Bayerischen Kommunen, intervi ew, 6. March 
1997, Brussel s. 
he, For details on EMU convergence criteria see Chapter 4, footnote 43. 
(,7 For instance, some social security provisions and environmental policy 
tasks were shifted to loca l authorities. 
(,R Official of the Europabliro der Bayeri schen Kommuncn , intcrview, 4. 
March 1997, Brussels. 
organisation for Tatmenschen on the party's left wing. Rather than become involved in a 
paralysing factional struggle these militants "hibernated" in the RFB to avoid disrupting a 
party regarded as their H eimat.181 In the Ruhr and Berlin the RFB conforms to the 
generalisation of an organisation which prioritised pro-Soviet propaganda, in particular 
communist campaigns against "imperialist war" (ie defence of the Soviet Union). Activists 
in these cases broke up meetings of the Opposition groups in a bid to enforce internal 
party Ruhe und Ordnung.182 West Saxony, however, was one of the party districts where 
a Left opposition did emerge, which became active in the factional struggle. 
In August 1927 the BL's internal reports described the situation in the RFB as having 
become "critical": this triggered an unsuccessful attempt to oust the Left from the Gau 
leadership.183 After a meeting in September 1927 between the Narrower BL and the RFB 
leadership around Hoffmann, Franz Albrecht and Schubert, Schumann complained that the 
organisation "lacked discipline and had received insufficient political schooling. ,,184 Unlike 
in the case of the RH, the RFB was the central vehicle for carrying out party agitation and 
propaganda while the party proper dissipated its energy in the factional struggle: without 
severely impairing the party's wider political work the BL was in no position to 
temporarily close down the RFB's District Executive. Despite repeated efforts Schumann 
was unable to replace the leftist RFB district leader, Arthur Hoffmann, with the more 
181 Reuter, KPD-Politik, pl04f. 
182 For Berlin, Winker, Schein der Normalitaet, p445; For the Ruhr, Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, p 71; 
For the RFB's role in campaigns against "imperialist war" (ie defence of the Soviet Union) see, Finker, 
K., Geschichte der RFB (Berlin(Ost), 1976), ppl6ff. 
183 SAPMO 13/10/116, Bericht fuer den Monat luli 1927. Leipzig, den 22.8.1927, B1.37. 
184 ibid, Protokoll der gemeinsamen Sitzung der engeren Bezirksleitung mit der Gaufuehrung des RFBs 
am 5.9.1927, B1.86-7. 
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compliant Hans Puetz.185 In West Saxony the RFB did not merely re-emerge to carry out 
the "ultra-Left" political line after its gradual introduction during 1928, but had carried out 
a leftist political line throughout the period when the "moderate" united front was official 
party policy.186 The leftists in the West Saxon RFB were able to remain in the KPD and 
continue their policies in 1928 when the official party line made a fresh declaration of 
leftism.187 
When the District Party Congress met on 10-11 December 1927, 132 delegates voted 
with the BL majority and only 18 supported the Opposition. This, however, was not an 
accurate reflection of the situation in the membership, but a facade constructed by the 
machinations of the party machine.188 However, the BL's final ability to marginalise the 
representation of the Vogt Group using the party machine coincided with the early signals 
of a "left turn" in party policy.189 The complex of conflicting developments in the KPD 
during 1927 and early 1928 helps explain the fragmentation of the factions comprising the 
so-called Wedding Opposition in Pfalz, Berlin and West Saxony. In Berlin, Koetter 
abandoned factional activity, for the security of a position in the district party in 
185 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirks1eitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927, B1.83-4; For the 1928 Reichstag election see, SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht ueber die 
Wahlbewegung zur Reichstagwah11928 der Bezirksleitung West Sachsen der KPD. Leipzig, den 
21.6.1928, BI.413. 
186 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927, B1.84-7. 
187 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer die monate April und Mai 1928. KPD Bezirk 
Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 16.6.1928, B1.360ff. 
188 ibid, Taetigkeitsbericht fuer den Monat Dezember 1927, Bezirk Westsachsen. Leipzig, den 5.1.1928, 
B1.192. 
189 For the political line presented by Schumann at the District Congress in December 1927 see, SAPMO, 
13/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an der Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927,B1.58ff. 
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Bielefeld.190 However, in West Saxony, despite Vogt's physical removal from the district, 
the so-called Vogt Group survived in the West Saxon KPD until the return to an ultra-
Left isolationist policy in the course of 1928. Weber's account of the dissolution of the 
Vogt Group in December 1927 due to a lack of support among the membership must now 
be revised in the light of new documentary evidence.191 The Vogt Group continued to 
exercise de Jacto control of the lower party organisations, at least in Leipzig, which 
carried the party line at grass roots level. 
The ability of the Vogt Group to remain in the KPD as an organised faction helps to 
explain the failure of the Lenin Bund, the consolidation of the former Left Opposition as 
an independent communist party led by Ruth Fischer and Hugo Urbahns, to attract left-
wing activists in West Saxony. There were meetings between Urbahns and members of the 
Vogt Group in West Saxony. However, despite considerable sympathy for the plight of 
their former party comrades, there was no mood to join the Lenin Bund's campaign 
outside the KPD; all the more so as the party had begun a new "left-tum".192 A dislike of 
political life outside the KPD also characterised the Lenin Bund's membership: the 
majority of them accepted an olive branch from the ZK in early 1928 allowing them to 
return to the KPD on condition that they desisted from oppositional activities for six 
months. 193 It appears that the Lenin Bund's, and indeed the Vogt Group's, motivation to 
190 Weber, Wandlung, p180. 
191 'b'd I I . 
192 On the meetings between the Vogt Group and the Lenin B und see, SAPMO I 3/1 0/117, Bericht von der 
Drbahnsversammlung in Leipzig am Deinstag, den 29.11.1927, B1.69ff. From the perspective of the BL 
see, ibid, 'Drbahns in Leipzig', in SAZ, 6.11.1927, B1.68. 
193 Zimmermann, R., Der Leninbund. Linke Kommunisten in der Weimarer RepubUk (Dusseldorf, 1978), 
pp107ff. 
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take up the factional struggle lay less in a contempt for Stalin, "socialism in one country", 
and the process of the KPD's "Stalinisation", than a commitment to left-wing communism. 
4.6 Conclusion: "Stalinisation" and the Saxon KPD. 
The depth of political division in the KPD after the Comintern's "open letter" of 
September 1925 varied across the three Saxon party districts. In Saxony at least, Rosa 
Meyer-Levine's belief that a major rift in the party was avoided, by Ruth Fischer's 
supporters "jumping ship" into the new vessel of Leftism, the Thaelmann leadership, is too 
generalised.194 The debate on the party's political line was far from over at the First Reich 
Conference at the end of October 1925. Throughout 1926 the feud on party policy and 
developments in the Soviet Union continued to dominate internal party life. The 
overthrow of the Fischer leadership, and the subsequent purge of the ultra-Left factions 
(ie those who could not be reconciled to the Comintern's policies), had necessitated a 
return to the cohabitation of factions in the ZK and the BLs. Saxony distinguished itself 
from national developments in that the Right, under Brandler's factional supporters, 
rejoined the Saxon Regional Executive and the BLs, producing a sharp backlash from 
their opponents. 
The strength of the Saxon Left's political conviction was not so weak that they simply 
abandoned ship in favour of flowing into the new prevailing current in the national 
leadership. Indeed, the Left had a powerful regional argument: the "old leadership", and 
their united front policy, had been held responsible for the "Failed October" of 1923, 
providing the ideological basis for the policy of outright rejection of cooperation between 
194 Meyer-Levine, Inside German Communism, p93. 
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Social Democrats and Communists at local as well as national level. 195 In Erzgebirge-
Vogtland the BL initially split over the "right-tum" in party policy and question of 
support for or rejection of the Thaelmann leadership. However, after the Thaelmann 
leadership sanctioned the return of the "old leadership" to senior positions in the Saxon 
leadership, the earlier BL dissidents, grouped around Bertz and Wesche, returned to 
prominence in a campaign against the ZK's "concessions to the Right". In 1926 Berzt and 
Wesche again resigned their positions as district secretaries in protest at party policy. The 
ability of the district secretaries in the Erzgebirge-Vogtland BL to gain concessions was, 
however, curtailed by their lack of support in the district membership, which remained a 
centre of right-wing communism. 
In West Saxony the "right-tum" in policy had also fractured the BL. A small group of 
functionaries, around the Political Secretary Max Stroetzel, initially went over to the new 
party leadership in autumn 1925. However, by 1927 this BL-faction began to oppose the 
direction of party policy as an organised faction. In West Saxony the most important 
faction was a so-called ultra-Left group, the Vogt Group, which was part of the factional 
alliance known as the Wedding Opposition. The Vogt Group had such ingrained support 
among the district party membership that it remained represented in the BL throughout 
the mid twenties. The KPD leadership's inability to eliminate this faction had two causes. 
Firstly, to have expelled all recalcitrant members would have meant the loss of almost all 
district party workers. And secondly, the further into the year 1927 the Vogt Group 
survived, the more its leaders realised that a fresh appeal would be made to the party's 
"left tradition". By December 1927, when the party machine had finally marginalised the 
Vogt Group's representation at the District Congress, its leaders had been recruited for 
195 See chapter three above, esp. section 3.2. 
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work in the party apparatus. West Saxony illustrates that, although the Comintern could 
set the national party's policy and determine the leadership in Gennany to implement it, at 
grass roots level, where campaigning came into contact with local politics, the political 
parameters of German Communism's "Stalinisation" were more limited. 
In East Saxony the KPD's weak support translated into a weaker development of the 
factional struggle. The district party came more rapidly under the direction of the party 
apparatus than in the other Saxony party districts. The leading figures in the BL, Schreiter 
and Gaebel, did not blame the factional struggle for impeding party work, but the KPO's 
inability to gain significant footholds in an area dominated by the right-wing of the SPD. 
In the local organisations of the KPD political tendencies and factional loyalties were not, 
in the frrst instance, determined by the ideological debate which absorbed much of the 
leadership. Instead, local "communisms" grew out of local conditions and local 
possibilities for communists policies. In Erzgibirge-Vogtland the KPO derived benefits 
from the united front tactic. On-going, day-to-day work in the trade unions and in local 
politics, when necessary in limited cooperation with the SPD, brought tangible results via 
improvement in workers' pay and living and working conditions The KPD's roots in the 
workers' movement enabled the district party to remain a stronghold of German 
communism during the mid twenties. It was in this Saxon party district that the KPD was 
most firmly anchored in local politics, the factories and the trade unions. The local SPO's 
independent left-wing position, and belief in the need for cooperation with the KPD, 
contributed to producing a right-Communist political tendency. 
The reverse of these factors applies in West Saxony where a left-isolationist political 
trend dominated the district party. Unable to penetrate the barriers of solid and stable SPD 
organisation and loyalty to the official party line, the KPD was politically repelled. Instead 
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of a policy of cooperation on joint socio-political aims in local politics and the trade 
unions to win over recruits for communism, the local party activists looked to an assertion 
of independence from and opposition to the SPD. In East Saxony the main expression of 
the inability to penetrate the SPD organisational citadel was the attraction of the RFB to 
local leftists. The district party, to generalise somewhat, felt shut out of workers' politics 
by the domination of the SPD. 
These results for Saxony do not confirm Reuter's thesis, constructed from interviews with 
contemporary party members, that Thaelmann functioned as an "integration figure" in the 
KPD, capable of bridging supporters across the factional divide.196 The recollections of 
party militants can be seen as a form of communist Munchhausen syndrome by proxy: 
Thaelmann was actively pursuing the factional struggle but those interviewed by Reuter 
believed him to be "restoring order". It is possible that, as those interviewed remained 
Communists in the early 1980s, internal party propaganda over the years "re-wrote" their 
historical recollections. In Saxony, when Thaelmann seemed to abandon the aims of the 
Left, the Left abandoned him. Saxony also differed from Reuter's findings in terms of the 
membership'S strength of factional and political conviction. While it is correct that some 
members did change their factional loyalties, there is no evidence that they switched 
across the factional spectrum from Right to Left and vice versa.197 Party members' 
incentive to embark on a factional flit appear to have been motivated by a strong desire to 
avoid any sanction against them by the leadership and took the form of accepting an olive 
branch, in the form of the programme of the most similar ZK-Ioyal faction. The only 
enclaves in the KPD which could have remained oblivious to the factional feud and the 
196 Reuter, KPD-Politik, p91. 
197 ibid, pp66-91. 
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changes of official policy in the mid twenties, as Daycock details did happen, were in areas 
like East Saxony where the party itself was weak. 198 However, it is correct that party 
militants did ignore the leadership's policy directives if they conflicted with the reality of 
local conditions. 
The new documentation conclusively disproves Peukert's "sociological" explanation for 
the changes in party policy, and its acceptance by the membership, during the mid 
twenties.199 It was not changes in the KPD's sociological composition which determined 
the KPD's policy, but directives from above, ultimately located in Moscow, which did so. 
In this regard Weber is correct that the "Stalinisation" of the KPD (ie the political purges 
and the re-organisation of the channels of instruction and control) characterised the party's 
political developments. However, in the mid twenties this too had its limits. The 
Politburo's Secretariat controlled the instruction of the district party organisations using 
an increasingly well developed party machine. Despite a facade of internal party 
democracy it was the party centre, and not the membership, which appointed the BLs and 
instructed the district apparatus. But at local level few members could be involved in party 
work which appeared meaningless. Where a faction was strongly enough implanted in the 
local environment, as the example of West Saxon illustrates, the density of the local 
communist undergrowth held back the advocates of the official party line as persona non 
grata. 
The power struggle in the KPD had burned up the political oxygen in the KPD which was 
necessary to conduct the constant political campaigning demanded by the leadership. The 
activists who were involved in the factional feud were precisely those most likely to have 
been active in local communist campaigns. The KPD's prioritisation of publicising its 
198 Daycock, 'Political Extremes', pp145-6. 
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political face, rather than anchoring the party's constituency through Sozialpolitik, 
loosened the party's ties to the Gennan political scene as the decade progressed. The 
KPD's increasingly totalitarian structure refused to yield to influences on the membership 
produced by local conditions: the failure to account for local differences in the party in 
turn limited party activism The Saxon KPD's membership, in any significant numbers, 
therefore, only became involved in specific campaigns. The KPD's political campaigning in 
Saxony during the mid twenties is the subject of the following chapter. 
199 Peukert, 'Sozialgeschichte', p35-6. 
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5. The Saxon KPD's "Unity Campaigns" in the Context of the 
Fragmentation of the Saxon Political System. 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the ability of the KPD to function within the Saxon political 
system and to influence public opinion. The Weimar Republic's middle years (1924-1928) 
have been described by historians as the period of "relative stability": "relative" to the 
socio-economic crisis and political turmoil of the Republic's first five years and the early 
thirties .1 In Saxony the need to emphasise the "relative" nature of the region's stability in 
the mid twenties led B. Lapp to question the suitability of adopting the tenn.2 Lapp re-
focuses the emphasis on conditions in Saxony to stress the region's early political 
fragmentation, whereby the traditional parties of the middle classes lost out to "particular 
interest" parties, in a process driven by structural economic and social tensions.3 
The Comintern and the KPD's leadership also justified the united front policy in terms of 
a "relative stabilisation" of the political and economic system in the capitalist world. The 
KPD's political tactic, at least on paper, returned to a policy of practical work in the trade 
unions and local councils, as well as agitation among the unemployed, to increase the 
party's appea1.4 So-called "Unity Committees" were set up to draw non-communists into 
communist-led campaigns, which would use topics of popular appeal, such as the 
1 Kolb, E., The Weimar Republic (trans: P. S. Falla; London, 1988), p66f, for a historiographical 
discusion of social and econonic developments, ppl57ff. 
2 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', PhD Dissertation (University of California, 1991), p9. 
3 ibid, pp204ff. 
4 Wuenderlich, V., Arbeiterbewegung und Selbstverwaltung. KPD und Kommunalpolitik in der Weimarer 
Republik. Mit dem Beispiel Solingen (Wuppertal, 1980), ppl63ff; Herlemann, B., Die Kommunalpolilik 
der KPD im Ruhrgebiet (WuppertaI,1977), pp90ff. 
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expropriation of the former German Princely Houses, as a conveyor belt to communism 5 
The KPD's campaigning was intended to create what the Comintern called a pro-Soviet 
"left-wing in the workers' movement", as a counterbalance to the SPD leadership's 
support for Gustav Stresemann's "Western Orientation" of Gennan foreign policy.6 
Continuity in the investigation of this thesis into the political development of the Saxon 
KPD during the middle years of the Weimar Republic will be provided by the following 
core questions. Firstly, at the national level the KPD's Stalinisation explained the changes 
of party policy and political leadership. 7 However, at local level could the centralising pull 
from Moscow overcome the centrifugal forces of every-day political experience? 
Secondly, did the KPD's adoption of democratic centralism and the forced re-organisation 
of members into factory cells create compliance with the leadership's directives in the 
party's lower organisations? Thirdly, to what extent could the KPD realise its objective of 
mobilising the whole membership in all areas of communist agitation and propaganda? 
And finally, to what extent did the local party membership limit their political activism to 
campaigns with achievable ends, rather than carrying out the leadership's permanent 
campaigning? 
The core questions are complemented by questions particular to this chapter. Firstly, the 
role of the tactic itself will be examined. Saxony's domination by the left-wing of the SPD 
5 lahrbuchfuer Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiterbewegung, 1925/6, p766 (p. Dietrich);Flechtheim, O.K., 
Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (3rd Edition, Hamburg, 1986), pp186; Bahne, S., Sozialfaschismus in 
Deutschland. Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffes, in International Review of Social History 
(IRSH) 10 (2) (1965), pp228-9. 
6 Text of the "Open Letter" in, Weber, H., Voelker hoert die Signale. Eine Dokumentation (Munich, 
Cologne,Berlin, 1967), pp86-90; Geyer, D., Sowjetrussland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1918-
1932, in Vierteljahrsheftefuer Zeitgeschichte (VIZ) 24 (1976), pp27-8. 
7 Weber, H., Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik (Gekurtzte Studentenausgabe; Frankfurt/M, 1971), passim. 
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gives a regional dimension to an area of study long neglected in comparison to historians' 
treatment of the KPD's role at the end of the Weimar Republic. At national level the 
KPD's united front from above (ie offers of co-operation in Communist-led campaigns 
made to the SPD leadership) was intended to "unmask" the SPD's right-wing in order to 
win the party's social basis for communism (ie the united front from below). In Saxony the 
same tactic was applied to the SPD's left-wing, which controlled the regional party. The 
limitations of communist policy in Saxony will be evaluated. Did the subterfuge, relating 
to radical left-wing reforms of the Weimar system, lead to the tactic working in reverse: 
the co-operation of rank-and-file Communists with Social Democrats to attain specific 
objectives, rather than bringing Social Democrats under communist political leadership? 
The chapter also sets out to identify the extent of any "left prolitarian milieu" in Saxony, in 
which local militants of the SPD and KPD worked together to achieve issues of joint 
interest, as detailed for the Reich KPD in recent research by K-H. Mallmann.8 The KPD's 
own claim, to be able to extend beyond the working classes into the downwardly mobile 
layers of the peasantry, white collar employees and the artisanal middle classes, will also 
be examined. Could the KPD attract these social groups by appealing to their material 
interests?9 Is the research by Conan Fischer correct that the KPD's policy of winning over 
a "potential" communist constituency among the lower middle classes grew out of "the 
objective conditions in which Germany found itself after the war?"l0 This chapter aims to 
8 Mallmann, K-H., Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft. Zur Sozialgeschichte einer 
revolutionaeren Bewegung, in Geschichte und Gesellschaft (GuG) 21 (1) (1995), pp23-4; Id. 
Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionaeren Bewegung (Darmstadt, 
1996), pp44-5,385-6. 
9 Daycock, D. W., 'The KPD and the NSDAP: A Study in the Relationship between the Political Extremes 
in Weimar Germany 1923-1933', PhD Dissertation (London School of Economics, 1980), ppI34-39. 
10 Fischer, C., The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism (London, 1991), p39. 
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establish what the KPD's actual relationship with its own membership and the wider 
political system was and to contrast this relationship with the KPD's ideological claims. 
In assessing the influences acting on the KPD's ability to function within the Saxon 
political system the chapter will initially set out the differences between the Saxon and 
Reich contexts which effected the campaign to expropriate the former Princely Houses. 
The party line will then be explored with reference to the campaign to expropriate the 
Princely Houses in 1926, in which communist policy was conducted in the context of a 
significant popular political mobilisation. The KPD's attempt to maintain its political 
presence will then be assessed in a period without a popular topic of political reform to 
exploit. The Congress of the Working People will be used to illustrate the limitations of 
communist tactics. These examples are to enable an assessment of the Saxon KPD's ability 
to realise the objective of the party line: to increase communist influence in the factories 
and among the unemployed, the peasantry and the urban Mittelschichten, and to use the 
Unity Committees to create a pro-Soviet "left-wing" in the workers' movement. The 
chapter will conclude with an evaluation of how successful the communist tactics were in 
widening the party's influence. 
5.2 Flying a Communist Kite: The High Point of the United Front Policy in 
Saxony. 
The Expropriation Campaign in a Communist Context 
During the first half of 1926 the issue dominating the political debate was the unresolved 
question of how to deal with the wealth and property of the former ruling Princely Houses 
throughout Germany. In 1918/19, following the collapse of the German monarchies, no 
national solution had been attempted. The consequence of this early omission was its 
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reappearance in 1925 as a protracted political debate in the Reichstag. An impasse was 
created by disagreement on whether the "princes question" should be settled by the law 
courts, which by 1925 were known to be sympathetic to the fonner monarchies' case, or a 
parliamentary solution. The latter means of resolving the debate came up against the 
parliamentary arithmetic in the Reichstag: the DNVP blocked the parliamentary channels 
and the SPD objected to the lenient treatment which the courts were likely to give the 
former Princely Houses. ll In an effort to break the deadlock the DDP forwarded a bill on 
the 23 November 1925 which envisaged the regional parliaments dealing with the former 
monarchies, without providing the possibility of "recourse to legal action" .12 The SPD 
leadership was in broad agreement with the DDP's bill. However, two days later the KPD 
exploited the issue as a means of providing the united front policy with a popular 
campaign. On the 4 December the KPD made a statement in the Reichstag, which was 
followed up by the publication of an "open letter" to the nationalleaderships of the SPD, 
the ADGB and the Reichsbanner, proposing co-operation in bringing about a campaign 
for a referendum to expropriate the former monarchies without compensation.13 
The KPD's political tactic coincided with a cyclical down-tum in the German economy. In 
Saxony the economic down-tum amounted to a short period of economic crisis, with 
unemployment approaching the levels reached in 1923 as a result of Saxon enterprises 
11 Winkler, H. A., Der Schein der Normalitaet. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer 
Republik, 1924-1920 (Berlin, Bonn, 1988), pp270-71; Schueren, U., Der Volksentscheid zur 
Fuerstenenteignung 1926. Die Vermoegensauseinandersetzung mit den depossedierten Landesherren als 
Problem der deutschen Innenpolitik unter besonderen Beruecksichtigung der Verhaeltnisse in Preussen., 
Dusseldorf,1978., pp 21-26, 283-98. 
12 Schuercn, ibid, p49. 
13 Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic (London, 1984), p137; Winkler, 
Schein der Normalitaet, p271; Schueren, Volksentscheid, p48f. 
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being liquidated in the post-inflationary stabilisation crisis.14 These economic conditions 
gave greater political weight in the workers' movement to the KPD's calls for the 
redistribution of the princes' property among peasants and tenant fanners, the use of 
palaces to alleviate the housing shortage and their liquid assets being transferred to those 
injured in the war, widows and orphans.15 Although the SPD's national leadership was 
hostile to being drawn into a communist inspired campaign, the popularity of the KPD's 
proposal among rank-and-file Social Democrats forced the Reich Executive's hand.16 On 
the 16 January 1926 the SPD's National Executive finally met with representatives of the 
KPD, and its front organisation the "Kuczinski Committee", to deal with the necessary 
parliamentary and organisational technicalities. It was at this point that official contact 
between the two parties ended: the SPD and ADOB leaderships forbade contact with the 
Communists in carrying out the campaign for a referendum.17 
The objectives of the Saxon KPD's political line during the campaign to expropriate the 
former princes were defined by party-political concerns: the expropriation campaign per 
se provided only a favourable opportunity with which to "win the broad masses for 
14 Adler, H., 'Wirtschaftskrise im Spiegel der saechsischen Konkursstatistik', in Zeitschrift des 
Saechsischen Statistischen Landesamptes, 78/79 (1932-33), pp305-31O. Bankruptcies in Saxony 
accounted for the disproportionately high figure of 13 per cent of all German liquidation between 1926-
1933. 
15 The text is given in full in, Dokumenten und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung [henceforth: DuM] Series II, vol.8, pp27lf. 
16 On the local organisations of the SPD see, Schueren, Volksentscheid, pp75-82. On the concerns 
expressed by Scheidemann about the dangers inherent in allowing another "communist signal" see, 
Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p272. 
17 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp273-4. 
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communism".18 This was made clear by Paul Boettcher, the leading figure in the Regional 
Executive, which co-ordinated the campaign in Saxony: 
The Expropriation Campaign is not a question of expropriating the fonner princes 
but a class question. It will increase class conflicts and help organise the 
sympathetic layers in the party. Unity means communist influence in the SPD and 
therefore requires the sharpest struggle against the SPD leadership. Unity 
Committees will be used to build up a left-wing in the workers' movement...(this) is 
the point of departure for the great struggles of the future. 19 
The KPD leadership believed that mobilising the SPD's membership "from below", in a 
communist inspired campaign, would "free" the party's left-wing members from their 
leaders, so that they would abandon reformism and its use of parliamentary channels, in 
favour of a mass mobilisation led by the KPD.20 However, in Saxony the SPD had a 
prominent left-wing which actively embraced issues of radical socialist refonn. The 
campaign to expropriate the former German Princes was regarded as precisely the type of 
reform the bourgeois Republic required if it was to move towards socialism21 The KPD's 
response to this was to emphasise the role of the 23 dissident SPD Landtag deputies, 
18 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO) I 3/10/115, Bericht ueber 
die Kampagne zum Volksentscheid im Bezirk West Sachsen, Bl.140. 
19 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. vom 25.2.1926, B1.7(Boettcher). 
20 This position was expressed by the leading Right communists Arthur Ewert and Paul Froehlich, see 
Bahne, 'Sozialfaschismus', p228 and note 1; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp271,275; Daycock, 
'Political Extremes', ppI46-7. 
21 Seydewitz, M., Es hat sich gelohnt zu leben (Berlin, 1976), p15l. On the SPD's internal party debate, 
see, Winkler, H. A., 'Klassenbewegung oder Volkspartei? Zur Programmdiskussion in der Weimarer SPD 
1920-1925', Geschichte und Gesellschaft 8 (1982), pp9-54. 
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who, against their national leadership's instructions, were in coalition with the DDP and 
DVP, in the hope of winning over radicalised Social Democrats.22 
The united front tactic also directed considerable attention to presenting the KPD as the 
party of "all exploited people": the Werktaetigen, which included the urban Mittelstand, 
intellectuals, peasants and rural workers, whose political "awakening" was deemed 
necessary for the success of a communist revolution in Germany.23 The political reality in 
Saxony, however, was an early right-ward gravitation of politics. The events of 1923 in 
Saxony, when an SPD-KPD coalition placed the burden of the crisis on middle-class 
shoulders, had accelerated and intensified a political drive among the broad spectrum of 
the middle classes to prevent another SPD-led regional government.24 In Saxony the 
predominance of the Protestant church, which was politically close to the DNVP, 
deprived the region of any force for political consensus with substantial cross-class 
support, on the model of the Catholic Centre party.25 In the Reich as a whole the 
strongest support for the expropriation of the former Princely Houses outside of SPD-
KPD strongholds came from the West German centres of political Catholicism?6 In 
Saxony, however, the socio-political system inhibited support for a "communist" inspired 
campaign. In Hamburg, Potsdam and Berlin, a significant number of lower middle-class 
supporters of the parties of the Right made a protest vote against the monarchist DNVP, 
22 SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Bericht vom Monat Februar, B1.393. 
23 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Bezirksparteitag in Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926. Resolution zur Lage, 
Aufgaben und Taktik der Partei, B1.24-5. 
24 Details in Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp204-40. 
25 Bramke, W., (verantwortlicher Autor) und Hess. U., unter Mitarbeit von Kretschmer, K., Roth, H .. 
Rudloff, M., und Dietrich, G., Sachsens Wirtschaft im Wechsel politischer Systerne im 20. Jahrh14ndert. 
Strukturelle Entwicldung und soziale Problerne vom Ausgang des Ersten Weltkrieges bis in die fr14eheren 
60er Jahre [hereafter: Arbeitsgruppe Sachsen], (Leipzig, 1992), p3. 
26 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp276-7. 
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which they felt had abandoned their economic interests during the post-inflationary re-
evaluation under pressure from large-scale industrial and agrarian interests.27 In Saxony, 
however, the statistical data indicates that the pre-war protest vote of the lower middle 
classes, which the pre-war SPD had been able to attract, had abandoned any form of 
alliance with the Left.28 
The campaign for the expropriation of the former princes was no different from the 
KPD's other united front campaigns, for example the campaign to have Sacco and 
Vanzetti, the American trade unionists, released from prison, or solidarity rallies and 
meetings for the General Strike in Britain.29 The objective was to increase the party's 
political profile, using a language of subterfuge which called for improvements in the 
conditions of the working population. This was typified by the slogan: "Not a penny to 
the Princes! Work and bread for the needy people! ,,30 The following discussion places the 
campaign to expropriate the former German Princes in the context of the KPD's ability to 
pursue the united front policy in the factories and trade unions, among the unemployed 
and the non-proletarian "working people", whom the KPD leadership continued to define 
as part of the communists' "potential" constituency. 
27 Schuren, Volksentscheid, pp228-34; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p282. 
28 Details in Walter, F., 'Sachsen - ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?', in Politische 
VierteljahresschriJt 32 (2) (1991), pp218ff. 
29 For examples of these campaigns in the Frankfurt-am-Main area see, Wickham, J., The Working-Class 
Movement in Frankfurt-am-Main during the Weimar Republic', Ph.D. thesis (University of Sussex, 1979), 
pp185-6. 
30 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, pp137-8; Flechtheim, KPD in der Weimarer Republik, p186. 
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Expropriation/rom the Factories? 
The KPD's Regional Executive introduced the "Princes Campaign" in mid December 
1925. The BL's directives on carrying out the campaign in the factories prioritised setting 
up Unity Committees, as a means of bringing Social Democrats and the so-called "non-
party" workers under communist leadership.31 The initial practical steps in organising the 
campaign were a series of meetings in the factory and street cells to discuss party 
tactics.32 The campaign to expropriate the former princes was the first campaign of 
national significance since 1923 which involved a mobilisation of the SPD and KPD with 
the same ostensible objectives. The KPD's internal circulars indicate that for this reason 
the first stage in the campaign would be schooling courses, which aimed to avoid any 
misconception of the campaign as an issue of socialist reform. Only after party workers 
were made clear about the KPD's actual objectives, to generate class tensions and to 
proselytise rank-and-file Social Democrats, was instruction of the wider membership to 
concentrate directly on organising the campaign itself.33 
During December and January the KPD's initial objective was to ensure that the SPD 
accepted the offer of "joint negotiations" on a draft bill, which would expropriate the 
former princes without compensation. Until mid January 1926 it was by no means certain 
that the SPD's Reich Executive would abandon all hope of a parliamentary solution. 
Winkler indicates that the SPD's Reich Executive was even prepared to join a Great 
31 SAPMO 13/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Stellungnahme zum Volksentscheid. Landesvorstand Sachsen. 
An das ZK, Polbuero. Dresden, den 26.2.1926, BI.30-1. 
32 SAPMO 13/10/112, Bericht "Volksbegehren". Bezirksleitung West Sachsen. An das ZK dcr Partei, 
Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 13.3.1926, B1.129. 
33 SAPMO I 3/8-10/8, Landesvorstand Sachsen. An die Zentrale der KPD. Dresden, den 1.12.1925, B1.74. 
Page 205 
Coalition cabinet.34 To force the SPD leadership's hand the KPD concentrated its efforts 
on holding joint meetings and demonstrations of factory workers and the unemployed, 
which the communist press exaggerated as displays of widespread support for the 
campaign under the KPD's leadership.35 However, in Saxony there is no evidence that the 
KPD's local campaigning had brought Social Democrats under communist leadership. 36 
The KPD's Regional Executive stated that: 
Top level negotiations are nothing without creating the necessary basis within the 
factories in order to mobilise the party membership and free the socialist workers 
from their leadership.37 
The ability to conduct the campaign in the factories was regarded by the KPD's leadership 
as the litmus test of the party's re-organisation on the basis of factory cells.38 However, 
even during the two peaks in the campaign, the collection of signatures for the petition to 
enable a referendum and the voting day itself on the 20th of June, there is no evidence of 
any widespread increase in communist activity in the factories. During the first half of 
1926 the Saxon KPD's district trade-union divisions continued to be absorbed in 
rebuilding the organisational framework, after their collapse in 1924/5, to enable co-
34 On the 12th of January the SPD's Reichstag faction rejected participation in a Great Coalition for the 
second time in a month. This led to the formation of the second Luther cabinet see, Winkler, Schein der 
Normalitaet, p273. For the SPD's demands during discussions on coalition government see, Schulthess' 
Europaeischer Geschichtskalender (Munich ,1925), p189. 
35 Die Rote Fahne during January and February 1926 gave this conciderable attention see, Winkler, 
Schein der Normalitaet, p272; Ruediger, B., 'Der Freistaat in der Weimarer Republik', in Saechsische 
lIeimatsblaetter 30 (3) (1984), p148. SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bl.169, Bericht ueber die Taetigkeiten des 
Bezirkes West Sachsen der KPD yom 1.4.1925 bis 31.3.1926 (Leipzig, 1926), p5. 
36 The SPD's Reich leadership did of course believe that they had been out flanked to the left by the 
Communists. Details of the "pressure from below" in the SPD see, Schueren, Volksentscheid, pp75-82. 
37 SAPMO I 3/9/68, BLS. Erzgebirge-VogtIand am 12.l2.1925, B1.380. 
38 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. yom 25.2.1926, BI.7(Boetcher). 
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ordinated communist work in the factories and trade unions. The KPD's ability to mobilise 
even its own members to conduct a political campaign in the factories was distinctly 
limited. 39 
The formation of Unity Committees including dissident socialists, the so-called SPD 
"Workers' Opposition", was regarded by the KPD leadership as the flagstone on which the 
whole campaign was to be built: they were, in theory, to function as active partisan 
organisations carrying out all communist campaigns in the factories.4o In reality there is 
no hard evidence that any factory-based Unity Committees existed in Saxony. Various 
factors contributed to this. In a labour market with high levels of unemployment, industrial 
militancy was tempered by a desire to remain in employment: workers did not want to be 
identified by employers as politically active in case this hastened their journey to the dole 
queue.41 The minority of KPD members who were organised in factory cells saw the 
"princes campaign", which was a political campaign, as more suited to the role of the 
street cells.42 In large factories, such as the Sachsenwerk in Niedersedlitz, where the KPD 
had an absolute majority on the factory council, a continued dislike of the united front 
tactic made union functionaries reluctant to implement the party line. In this case the 
factory functionaries stated that: "The Unity Committees must come after the SPD leaders 
go against the referendum": in other words how could the SPD be "unmasked" if it too 
39 SAPMO I 3/8-10/10, Bericht fuer die Zeit vorn 27.4 bis 31.5.1926, B1.47(Siewert). 
40 SAPMO 13/10/115, Bl.169, Bericht ueber die Taetigkeiten des Bezirkes West Sachsen der KPD vorn 
1.4.1925 bis 31.3.1926, ibid, p5. 
41 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Stellungnahrne zurn Volksentscheid. Landesvorstand Sachsen. 
An das ZK, Polbuero. Dresden, den 26.2.1926, B1.30; SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgabe 
und Taktik der Partei. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-VogtJand am 10-11.4 .1926, B 1.24-5. 
42 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Bericht "Volksbegehren". Bezirksleitung West Sachsen. An das ZK der Partei, 
Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 13.3.1926, B1.132. 
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was conducting the expropriation campaignt3 Instead of increasing the activity of 
Communists in the factories and winning sympathisers, the Regional Executive concluded 
that the membership was "passive". 44 There is some evidence of district variations in the 
Saxon factories: most discussion was recorded in Erzgebirge-Vogtland and least in the 
centre of opposition to the united front tactic in West Saxony.45 However, it can only be 
concluded that, with some exceptions in individual factories, Communists in the factories 
would not carry out a party line which was seen to be unhelpful or unrelated to trade-
union work. The KPD could forcefully re-organise the membership, albeit with limited 
results, into factory cells but social and economic aims remained uppermost in these 
Communists' minds. During the expropriation campaign communist trade unionists in the 
metal working factories of Limbach, Annaberg and Werdau focused their activities only 
on matters of direct relevance to the workforce.46 The limited number of Unity 
Committees which did include, at least temporarily, official representation from the local 
trade-union cartels were not factory based, but were organised in residential districtS.47 
43 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Stellungnahme zum Volksentscheid. Landesvorstand Sachsen. 
An das ZK, Polbuero. Dresden, den 26.2.1926, B1.31. 
44 'b'd 1 1 • 
45 ibid, B1.30. 
46 SAPMO I 3/8-10/10, Bericht ueber die Sitzung der Landesleitung Metall Sachsens am 29.5.1926 in 
Chemnitz, B1.66-7. 
47 SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Bericht vom Monat Februar, B1.392. Both the Reich leadership 
and the Saxon leadership of the ABGB strictly forbaded co-operation in the KPD's Unity Committees and 
were normally able to enforce their position on the local memberships see, 'Es gibt keine Einheitsfront mit 
der KPD', in Gewerkschajtszeitung, Nr.6, 6.2.1926, quoted in Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p277. 
The KPD's response is published in, 'Verhindert die Sprengung der Einheit', in DuM, series II, vol.8, 
pp313f. Stoeschek, H. and Zeidler, E., 'Zum Kampf der KPD urn den Saechsischen Landtag gcgcn 
Militarismus und Faschismus in Deutschland', Dissertation (Potsdam, 1976), p442. 
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The KPD's tactics, during the campaign to gain legal sanction for a referendum, also 
failed to act as a springboard to establishing a communist -led pro-Soviet "left-wing" in the 
trade unions. The KPD's efforts to link the campaign to expropriate the princes to other 
areas of party agitation and propaganda were without significant result. Few workers 
attended communist convened factory meetings to discuss the British miners' strike along 
side the expropriation campaign. The campaign to have the right-wing of the SPD 
expelled from the unions with the co-operation of the left-wing of the SPD also came to 
nothing. Exceptions did occur, but never became more than limited events specific to the 
factory they were held in.48 In the Dresden-Bautzen area the KPD leadership had to 
concede that not only was the SPD very strong in the unions, but it was the party's right-
wing which was dominant. The BL's repeated calls to "harness all strength" in order to 
create a "left-wing movement" could not surmount the barrier of entrenched SPD 
contro1.49 Indeed, when the ASPD stood electorally as an independent party in the 1926 
municipal elections, in the ASPD centre of Dresden-Bautzen at least, it is likely that it was 
able to win over more anti-communist right-wing Social Democrats that the KPD could 
win over left-wing SPD militants.50 In Saxony there were no political strikes as part of the 
"Princes Campaign". The KPD had certainly put a popular political issue on the tip of 
working-class tongues, but it had not fostered a breach between the SPD leadership in 
48 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgabe und Taktik der Partei. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-
Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.24-25. Reference is made to a meeting in an unspecified large factory in 
Dresden and seven mid sized factories where "joint" meetings took place with the SPD. 
49 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Sitzung mit dem Pol. und Gewerkschaftsleitem der dreien 
saechsischen Bezirke am 31.3.1926 in Dresden, B1.39; SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. vom 
25.2.1926, B1.7-8. 
50 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen (StJFS) Nr.46, (Dresden, 1927), p459. In Saxony 18 
ASPD councillors were elected: six in the electoral ward of Bautzen; seven in Dresden; one in Leipzig; 
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Saxony and the party's left-wing members. In the Saxon factories the ability to use the 
expropriation campaign to "make a piece of revolution" during Weimar's middle years did 
. 51 
not transprre. 
Expropriation through Extra-Parliamentary Action? 
In extra-parliamentary party work the KPD leadership also emphasised the creation of 
Unity Committees, with the intention of turning these into forums for the implementation 
of communist-led campaigns.52 In order to work towards these ends local party 
organisations were instructed to establish contact with the SPD, Reichsbanner, War 
Victims' Organisations, Pensioners' Organisations, the Free Thinkers, Tenants' Groups, the 
Sports Organisations and the organisations of those who had lost out in the currency 
stabilisation. At meetings between the KPD and these "other workers' organisations", 
Unity Committees were to be proposed to organise the "joint" implementation of 
demonstrations, public meetings and general propaganda for the "Princes Campaign". 53 In 
theory the expropriation campaign was to be used to assist the permanent mobilisation of 
the party, with the objective of winning new members and an extended periphery of 
sympathisers.54 In reality, however, the political activity of the KPD's membership had 
three in Zwickau; and one in Chemnitz. The SPD had 4,961 councillors in Saxony. On the origins and 
development of the ASPD see Lapp, 'Political Extremes', ppl44ff. 
51 For Wickham's conclusions in the FrankfurtIM area, 'Working Class Life', p186; Winkler, Schein der 
Normalitaet, p289. 
52 SAPMO 13/10/115, Bericht ueber die Kampagne zum Volksentscheid im Bezirk West Sachsen, den 
23.7.1926, B1.140; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Bericht ueber das Volksbegehren in Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, 
B1.286. 
53 SAPMO I 3/8/31, 'AIle Kraefte fuer den Volksentscheid!' KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben 
(23.1.1926), B1.8. 
54 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Bericht der BLS. am 6.4.1926,BI.398; SAPMO 13/10/115, BL dcr KPD 
Westsachsens. An deas ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3.1926, BI.130. 
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sharp peaks during the collection of signatures for the petition, between the 4 and 17 
March, and the referendum itself on the 20 June.55 However, the popularity of the 
campaign saw an above average willingness of party members to take part in it. 56 Statistics 
collected by the BL in Erzgebirge-Vogtland on the participation of members during the 
collection of signatures for the referendum petition in March indicate that in 67 local 
groups up to 40 per cent of members were active; in 61 local groups 60 per cent were 
active; in 14 local groups up to 80 per cent; and in 42 up to 100 per cent. In 65 of the 
district's 250 local groups the questionnaire was not returned. 57 
The united front tactic's ability to bring members of the wider workers' movement into 
communist-led campaigns was decidedly limited. Even in Erzgebirge-Vogdand, the Saxon 
centre of the political tendency for "proletarian unity" among the KPD's right-wing and 
the SPD's far left-wing, 90 per cent of local SPD leaderships rejected participation in 
Unity Committees outright. 58 The reason for the SPD's response was that it was only too 
well aware the KPD leadership wanted to use the united front tactic to erode the influence 
of the SPD's left-wing leaders among party militants. Crucially, however, genuine co-
operation on the specific issue of the expropriation was being carried out by Communists 
and Socialists outside the constraints of the partisan Unity Committees. 59 The political 
border between the two parties was strongest in the cities and declined, along with party 
55 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht Erzgebirge-Vogtland Februar und Maerz 1926, B1.267 -8; 
SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Monat Juni 1926, B1.308-9; SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht 
ueber die Kampagne zum Volksentscheid im Bezirk Westsachsen, den 23.7.1926, B1.140; Stadtsarchiv 
Leipzig (Sta.L.), Ah Boma Nr.2624, Ah Boma, den 3.4.1926. An die Khm Leipzig, B1.125f. 
56 For details of meetings in the BL Departments into the factory and street cells and local groups sec, 
SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Monat Juni 1926, Bl.308-9. 
57 ibid, Bericht ueber das Volksbegehren in Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, B 1.288. 
58 ibid. B1.286. 
59°bOd 1 I . 
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strength generally, in the industrial-rural settings of the Saxon industrial villages. This was 
also reflected in the location of the limited number of Unity Committees, which were 
predominantly fonned in small localities. At the beginning of the "Princes Campaign" in 
Saxony there had been no Unity Committees at all.60 In Erzgebirge-Vogtland by the end 
of the campaign in June there were eight Unity Committees which included the SPD and a 
further 30 without official socialist representation.61 Again in West Saxony the barriers 
impeding the Communist party tactic were strongest. The preparations for forming the 
Unity Committee of Greater Leipzig were begun in early January.62 The Unity Committee 
was finally fonned without representation from the SPD or the local trade-union cartel; it 
did, however, include representatives from the USPD, the Socialist Bund and the 
Organisation for Victims of the War.63 In northwestern Saxony the border between the 
parties was also less well defined in environments where industrial workers lived and 
worked in close proximity to rural workers. In Tauchau and Nerchau Unity Committees 
were set up at in late January, but were almost immediately dissolved following the 
intervention of the ADGB.64 Throughout the six months of the campaign there were no 
Unity Committees co-ordinating a communist-led expropriation campaign; of 164 
demonstrations held in the same period only nine were held jointly with the SPD.65 In 
West Saxony, a centre of the KPD's left-wing, there also continued to be violent clashes 
60 SAPMO I 3/9/65, Bericht der BLS. vom 12.12.1925, BI.380(Boettcher). 
61 SAPMO I 3/9/69, An das ZK. Chemnitz, den 16.6.1926, B1.146. 
62 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS. am 15.1.1926, B1.342(Koenen)" 
63 SAPMO 13/10/115, BL Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3"1926, 
B1.131. 
64 "bOd I I " 
65 ibid, Bericht ueber die Kampagne zum Volksentscheid im Bezirk Westsachsen, den 23.7.1926, B1.142. 
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between the two parties, for example on May Day 1926 in Leipzig and in Borna.66 
Particularly in Leipzig, Communists who did try to set up Unity Committees quickly gave 
up when it became clear that there was no prospect of their success. The party 
membership then worked in isolation from the SPD during the campaign. Even during the 
weeks preceding the vote itself, at most some 50 per cent of the district membership were 
actively involved. Many left-wing Communists saw the expropriation campaign as too 
much of a socialist reform and not enough of a direct campaign against the SPD.67 
In the East Saxon district party some 14 Unity Committees were set up which included 
representation from the SPD and local trade-union cartels.68 However, in a proliferation of 
small localities in industrial-rural environments, where the KPD was weak and the SPD's 
left-wing was dominant, co-operation on the specific issue of the expropriation was 
carried out without forming partisan Unity Committees. The KPD's local groups in the 
sub-district Meissen provide an example of these developments. In the city of Meissen 
itself the strength of the SPD proved an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the 
communist party line.69 The situation in the surrounding industrial villages was, however, 
different. In the working area of Loschwitz the KPD co-operated with the SPD in a 
"Working Committee" which prepared events for the expropriation campaign at joint 
meetings. Both parties' members distributed material together and immediately prior to the 
referendum vote on the 20 June the local KPD put its members at the disposal of the local 
66 Sta.L., Ah Borna 2624, Ah Borna, den 2.6.1926. An die Khm Leipzig, B1.146; St.a.L., Polizei 
Presidium (pP-S.) Leipzig, Nr.5882, Bericht ueber die Maifeier, den 3.5.1926. In Leipzig the 
demonstration which clashed with the socialists was led by the district factional leader Arthur Vogt. 
67 SAPMO 13/10/112, Protokoll der BLS. am 6.4.1926, B1.398; SAPMO I 3/10/115, BL Westsachscn. An 
das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3 .1926, BI.131. 
68 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS vom 10.7.1926, B1.99. 
69 SAPMO I 3/8/33, Abschrift. Bericht ueber die Durchfuerung der Kampagne zum Volkscntscheid im 
UB Meissen. Meisscn, am 10.7.1926. An die BL Ostsachsen, B1.138. 
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SPD to ensure the co-ordination of effective work. 70 In Schmeideberg, although there was 
no Unity Committee, the local Sports Cartel co-operated with the KPD to enable joint 
demonstrations of the two parties.71 It was in this environment that the Reichsbanner , 
which was officially neutral in the campaign because of its (nominal) representation of the 
Catholic Centre Party and the DDP, joined in communist demonstrations.72 Already in the 
preparations for the May Day Celebrations the BL was concerned that in the cities the 
"ultra-Left" were ignoring the party line, while in the industrial villages a "false united 
front" was being carried out, in which local Communist's made no demands in return for 
their participation in SPD organised events. In Radeberg the local KPD made no demands 
for participation in a joint May Day celebration; in Cossmannsdorf it was agreed that the 
RFB would wear civilian dress in the demonstration; and in Obersfriedersdorf a "Workers' 
Cartel" was set up with the objective of overcoming the split in the workers' movement 
and bringing about a re-union with the SPD.73 East Saxony indicates that the strongest 
barrier to the KPD's united front tactic was the urban setting of cities which were socialist 
strongholds; this was accentuated if the KPD was weak, as in Dresden. The second 
strongest indicator was the composition of the local ADGB: local support for the KPD 
came predominantly from the Builders' Union, the DMV and the unskilled and industry-
based FAV.74 Franz Walter identified the strength of the network of SPD political and 
cultural organisations (Vereinsnetz) as the primary indicator of the strength of the socialist 
70 ibid, Volksentscheid. Arbeitsgeniet Loschwitz (undated), B1.152. 
71 ibid, Abschrift. Bericht der Volksentscheidskampagne der KPD (18.7.1926), B1.150. 
n ibid, Abschrift. Bericht von Koetzschenbroda (12.7.1926), B1.148. 
73 SAPMO I 3/8/25, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Sitzung der engeren BL. yom 26.5.1926, Bl.80. 
74 SAPMO I 3/8/27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Berichte ueber die Vorarbeit zur Durchfuerung des 1. Mai, 
B1.413-14. 
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milieu.75 Normally the strength of the SPD's organisational integration of its membership, 
both politically and socially, served as a barrier to communist influence. However, in the 
industrial villages contact between the SPD's and KPD's local membership in the sports 
cartels was fostering co-operation in contravention of their leaderships' explicit 
• . 76 
mstrucnons. 
The campaign for the expropriation of the former Saxon monarchy had raised the activity 
of the KPD and brought the party into greater contact with the SPD. The expropriation 
campaign was the first campaign in which both parties had been on the same side since 
1923.77 However, this did not represent a significant success for the actual party line (ie 
organising dissident socialists in communist Unity Committees). The party conception of 
the "moderate" united front policy remained the destruction of the SPD as the principal 
obstacle to communist objectives. The documentation of the meetings of the Regional 
Executive make it abundantly clear that "decomposing" the SPD remained the main 
objective of the party line: this prioritised splitting the increasingly antagonistic pro-
coalition right wing of the Saxon SPD from the class-war inclined left wing.78 The 
Regional Executive, however, admitted that the Saxon KPD did not have the "political or 
organisational strength" to interconnect its wider political campaigns with the prosecution 
of the expropriation campaign.79 The KPD leadership's plans for an extra-parliamentary 
campaign petitioning for the dissolution of the Landtag came to nothing.80 The problems 
75 Walter, 'Stammland', p215. 
76 ibid, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Berichte ueber die Vorarbeit zur Durchfuerung des 1. Mai, B1.413-14. 
77 SAPMO I 3/8{l5, Protokoll der BLS vom 10.7.1926, B1.98. 
78 SAPMO 13/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Stellungnahme zum Volksentscheid.Landesvorstand Sachsen. 
Dresden, den 26.2.1926. An das ZK, Polbuero, B1.30f. 
79 ibid, B1.31-2. 
80 For the objectives of the Saxon KPD see, SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lagc, Aufgabcn und Taktik 
der Partci. Bezirkspartcitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B l. 23 -5. 
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of connnunist language and ideology were indicated by the report of a party functionary 
to the ZK, which stated that although the left-wing Social Democrats he had spoken with 
saw the right-wing of the SPD as "class traitors", the KPD's press campaign against the 
SPD's left-wing was preventing "joint work": neither the Communist functionary nor his 
Socialist colleague seemed to understand what was subterfuge and what was the 
communist party line.81 
The KPD and the Unemployed: Expropriation by the Expropriated? 
At the turn of 1925/6 Germany underwent a sharp rise in the level of unemployment as a 
consequence of a cyclical economic down turn. In Saxony this was intensified by 
structural factors, most particularly the drop in world demand for the export oriented 
products of the textile and clothing industries.82 The KPD set out to link the privations of 
unemployment with the wealth of the former monarchies as a means of attracting the 
unemployed to participate in communist campaigning.83 Communist motions from the 
Landtag and municipal councils contrasted the state's ability to give vast sums of public 
money to the former princes while the unemployed went hungry.84 Parliamentary motions 
were then followed up at meetings of the Committees of the Unemployed, a communist 
front organisation, which stressed the need for participation in the campaign for the 
81 SAPMO I 3/8-10/7, An das ZK. BL Dresden, den 17.6.1926, B1.148. 
82 See chapter 2.2 above. 
83 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgaben und Taktik der Partei. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-
Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.23-5; Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p138. 
84 Stoeschek and Zeidler, 'Saechsischen Landtag', p443; SAPMO I 3/8-10/7, An die saechsische 
Arbeitershaft, B1.54-5; Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, pp94-5, quoting a ZK circular; SAPMO I 3/8/31, 
'AIle Kraefte fuer den Volksentscheid!' KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben (23.1.1926), B1.8. 
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expropriation of the House of Wettin.85 At these meetings demonstrations of the 
unemployed were organised to march on the Town Halls when matters relating to their 
material conditions were being presented by the KPD. 86 This was done in Leipzig as part 
of the KPD's demonstration for a referendum on the 27 January.87 By late March 49 Town 
Halls in Erzgebirge-Vogdand had experienced similar events.88 Demonstrations of the 
unemployed were also organised to coincide with factories' closing times in an attempt to 
include workers in "united" demonstrations.89 
The KPD, despite repeated attempts, was unable to involve unemployed workers in 
communist propaganda which centred on the factories. 9o During the expropriation 
campaign there is no evidence of unemployed workers being organised in the KPD's 
political or economic campaigns in the factories, which were linked in the party press and 
public agitation to the expropriation campaign. Furthermore, the wider circle of 
unemployed workers, who joined in the KPD actions for higher benefit payments, 
disappointed the party leadership's hopes of creating a large periphery of co-workers in 
85 'b'd 1 1 . 
86 This was already a universal communist tactic, see, Huber-Koller, R-M., 'Die kommunistische 
Erwerbslosenbewegung in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik', in Gesellschaft· Beitraege zur 
Marxistischen Theory 10 (1977) (pp81-140), pp96-7. 
87 Kommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der oertlichen Arbeiterbewegung bei der Bezirksleitung 
der SED Leipzig der SEd in Zusammenarbeit mit den Sektionen Geschichte und Marxismus-Leninismus 
sowie dem Franz Mehring-Institut der Karl Marx Universitaet Leipzig: In der Revolution geboren - In 
den Klassenkampf bewaehrt. Geschichte der KPD-Bezirksorganisation Leipzig-Westsachsen (Leipzig, 
1986) [henceforth: 'In den Revolution geboren'], p142; SAPMO I 3/10/115, BL Westsachsen. An das ZK 
der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3.1926, Bl.132. 
88 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Bericht ueber das Volksbegehren im Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, B1.287. 
89 SAPMO I 3/10/112, Protokoll der BLS. am 15.1.1926, Bl.342. 
90 SAPMO 13/10/115, B1.169, Bericht ueber die Taetigkeiten des Bezirkes West Sachscn der KPD vom 
1.4.1925 bis 31.3.1926 (Leipzig, 1926), pp5-6. 
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the "Princes Campaign".91 Huber-Koller's research on the political-psychology of the 
unemployed shows a narrowing of their horizons to the struggle for everyday needs; 
feelings of atomisation and helpless isolation produced an angry apathy, which on 
occasion developed into spontaneous protests.92 McElligott's research in Hamburg-Altona 
also concludes that if the KPD did not act in the direct interests of the unemployed, the 
unemployed would not take part in communist organised campaigns.93 
Communism Offers its Hand to the Saxon Buerger. 
During the mid twenties the KPD's campaigning also made attempts to win over the so-
called non-proletarian working people: the artisanal urban lower middle classes and 
peasant farmers. 94 Internal party circulars indicate that the "princes campaign" was only a 
means to the communist end of extending and organising wider support for the party. The 
"main task" was: "To bring not only the broad masses of workers, but also wide layers of 
the Mittelstand to the KPD. ,,95 The ability to do so remained in the realms of communist 
propaganda. The Saxon KPD did not have specific BL departments with which to 
organise party work among the Mittelstand and intellectuals; consequently the Agit-Prop 
Departments took over what was a bete noir among functionaries. 96 The BLs frequently 
91 ibid, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3.1926, B1.132. 
92 Huber-Koller, Erwerbslosenbewegung', pp92-6. 
93 McElligott, A., 'Mobilising the Unemployed: The Unemployed Workers' Movement in Hamburg-
Altona during the Weimar Republic' in Evans, R.J. and Geary, D. (eds.), The German Unemployed. 
Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemploymentjrom the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich 
(London, 1987),p231. 
94 Flechthcim, Die KPD, p186; Die International, IX (1926) (15.3.1926), ppI84-5(E. Schneller). 
95 Circular of Bezirk Berlin-Brandenburg, quoted in 'Kommunistische Dolchstosstaktik' in, Vorwaerts, 
Nr.56, 3.2.1926. 
96 SAPMO 13/10/115, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
12.3.l926, B1.130. 
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criticised the grass roots party organisations for simply not carrying out the party line.97 In 
the Leipzig cell group of Schleussig, for example, political agitation in the non-proletarian 
suburbs was not carried out.98 Socio-political antagonisms in Leipzig were such that 
unifonned RFB militants, using class war propaganda, were likely only to reinforce 
hostilities between the blue collar and white collar "working people".99 
Nationally, the level of support for the expropriation of the fonner monarchies was most 
significantly in excess of the combined KPD-SPD vote at the December 1924 Reichstag 
election in the strongholds of the Catholic Centre Party in Western Gennany. Above all in 
Cologne-Aachen, Baden and Wuerttenberg the Catholic social and political movement had 
significant support among catholic workers. 100 Furthennore, the Catholic Youth 
Movement declared its support for the expropriation of the fonner Princely Houses.101 A 
lack of allegiance to the Protestant Hohenzollern monarchy combined with cross-class 
political support for the Catholic Centre Party to create a climate favouring radical 
refonn. In Saxony the socio-political tensions, which had become more pronounced after 
1923, were also reflected in the outcome of the petition for a referendum and in the 
referendum itself. 
The traditions of left-wing liberalism were also weak in Saxony. Support for the DDP had 
already been eroded by the right-ward gravitation of Saxon political affiliations, which 
97 SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgaben und Taktik der Partei. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-
Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.26. 
98 SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bericht der Zellengruppe Schleussig fuer Juni 1926, B1.146. 
99 A typical example of the KPD's slogans is, "Nothing for the princes except the iron fist of the class 
conscious proletariat" see, SAPMO I 3/8/31, 'AIle Kraefte fuer den Volksentscheid!', Rundschreiben, 
B1.8; On the socio-political divide in Saxony see, Lapp, 'Political Extremes', pI. 
100 Schueren, Volksentscheid, pp 1 37ff. 
101 °bOd 1 1 . 
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were more pronounced that the national trend. 102 During the campaign for a referendum 
the only major press organ which had continued to support the DDP, the Zwickauer 
Tagesblatt, transferred its allegiance to the DVp.103 This deprived the expropriation 
campaign in Saxony of any support in the bourgeois press. 104 During the expropriation 
campaign the KPD also tried to win support among the growing middle-class protest 
movement, particularly among those who had lost much of their savings in the currency 
reform.105 The KPD held to an ideologically based interpretation which saw the rise of the 
economic interest parties as a staging post on these social groups' defection from the 
bourgeoisie to communism 106 Schueren identified a protest vote in Berlin, Hamburg and 
Potsdam among certain lower middle-class voters, who felt that their social and economic 
interests were being abandoned by the traditional parties of the middle classes.107 In 
Saxony, however, by 1926 a line in the political sand had been drawn between the 
supporters of the Left and Righi. The regional opposition movement to the expropriation 
campaign was led by the DNVP, which advocated a "strongman" to restore order in 
Germany, on the model of Mussolini in Italy.lOs During the campaign representatives from 
the former House of Wettin participated in nationalist rallies and demonstration. 109 The 
referendum campaign was conducted before the breakthrough in Saxony of the other chief 
player among the lower middle classes, the NSDAP. Despite an active Nazi campaign of 
102 For the Reich in general see, Jones, L.E., German Liberalism and the Dissolution o/the Weimar Party 
System 1918-33 (Chapel Hill, 1988), p60; For Saxony, Lapp, 'Political Extremes', ppl,35,58ff. 
103 SAPMO 13/9/69, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitungsitzung vom 21.6.1926, B1.157. 
104 Divisions in the DDP on the question of expropriation were resolved by permitting the expression of 
"individaul opinions" see, Schueren, Volksentscheid, p137. 
105 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, An den Regionalvorstand. Berlin, den 15.1.1927, B1.4. 
106 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, An den Regionalvorstand. Berlin, den 15.l.1927, B1.4. 
107 Schueren, Volksentscheid, pp228-34. 
108 SAPMO 13/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuerden Monat Juni 1926, B1.311-12. 
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meetings, which aimed to end the speaking ban imposed on Hitler after the Beerhall 
Putsch, the party remained as yet on the political fringes. IIO Conflict between the Nazis' 
pro-referendum left-wing, around the Strasser brothers and Goebbels, and the anti-
referendum wing around Hitler, who depicted the expropriation issue as a "Jewish 
swindle", restricted any coherent campaign. I I I 
The opponents of the expropriation campaign, the parties of the middle classes, the right-
wing paramilitary Verbaende and the associations of the agricultural and industrial 
employers, presented their campaign as opposition to the "precedent" of expropriation. It 
was claimed that the former monarchies were not the real issue: property relations per se 
were endangered.112 In Leipzig a bill poster of the "Working Committee Against the 
Referendum" stated that: 
The 20th of June will bring us great communist recruiting. Whoever wants to 
uphold our state and economic order will stay at home. Whoever works for the 
abolition of private ownership, and thereby wants to throw the German people 
into great confusion, will co-operate with the referendum ... Anyone who goes to 
vote on the 20 June, and is thereby registered on the electoral list, lets themselves 
be known as a friend and accomplice of the socialist -communist intemational.113 
Where the KPD leadership had hoped to find a reservoir of support, political 
developments in Saxony had created a salt flat among the "non-proletarian working 
109 Stoeschek and Zeidler, 'Saechsichen Landtag', p440. 
110 On the NSDAP breakthrough in Erzgebirge-Vogtland, Walter, 'Stammland', pp218ff; For the 
campaign to the end the speaking ban on Hitler see the collection of material by the Saxon Ministry of the 
Interior in, Saechsischer Staatshauptrachiv Dresden (St.H.D) MdI, Nr.II135.,B1.83ff. 
111 The conflict was overcome at the Bamberg "Fuehrertagung" in 1926 which established the principle of 
the Fuehrerprinzip see, Orlow, D., The History of the Nazi Party, vol.11919-33 (Pittsburg, 1969), pp6711. 
112 Schueren, Volksentscheid, p 183. 
113 ibid, pI83. 
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people. ,,114 Intellectuals in Saxony also failed to flood into the "Kuczinski Committees", 
which were headed at Reich level by prominent artists and intellectuals, most notably 
Albert Einstein.1l5 Throughout the referendum campaign in Erzgebirge-Vogtland there 
were only four "Kuczinski Committees".1l6 Articles in the KPD's press claiming to be the 
"true" representatives of the Mittlestand, did nothing to dissuade these social groups from 
regarding communism as the devil incarnate.117 The higher the population concentration 
of the Saxon Mittelstand, the lower the level of support for anything associated with the 
KPD fell. I IS 
The Campaign Among Peasant Farmers. 
The KPD's propaganda during the "princes campaign" also specifically addressed the 
peasants at national, regional and local level. The KPD's draft bill in the Reichstag on the 
25 November and subsequent public statements informed the peasantry that the land 
114 The Regional Executive in Saxony noted that while the upper leadership was disposed towards the 
party line, lower functionaries and ordinary members did not carry it out see, SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Bericht 
ueber die Stellungnahme zum Volksentscheid.Landesvorstand Sachsen. Dresden, den 26.2.1926. An das 
ZK, Polbuero, B1.32(Boettcher). 
115 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp275-76. 
116 SAPMO 13/9/69, An das ZK. Chemnitz, den 16.6.1926, Bl.146. 
117 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Monat Juni 1926, B1.31l-12. the document refers to a 
series of articles under the title, "Wo stehen die Feinde des Mittelstandes". 
118 Employment in the offices of the state administration increased the proportion of Beamten see, 
Statistisches lahrbuchfuer die Stadt Dresden 31/32 (Dresden, 1932), p8; For a discussion of the social 
and industrial structure of Dresden, see, Kriegenherdt, F., 'Der Kampf der KPD in Dresden urn die 
Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse gegen die drohende Gefahr der Faschismus und des Krieges (non den 
Reichstagwahlen am 14.9.1930 biz zur Einsetzung der Hitierregierung am 30.1.1933)" Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Dresden, 1966), pp 1-17; For sub-regional differences in the industrial structure of Saxony, see, Bramke, 
W. and Hess, U., 'Ergebnisse - Schwerepunkt - Problemkreise. Berichte ueber das erste Arbeitsjahr' in 
Projekt 'Sachsen im 20. lahrhundert'. Politische, wirtscha/tliche und soziale Wandlung einer allen 
industrie Region (Leipzig, 1994) [henceforth: Projekt Sachsen], pp3-14. 
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expropriated from the fonner princes would be re-distributed to small and medium 
peasants and tenant fanners. 119 This was part of the party's wider objective of gaining 
sympathy from these social groups by emphasising the difference in interests between 
small-scale producers and large land owners.120 In the Saxon Landtag Boettcher 
developed this tactic by pointing to the public funds given to the former House of Wettin 
while the peasants went without financial assistance.121 
It was in rural areas that opponents of the expropriation campaign were most successfully 
able to organise their counter-campaign.122 In the predominantly agricultural eastern 
regions, of East Prussia, Mecklenburg and Pommerania, both signature of the petition and 
voting in the referendum were well below the combined SPD-KPD vote in the December 
1924 Reichstag election.123 In Saxony, support for the expropriation of the House of 
Wettin actually fell in the countryside between the petition in March and the referendum 
vote on 20 June. This was due to the role of the Saechsische Landbund (SLB), the 
delayed co-ordination of the referendum's opponents into the Working Committee Against 
the Referendum, and the local press' ability to exploit the cautious psychology of the rural 
population. 124 
119 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p271; Text of KPD's bill, in, DuM, series II, vol.8 p27lf; SAPMO I 
3/8-10/8, Landesvorstand Sachsen. An das ZK der KPD, den 9.4.1926, Bl.141. 
120 In 1925 the KPD divided the peasantry into four classes according to farm sizes: the upper two were 
labeled "bourgeois" and the lower two "proletarian" see, Farquaharson, 1. E., The Plough and the 
Swastika: National Socialism and Agriculture in Germany 1928-1945 (London, 1976), p40. 
121 Stoeschek und Zeidler, 'Saechsischen Landtag', p443. 
122 Ibid. 
123 ibid, p137f; Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp276f. 
124 SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
12.3.1926, Bl.133; SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politischer Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirgc-Vogtland vom to. 
Parteitag bis Oktober 1926, B1.329; ibid, Bericht ueber das Volksbegehren in Bezirk Erl.gcbirgc-
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In the KPD there was considerable resistance among rank-and-file members and lower 
functionaries to carrying out the campaign in rural areas.125 Party worker's knew that the 
leadership's press statements and policy directives, which claimed there was "growing 
sympathy" for the KPD among the rural population, were merely propaganda.126 The 
KPD's rural campaign, which parallelled similar developments in the Soviet Union, was 
intended to channel the small peasants' movement into the KPD's expropriation campaign. 
Communist rural work stressed that peasants would gain by the redistribution of the lands 
owned by the former Saxon monarchy.127 However, the proposed campaign of meetings 
overstretched the KPD's weak rural organisation, few peasants attended them and those 
who did were disinclined to believe what they heard. One report to the BL in West 
Saxony indicated that the peasants considered everything a hundred times and had been 
convinced by the SLB and their local press that: "after the expropriation of the former 
monarchies would be the Bolshevisation of the rural economy and house ownership. ,,128 
Distrust of communism was reinforced by the perception of the party's activists as 
"outsiders", who arrived in lorries from nearby urban areas. 129 When KPD's activists 
divided into agitation troops, such as cyclists, bill-posting squadrons, those demonstrating 
through the neighbouring villages and "house to house" agitation groups, many peasants 
Vogtland, B1.287. The "Working Committee" was founded on 15 April see, Winkler, Schein der 
Normalitaet, p279 and note 211. 
125 SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bezirksleitung Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
12.3.1926, B1.130. 
126 SAPMO I 3/8(27, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Bericht vom Monat Februar, B1.393. 
127 'In der Revolution geboren', p143; SAPMO I 3/9/60, Resolution zur Lage, Aufgaben und Taktik der 
Partei. Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.26. 
128 SAPMO I 3/10/115, BL Westsachsen. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 12.3.1926, 
81.133. 
129 ibid, Bericht ueber die Kampagne zur Volksentscheid im Bezirk Westsachsen, den 23.7.1926.81.140-
41; ibid, Bericht der Zellengruppe Zentrum 5, B1.147. 
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were alarmed, particularly when uniformed RFB members stood on their doorstep.130 The 
KPD's distinctly class war style propaganda also helped to repel rather than attract 
peasants.131 In some cases distraught peasants personally tried to disperse the communist 
propaganda troops. One such example was in the village of Althen, where a peasant's 
wife attacked Communists with a wooden shoe.132 The Red Rural Sundays, which took 
place immediately prior to the petition and the vote itself, were the high points of 
communist activity in rural areas. The KPD made its presence felt using demonstrations 
with accompanying bands and propaganda troops.I33 This too did more to disrupt rural 
life than assure peasants of the KPD's intention to represent their interest. 
The KPD's organisational Bolshevisation had, in rural work as in all other areas, done 
nothing to assist the mobilisation of party members to carry out the party line. Factory and 
street cell involvement in rural work was the exception to the rule. The prosecution of 
grass roots' political work continued to be done by the residentially based party units. 134 
While the factional struggle blazed throughout party meetings, it devolved on militants in 
the RFB to take communism to the countryside. Indeed, the extent to which the RFB was 
responsible for carrying out practical party work had already begun to concern senior 
130 SAPMO 13/8-10/6, Sitzung des Landesvorstandes mit den Landesvertrauensleute. Dresden, den 
5.9.1926, B1.42-3(Waesche). 
131 SAPMO 13/9/69, Protokoll der engeren BLS am 21.6.1926, B1.157(Erfenschlag). 
132 SAPMO 13/10/115, Bericht der Zellengruppe Zentrum 5, B1.147. 
133 'In der Revolution geboren', p143f. 
134 For an example of a factory cell involved in rural work during the expropriation campaign see, 
SAPMO 13/8/33, Abschrift. Bericht der Betreibszelle S-W, Niedersedlitz. An die Bezirksleitung 
Ostsachsen der KPD. Dresden-Leuben, den 11.7.1926, B1.147; SAPMO I 3/10/115, Bcrichtdcr 
Zellengruppe Schleussig fuer Juni 1926, B1.146. 
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functionaries. 135 However, no matter how much communist campaigning was carried out 
in the countryside, there was no road into the hinterland which led to the peasantry's heart. 
The invitation to join the communist movement remained like an invitation to drink from a 
politically poisoned chalice.136 
The Significance of the Expropriation Campaign in Saxony. 
The outcome of the communist inspired campaign to expropriate the former Princely 
Houses was what could be called a respectable failure. Nationally, the referendum 
received 14.5 million votes favouring the former monarchies' expropriation without 
compensation, but 19.8 million votes would have been required for an absolute 
majority.137 In the major Saxon cities of Chemnitz (53.1 per cent) and Leipzig (62.7 per 
cent) participation was well in excess of the Reich average of 36.4 per cent. 138 In the more 
buergerlich Dresden, the 47 per cent rate of participation represented a considerable 
achievement!39 However, it was evident that the campaign's support among the "workers' 
parties" and rejection by the parties of the middle classes, reflected the sharpening 
conflicts between social classes in the region. Crucial to the referendum's outcome in 
135 The role of the RFB is stressed throughout the party documentation see, for example, SAPMO I 
10/115, Bericht ueber die Kampagne zur Volksentscheid im Bezirk Westsachsen, den 23.7 . 1926,B l.141; 
SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der engeren BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 21.6.1926, BL.157(Ohr). 
136 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Sitzung des Landesvorstandes mit den Landesvertrauensleute. Dresden, den 
5.9.1926, B1.42-3(Waesche). 
137 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, 277-82. 
138 ibid, pp281-2. 
139 Statistics, in Wiederhoeft, H., 'Der Kampf der KPD zur Schaffung der Einheitsfront in der Zeit der 
Fuerstenenteignungskampagne 1925/6 in Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland' Diplomarbeit (Leipzig University, 
1965), pp52ff; On the social profile of Saxony, Laban, K., 'Zur Struktur der staedtischen Arbeiterkla'lsc 
im Land Sachsen auf Grundlage der Volks-Berufs-und-Betriebszaehlung von 1925-1933', in 
Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Wilhelm Pieck Universitaet, Rostock 33 (8) (1984), pp46-9. 
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Saxony was the SPD's active support. However, it was symbolic of the political 
development of the Weimar Republic that the monarchist president, von Hindenburg, had 
acted behind the scenes to prevent any ill fate becoming the German princes. In the course 
of March and April 1926 Hindenburg was able to achieve the Reich cabinet's acceptance 
for his own definition of the bill as an issue of constitutional change, which would have 
required a majority of two-thirds of all those entitled to vote.140 
The expropriation campaign was an undoubted success for the KPD's united front from 
above, using a popular issue to force the SPD leadership's hand. However, this related to 
the subterfuge rather than the substance: the expropriation of the Princely Houses rather 
than the creation of a pro-Soviet "left-wing" in the workers' movement under communist 
leadership, which would take part in all areas of the party's on-going political 
campaigning. The united front from below, however, was unable to break down the 
organisational barriers of the social democratic movement: the campaign was in no way 
brought under the KPD's political leadership. Social democrats carried out the campaign 
in their party organisations, they did not join the KPD's "Unity Committees". The limited 
number of "Unity Committees" set up during the campaign are unlikely to have included 
the unofficial participation of more than 100 Social Democrats and perhaps as many "non-
party" workers. Furthermore, these committees were only able to organise work on the 
specific issue of the expropriation campaign, and they fell into disuse thereafter.141 
After the campaign to expropriate the former monarchies, the KPD's Regional Executive 
claimed that the referendum was "evidence" of a "left orientation" of the working 
c1asses. 142 This view was also expressed by the left-wing Social Democrat, Georg Decker, 
140 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, 277-82. 
141 SAPMO I 3/9/69, An das ZK. Chemnitz den 16.6.1926, Bl.146. 
142 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS. vom 10.7.1926, Bl.97. 
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writing ill the in SPD's house journal, Gesellschaft. Decker's analysis detailed the 
campaign as a left-wing counter-offensive, showing what could be achieved when the left 
was united. 143 However, the meaning of unity to the left-wing of social democracy, who 
were inclined towards co-operation with the KPD on specific issues, was different to the 
communist definition. In communist terms there had been very little "communist unity", 
and a real danger of the tactic working in reverse: Communists working with Social 
Democrats outside the KPD's front organisations. 
Winkler concluded that the referendum campaign in itself was one in a series of blows to 
the Weimar Republic and parliamentary democracy. The SPD, in Winkler's view, had 
alienated its potential middle-class coalition partners and disappointed radical Social 
Democrats by helping to discredit the reforming potential of parliamentary democracy.144 
However, in Saxony at least, it was a symptom of existing socio-political antagonisms 
rather than their cause. Political tension in Saxony had already been molded by the 
developments during the Weimar Republic's early years. The KPD's response to political 
developments after the expropriation campaign, further detailed the difficulties 
experienced in carrying out the united front policy. 
5.3 The United Front Comes to Ground. 
The Saxon Political System in the Middle Years of Weimar. 
The KPD's return to a united front policy in late 1925 coincided with a period of 
accelerated fragmentation in the Weimar political system. The lines of fracture ran both 
within and between the parties. It was in this context that the KPD made the ideological 
143 Decker, G., 'Lehren des Volksentscheides', in Gesellschaft 3 (2) (1926), pp193-203. 
144 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p289. 
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claim to be the "objective" representative of not only the proletariat, but the wider 
Werktaetigen, the working people, which included the artisanal and commercial lower 
middle classes and peasant farmers. During 1926/7 the KPD placed greater emphasis on 
winning the support of the "working people". 
In Saxony the social and economic impact of the hyper-inflation and then currency 
stabilisation had a more intense political impact than in the Reich in general.145 In the 1926 
Landtag election the traditional middle-class parties, the DDP, DVP and DNVP, lost 40 
per cent of their share of the vote to the Peoples' Rights and Re-evaluation Party (VRP), 
which represented the interests of those who had lost substantial financial sums in the 
currency re-evaluation, and the Economic Party (WP), which represented the business 
interests of small-scale artisanal producers and shopkeepers.146 The origins of these 
political developments in Germany have been located in the social shifts, produced by the 
process of industrial modernisation from the late Imperial period, which spawned a search 
for vehicles of political protection.147 In Saxony the high proportion of small- and 
medium-scale industrial and the commercial interests intensified the dissolution of the 
145 Feldmann, G. D., 'Saxony, the Reich and the Problem of Unemployment in the German Inflation', in 
Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte (AjS) XXVII (1987), pp103-44. 
146 Jones, German Liberalism, p264; Lapp, 'Political Extremes', p189; For a report on these developments 
in Saxony, see, B.A.P. (Bundesarchiv Potsdam) RKO IS.07, Nr.243/1,B1.68ff. 
147 Winkler, H. A., 'From Social Protectionism to National Socialism: The German Small Business 
Movement in Comparative Perspective', in Journal of Modern History (JMH) 48 (1) (1976), pp.I-18; 
Jones, L. E., ''The Dying Middle' - The Fragmentation of the Bourgeois Middle', in Contemporary 
European History (CEH) S (1) (1972), pp24-S. On the impact of industrialisation on the social basis, or 
milieu, underpinning the political system, Lepsius, R.M., 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum 
Problem der Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft', in Ritter, G. A. (ed), Deutsche Parteien vor 1918 
(Cologne, 1973), ppS8-80. For an overview with reference to Saxony see, Szejnmann, C-c. H., 'The Rise 
of the Nazi Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933', Ph.D. thesis (King's College, University of London, 
1994), p.1S. 
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party system Saxon industrialists, and the wider commercial and art is anal lower middle 
classes, resented the region's transition from the "pioneer land" of the industrial revolution 
to a poor relation, left out in the political cold by the Reich government's political 
prioritisation of large-scale industrial and business interests.148 Saxony's confinement 
within an "old industrial" structure pushed apart the different interest groups which had 
formed the social basis of the traditional parties of the middle classes.149 Rentiers and 
pensioners, who had defected to the DNVP from the DDP and DVP in 1924, transferred 
their political allegiance in 1926 to the VRP.150 Saxon small-scale business interests, in 
significant numbers, defected politically from the DVP to the wp. 151 The economic and 
social protests of the Saxon business community also helps to explains why the DVP, and 
the VSI (Verband Saechsische Industriellen), were positioned on the right-wing of the 
national party.152 The relegation of the Saxon economy to the fringes of the national 
economy, the labour-intensive nature of Saxon industry, and the Reich government's use 
of progressive taxation to finance the Sozialstaat, all contributed to the confrontational 
relationship between Saxon employers and employees.153 
The small- and medium-scale structure of Saxon agricultural production also contributed 
to Saxony's drift into ring-wing political particularism. Saxon farmers by 1927 began to 
148 In general, Jones, L. E., 'The Dying Middle': Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois 
Politics', in, CEH 5 (1) (1972) (pp23-54), pp24-5; On the impact of industrialisation on the social basis, 
or milieu, underpinning the political system, Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem', pp58-80. 
149 On the influence of industrial interests on the mainstream political parties see, James, H. J., The 
German Slump, Politics and Economics 1924-1930 (Oxford, 1986); Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', 
pp.205ff. 
ISO Lapp, ibid, pp208-9. 
lSI 'b'd 1 I • 
152 ibid, pp.209ff,190ff. 
153 Blaich, F., 'Staatsverstaendnis und politische Haltung dcr deutschen Untemehmer, 1918-1930', in 
Bracher, K. D" Funke, E. und Jackobsen, H-A. (eds.), Die Weimar Republik (Dusseldorf, 1987), p 166, 
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feel the twin impact of reduced domestic demand and the decline in commodity prices as a 
correlative of the world depression in agriculture.154 In agriculture, as in industry, the 
conflict of interests between branches of production saw fragmentation of political 
interests along economic dividing lines, eroding traditional political loyalties. The 
radicalisation of the Saxon peasantry, although later than among workers in industry and 
commerce, initiated the metamorphosis of the Saechsische Landbund (SLB), which had 
been closely associated with the DNVP, into the independent and regionally assertive 
Sachsische Landvolk (SL V).155 The Saxon rural protest movement had grown out of a 
feeling of being socially and economically sidelined by the DNVP's domination by heavy 
industry and large-scale agriculture interests.156 
The fragmentation of the traditional middle-class parties was parallelled in the SPD. The 
so-called "23", the SPD Landtag deputies who continued to take part in the regional 
coalition government with the DDP and DVP, were expelled from the party in April 1926. 
Under the leadership of Wilhelm Buck and Karl Bethke, the ASPD (Aite 
Sozialdemokratische Partei) was formed as a party of class compromise through 
participation in the institutions of state. However, unlike the right-wing particular interest 
parties, the ASPD did not become a significant social movement. The overwhelming 
majority of the SPD membership and electorate were not inspired to politically rehouse 
themselves. 157 The lack of a centre ground in Saxon politics, on which a socio-economic 
154 Lobmeier, K., 'Die Sozialoekonomische Lage und das politische Verhaltnis der Mittelschichten in der 
Kreishauptmannschaft Chemnitz 1927 bis 1935' Dissertation (University of Leipzig, 1989), pp21-3. 
155 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp227. 
156 Farquharson, Plough and the Swastika, pp26-7; Gessner, D., 'Agrarian Protectionism in the Weimar 
Republic', in Journal o/Contemporary History (ICH) 12 (1977), pp766-70. 
157 Lapp, B., 'A 'National' Socialism: The Old Socialist Party of Saxony, 1926-1932', in Iel/30 (1995), 
pp29 1-309. Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp195-202,327-31. 
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compromise could be built, increasingly gave way to political polarisation. This process 
had its roots in the Imperial era, when the working and lower middle classes were 
politically excluded by a restrictive franchise. 158 However, while political protest benefited 
the SPD in the Imperial political system, the Weimar political system saw a rightward 
gravitation of the lower middle classes. 
Divisions in the Saxon middle classes prevented a coherent economic policy in the 1926-
29 Landtag. However, the memory of the SPD-Ied governments between 1921-23 
bridged the divide that economic interests had created.159 The role of the ASPD was 
crucial in enabling the Saxon coalition government of 1926-29, which repealed much of 
the earlier socialist reforms: with four seats it held the balance of power. 160 The role of the 
ASPD in the Saxon political system was that of catalyst, enabling the exclusion of the Left 
from regional political power. 161 With the legislation of the Landtag administration 
defmed by a predominantly right-wing agenda, the KPD applied the term "social fascist" 
to the ASPD in the mid twenties, before it became current at national level after 1928. 
The KPD's Interpretation of Saxon Political Developments. 
It was in this climate of economic dissatisfaction and political protest that the KPD played 
out the united front policy in Saxony. The Regional Executive adopted a policy of 
political subterfuge, as opposed to direct confrontation with the SPD. In the 1926 
Landtag elections the KPD called for a "Red Workers' Saxony", implying support for an 
158 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', 145f. 
159 Szejnmann, C-C. H., 'The Rise of the Nazi Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933', Ph.D. thesis 
(King's College, University of London, 1994), ppl7ff. 
160 Sejnmann, 'Rise of the Nazi Party', pp 19ff. 
161 Fenske, H., Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem (Frankfurt, 1972), pp298-300. 
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SPD-Ied refonn government. 162 The municipal elections in November saw the Saxon KPD 
approve the use of "joint lists" with the SPD in wards which would otherwise have fallen 
to the parties of the Right.163 However, the KPD Regional Executive's policy was 
intended to prevent the SPD gaining politically by persuasively pointing out that it was the 
Communists who were preventing a "workers' government" .164 The Saxon KPD's policy, 
however, did not even constitute a political cease fire with the left-wing of the SPD, let 
alone a modus operandi. The KPD held to its "unmasking" policy, whereby continuous 
propaganda was made which claimed that the Saxon SPD's radical public statements were 
merely an attempt to hold back the workers from communism. 165 The KPD's tactic 
envisaged winning over the so-called "Workers' Opposition" in the SPD at public and 
party meetings, which would demonstrate the alleged differences between the SPD's 
words and actions.166 
The objective of the KPD's political line to promote an "alliance" between the proletariat 
and the non-proletarian "working people" made the breakthrough of the mittelstaendisch 
particular interest parties of direct relevance. The ZK interpreted the political rise of the 
economic protest movement as a re-grouping within the middle classes, characterised by 
the lower middle classes' search for political representation which was independent of 
both the middle and working classes. This option was, however, ruled out by the KPD's 
162 SAPMO 13/8-10/5, Landesvorstandsitzung. Dresden, den 2.8.1926, B1.136-40. The Left was 
represented by Fritz Gloebig, the apparatus faction by Rudolf Renner and the Right by Lieberasch. 
163 SAPMO 13/8-10/9, Unsere Taktik im Wahlkampfin Sachsen. Landesvorstand (undated), B1.56-8. 
164 SAPMO 13/8-10/5, Landesvorstandsitzung. Dresden, den 2.8.1926, B1.129-30. 
165 SAPMO 13/9/61, Aufgaben, Taktik und Situation der Partei. Bezirksparteitag am 12-13.2.1927, 
B1.47; SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Landesparteiarbeiterkonferenz. Dresden den 23.1.1927, BI.2-3. 
166 SAPMO I 2/1/50, Wahlergebnis in Sachsen und unsere weitere Taktik. Protokoll der Sitzung der ZK 
der KPD vom 10.11.1926, BI.7(Thaelmann). At this meeting Thaelmann made "corrections" to the Saxon 
Regional Executive's forthcoming public statements from a leftist perspective, see ibid, B1.6. 
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ideologically driven bipolar model of society, in which the lower middle classes were 
incapable of independent political action, and must therefore gravitate towards either the 
proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The KPD's task was to demonstrate that they "stood with 
the proletariat".167 The KPD's interpretation focused on the economic rivalries within the 
middle-class vote, instead of accepting that the consequence of communist involvement in 
the Saxon government in 1923 had intensified these social groups' anti-Marxism. Equally, 
the right-wing political agenda of the particular interest parties was dismissed as the result 
of differences between their leaderships and memberships.168 The KPD was unable to 
accept that a protest against the policies of large-scale capitalism by small-scale producers 
could come from a right-wing political perspective, which was also directed against 
organised labour. For this reason party policy continued to insist that a "proletarian mass 
movement" could bring lower middle-class malcontents over to the KPD.169 On the basis 
of this political interpretation, the KPD's campaign to win over the Saxon Mittelstand 
involved creating an "opposition tendency" in the protest movement which would divide 
the protesters from their new found political leaders. 170 In all salient points this policy was 
the same "unmasking" tactic that the KPD applied to the SPD. The KPD's regional 
leadership actually contended that it could bring down the Held government in the 
167 ibid, BI.4(Schneller); SAPMO I 3/9/69, Stellungnahme zur Landtagswahl. Protokoll der engeren BLS. 
am 1.11.1926, BI.301(Schneller). 
168 SAPMO 13/8-10/7, Landesvorstand Sachsen. An die ZK, Polbuero. Dresden, den 15.12.1926, 
B1.107-9. 
169 SAPMO 13/8-10/3, 'Gegen den Buergerblock', in Arbeiterstimme, Nr19, 24.1.1927, B1.17. 
170 Wahlergebnis in Sachsen und unsere weitere Taktik. Protokoll der Sitzung des Sitzung der ZK vom 
10.11.1926., SAPMO I 2/1/50.,BI.4(Schneller); SAPMO I 3/9/69, Stellungnahme zur Landlagswahl. 
Protokoll der cngeren BLS. am 1.11.1926, BIJ03(Mapitz). 
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Landtag by putting pressure "from below" on the leaderships of the "special interest" 
parties to withdraw support from the coalition. l71 
"LetAll Who Have Ears Hear": The KPD Addresses the Working People. 
The KPD intended the Working Peoples' Movement to provide "the organisational and 
political means of continuing the united front campaign and uniting all working layers for 
communism. ,,172 The campaign had the objective of widening the party's sphere of 
influence and reviving the Unity Committees, which had all but vanished after the 
campaign to expropriate the former Princely Houses. The KPD leadership saw the 
campaign as a means: "to free the widest section of the Social Democratic workers from 
their reformist, or seemingly radical leaders, and to bring them nearer to the (Communist) 
Party, along with the decisive layers of the Mittelstand.,,173 The ZK's policy discussions 
placed a strong emphasis on winning over radicalised Social Democrats and workers 
employed in large factories. 174 The campaign was to be given a national platform at the 
Reich Congress of the Working People, held in early December 1926 in Berlin.175 
When the Congress of Working People met, under the chairmanship of the Independent 
Socialist Ledebour, 1,956 delegates were present. However, the Working Peoples' 
Movement had done little to attract those outside of the KPD's own ranks: 137 delegates 
171 SAPMO I 3/9/61, Aufgaben, Taktik und Situation der Partei. Bezirksparteitag am 12-13.2.1927, 
B1.47. 
172 SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der engeren Bezirksleitung vorn 6.12.1926, 
BI.319(Hauschild). 
173 SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben zurn Januar Arbeitsplan 1927. Dresden, den 
21.12.1926, B1.157. 
174 SAPMO 12/1/50, Protokoll der Sitzung des ZKes der KPD vorn 1O.11.1926,Bl.l(Heckert). 
175 SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben an all Ortsgruppen und Zellen. Dresden, Anfang 
August 1926, B1.126. 
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were members of the SPD; 31 were members of the USPD; and a handful of delegates had 
been sent from the Christian trade unions, the Mittelstand, and peasant fanners. 176 At local 
level the delegate movement had stressed the KPD's advocacy of the interests of all 
working people, connecting the specific grievances of the audience to the policies of the 
party.l77 However, Heckert's main speech made clear that the KPD wanted to create a 
national impression of a wide ranging movement of sympathy and support for the Soviet 
Union. 178 In reality, however, the KPD leadership knew that the campaign had done little 
to mobilise the party membership and had not proved to be a popular platfonn for 
communist recruitment and propaganda.179 Despite this manifest reality the Congress was 
not the culmination of communist overtures to the "working people", but more of a 
prominent staging post in an on-going policy of communist infiltration. 
Report to the Working People!: The Saxon KPD's Efforts to Revive the United Front. 
After the Reich Congress the Working Peoples' Movement was further developed in a 
campaign of meetings "reporting" on the Congress' decisions. The party's lower 
organisations received circulars informing them how to "skilfully connect" grievances 
about local working and living conditions with the objectives of the Working Peoples' 
Movement. The central aim of communist activity was to create a catalyst widening 
communist influence and to organising non-communists in Unity Committees, which 
176 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p138; Flechtheim, Die KPD, p186. 
177 SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben an all Ortsgruppen und Zellen. Dresden, Anfang 
August 1926, BI.126-27. 
178 Bericht der Verhandlungen des 11. Parteitages der KPD (Berlin, 1927), p36(Dengel), quoted in 
Fowkes, German Communism, p138. 
179 SAPMO I 2/1/50, Protokoll der Sitzung des ZKes der KPD vom 10.11.1926, B1.2-3(Thaelmann). 
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would carry out KPD-led campaigns. I8o The policy in Saxony was co-ordinated by a 
Regional Committee of the Working Peoples' Movement, under the leadership of Paul 
h 181 Boettc er. 
The Regional Committee meeting of 3 March 1927 indicates the difficulties experienced 
in pursuing the united front tactic and the sub-regional variations in its progress. I82 From 
the beginning of the working peoples' delegate movement (ie electing representatives of 
social groups and political organisations to communist congresses) in August 1926, it had 
proved difficult to generate enthusiasm in the party membership or the wider population. 
In West Saxony there had been some 200 meetings; however, only 30 of these included 
local trade-union organisations, and only 10 local Unity Committees were founded. In 
Erzgebirge-Vogdand there had been some 150 meetings and rallies, but only 14 local 
Unity Committees were set up. In East Saxony only 50 meetings were held and two 
Unity Committees formed. I83 The social and political composition of the local Unity 
Committees are not documented, but the overwhelmingly communist complexion of the 
whole campaign is reflected in the delegates to the Regional Congress of the Working 
People, which was held in Dresden on 21-22 May 1927: from 220 delegates, 17 were 
180 SAPMO I 3/8/31, KPD.8.0stsachsen. Rundschreiben zum Januar Arbeitsplan 1927. Dresden, den 
21.12.1926, B1.156-7; SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der Sitzung der engeren BLS. yom 6.12.1926, 
BI.318(Mapitz). 
181 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Landesparteiarbeiterkonferenz. Dresden, den 15.1.1927, B1.3; SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, 
An den Landesvorstand Sachsens. ZK Rundschreiben. Berlin, den 15.1.1927, B1.7-8. 
182 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 11.3.1927. An das ZK der KPD, 
Polbuero, BI.5-6. 
183 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 11.3.1927. An das ZK der KPD, 
Polbuero, BI.5-6. 
Page 237 
members of the SPD; only five delegates had been sent from a local.trade~nion branch' , 
one delegate represented the Mittlestand; and 19 were delegated by small peasants. l84 
Despite the obstacles obstructing party policy, the KPD propaganda machine proclaimed 
that the Regional Congress had been a "great success" and "powerful validation" of party 
policy.18s Boettcher's speech, like Heckert's at national level, placed greatest emphasis on 
the "working peoples'" sympathy for the Soviet Union and opposition to the alleged 
danger of an imperialist war of intervention against it. The other central themes in the 
speech addressed the social and economic concerns of the wider constituency targeted for 
communist recruitment: the KPD would oppose tax and customs policies "burdening" the 
peasant farmers and Mittelstand; cultural reaction would be opposed (ie religious 
education in schools); and unemployment benefits would be increased, while rent rises 
would be opposed.1 86 The KPD's Regional Committee of the Working People, however, 
realised that the communists' "signals" had received almost no echo from the "working 
people". Addressing the membership's resistance to carrying out the party line among the 
Mittelstand, the leadership stated that: "In our party there is undoubtedly an 
underestimation of party work among the Mittelstand and a relative indolence towards 
winning the sympathising classes. ,,187 The experience of party workers, at the front line of 
political campaigning, was ignored: the KPD during 1927 continued the policy without 
modification, expending vast reserves of energy for little in return. The top down 
imposition of an unpopular policy provides an illustration of the KPD's political 
relationship with Saxon society at local level. The following discussion will detail the 
184 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.15-6. 
185 ibid,BI.23-4. 
186 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Landesvorstand Sachsens. An das ZK der KPD, Polbuero. Dresden, den 
18.6.1927, B1.27. 
187 ibid, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 16.5.1927. An das ZK der KPD, Polbuero, B1.8. 
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impact of the KPD's political line with reference to communist activity in the factories and 
trade unions; in the municipal councils; among the unemployed; and with the Mittlestand 
and peasant farmers. 
Communist Factory Workers and the Working Peoples' Movement. 
The Regional Executive of the Saxon KPD regarded carrying the political line into the 
factories and trade unions as the fulcrum on which the Working Peoples' Movement was 
balanced: the success of the whole tactic was deemed to hinge on the success of this 
aspect of the party's campaign. I88 Communists in the factories were instructed to forward 
resolutions at all factory and union meetings linking the demands of the Congress of 
Working People, to conditions in the individual factories. The main thrust of the 
communists' tactic was to "demonstrate" the left-wing SPD leadership's alleged role in 
preventing the extra-parliamentary mass action, which, according to the KPD, was the 
only means of successfully struggling against the Saxon Landtag government. 189 The 
KPD's tactic envisaged the formation of a broad movement which would unfold as non-
communists were drawn into the party's Unity Committees.190 However, the KPD 
leadership's tactic did not take account of the weak structures of the party's trade-union 
divisions in the sub-districts, which came up against the ingrained support for the Social 
Democrats in the unions. The policy also came up against the reluctance of Communists in 
188 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 11.3.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbuero, B1.6; SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK 
der Partei, Polbuero, B1.27.(Boettcher). 
189 ibid, B1.17. 
190 SAPMO 13/8-10/3, An das Landesvorstand Sachsens. ZK Rundschrieben. Berlin, den 15.1.1927, 
BI.7-8; SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Bericht ueber die Landesparteiarbeiterkonferenz am 23.1.1927. An das ZK 
der KPD, Polbucro. Dresden, den 25.1.1927, B1.15. 
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the factories to carry out policies which were unrelated to factory or union based issues. 191 
Indeed, it was the reluctance of Communists in the factories to carry out a sectarian policy 
which was a defining feature of the KPD's right-wing union functionaries. 
Throughout 1926 and 1927 the Saxon KPD undertook three campaigns in the factories 
which aimed to exploit differences within the Saxon SPD. The KPD's campaigning was 
intensified after the SPD's right-wing formally split-off as an independent party in April 
1926. However, the ASPD initially retained strong influence in the trade-union branches 
in the Dresden-Bautzen area. According to Lapp, the ASPD's support in this area only 
dissipated when the party adopted a more explicitly Gennan nationalist ideology under the 
influence of Ernst Niekisch in 1928.192 The KPD's campaign focused its fire on both 
ASPD members in leading positions in the Saxon trade unions and on those who remained 
in the SPD, but were sympathetic to the party's stance in favour of participation in the 
institutions of state. These union functionaries included the ASPD members Wirth in the 
Railway Workers' Union, Jaeckel in the DTV and Franz Schilling, a "sympathiser", in the 
DMV, who was the editor of the Saechsische Gewerkscha!tszeitung. 193 The KPD's tactic, 
in precisely the same manner as applied to the SPD and the organisations of the so-called 
non-proletarian working people, aimed to develop contacts with the ASPD's social basis, 
which was to be won over by discrediting their party leaders. 194 While lambasting the 
ASPD as a "social fascist" organisation, the KPD leadership believed that its members 
191 SAPMO I 3/8-10/5, Bericht von Erich Melcher. An das ZK der Partei. Dresden, den 3.11.1927, 
B1.146; SAPMO 13/8-10/4., KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der 
Partei, Polbuero, B1.29. 
192 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp152f. 
193 SAPMO 13/8-10/3, Landesvorstand Sachsens. An die BLen Erzgebirge-Vogdand, Ost und 
Westsachsen (undated), B1.14. 
194 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der Partci, 
Polbuero, B1.27. 
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could be won over for communism The KPD's adoption of policies, based on such 
political conceptions, became crucial in the early 1930s when the same tactic was applied 
to the social basis of the Nazis. 
The Saxon KPD's factory policy was part of the party's national campaign to associate 
the SPD and ADGB leaderships with the impact of industrial rationalisation: above all this 
related to the creation of structural unemployment and the deskilling of the workforce. 195 
In Saxony the KPD tried to unfold an extra-parliamentary campaign which would involve 
the co-operation of employed workers and those who had been made unemployed as a 
result of industrial rationalisation. The policy was also dressed up in revolutionary 
sounding slogans, which claimed that the "movement" could overthrow the Saxon 
government. l96 The KPD leadership's policy was a two-pronged propaganda campaign in 
the factories. The left-wing of the SPD was offered a "voting alliance" to prevent the 
election of right-wing Social Democrats and ASPD members as union functionaries; if, or 
largely when, they refused to co-operate with the KPD, the communists could add the 
alleged co-operation of the right and left-wings of social democracy to their propaganda 
arsenal. 197 At least one reason for the SPD's refusal to co-operate with the Communists in 
195 SAPMO I 3/8-10/10, Provisorischer Zentralausschuss der Erwerbslosausschuesse Sachsens. An das 
Bezirksausschuss des ADGB, die Bezirkskartell des AfA Bundes, und das Bezirksausschuss des 
Allgemein Deutschen Beamtenbundes Sachsens. Dresden, den 20.5.1926, B1.59-60. For the SPD's 
economic policy conceptions during the mid twenties, Howard, M. C., and King, 1. E., 'The Revival of 
Revisionism. The Political Economy of German Marxism, 1924-1929', European History Quarterly 
(EHQ) 18 (4) (1988), pp409-36. Peukert points out that, as there is no comprehensive study of industrial 
rationalisation in different regions and economic sectors, generalisations should be avoided; see, Peukcrt, 
D., The Weimar Republic. The Crisis o/Classical Modernity (trans.: R. Deveson; Penguin, 1991), pllS. 
196 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbucro, B1.59-60. 
197 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Bericht ueber die Sitzung mit den Pol. und Gewerkschaftsleitcm der drei 
saechsischen Bezirke am 31.3.1926, B1.39 
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the factories was the constant and vitriolic attacks on them in the KPD's regional press. 198 
In the centre of the SPD's "class war" faction, in Chemnitz and Zwickau, the SPD was 
able to act, often successfully, against the influence of the ASPD in the unions 
independently of communist co-operation: a hard fact that the KPD's internal reports were 
only too well aware Of.199 The SPD in these areas also had the motivation that the ASPD 
had made a small electoral impact in the local elections of November 1926.200 
Mter the inclusion of the DNVP in the Saxon government in July 1927, the KPD 
rekindled the campaign to remove the ASPD from its positions in the trade unions.201 The 
re-composition of the Saxon government, extending from the DNVP, an outspoken 
advocate of the interests of industrialists, to the ASPD, was viewed by the KPD as a 
golden opportunity for an intensified campaign in the factories. The KPD's propaganda 
campaign stated that the fIrst Burgfrieden since August 1914 had been agreed upon by the 
unions and the German Nationalists.202 The Regional Executive of the KPD based its 
campaign on presenting motions at factory and trade-union meetings on the dangers of 
"social fascism" and the need to unfold an extra-parliamentary campaign to remove the 
ASPD Ministers from the government and the unions. The Regional Executive instructed 
Communists in the factories to discuss the "social fascist II role of the ASPD with 
colleagues, pointing out that the SPD and ADGB were disciplining members for 
198 For Example, SAPMO I 3/8-10/10, Bericht von Siewert fuer die Zeit von 27.4-31.5.1926, B1.47-8. 
199 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbuero, B1.88; SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Gewerkschaftsabteilung. Bezirksparteitag am 12-
13.2.1927, B1.17. 
200 StJFS Nr.46 (Dresden, 1927), p459. 
201 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Landesvorstand Sachsen. Dresden, den 20.9.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Sekretariat, B1.18. 
202 SAPMO I 3/8-10/10, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 14.7.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Sckrctariat, BI.79-80. 
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participation in the KPD's Working Peoples' Movement, but did nothing about union 
members who belonged to the ASPD.203 However, KPD members did not develop the 
campaign at any notable number of meetings in their unions or factories. At the end of 
1927 it was conceded that there had been no "broad movement" in the unions after the 
entry of the DNVP into the state government.204 The strongest ASPD influence continued 
to be in the DTV, under the leadership of the union official Jaecke1.205 At the West Saxon 
District Party Congress in December 1927 it was conceded that the whole campaign had 
done little to mobilise Communists in the factories. 206 Party members regarded 
campaigning on pay and conditions in the factories as a means of widening communist 
influence, while explicitly political campaigns were believed to be the role of residentially 
based party organisations. 
The KPD's united front policy was most seriously brought into crisis by the pronounced 
upsurge of local and regional strikes, which took place under SPD-Ieadership between 
autumn 1927 and spring 1928. The peak of the economic conjuncture, with high levels of 
employment across the spectrum of Saxon industries, had produced the optimum 
conditions for the unions to apply upward pressure on wages.207 In August 1927 the 
Saxon Ministry of the Interior noted that "almost all branches of industry" were affected 
by strikes. This principally involved the textile industry, railway workers, the Saxon 
203 'b'd 1 1 , 
204 SAPMO 13/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an den Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927, B1.60. 
205 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, Landesvorstand Sachsen. Dresden, den 20.9.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Sekretariat, B1.18. 
206 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Orgabteilung. Bezirksparteitag am 10-11.12.1927, B1.65f. 
207 SLHa.D." MdI Nr.l1126/1, Monatsbericht ueber die politische und wirtschaftliche Lage im Freistaat 
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tobacco industry and the Central German coal industry.2os The KPD's central propaganda 
theme, that the left-wing of the SPD was in all essential aspects no different from the 
party's right-wing, was placed under intense pressure by the radicalism of local union 
branches, which were controlled by Social Democrats.209 The KPD's ideological 
interpretation of strikes as an expression of class war (ie political forces) conflicted with 
the reality of these movements as economic protests, particularly when the economic 
conjuncture increased the demand for labour. The SPD's ability to act in harmony with the 
grass roots mood in the workforce allowed them to dominate the strike movement, 
thereby reversing the central ideological tenet of the united front tactic: the inclusion of 
non-communists in communist-led actions. The KPD leadership's refusal to adapt to the 
realities of every-day factory life served only to intensify the crisis caused by the SPD-Ied 
strike wave; the party found itself on the periphery of the strike movement unable to 
influence its organisation or aims.2IO 
Immediately before the strike in the Central German lignite industry, which lasted 
between 17-22 October, the KPD in Borna relied on the RFB to distribute leaflets in front 
of the pitS.211 The KPD's efforts to have the strike take on political objectives, in contrast 
to the "reformists'" purely economic demands, also failed to gain currency among the 
textile, railway and tobacco workers' wage movements. Furthermore, the KPD relied on 
public meetings to present its case after it proved impossible to convene meetings dealing 
with their policy in the factories and trade unions.212 During a joiners' strike in Chemnitz in 
208 St.Ha.D." MdI Nr.11126/1, Monatsbericht (August 1927), B1.36. 
209 For local examples of the KPD's policy, see, Reer-Kleinert, L., Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD in 
der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt/M, New York, 1983), pp328ff. 
210 St.Ha.D." MdI Nr.l1 126/1, Monatsbericht (August 1927), B1.36. 
2ll Sta.L., Ah Boma Nr.2624, Ah Boma, den 3.10.1927, B1.262. 
212 St.Ha.D." MdI Nr.11126/l, Monatsbericht (Oktober 1927), B1.62f; ibid, (November 1927), B1.78. 
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October 1927 the ZK placed the local party organisations in the highly unattractive 
position of rejecting participation in a SPD-Ied strike, claiming that it would only end in an 
"unacceptable compromise" with the employers.213 This became the KPD's official 
position in the elections to the factory councils in early 1928: despite the unions' 
achievement of a range of favourable pay awards, the KPD's official stance was that to 
elect SPD officials would result in the failure of "partial actions" for pay and conditions. 
The KPD's policy was limiting the involvement of communist trade unionists as well as 
failing to hit a chord with the wider workforce. Nevertheless, the ZK instructed the BLs 
to gain control of the strike movement by using public and internal party meetings on the 
need to give the strikes a political character.214 
A range of factors had combined to obstruct the KPD's ability to take the Working 
Peoples' Movement into the Saxon factories. One factor was the resistance of 
Communists in the factories, including the minority organised in factory cells, to carry out 
political work that could result in their expulsion from the unions.215 The KPD's re-
organisation on the basis of cells was clearly not able to impose a party line unrelated to 
the every-day experience of party members. The immersion of the party machine in the 
factional feud also limited its ability to co-ordinate political campaigns. This especially 
affected West Saxony where the dominance of the Vogt Group throughout 1927 meant 
that local left-wing Communists rejected even discussions with Social Democrats in the 
unions who, it was alleged, "never learned".216 The factional struggle and the top-down 
imposition of policies which did not accord with the political instincts of party workers 
213 SAPMO I 3/9/69, Protokoll der engeren BLS von 19.9.1927, B1.412,416-7(Gen. Gewerkschaft). 
214 SLHa.D." MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (Januar 1928), Bl.I4-15. 
215 SAPMO I 3/9/63, lahresbericht. Bezirksparteitag am 24-25.3.1928, BI.91-3; SAPMO I 3/10/108, 
Bericht der Orgabteilung. Bezirksparteitag am 10-11.12.1927 ,BI.65-6. 
216 SAPMO I 3/8-10/7, Landesvorstand Sachsens. An das ZK der Partei, Sekrctariat (undated), B1.97. 
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combined to blunt the KPD's cutting edge.217 While the KPD leadership defined its role in 
the unions as the political proselytisation of non-communist workers, the local party 
militants remained influenced by the context of their local environment. Mallmann is 
correct in stating that there were local milieu where Communists behaved similarly to 
radical Social Democrats.218 However, in Saxony at least, as the decade progressed, the 
stress needs to be placed increasingly finnly on the limited number of cases in which social 
conditions encouraged Communists to believe in the possibilities of co-operation with 
their Social Democratic rivals. 
Although the gradual "left-turn" in communist tactics came from a new phase in the 
factional struggle, the SPD's dominant role in the strikes of late 1927 and early 1928 
reinforced the concerns of left-wing Communists that organisational contact with the SPD 
would lead to the united front working in reverse: Communists joining SPD-Ied strike 
movements instead of Social Democrats defecting to the KPD because of dissatisfaction 
with their leadership's "moderation". Although this does not explain the origins of the 
"Third Period" political line in the KPD, it does help to explain why left-wing Communists 
could receive it with, at least initial, enthusiasm. The Saxon example confirms Ute Stolle's 
thesis that the "left-turn" was conceived of by the Left in the party leadership, as a tactic 
"to re-integrate the mass basis of the KPD, and to counteract the attractions of 
reformism.,,219 However, it was not a decision made by democratic party consent. 
Crucially, it was not the KPD's left-wing which carried out work in the factories and 
217 SAPMO 13/10/110, Protokoll der Bezirksparteiarbeiterkonferenz am 11.3.1928, B1.20(Schumann). 
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trade union, but the right-wing. The more left-isolationist communist policy became, the 
more communist trade unionists would be pushed into a renewed factional struggle, 
thereby limiting the impact of communist policy in the factories. 
Kommunalpolitik: The Local Face of the KPD. 
Communist councillors were expected not just to involve themselves in council activities, 
but also to connect all parliamentary proceedings to the KPD's extra-parliamentary 
campaigns.22o During the mid twenties the KPD's Kommunalpolitik was used to highlight 
the party's work for social benefits, such as opposing rent increases, promoting tenants' 
protection laws and, when necessary, voting with the SPD to achieve increases in 
unemployment benefits.221 However, as Bahne illustrates with reference to the Ruhr, 
social policy was not central to the KPD's political strategy.222 Communist work in local 
government was primarily to facilitate the party's wider penetration of local politics. Using 
Communal Advisory Councils (Beiraete), local deputies were to work with Communists 
in tenants' and residents' organisations, the Co-operatives, the Free Thinkers and sporting 
clubs, with the objective of causing disillusionment with the SPD and thereby winning 
over erstwhile Social Democrats for communism.223 The same tactic was to be applied to 
the organisations of the Mittlestand and peasant farmers. For this reason local Communist 
220 SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Abteilung Kompo1. Bezirksparteitag 12-13.2.1927, B1.22. For 
communist political strategy at municipal level in general see, Wunderlich, Kommunalpolitik, pp163-7. 
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deputies opposed increases in local taxation, and voiced support for the "tax rebellion" of 
the Saxon lower middle classes.224 The KPD's policy of reducing the level of local taxation 
on the lower middle classes was done without ever addressing the conflict of interest with 
the party's advocacy of higher social spending or the self financing of local administrative 
districts.225 Although the KPD's efforts to recruit the Mittelstand for the Working Peoples' 
Movement only ever met with the virulent anti-Marxism of the Mittlestandsbewegung, the 
party leadership continued to devote considerable energy to convincing party workers that 
by rigourously applying the party line the lower middle classes would be "awakened".226 
During this process of infiltrating the social seams of local politics the KPD's press openly 
stated the actual aim of the policy: the destruction of the SPD and winning over its 
members. Social Democrats' knowledge of the KPD's party line, however, worked against 
the communist policy. Communists involved in tenants' organisations informed the 
leadership that their tirades against the SPD leadership were preventing the party from 
widening its influence.227 The Saxon SPD had not abandoned its own strategy of involving 
the KPD in the Landtag and local councils in so-called "workers' majorities", to achieve 
social concessions and socialist refoTITIS. The overlap in the two "workers' parties'" 
objectives in the mid twenties saw the limited local use of "joint lists" in electoral wards to 
prevent the parties of the middle classes dominating Town Halls. The KPD was also 
aware that to have done otherwise handed local organisations of the SPD the propaganda 
coup of being able to convincingly point out the communists' responsibility in enabling a 
224 SAPMO I 3/9/73, Politiseher Bericht fuer den Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 10 Parteitag bis 
Oktober 1926,B1.331; 13/8-10/5, Landesvorstandsstizung yom 2.8.1926, Bl.I41(Waesehe). 
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local Buergerblock government.228 Where the KPD had used "joint lists" in local elections 
in addition to the Town Hall tactic of "workers' majorities", for example in Doebeln and 
Waldheim, the Janus face of the Working Peoples' Movement (ie claiming to represent the 
lower middle classes as well as the proletariat) was highlighted in schizophrenic 
colours.229 Among the Saxon middle classes anti-Marxism functioned as the political glue 
holding economic rivals together in Town Halls.230 The KPD's policy of winning over the 
Mittelstand by proletarian "mass actions" never left the realms of theoretical discussion. 
The surreal nature of life inside the KPD is further illustrated by the attack on senior 
members of the Saxon leadership for carrying the "joint lists" policy when another "left-
tum" loomed in late 1927. Melcher and Gaebel, who during 1925/6 were the leading 
figures in the East Saxon BL, were accused of "deviation" because of their successes in 
negotiating electoral agreements with the SPD, and the "rump" USPD, at locallevel.231 
The KPD's policy of contact with the SPD at local level did not run as smoothly as the 
ink on the pages of party directives. The transmission of the party line was in practice 
refracted through the pertaining local conditions. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the party line 
underwent a strong refraction to the right: throughout the district Social Democrats were 
elected as local office holders with communist votes, and a genuine parliamentary co-
operation for "workers' demands" was readily entered into without sectarian 
precondition.232 A BL report stated with regret that: 
Our comrades believe that the united front tactic among the masses must be 
understood in such a way that the SPD's leaders, right as well as left, must not be 
228 SAPMO 13/8-10/5, Landesvorstandssitzung yom 2.8.1926 in Dresden, B1.136f. 
229 SAPMO I 3/8-10/9, Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 15.11.1926, B1.48. 
230 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', p 199f. 
231 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Bericht Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, BI.48. 
232 SAPMO I 3/9/61, Bericht der Abteilung Kompo1. Bezirksparteitag 12-13.2.1927, B1.22. 
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so strongly struggled against. With this comes the danger of being taken in tow by 
the SPD. In certain cases it has already been the case?33 
The contrast with Western Saxony could not have been more striking. The domination of 
the leftist Vogt faction had penetrated so deeply into the membership that local 
Communist deputies were hostile to any degree of co-operation with the SPD. The 
priority of parliamentary work lay in making demands for higher unemployment benefits 
and causing extra-parliamentary actions of the unemployed.234 In Leipzig, where the KPD 
and SPD had a combined majority in the Town Hall, the KPD focused its activity on 
public meetings to discredit the SPD's budget as "bourgeois".235 The BL's Department of 
Communal Politics was reorganised in May 1927 in an effort to impose conformity by 
installing new functionaries. However, meetings held between local councillors and 
members of the party apparatus failed to achieve their objective.236 The KPD's experience 
in local politics demonstrates the limitations placed on carrying out the party line, both by 
the party's membership and the wider political environment. 
The ZK formed the Working Peoples' Movement on a theoretical basis, which did not 
account for local conditions. However, the reality of local conditions saw the communist 
policy being reinterpreted to reflect conditions at grass roots level. Party districts molded 
by right-wing communism and contact with the SPD brought about genuine co-operation; 
districts dominated by the KPD's left-wing, continued to resist limited co-operation with 
the SPD. To have addressed these issues in the context of a democratic internal party 
discussion would have had an explosive impact on the factional struggle. It was for this 
233 'b'd 1 1 . 
234 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Westsachsen der KPD an den Bezirksparteitag am 10-
11.12.1927, B1.72. 
235 ibid, B1.60. 
236 ibid, B1.72f. 
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reason that senior functionaries in the party apparatus, such as Wilhelm Koenen, always 
looked to schooling courses to put these local "deviations" straight.237 
The Communist Employed Forget About their Unemployed Genossen. 
The sharp fall in unemployment in Saxony, reaching just above 150,000 in mid 1927, 
deprived the KPD of its "demonstration arm" and "non-communist" delegates to regional 
• 238 E h . al I commumst congresses. ven w en regIOn unemp oyment surged to near the levels 
experienced in 1923, between autumn 1925 and spring 1926, the KPD had experienced 
competition from "wild" or independent committees of the unemployed. In Saxony the 
local branches of the ADGB were also actively involved in work among the 
unemployed.239 Nevertheless the KPD had been the principal beneficiary of the social 
dislocation caused by unemployment. However, the more the KPD concentrated on 
opposing the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1927, claiming that it would reduce the 
level of benefits through a whole series of qualifications, the less the party was able to 
mobilise the unemployed.240 It was one thing taking to the streets for benefit increases as 
part of a communist action, but quite another to oppose them in similar actions. During 
the KPD's 1926 Landtag election, the Regional Executive complained of the party's 
237 SAPMO I 3/8-10/6, Sitzung der Landesvorstand Sachsen mit den Landesvertrauens1euten. Dresden, 
den 5.9.1926, B1.43. 
238 Zeitschrift der Saechsisches Statistisches Landesamt (ZSSL) 87/88 (1941/2), p86. 
239 On "wild" committees of the unemployed see, SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Bericht Landeskongress des 
Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.82-3; Staatsarchiv Bremen (StaB.) Sig. 4,65 1727/291, 
Monatsbericht (Februar 1926). 
240 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbuero, B1.59-63; SLHa.D." MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (Januar 1928), B1.19. For details of the 
1927 Unemployment Insurance Act and its origins, in, Stachura, P.D., 'The Development of 
Unemployment in Modem Germany', in Id. (ed.), Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar 
Germany, (London, 1986), pp3-17. 
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inability to create a movement of the unemployed?41 At the Regional Congress of the 
Working People, held in Dresden on the 21-22 May 1927, the three Saxon BLs were 
criticised for their lack of involvement in organising communist work among the 
unemployed; their failure to send adequate representation to the Reich Congress of the 
Unemployed in Berlin in December 1926; and their failure to set up the committees of the 
unemployed at local leve1.242 The Regional Executive identified the main reason for the 
collapse of the communist work among the unemployed as the return to work of the party 
activists who had carried out the policy. The BLs were instructed to breath new life into 
this area of party work by rebuilding the committees of the unemployed and going onto 
the streets with party propaganda.243 However, until unemployment again surged during 
the Great Depression, the Saxon KPD was unable to cause widespread street 
demonstrations. 
The Working Peoples' Movement and the Saxon Mittelstand. 
During 1927 the Regional Executive of the Saxon KPD formulated a policy to bring down 
the Landtag government by means of an extra-parliamentary movement against the impact 
of its policies.244 The KPD's interpretation of the constellation of political forces in the 
Landtag held that by influencing the lower middle classes, who supported the "special 
interest" parties, the KPD could force the dissolution of the Saxon government.
245 
In 
241 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.132-3. 
242 ibid, Landesvorstand Sachsen. Dresden, den 16.5.1927. An das ZK der Partei, Sekretariat, BI.10-11; 
243 ibid, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.16-17. 
244 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, "Gegen den Buergerblock", in Arbeiterstimme, Nr.19, den 24.1.1927, B1.17. 
245 SAPMO I 2/1/50, Wahlergebnis in Sachsen und unsere weitere Taktik. Protokoll der Sitzung des 
Sitzung der ZK vom 10.11.1926, B1.4(Schneller). 
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reality, however, the Zeit motiv of the regional government after the 1926 Landtag 
election was to exclude both the SPD and KPD from political influence.246 The policy 
discussions of the ZK, however, refused to acknowledge any immovable practical political 
obstacle blocking the path of its ideological interpretation?47 
During the inter-party discussions on the formation of a governing coalition in early 
January 1927, the KPD instructed the lower party organisations to prepare for a campaign 
to win over the "misled" supporters of the special "interest parties". Party circulars 
detailed the organisation of campaigns which were intended to "free" the artisanal and 
small-scale commercial lower middle-classes from their leaders in the VRP and wp.248 
The policy's failure to materialise as a political campaign did not alter the KPD's tactics 
during the political negotiations surrounding the inclusion of the DNVP in the Saxon 
government in summer 1927. The KPD leadership continued to dissipate considerable 
time and effort to forcing a reluctant membership to cause a protest movement of the 
lower middle classes under communist leadership.249 
The KPD only ever, at least officially, saw the lower middle classes' flight from the 
DNVP to the "particular interest" parties as part of their journey on the road to a 
communist Damascus; their public statements of anti-communism were never accepted as 
part of a swing to the right in Saxon politics?50 Instead, the regional party leadership 
blamed the failure of the Working Peoples' Movement to involve the art is anal and 
246 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp206ff. 
247 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, An das Landesvorstand Sachsens. ZK Rundschrieben. Berlin, den 15.1.1927, 
B1.4-8. 
248 SAPMO I 3/8-10/7, Landesvorstand Sachsen. Dresden, den 15.12.1926. Rundschreiben ueber die Lage 
in Sachsen. An die Bizirksleitungen, Bl.I07. 
249 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.24. 
2SO Jones, German Liberalism, pp252,476ff. 
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commercial middle classes on the failure of the lower level party organisations to establish 
I . . h h ial 251 H loca connectlons wIt t ese soc groups. owever, even the active party membership 
which was involved in the Working Peoples' Movement remained unmotivated to pursue a 
policy so evidently at odds with the situation in Saxony.252 The strengthening of the right-
wing prevailing political wind had, however, began to fill the sails of the NSDAP, at least 
in Erzgebirge-Vogtland. With a focal point in the textile town of Plauen leading figures 
such as Gregor Strasser, Gottfried Feder and Robert Ley addressed attentive audiences of 
small business owners and small traders. The agenda of the Nazis' meetings was hostile to 
large-scale capitalism, while also reassuring the anxious lower middle classes that they 
would not become "proletarians".253 Of symbolic importance was Hitler's first speech in 
Saxony after the speaking ban imposed after the "Beer Hall Putsch": it took place in 
November 1927 in the "workers' city" of Chemnitz.254 
The Peasant Farmers and the Working People's Movement. 
During the Working People's Movement the KPD's advocated a "workers' and peasants" 
government as an alternative to the Buergerblock.255 The KPD's slogans, however, meant 
nothing to the Saxon peasantry, which continued to support their political interest party, 
the Saechsische Landbund, and, by 1928, the stridently right-wing Sachsisches Landvolk, 
251 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, KPD Landesvorstand Sachsens. Dresden, den 18.6.1927. An das ZK der Partei, 
Polbuero, B1.27(Boettcher). 
252 ibid, B1.29. 
253 SLHa.D., MdI Nr.11126/1, Monatsbericht (September 1927), B1.46. 
254 SLHa.D." MdI Nr.11126/1, Monatsbericht (November 1927), B1.66. 
255 SAPMO I 3/8-10/3, "Gegen den Buergerblock", in Arbeiterstimme, Nr.19, den 24.1.1927, B1.17. For 
the Comintern's interpretation of campaigning among peasants see, Jackson, G. D., Cominlern and 
Peasant in Eastern Europe, 1919-1930 (New York, 1966). 
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which promoted the economic interests of small-scale rural producers. The peasant vote, 
however, was largely absorbed by the NSDAP in the 1930 Reichstag election.256 There is 
no evidence of any significant peasant interest in the KPD's League of Working Peasants 
(Bund schaffender Wirt)?57 There is some evidence that the KPD was able to include a 
small number of peasants in the Working Peoples' Movement. The Saxon Congress of 
Working People in May 1927 included the participation of 19 delegates from small-scale 
farming communities in Erzgebirge and Lausitz.258 It is at least possible that these 
delegates' involvement on the fringes of the KPD came from their contact with 
impoverished workers in the local cottage industries, where small peasant farmers took on 
seasonal work.259 
The KPD used a range of activities to recruit peasant farmers into the Working Peoples' 
Movement. So-called "Peasant's Congresses" were held at which speakers informed their 
audience of the KPD's role in the Landtag defending peasants' communist interests.260 
One such example was a "Peasants' Day" in Marienberg in Erzgebirge on 4 December 
1927. The event was organised by the KPD's League of Working Peasants, under the 
farmer and Communist functionary Birnbaum. The event was largely packed with 
Communists, but attracted perhaps 100 peasants. The speeches presented the KPD as a 
defender of peasants' interests, forcing the state government to pay attention to the rural 
population's material needs. This was complemented by glowing "eyewitness reports" of a 
256 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', pp222ff. 
257 In the mid twenties the KPD's official national figures stated that there were 10,000 members of the 
League of Working Peasants see, Farquharson, Plough and the Swastika, p40. 
258 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, B1.19. 
259 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp 11-15. For similar circumstances in Baden see, Grill, J.H., The Nazi 
Movement in Baden 1920-1945 (vol. 1.; Chapel Hill, 1983), pp13lff. 
260 SAPMO 13/8-10/4, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.l927, 81."+2-3. 
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peasant Valhalla in the Soviet Union, where taxes were not paid but subsidies were 
generous.261 The event also functioned as internal party propaganda by using the 
"Peasants' Day" as an example of what the KPD could achieve if the party actively carried 
1· 262 out party po ICy. 
The KPD's lack of members in rural areas saw the development of the sponsorship system 
(Patenschaftssystem) whereby party organisations in industrial areas and cities "adopted" 
a rural area or village to work on.263 In Western Saxony, however, the party leadership 
complained that this type of work had only involved some members from Greater 
Leipzig.264 There is, however, no hard evidence that the KPD's rural agitation and 
propaganda did anything but antagonise the rural population. Peasant hostility was 
particularly marked when communist activities were carried out by uniformed RFB 
militants.265 Furthermore, the rural-industrial landscape of the industrial village became 
something of a sparring ground between the rival para-military organisations which 
proliferated in Saxony during the mid 1920s.266 In the acrimonious political atmosphere of 
Saxony during the Weimar Republic Lapp describes how: "The right to parade - and 
thereby dominate a town's public spaces - was fiercely contested. ,,267 Rival political 
affiliations were stamped out by the activities of the SPD and Reichsbanner, in the form of 
celebrations commemorating the November Revolution and the Weimar Constitution; the 
261 St.Ha.D." MdI Nr.11126/1, Monatsbericht (December 1928, Bl.86f; ibid, (Januar 1928), Bl.17. 
262 SAPMO I 3/9/63, lahresbericht fuer 1927. Bezirksparteitag am 24-25.3.1928, B1.91. 
263 SAPMO 13/9/61, Bericht der Gewerkschaftsabteilung. Bezirksparteitag am 12-13.2.1927, BLl8. 
264 SAPMO 13/10/108, Material zum Bezirksparteitag. KPD Westsachsen, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
3.11.1927, Bl.28. 
265 SAPMO I 3/8-10/4, Bericht. Landeskongress des Werktaetigen Sachsens am 21-22.5.1927, Bl.42. 
266 The laws for the protection of the republic were no longer applied against the right-wing associations 
after 1923, see, Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp 177ff. 
267 ibid, pp 179. 
Page 256 
Stahlhelm, Werewolf and Jungdo connnemorated "German Nationalist" events, such as 
Sedan Day and the formation of the German Reich in 1871; the KPD was involved in its 
own "revolutionary" celebrations, commemorating the Russian Revolution and Lenin-
Liebknecht-Luxemburg Day each January?68 The KPD's "Rural Sundays" and "Red 
Days", which were held in the industrialised countryside, sparked off frequent clashes with 
the Nazis and the right-wing paramilitary organisations.269 Crucially, Lapp has detailed 
how the right-wing paramilitary organisations and their celebrations began to carry grass 
roots "bourgeois unity" while the political parties increasingly fragmented into economic 
particularism270 In the rural environment of Erzgebirge and its textile-working cities, 
most notably Plauen, the NSDAP made its earliest and deepest penetration of Saxon 
political life.271 In the culture of political polarisation in Saxony the KPD's Working 
Peoples' Movement was a tactic only serving to increase hostility between the political 
roles of peasants and industrial workers. 
5.4 Conclusion: The Limits of Communist Campaigning 
What progress had the Saxon KPD made in the middle years of the Weimar Republic to 
create a pro-Soviet left-wing in the workers' movement? The campaign to expropriate the 
former German princes had been a success for the KPD's united front from above: 
negotiating with the leaderships of the SPD and ADGB to "force" them into joining a 
communist campaign. However, in terms of the united front from below, winning over 
268 For a typical example see, St.H.D., MdI Nr.1l126/2, Monatsbericht (January 1928), B1.14. 
269 ibid, (Oktober 1928), B1.53. 
270 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp200-3. 
271 Walter, 'Stammland', pp218ff. Plauen features regularly in the reports of the Ministry of the Interior, 
see, for example, StAD., MdI Nr.l 1 126/1 , Monatsbericht (Juni 1927), BI.39. 
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rank -and-file Social Democrats, progress had been distinctly limited. The expropriation 
campaign had proved to be a popular campaigning issue on the Left, producing a popular 
movement initiated by the KPD. However, the united front tactic had worked in reverse at 
local level: the number of Social Democrats and so-called "non-party workers" who joined 
the KPD's Unity Committees, had been far exceeded by joint demonstrations and rallies 
organised on an equal basis by local groups of the SPD and KPD. Co-operation on an 
issue of socialist reform, rather than creating a movement under communist leadership, 
had characterised the campaign. Even in Erzgebirge-Vogtland, where the KPD remained 
rooted in the workers' movement, the number of Social Democrats joining the KPD's 
Unity Committees had been extremely small. Saxon Social Democrats did not share the 
KPD's Leninist belief that working class "unity" could only be achieved under communist 
leadership; still less did they want to destroy their own party. The political border between 
the SPD and KPD was strongest in the larger cities and receded in the smaller towns and, 
above all, in the industrial villages which peppered the countryside. It was in the 
industrialised countryside, which dominated the Saxon economy throughout Erzgebirge, 
Vogdand, and the outlying industrial villages of the Elbe Valley, where local militants 
from both parties co-operated on the specific issue of the expropriation campaign. 
Contact between Communists and Social Democrats, in the sporting and cultural Vereine, 
reinforced feelings of working-class solidarity. The "Class War" group in the SPD, which 
found greatest support in the southwest of Saxony, promoted "proletarian unity" despite 
the party leadership's hostility to local co-operation with Communists.272 It was in the 
same setting where the KPD's right-wing advocated achieving communist goals in contact 
with the SPD. The extent of the local "left prolitarian milieu", however, was limited and 
272 For example see, Klassenkamp/ 3 (10) (1928), p291. 
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the parties retained their separate identities.273 Saxony is a regional example indicating that 
Ma1lmann has gone too far in replacing the Stalinisation thesis with an explanation of the 
KPD's internal development in terms of local conditions. In the mid twenties the truth lay 
somewhere in between: local militants would not carry out policies which had no 
connection to the environment they operated within; however, party members had no 
input in policy making and many activists refused to speak at party meetings for fear of 
being accused of holding views which "deviated" from the party line.274 In the mid 
twenties the KPD was not in the first instance a social movement, but a movement which 
made a totalitarian claim on its members' political lives. Unlike the SPD and the Catholic 
Centre Party, which developed a socio-political milieu, the KPD's politicisation of all areas 
of party life repelled members rather than cementing relations with them.275 
By late 1927 the united front policy had come up against significant obstacles in Saxony. 
The dilemma of communist policy was that without an issue of popular appeal the KPD 
could not conduct a high profile campaign, but contact with the SPD, in issues of socialist 
reform, saw the subterfuge being subsumed by genuine co-operation with the SPD at local 
level. The Working Peoples' Movement was unable to continue the momentum of the 
united front campaign. The "movement" never took on the dimension of a popular 
campaign and remained a narrowly communist affair. The tactic of winning over the 
Saxon Mittelstand was confined to party propaganda: it found no echo in Saxon society. 
The policy was justified using an economic interpretation of political behaviour, which 
273 Cf. Mallmann, 'Sozialgeschichte', p23. 
274 SAPMO 13/8-10/3, Bericht ueber die Landesparteiarbeiterskonferenz am 23.1.1927. An das ZK der 
KPD. Dresden, den 25.1.1927, Bl.l1. 
275 On the KPD's attempts to develop a communist worker's sub-culture, and the difficulties experienced 
sec, Guttsmann, W. L., Workers' Culture in Weimar Germany. Between Tradition and Commitment 
(Oxford, 1990), pp74ff. 
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held that the economic plight of the Saxon lower middle classes would lead them to the 
KPD. Discussions within the Saxon BLs, however, indicate the policy's close connection 
with Soviet foreign policy: the wider a pro-Soviet "left-wing movement" in Germany, the 
more assured Moscow could feel that there was a counterbalance to the "Western 
Orientation" of German foreign policy in the mid 1920s.276 The KPD's interpretation of 
the course of political developments were a mirror image of what actually occurred. In 
Saxony the economic protest movements of the lower middle classes, which aimed to 
preserve their social and economic status, were politically expressed at the 1926 Landtag 
election with the rise of "special interest" parties.277 In Saxony the memory of 1923 
intensified a national trend towards virulent middle-class anti-Marxism278 While Conan 
Fischer is correct that the KPD leadership believed the Mittelstand formed part of a 
"potential" communist constituency, the evidence in Saxony indicates that there were no 
developments in German society and politics to substantiate the policy.279 Furthermore, 
the party membership simply ignored work among the middle classes, believing that it was 
impossible to channel the lower middle-class protest movement into communist conduits. 
The wave of strikes in late 1927 and early 1928 also threw the policy of contact with the 
SPD into crisis. The KPD repeatedly asserted that the Saxon SPD's left-wing only used a 
verbal radicalism to hold back the "masses" from communism However, these strikes 
were led by the left-wing of the SPD, which dominated the local branches of the Saxon 
trade unions. Contact with the SPD in the unions saw the concept of the united front 
being turned on its head: Communists, politically unaffiliated workers and Social 
276 For example, SAPMO I 3/9/60, Die politische Lage und un sere Aufgaben. Bezirksparteitag 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 10-11.4.1926, B1.5f. 
277 Jones, German Liberalism, p264. 
278 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', pp 169 ff. 
279 Fischer, German Communists, p39. 
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Democrats were coming under SPD leadership. The development of Saxon politics in the 
mid twenties presented the KPD leadership with something of an identity crisis: how 
could the KPD function on the left of Saxon politics, but insulate the membership and 
potential supporters from the attractions of radical reformism? The Left in the Saxon KPD 
believed that events justified a return to a left-isolationist political tactic at all levels of 
party work.280 The right wing of the KPD, however, continued to insist that the united 
front policy created the framework of contacts and connections in the wider workers' 
movement, which would benefit the KPD in the next "crisis of capitalism". The impact of 
the KPD's "left-turn" in 1928/9 is the subject of the following chapter. 
The local socio-political environment, rather than the ideologically driven directives of 
the party leadership, continued to condition whether party members carried out party 
policy or not. In Erzgebirge, Vogdand and the industrial villages around Meissen, the 
expropriation campaign had brought the first co-operation between the SPD and KPD 
since 1923. In West Saxony, however, social and political antagonisms continued to 
characterise relations between the two "workers' parties". The SPD and KPD conducted 
the expropriation campaign separately at local as well at district level. During the mid 
twenties the KPD's Stalinisation could not, as yet, uproot the local membership from the 
conditions they lived and worked in. If directives from above did not correspond to the 
immediate context of every-day political life, they were not carried out. The KPD's forced 
280 Certain interpretations stress the presure on the KPD leadership from party members to change the 
communist trade-union and factory policy because of the lack of room for maneuvre within the reformist-
led organisations. See, Wunderer, H., Arbeitervereine und Arbeiterparteien. Kultur und 
Massenorganisationen in der Arbeiterbewegung (1890-1933) (Frankfurt/M, 1980), pp138ff; Lehndorff, 
S., Wie Kam es zur RGO? Probleme der Gewerkschastsentwicklung in der Weimarer Republik von 1927 
bis 1929 (Frankfurt/M, 1975), pp54ff. In Saxony there is no evidence of party members, who were 
employed in the factories and organised in the trade unions, calling for a change in party tactics. See, 
chapter 6.3 below. 
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re-organisation of its membership was not only strongly resisted, but those organised in 
factory cells would not carry out party political campaigns which were unrelated to 
factory and union affairs. Equally, the unemployed would only take part in communist 
campaigns if they directly addressed their own material needs. 
The KPD's claim to be the vanguard of the working class was a purely ideological 
assertion devoid of political substance. By early 1928 the SPD was able to point out that 
the KPD's "unmasking" tactic had left the communists stranded on radicalised sandbanks, 
while the SPD enjoyed substantial support throughout Saxony.28t There was, however, a 
German context to the KPD's location in the Saxon political system The KPD took on the 
role of a "particular interest" party for industrial workers who felt socially and 
economically marginalised under the Weimar Republic.282 The KPD's self identity as a 
party of permanent campaigning was also beyond the strength of a political body 
weakened by a diet of inappropriate policies and continual fratricidal factional feuds. It is 
not new to identify the origins of the KPD's overtures to the lower middle classes and 
changing tactic towards the SPD in relation to the domestic policies of the CPSU.283 
However, it must be stressed that the imposition of these policies in Germany turned the 
KPD into an apparatus party: a permanently running party machine without the fuel of a 
281 Leipziger Volkszeitung, Nr.49, 27.2.1928. 
282 Peukert, D., 'Zur Sozialgeschicht der KPD', in Kloenne, A. and Vack, K., Zur Geschichte der 
Arbeiterbewegung,4 (November 1978) ,p36. 
283 Rosenberg, A., Geschichte des Bolshevismus (Frankfurt/M, Cologne, 1975). 
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membership which would take the party forward. 284 In the mid twenties the KPD was 
already manifesting the political traits which would push the party away from its roots in 
the German workers' movement during the Great Depression. 
284 Weber, Wandlung, p267. 
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6. "Social Fascism" and Saxony: The Roots and Reception of the "Left-
Turn" in the KPD, 1928-1930. 
6.1 Introduction 
It might have been expected that the new "revolutionary" General Line, conducted by the 
world communist movement between 1928 and 1934, would have been introduced with a 
fanfare of trumpets by the Comintern and its national sections. However, the KPD 
accepted the new party line at the 9th ECCI-Plenum in February 1928, not in the form of 
an official protocol but by signing a secret agreement. The Thaelmann Group voluntarily 
signed up for the policy, while the Conciliators or at least their delegatespwert and Eisler, 
signed after Moscow's arm twisting. 1 This step represented the first stage in formalising a 
policy which had already become noticeable in Germany from late 1927 and had been 
sanctioned at the 15th Congress of the CPSU.2 At the March 1928 District Party 
Congress in Erzgebirge Vogdand Ernst Schneller had openly informed the delegates, that, 
although the party line from the 9th ECCI Plenum was primarily relevant to policy in 
France and Britain, and not specifically related to Germany, it was the duty of all 
Communist Parties to support the Comintern's international policy.3 The 6th World 
Congress of the Comintern, held in the summer of 1928, continued the administrative 
secrecy and bureaucratic bulldozing already undertaken at the ECCI-Plenum. Watlin's 
1 Weber, H., "Zu den Beziehungen zwischen der KPD und der Kommunistischen Intemationale", in 
Vierteljahrsheftefuer Zeitgeschichte (VjZ) 2 (1968), p205. The name Conciliator (Versohnler) was a 
reference to their sympathies for Right communism at the 6th World Congress of the Comintem, while 
declaring the Group was "Comintem-Ioyal" and prepared to carry out the General Line. The term 
Conciliator was pejorative in the party lexicon in that it referred to a faction in the CPSU's history which 
before 1917 advocated "reconciliation" between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. 
2 Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic (London, 1984), p145. 
3 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO) 13/9/63, Bezirksparteitag 
der KPD Erzgebirge Vogtland am 24-5.3.1928, B1.22. 
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research, using declassified Soviet documentation, indicates that many delegates to the 
Comintern's World Congress were only too well aware that the real decisions were being 
made at the secret meetings which parallelled the official Congress.4 Internal KPD 
documents indicate that the Comintern did not want a renewed factional feud in the KPD 
and had hoped that the "course of concentration" leadership would bring German policy in 
line with the CPSU's official pOlicy.5 However, the KPD was unable to pursue a rolling 
"left-turn" because the policy's opponents resisted its implementation in Germany. The 
introduction of the "social fascist" policy of outright conflict with the SPD became the 
mouse which roared. 
The official resolutions included in the minutes of the Congress announced a "3rd Period" 
of revolution and wars: the first period was represented by the post-war revolutionary up 
swing; the second period by the relative stabilisation of international capitalism; and now 
the new General Line for all communist parties was justified by the ending of the period of 
capitalist stabilisation and the expectation of a new revolutionary wave.6 However, the 
main resolutions of the Comintern Congress were not related to revolution in Western 
Europe but to the alleged danger of an imperialist war against the Soviet Union, in which 
the socialist Second International would co-operate; the colonial question; and the 
situation in Soviet Russia.? The Comintern's policies meant that the KPD must defend the 
4 Watlin, A., Die Komintern, 1919-29 (Mainz, 1993), pI80. 
5 The internal party discussions are detailed in the file series: I 3/8(25 (Ostsachsen); I 3/9/70 (Erzgihirge-
Vogtland); I 3/10/114(Westsachsen). For a new interpretation of the KPD's "left-tum" which stresses the 
active involvement of Bukharin see, McDermott, K. and Agnew, 1., The Comintern. A History of 
International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (London, 1996), ppp68ff. 
6 Degras, J.(ed) The Communist International, 1919-1943. Documents (vo1.2; London, 1971), pp455ff. On 
the definition of "social fascism" esp. p459. 
7 ibid; Weber, H., Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik (Gekuertzte Studentenausgabe; Frankfurt/M, 1971), pI95. 
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Soviet Union from the an allegedly planned imperialist war and struggle against the state 
and its apparatus, with which the SPD and the refonnist trade unions had grown together. 
The KPD was again regarded as "the only workers' party", and the main enemy within the 
working class was the "left" SPD, which "tried to disguise its fight against the Soviet 
Union with lying phrases of sympathy and 'conditional' support."s The policy vis a vis the 
reformist trade unions was defined at the 4th Congress of the Red International of Labour 
Unions (RILU), which met during March and April 1928. The RGO-politik (policy of the 
Red Trade Union Opposition) announced, in highly ambiguous terms, that a new from of 
organisation was needed for the class war and that strikes should be led "without and 
against" the refonnist union leaders, who had become intertwined with the state 
apparatus.9 
The following chapter investigates the causes of the KPD's "left-turn" between 1928-30 
and how the Saxon party membership received it. The historiographical debate will be 
placed in the context of new documentation to provide a case study of Saxony. The 
traditional explanation for the KPD's return to a policy of ultra-Leftism located the turning 
points in Soviet Russia. Moscow's reasons of state, foreign policy and the conclusion of 
the CPSU's power struggle, triggered the Communist parties' attack on the social 
democratic workers' movement as "social fascists".l0 The revision introduced by more 
8 Weber, H., Hauptfeind Sozialdemokratie. Strategie und Taktik der KPD 1929-33 (Duesseldorf, 1982), 
pp18-19. 
9 This was stated by Losowsky at the 4th RGI Congress, see, Fowkes, German Communism, p 147. 
10 Rosenberg, A., Geschichte des Bolshevismus (Reprint of Original; Frankfurt/M, Cologne, 1975), 
pp243ff; Rosenberg, A., A History o/the German Republic (London, 1936), pp288-9; Fowkes, German 
Communism, pl45ff; Weber, Wandlung, passim; Flechtheim, O.K., Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik 
(3 edn; Hamburg, 1986), ppl97ff; Bahne, S.,Die KPD und das Ende von Weimar. Das Scheitern einer 
Politik 1932-35 (Frankfurt/M, New York, 1976), pp68-70; Particularly on the relationship between Soviet 
foreign policy and the KPD's policies in Gennany, Weingartner, T., Stalin und der Au/steig /Iitlers: Die 
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recent literature has been to identify causes for the "left-turn" in German political and 
socio-economic developments. Hennig, Wuenderlich and Wieszt explain the acceptance of 
the "social fascist" policy by the KPD's membership as a response to the actions of the 
SPD in the Reich and Prussian governments. The SPD's involvement in the construction 
of Panzerkreuzer "A" (a so-called pocket battleship) in late 1928, and in particular the 
event of May Day 1929 (Blutmai), when the SPD administered police force opened fire 
on illegal communist outdoor marches, were accepted as "proof' that the SPD had 
changed from a party of social democracy to one of "social fascism". 11 Wickham goes as 
far as to state that the policies associated with the "social fascist" thesis were not just 
imposed by Stalin, but were "perfectly acceptable" to many members of the KPD because 
the two parties' points of common contact in the wider workers' movement had been so 
eroded by 1929 that the political parties became the sole basis of political expression in a 
socially divided working c1ass.12 Winkler took a middle position which agreed with the 
"Stalinisation" school of thought that the KPD's policies originated in Moscow, but 
sociological changes in the KPD's membership, which increasingly comprised unskilled 
and unemployed workers, produced a "structural echo" for a radical protest against 
capitalism and the policies of the SPD.13 
Deutschland PoUtik der Sowjetunion und der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1929-34, (Berlin, 1970), 
passim. 
11 Hennig, E., 'Nachbemerkungen zu einem Aspekt des kommunistischen Tageskampfes gegen die 
Sozialdemokratie', in Gesellschaft, Beitrage zur Marxschen Theorie 6 (1976), pp292f; Wuenderlich, V., 
Arbeiterbewegung und Selbstverwaltung. KPD und Kommunalpolitik in der Weimarer Republik. Mit dem 
Beispiel Solingen (Wuppertal, 1980), pp57-8; Wieszt, J., KPD-Politik in der Krise, 1928-32 
(Frankfurt/M, 1976), pp 17ff. 
12 Wickham, J., 'Social Fascism and the division of the Working Class Movement: Workers and Political 
Parties in the Frankfurt Area 1929/30', in Capital and Class 7 (1979) (Ppl-34), pp28ff. 
13 Winkler, H.A., Der Schein der Normalitaet. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik. 
1924-30 (Berlin, Bonn, 1988), pp438-9. 
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A series of studies also explain the KPD's policy in the factories with reference to 
conditions in Germany. The process of rationalisation, which had been accepted by the 
SPD and Free Trade Unions, had split the working class into a new "workers' 
aristocracy", the social basis of "social fascism" (ie the SPD), and an increasingly 
impoverished and radicalised layer of "mass workers" in heavy industry, the social basis 
for communist policies. Schoeck saw the KPD's isolation from the social democratic 
workers' movement by 1929 as having enforced the RGO-politik on the KPD: social 
isolation led to a new form of political organisation.14 Heer-Kleinert pointed out that, 
while the KPD's political predictions did not transpire, it held to an ideologically 
reinforced system of thought: the KPD continued to anticipate revolution in Germany, 
carried by the revolutionary rejection of Weimar by the underprivileged strata within the 
ki I 15 wor ng c asses. 
Central to this case study of Saxony will be an analysis of the accuracy of the consensus 
in the literature that there was a relatively rapid and smooth transition to the policies of 
ultra-Leftism.16 The chapter will begin by assessing the reception of the "left-tum" in the 
Saxon KPD, using newly available documentation of the party at local and district level. 
The chapter will then ask to what extent the KPD's membership took up the Comintem's 
call for a fratricidal "class war" within the German working class? Finally, an assessment 
will be made of the extent to which sociological changes in the Saxon KPD gave the 
policies of the "3rd Period" a "structural echo" in the party's membership. 
14 Schoeck, E.C., Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung. Die Lage der Arbeiter und die kommunistische 
Gewerkscha/tspolitik (Frankfurt/M, 1977), ppI5,172ff. 
15 Heer-Kleinert, L., Die Gewerkscha/tspolitik der KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt/M, 1983), 
p360. 
16 This interpretation stretches accross the otherwise interpretative gulf between neo-communist historians 
such as Weiszt, KPD-Politik, p36, and Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, p439. 
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6.2 The Saxon KPD and ultra-Leftism: Party Comrades or Political Opponents? 
The " Wittorf Affair". 
The "Wittorf Affair" has traditionally been viewed as an attempted "palace coup" by the 
Conciliators, who, alarmed by the KPD's policies, used their minority representation in the 
Secretariat, Politburo and ZK to oust Thaelmann as party chairman.1? The immediate 
pretext was provided by an embezzlement scandal in Thaelmann's home district of 
Hamburg. The political leader, John Wittorf, whom Thaelmann had appointed to this post 
in March 1927, was found to have been a gambler who had made good his losses by 
embezzling 1,850 marks of party funds with the complicity of three other local party 
officials including the treasurer. The expose by the left communist newspaper, Volkswille, 
forced the KPD to set up a commission of inquiry under Hugo Eberlein, the party's 
financial expert, which uncovered a proliferation of similar irregularities in the local party 
and affiliated organisations. Crucially, Thaelmann's role in protecting his factional 
appointees in Hamburg, at the expense of party propriety, was uncovered. 18 Ernst Meyer's 
widow described this discovery in her memoirs as a "god send": the Conciliators did not 
17 For details of the Wittorf Affair before access to the wider documentation see, Weber, Wandlung, 
ppl99ff; Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany, ppl49f; Levine-Meyer, R., Inside German Communism. 
Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar Republic (London, 1977), pp13lff. 
18 The treasurer had come to the KPD from the NSDAP only two years before, SAPMO I 3/9nO, Protokoll 
der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 15.10.1928, Bl.130(Schreiber). After the Wittorf Affair all party 
treasuries were checked and a proliferation of irregularities were uncovered and "exposed" in the SPO 
press. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the RH treasure was short of 1,000 marks, which was explained by the 
district chairman as a "loan" to a member see, SAPMO I 3/9/70, Protokoll der engeren BLS vom 
3.12.1928, B1.196-7. The SPD's Volksstimme 13.11.1928, Nr.265, ReichskonJerenz der KPD, stated that 
in the KPD, "one corruption scandal follows another and the respectable elements in the KPO shake the 
dust off their feet" . 
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want a square political struggle and the events in Hamburg allowed them to stage a 
"palace coup" in the uppennost leadership.19 
Two interrelated factors coincided in the KPD's uppennost leadership, the Secretariat, to 
bring about Thaelmann's deposition.20 Firstly in was known that Thaelmann was building 
up an entourage of factional appointees, causing concern to members of the national 
leadership, who feared that they could lose their positions. Thaelmann had already made 
clear his intention to oust the Conciliators from the KPD leadership at the secret meetings 
held during the 6th Congress of the Comintern.21 The Right in the KPD, whose influence 
was also unofficially represented in the ZK, had been preparing for a renewed factional 
struggle since early 1928.22 Secondly, it was felt that Thaelmann should take personal 
responsibility for leading the KPD into a public scandal caused by his factional friends. 
19 Levine-Meyer, Inside German Communism, p13l. Ernst Meyer was the leading figure in the 
Conciliator faction. Due to illness, however, the main role in the Wittorf Affair was undertaken by Ewert. 
Both Ewert and Meyer had influential positions in the Secretariat after the Essen Congress. 
20 Weber, Wandlung, ppl99ff; Fowkes, Communism in Germany, ppl49f; Levine-Meyer, Inside German 
Communism, (London, 1977), pp131ff. Thaelmann had made it clear at the secret meetings, chaired by 
Stalin, during the 6th Comintern World Congress that he wanted to oust the Conciliators from the KPD's 
leadership see, SAPMO 13/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, 
Bl.346(Schumann). The events at the 6th World Congress of the Comintern are detailed from the 
perspective of the Thaelmann faction in SAPMO I 3/9/70, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 
15.10.1928, Bl.I24(Mapitz). The right had been preparing for a renewed factional struggle since early 
1928 see, Watlin Die Komintern, pp18lf (using new documentary evidence). For the role of Bukharin and 
other Comintern Secretaries making it possible for Thalheimer and then Brandler to return to Germany 
see, Bergmann, Th., Gegen den Strom-Die Geschichte der KPD(O) (Hamburg, 1987), pp38-46; Dunke, 
H.,Die KPD von 1933 his 1945, (Cologne, 1972), ppl7ff. 
21 SAPMO 13/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, 
BI.346(Schumann). These events at the 6th World Congress of the Comintem are detailed from the 
perspective of the Thaelmann faction in, SAPMO, I 3/9nO, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 
15.10.1928, Bl.I24(Mapitz). 
22 For opposition in the Com intern national sections to Stalin's role in the Wittorf Affair, particularly the 
Swiss CP see, Watlin, Die Komintern, ppl8lff. 
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These factors tipped the balance in the five man Secretariat when Dengel, a leftist, 
endorsed the Commission of Inquiry's recommendations to relieve Thaelmann of his 
position.23 When the Politburo recommended Thaelmann's deposition as party chainnan, 
the ZK initially gave its full agreement. However, under the direction of Heinz Neumann , 
a prominent member of the Stalin faction, 25 of the 31 members of the ZK carried out a 
volte face at the end of September, even before a KPD delegation reached Moscow, 
enabling the Comintem to rapidly re-appoint Thaelmann.24 
Not only was the discontent in the KPD leadership with Thaelmann, and his 
intensification of the "left-tum", wider than previously thought, it was also deeper than a 
mere "palace coup". In the BL of West Saxony, where there was a Right-Conciliator 
majority,25 a resolution in support of Thaelmann's deposition was accepted on 27 
September.26 The BL's position was then immediately related to the wider membership at 
a Party Workers' Information Evening in Leipzig, which was attended by Schumann, 
Boettcher and Hans Puetz. The meeting was informed that the BL considered a debate on 
the policies of the 6th World Congress of the Comintern long overdue?? It was only after 
23 The Sekretariat and Politburo meetings were discussed in, SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung 
dcr erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, B1.347(Schumann). The Secretariat comprised 
Thaelmann, Dengel and Schneller on the KPD's Left and Ewert and Meyer. Meyer's illness and treatment 
in Moscow left Ewert the sole representative of the Conciliators in the Secretariat 
24 SAPMO 13/9(10, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 15.10.1928, Bl.133(Vertreter des ZKs); 
SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung am 3.10.1928, B1.356(Raedel); ibid, 
BI.359(Renner). 
25 With some irony this was a leadership appointed by the ZK to curb the leftism of the Vogt Group 
during the "moderate" party line of 1926-7, see chapter 4.5 above. 
26 Only one member of the BL voted against the motion, see, SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung 
dererweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, B1.346. 
27 ibid, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, BI.354(Dascckc); ibid, 
Bl.359(Schumann). 
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the ZK majority turned tail and once more gave their support to Thaelmann, that 
Schumann and the Conciliators abandoned the Right, and "their methods", claiming, 
rather tenuously, not to have broken party discipline as they had acted against Thaelmann 
rather than Comintern policy.28 In the BLs of Erzgebirge-Vogdand, which was controlled 
by the Left under Mapitz, it was ensured that no resolution on the "Thaelmann Case" was 
taken until the Comintern had dealt with the matter.29 In East Saxony the BL made a 
signed declaration in support of Thaelmann, in the hope of "strengthening the backbone of 
the Thaelmann Group" against the Right and Conciliators; the resolution ended in an 
appeal to the membership to support the party's Left.30 This was a clear indication that the 
apparatus faction, which had avoided the factional feuds by turning whichever way the 
party wind blew, knew that Thaelmann's opponents faced a party tornado from the East. 
The "Thaelmann Case" had also gone into the membership through the activities of the 
independent minded RFB. Although the RFB leader, Willi Leoew, had spoken out in 
support of Thaelmann, its National Leadership had issued a circular to the Gau 
leaderships on 3 October calling for a discussion among the membership. In West Saxony 
the RFB sent a circular to all party divisions and local groups detailing events. This was all 
28 ibid, Entschliessung der Versoehnler (Westsachsen) vom 18.10.1928, B1.361. 
29 Erzgebirge-Vogtland was in fact a stronghold of the Right or Brandler faction. The Chemnitz Left 
owed its position to centralised control over the installation of BLs. East Saxony, as a weak party district, 
was already relatively easily and quickly controlled by the central leadership through the party apparatus 
faction. SAPMO 13/9/70, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung vom 15.10.1928, B1.123(Mapitz). Raedel 
informed the BL meeting on 3 October that the Politburo had telephoned him immediately after it had 
voted to reinstate Thaelmann, SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung am 3.10.1928, 
BI.365-6(Raedel). 
30 Only Schneider, an associate of Melcher, abstained, see SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der engeren 
Bezirksleitung am 3.10.1928, B1.364(Anton); ibid, Beschluss der engeren Bezirksleitung Ostsachsen. 
Dresden, den 3.10.1928, B1.367. 
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the more important as not all RFB members were party members.31 A well organised and 
co-ordinated Right faction, which was entrenched in the Reich Trade Union Division, and 
had positions in the district apparatus in Thuringia, West Saxony, Hessen Frankfurt 
(Offenbach) Silesia and Breslau, was well placed with capable leaders such as Brandler, 
Thalheimer, Paul Froehlich, Hans Tittel and Erich Hausen, to mount a challenge to the 
party line and leadership.32 Not only was this done by Thalheimer's prolific circulars, but 
the right's influence in factory cells and among trade-union Communists transmitted the 
Right's position throughout the KPD from below.33 One such case was in the 
Sachsenwerk factory, which employed over 1,000 workers in the industrial suburbs of 
Dresden. The factory cell leadership endorsed a resolution condemning Thaelmann and 
distributed literature printed by the Right. The discussion then spread into the adjoining 
City District of Streisen.34 The discussion on the "Thaelmann Case" also spontaneously 
took place in local party organisations with a pro-Thaelmann leadership, such as Freital, 
because the debate was being transmitted through the grass roots party organisations in a 
manner that the ZK could not suppress.35 
The micro level documentation of events at district and local level indicate that the 
"Thaelmann Affair" was more than a "palace revolution": the impetus for a party debate 
quickly came from the bottom up after a fire in the crown room blazed through the party 
subjects' lodgings. The Comintern had intended the KPD's "left-turn" to be presented as a 
31 The ZK was concerned that the RFB's widespread meetings on the "Thaelmann Case" in Thuringia 
took place despite 60 per cent of members not belonging to the KPD see, SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll 
der Sitzung der erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, B1.347(Schumann). 
32 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Ba.K.), R 134/42/49-97. Hausen was also a Candidate member of the ZK. 
33 SAPMO 13/8(25, Abschrift. Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung Ostsachsen vom 10.10.1928, 
B1.390(Bericht des Instrukteures). 
34 ibid, B1.388-90(Bericht der Instrukteur). 
35 ibid, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung am 3.10.1928, B1.361-2(Rentsch). 
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continuation of the policies decided at the previous Reich Congress, and for the "course of 
concentration" leadership to carry it out. However, another factional struggle broke out, 
culminating in the 12th, and final, Reich Congress. The Thaelmann Group now set out to 
use the party apparatus to control the debate. Hausen, a leading member of the KPD's 
right-wing, complained about the transformation of the party's apparatus into a corrupt 
bureaucracy.36 However, these were crocodile tears: the Comintern could impose its 
position in the KPD not least because each faction, Right as well as Left, which came into 
the ascendant, willingly purged the influence of its rivals. 
What had changed in the power struggle by 1928 were the internal methods of routing 
out party dissidents by using the secret internal party apparatus, the Nachrichtendienst, 
which became known to party activists as the "ZK Cheka". There had always been 
Comintern representatives in the ZK who could, and did, report to the CPSU over the 
heads of the KPD leadership. However, by 1928 this was extended into a means of 
dealing with dissent in the wider party. A system of control was developed, which 
extended into the everyday activities of party dissidents, employing not only "ideological 
terror", but often physical force. 37 The use of these methods of coercion was not exclusive 
to the Thaelmann faction. Schumann, a Conciliator, was accused of spying on the Left in 
36 Tjaden, K. J., Struktur und Funktion der 'KPD-Opposition'(KPO). Eine organisationssoziologische 
Untersuchung zur 'Rechts'-Opposition im deutschen Kommunismus zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik 
(Meisenheim am Glan, 1964), p84. 
37 The term "ideological terror" comes from the Italian leader of the ultra-Left faction, Amandes Bordiga, 
and the German, Karl Korsch, to describe the attack on views which did not correspond to the 
Comintem's official line as "anti Bolshevik" and help for the "enemies" of the Soviet Union, see, Weber, 
/[aupt/eind, p80. The CPSU derided Right communists as the "agents of the enemy" see, Weber, 
Wandlung, p207 
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West Saxony by the prominent leftist Fritz Gloebig.38 In East Saxony the atmosphere in 
the party was described in internal reports as "catastrophic": leading district functionaries 
resented being placed under surveillance.39 House searches were made of dissident 
member's private houses. One method used was by "invitation": party members were 
informed that the "party" wanted to check their flats for Oppositional literature. One such 
example was in East Saxony: the BL informed the Right activist, Wagner, that a 
representative of the leadership was to "accompany" him home to assess the precise 
nature of literature that he had distributed at party meetings.40 House searches were also 
carried out by simply knocking at the door. In the district of North Bavaria, the leading 
local functionary and Right Communist, Emma Groensfelder, described the appearance of 
the "ZK Cheka" at her flat in a search for factional materia1.41 H. A. Winkler has used the 
memoirs of leading party functionaries to construct an interesting and convincing analysis 
of the penetration of the KPD's secret apparatus by the Soviet secret police and its rise to 
domination over the legal party. Winkler argues that this process was used to reinforce the 
Stalinisation of the KPD, ensuring the dominance of Soviet state interests. Furthermore, 
the secret party apparatus carried out the KPD's Gleichschaltung in a process which 
neared completion by 1928. Winkler presents the image of a legal party facade which gave 
a radical communist face to an underground secret apparatus, which dominated the KPD 
38 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten Bezirksleitung vom 18.10.1928, 
B1.359(Schumann). 
39 SAPMO 13/8/25, Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung Ostsachsen am 3.10.1928, B1.357-
8(1 nstrukteur). 
40 ibid, Abschrift. Protokoll der engeren Bezirksleitung Ostsachsen vom 10.10.1928, B1.390(Bericht des 
Instrukteures). 
41 Neuhaeusser-Wespy, U., Die KPD in Nordbayern 1919-1933. Ein Beitrag zur Regional und 
Lokalgeschichte des deutschen Kommunismus (Nurenberg, 1981), p226. Emma Groensfelder was 
expelled at the end of 1929 for "behaviour harmful to the party" (ie factionalism). 
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and acted in the tradition of the Tsarist secret police.42 Winkler's interpretation has been 
confinned by a new documentary based study of the KPD's Nachrichtendienst. The main 
conclusions of this study are that the secret apparatus reinforced the division between the 
claims of party propaganda, which were addressed to Gennan workers, and the KPD's 
role to act in the interests of the Soviet Union.43 The immediate presence of Soviet 
functionaries, working through the Nachrichtendienst, helps explain why the KPD 
leadership was unable to announce any substantial modifications to party policy as a 
response to developments in Germany. 
Gleichschaltung in the Districts. 
It had become the norm in the KPD that the BLs carried out the district party 
membership'S Gleichschaltung. The ZK's first task, therefore, was to ensure that the BLs 
would filter out the voices of opposition in the process of "electing" delegates to the 
various stages in the campaign of meetings which made up the "discussion" on party 
policy.44 By the end of October 1928 only two BLs (Halle-Merseburg and Thuringia) 
from a total of 28 continued to have a majority opposing Thaelmann's re-appointment as 
party chairman, giving the impression that the leadership need only snap its fingers and the 
whole membership came into line.45 In West Saxony a "course of concentration" 
leadership coalition, between the Right and Conciliators, also continued to resist the 
42 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp443-5, and source references notes 445-7. 
43 Kaufmann, B., Reisener, E., Schwips, D., and Walter, H., Nachrichtendienst der KPD 1919-1937 
(Berlin, 1993), pp94ff. 
44 For a case study of the Ruhr, see, Herlemann, B., Kommunalpolitik der KPD im Ruhrgebiet 1924-1933 
(Wuppertal, 1977), p143. 
45 Weber, Wandlung, p210. For developments in Saxony see, SAPMO I 3/9/70, Entschliessung der BL 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 21.10.1928, B1.159; SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der BLS am 24.10.1928. 
B1.404. 
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Thaelmann leadership. However, the BL did not have a majority opposing the party line 
because of the reluctance of the Conciliators, under Georg Schumann, to risk open 
confrontation with the ZK.46 
Schumann's political behaviour is interesting both in terms of the role of the Conciliators 
and the nature of internal party life among the "inner core" of functionaries. Firstly, at 
Reich level and in Halle-Merseburg, where they enjoyed a majority, the Conciliators 
continued to advocate the use of the united front tactic and trade union policy on the basis 
of the Essen Party Congress.47 In West Saxony, however, Schumann tried to present his 
criticisms of the party's political line within what was known as the "framework" of the 
party. In order to minimise the charge of breaking party discipline, Schumann stated that 
he "unconditionally and unreservedly" supported the decisions of the Comintern and 
RILU Congresses. However, Schumann voted against the ZK majority's resolution on the 
basis of their "false interpretation" of the "internal party course".48 But, Schumann's use of 
party semantics was well known to the ZK majority, which simply dismissed his protests 
out of hand. The repeated use of the slogan "Hands off the Party" indicated how the 
"Party" was being continually re-defined in terms of the dominant faction, reinforcing the 
rhetoric which depicted the Opposition as the "enemy within the Party". This style of 
leadership led the district secretary Engert, who had been a member of the West Saxon 
leadership since 1924, to inform Remmele, the ZK's representative, that: 
46 The vote in the BL on the three main factionally based resolutions was: 28 to 5 against the Right's 
resolution; 20 to 13 against the ZK majority's resolution; 18 to 15 against the Conciliator's resolution, see 
SAPMO 13/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, Bl.471-
2. 
47 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p151. 
48 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
B1.459-61 (Schumann). 
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Everything is characterised as Leninism. In 1925 when Ruth Fischer was at the 
helm the policy was Leninism. At that time there was a God called Maslow and his 
prophet was Remmele. A quarter of a year later the same Remmele asserted that 
Maslow and his friends were enemies of Leninism. Then something else was 
Leninism. I have lost trust in such a leadership.49 
The ZK appointed Rudolf Renner as a ZK Kommissar in West Saxony, with the intention 
of overcoming the BL's reluctance to abandon its opposition to the "left-turn".5o However, 
Renner was unable to simply walk into the BL and take over control on behalf of the ZK. 
Instead, something of a stalemate was created. With the help of the party workers in the 
Vogt Group, the ZK was able to restrict dissident functionaries speaking at meetings in 
the local groups and cells.51 However, at the same time the Right was able to draw in Paul 
Froehlich, a prominent Right Communist, into the BL.52 Furthermore, the BL had a 
factional majority which continued to prevent the ZK from controlling the process of 
d 1 . . 53 e egatlon to party meetIngs. 
The 2nd Party Workers' Conference 
With control of the overwhelming majority of the BLs, the ZK could now take the "party 
discussion" into the wider party membership. The campaign of meetings culminated in the 
2nd Reich Party Workers' Conference, which was held in Berlin between 3 and 4 
49 ibid, B1.464(Engert). 
50 Weber, Weber, pp210-11. 
51 The vote was 18 for, to 5 against and 3 abstentions, see ibid, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten 
BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, B1.472. 
52 ibid, B1.451. 
53 ibid, B1.466-7(Kohl). 
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November 1928.54 However, the process of delegation to the conference was less 
democratic still than during the First Reich Conference in 1925: delegates were not 
elected, but nominated at BL meetings. The ZK was able to confirm or reject the 
nominees.55 The Conference was intended to give the KPD's "left-turn" a belated 
semblance of membership participation in the policy decision. At the Conference 
Neumann insisted that the "social fascist" thesis did not diverge from the decisions of the 
Essen Congress, it was merely their application to present conditions in Germany.56 
Neumann's policy declaration centred on identifying a radicalisation of the workforce, 
pointing to the strike in the Ruhr iron and steel industry, and the movement's alleged 
abandonment by "social fascist" functionaries in the SPD.57 However, the function of the 
Conference was not only to act as a platform reinforcing the "left-tum" in policy, it also 
made significant changes to the party's leading personnel. After the 2nd Reich Conference 
the Secretariat comprised Thaelmann, Remmele and Neumann; the only Conciliators to 
remain in the Politburo were Ewert and Meyer, and the Thaelmann Group had a three-
quarters majority in the ZK.58 The ZK then acted against the Opposition's influential 
positions in the party press: in the central organ, die Rote Fahne, Suesskind, a Conciliator, 
was replaced by the Stalinist Neumann; at local level the Conciliators lost their positions 
54 The resolutions of the conference were published in the SPD press see, 'Reichskonferenz der KPD', in 
Volksstimme, Nr.264, 12.11.1928. 
55 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
B1.466-7(Kohl); Weber, Wandlung, p211. Weber stated that the process of delegation was not fully 
democratic but did not have the documentation to detail why. 
56 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-BL am 11.11.1928, B1.422-4(Saeikow); SAPMO 13/9/70, 
Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 5.11.1928. Bericht der 
Reichsparteiarbeiterkonferenz, B1.177. On the resolutions of the Conference in general, Weber, 
Wandlung, pp211f. 
57 ibid. The Ruhr strikes were in fact a lockout and the KPD, using "independent strike leaderships" for 
the first time, was unable to win any significant support from the trade-unionists or the unorganised. 
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as editor-in-chief in Hamburg, Essen and Chemnitz, retaining only Halle-Merseburg. The 
Right lost control of the Saechsische Arbeiterzeitung (SAZ) in West Saxony and the 
Bergische Arbeiterstimme in SOlingen.59 Almost all of the KPD's press could now be used 
in the leadership's campaign against the Opposition, including the functionaries' organ, 
Der Parteiarbeiter.60 The only notable exception was the pages of die Internationale. 
The link between party organisation and the implementation of party policy was also 
tightened by the introduction of "organisational discipline" (Koerperscha/tsdisziplin): not 
only must party debate end after a decision was reached by a higher authority, but, more 
importantly, any policy discussion was only sanctioned within the organisational unit the 
party member belonged to. Furthermore, dissident BL secretaries were precluded from 
presenting their views at meetings of the lower organisations, while the party apparatus 
stood at the disposal of the ZK majority.61 This explains why the Right, who were largely 
factory-based trade-union Communists, did not gain from the KPD's re-organisation on 
the basis of factory cells and vociferously campaigned for a re-invigoration of internal 
party life by returning to the larger and more representative membership meetings.62 
Only a handful of right-wing Communists were able to present their factional critique of 
the KPD's return to an ultra-Left policy. Central to the Right's declaration was that ultra-
58 Weber, Wandlung, p208-11. 
59 ibid, 208f. For details on the deposition of Moeller in Chemnitz, see SAPMO I 3/9nO, Protokoll der 
engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 15.10.1928, B1.134ff. For Boettcher in Leipzig, see SAPMO I 
3/10/114, Entschliessung der BL Westsachsen am 5.11.1928, B1.443; For Solingen, Wunderlich, 
Kommunalpolitik, p55. 
60 Weber, Wandlung, p210; On the role of Der Parteiarbeiter, see SAPMO I 3/10/114, Entschliessung 
ueber die 6. Weltkongress (Recht), B1.473. 
61 idid, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, B1.469(Remmele). 
62 SAPMO 13/9/79, Bericht ueber die Fraktionstaetigkeit der Rechten im Bezirk ErLgebirge-Vogtland. 
Bl.l1. 
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Leftism during the Ruth Fischer leadership in 1924/5 had merely limited the KPD's 
influence on the wider working class. The "left-turn" was frequently justified in the party 
press with reference to the role of social democratic police presidents breaking up 
"workers' demonstrations" (ie communist actions). However, Boettcher pointed out that: 
"If the united front is put down to the question of spilt blood, then we could never have 
had a united front with the SPD since 1918.,,63 The Right stressed that if the KPD looked 
to a separate social constituency, in isolation from and outright opposition to the SPD, 
the political result could only be the constriction of the party's "room to manoeuvre". 64 
The Conciliators at the conference did not vote against the ZK majority's resolutions.65 
However, they did submit a resolution, signed by twenty delegates, which detailed their 
opposition to the restrictions on debate speakers and the use of organisational measures to 
prevent all those holding a minority view from expressing their opinions to the 
b h· 66 mem ers Ip. 
Gleichschaltung in the Membership. 
Previous studies at Reich, regional and local level have placed the emphasis on a largely 
uncontested transition to the policies of the "3rd Period" in the KPD membership. 
Historians have explained this in terms of a combination of factors: the regional weakness 
of the Right, such as in the Ruhr; the ZK majority's rapid control of the BLs; and the view 
that the new General Line gave expression to strong anti-reformist tendencies long held at 
63 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
B 1.462(Boettcher). 
64 ibid, BI.461-2(Boettcher). 
65 SAPMO 13/9/70, Entschliessung der BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 5.11.1928, B1.188. 
66 ibid. In previous literature the Conciliators thought to have abandoned all opposition at the conference 
cf., Weber, Wandlung p212. 
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all levels in the KPD.67 Weber is undoubtedly correct that the Opposition stood no chance 
against the party machine.68 However, in Saxony the KPD was shaken more than in other 
regions for two reasons. Firstly, the Right occupied prominent positions in the Saxon BLs 
and the Regional Executive; and secondly, the continued strong support for right-wing 
communism, centring on the southwestern localities. To the Saxon Left factions the 
challenge presented by the Right was taken extremely seriously. All the more so as until 
the "open letter" against the Right, in mid December 1928, the Comintem, still under 
Bukharin's leadership, refused to sanction a full blown party purge. In Saxony the ZK 
instructed the BL only to use expulsions of ordinary members in the most extreme cases 
when all other schooling and ideological persuasion had failed and the party line was 
under threat in the district or locality. 69 During the initial stages in the KPD's 
Gleichschaltung, therefore, the Opposition had considerable room for manoeuvre in the 
lower party organisations. 
In East Saxony the KPD's shallow roots in the district had enabled an earlier and more 
effective control of party affairs by functionaries in the Reich apparatus, under Rudolf 
Renner and Sigrid Raedel: district secretaries came and went as the tides of the factional 
struggle turned, but they had remained constants in the equation. However, having nailed 
their flag, along with the Left majority in the BL, to Thaelmann's "left-tum", Renner and 
Raedel now felt threatened by the ZK's inaction against open factional activity by the 
Right.70 The East Saxon BL knew nothing of Thaelmann's constant petitioning of Stalin 
to sanction a party purge against the Right, and on 13 December sent a BL resolution to 
67 ibid, p209; Wunderlich, Kommunalpolitik, pp55-6; Herlemann, Kommunalpolitik, pl44; Winkler, 
Schein der normalitaet, p444. 
68 Weber, Wandlung, p209. 
69 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Entschliessung der BL Westsachsen am 5.11.1928, BI.443. 
70 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-Bl am 11.11.1928, BI.430(Goldhammcr). 
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the ZK calling for immediate action.71 Already in early November the BL was acting as a 
form of "party court", in place of the slower channels of the Complaints Commission. 
While the ZK had cautioned against expulsions at this point, the East Saxon party acted 
on 11 November to confirm the expulsion of Erich Melcher, the previous Political 
Secretary, for alleged co-operation with the Opposition. Furthermore, two factory 
functionaries, Fritz Schreiter and Kurt Wagner, were expelled for a minimum period of six 
months for distributing Erich Hausen's circulars in the factories.72 
In West Saxony the cross-currents in the party acted to limit the ZK's authority in what 
was a centre of Leftism in the membership. Having finally installed a compliant leadership 
in the course of 1927, the BL coalition, of the Right and Conciliators, constrained reining 
in the dissidents.73 The ZK took various measures to impose compliance in West Saxony. 
At the end of 1928 the District Trade Union Department was taken over by the 
Organisation Division for five weeks. In Leipzig all trade-union work was run by a ZK 
Kommissar.74 The leftism of the Vogt Group had drawn considerable support from 
factory workers, particularly in Leipzig, in opposition to what was seen as too much co-
operation with the social democrats in 1926/7.75 The rejection of the new leftism in the 
factories, however, represented a change in the nature of the KPD's union policy: it was 
71 On Thaelmann's correspondence with Stalin, see Watlin, Die Komintern, ppI80-1. SAPMO I 3/8/25, 
Entschleissung. Protokoll der engeren BL vom 12.12.1928, B1.466. The resolution was signed by: 
Bernhard Wiesner, Bruno Siegel, Martin Schneider, Anton Saefkow, Bruno Goldhammer, Kurt 
Froehlich, Paul Gruner, Martin Hoop. 
72 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-BI am 11.11.1928,B1.430. The outcome of the vote was: on 
Melcher unaminous; Wagner, 1 against and 2 abstentions; Schreiter, 1 against and 1 abstention. 
73 ibid, Protokoll der engeren BL am 21.11.1928, B1.438(Siegel). 
74 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht der Gewerkschaftsabteilung der Bezirks Westsachsen fuer die Monatc 
Dezember bis Mitte Maerz 1929, B1.587. 
75 See Chapter 4.2 above. 
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one thing to support a policy of industrial militancy but quite another to sacrifice the 
benefits of organisation in the trade unions, not least of which was strike pay. The 
Communist Youth (KJVD) in Leipzig, which had a history of contact with the Socialist 
Youth movement (SAJ), was also a centre of Right opposition to the new party line. The 
KJ's district leader, Lufi, and three other district leaders, were deposed by the ZK and the 
organisation was then led by appointees from the Reich leadership.76 In the Sports 
Organisations there was also a fonn of non-acceptance of the implications of the party line 
by Communists who were not factionally organised.77 Where contact with the rank-and-
file members of the SPD seemed a natural part of working-class life, even leftists 
questioned cutting off organisational contact in order to, in the ZK's opinion, enhance the 
KPD's revolutionary profile. 
It was in Erzgebirge-Vogdand that the BL had greatest difficulty in acting against the 
Right. The district, especially in the industrial suburbs of Chemnitz, remained a stronghold 
of the Right, and was the political Heimat of Heinrich Brandler, its factional leader. The 
Left in the BL, around Mapitz and Ohr, owed their position not to support among the 
district membership, but to keeping court in Thaelmann's entourage. During the 
"moderate" political line in the mid twenties, the BL had the role of acting as a 
counterbalance to the strength of support for the right-wing communism in the 
membership.78 The leftists in the BL could now act, out of factional self interest, against 
all opposition to the party line. After the Reich Party Workers' Conference the BL's first 
76 Staatsarchiv Bremen (Sta.B.), Monatsbericht ueber die politische und wirtschaftliche Lage im Freistaat 
Sachsen (November 1928) [henceforth: Monatsbericht], Sig. 4,65-1729. 
77 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
BI.460(Schumann). 
78 See chapter 4.2 above. 
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step to impose the new party line was a BL meeting on 5 November, which unanimously 
accepted the Conference's decisions and decided to hold a District Party Workers' 
Conference on 17-18 November.79 The mode of delegation to the conference ensured a 
built in majority in favour of the ZK's resolutions. The "delegates" included members of 
the BL and UBLs, delegates who had attended the Reich Party Workers' Conference, 
leaders of the City District and Working Area leaderships in Greater Chemnitz and finally 
a number of hand-picked factory workers.80 The party members who attended at the 
conference represented the so-called party workers' faction; however, rather than 
constituting a grass roots pro-ZK tendency, it was a group of hand-picked "delegates".81 
The BL had acted to ensure the outcome of the conference in advance. The KPD's 
publication of the resolutions of the District Party Workers' Conference, which voted for 
the ZK's resolutions by 132 to four with four abstentions, was by no means representative 
of the strength of district support for right-wing communism 82 It was the absence of 
documentation detailing local developments that led earlier accounts of the KPD to 
conclude that the "left-tum" was widely accepted by the party membership.83 
The KPD's top down imposition of the party line had taken on a now characteristic form. 
The party press published the contrived "votes" of conferences, which declared 
overwhelming support for the ZK's policies. In reality, however, opponents of the "left-
turn" were excluded from the conferences. The "debate" itself was in reality part of the 
79 SAPMO I 3/9/70, Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 5.11.1928, B1.176. 
80 o bO d 1 1 . 
81 Details in, SAPMO 13/9/65, Bericht ueber die innerparteilich Lage. Vorbereitung der 
Bezirksparteikonferenz vom 17-18.11.1928, Bl.27-30. 
82 SAPMO I 3/9/79, Bericht ueber die Fraktionstaetigkeit der Rechten im Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, 
B1.12. 
83 Cf. Weber, Wandlung, p213. 
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KPD's Gleichschaltung. The "debate" was not just about ensuring conference resolutions 
supporting party policy: the apparatus functionaries who went into the lower party 
organisations simultaneously spent considerable time trying to organise the membership to 
carry out the policy. Local functionaries expressing outright rejection of the party line 
were ousted in micro-level coups and a new leadership "elected" who agreed to conform 
to the party line.84 The strength of the Right throughout the district, however, continued 
to cause the BL serious concern. The BL in Erzgebirge-Vogdand wrote to both the ZK 
and the CPSU urging the purge of Brandler and Thalheimer in the hope that a headless 
opposition would also lose its foot-soldiers.85 
Role of the Right-Opposition 
The Right's challenge to the ZK majority functioned as part of a nationally organised and 
coordinated group. However, only in Offenbach did the KPD-Opposition (KPD(O)) win 
over a majority of the membership, functionaries and the communist electorate.86 The 
Right did, however, have significant influence within the KPD in the districts of 
Wuerttemberg, centred on Stuttgart; Silesia, centred on Breslau, and in Saxony, especially 
the southwest of the region with an epicentre in Chemnitz.87 The leading figures in the 
Saxony Right, Brandler, Vettermann, Ludewig Kuehn and Davidowski, organised their 
84 SAPMO I 3/9/70, Entschliessung der BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 5.11.1928, B1.188; For an example 
of a micro-coup d'etat in Zschachwitz, see SAPMO I 3/8/25, Innerparteiliche Lage in Ostsachsen. 
Protokoll der BL am 21.11.1928, B1.443. 
85 SAPMO I 3/9/79, Bericht ueber die Fraktionstaetigkeit der Rechten im Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, 
B1.12. 
86 Wickham, J., 'The Working Class-Movement in Frankfurt-am-Main during the Weimar Republic', 
Ph.D. thesis (University of Sussex, 1979), pp194f. 
87 SAPMO I 3/9/64, Zum Bericht der BL an den Bezirksparteitag Er.lgebirge-Vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, 
Bl.l0. 
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factional activity from Davidowski's flat in Chemnitz. Meetings of the wider factional 
leadership were held in the Annegarten Inn.88 The ZK's ability to close down the channels 
of dissent in the party and the communist press meant that the Right's main means of 
gaining its political position a wider audience was the distribution of leaflets in the 
factories and at the factory gates at closing time.89 Right Communist councillors in many 
local councils also used their positions to distribute factional material. Public meetings 
were also convened. For example Paul Froehlich, who had recently taken up work in 
Saxony, was openly holding meetings against the ZK's policies.90 The strength of support 
for the Right among trade-union Communists also brought invitations from cell groups to 
speak on the implications of the Comintem's policies for factory work. 91 The BL's 
response, in line with that employed throughout Germany, was to use strong-arm tactics 
to prevent the Right speaking at factory cell meetings.92 
The KPD was able to enforce party discipline in the Krautheim factory cell, which had 
invited Brandler to speak on 20 November. However, the support for the Right in the 
Schubert and Salzer factory cell, led by the oppositional activist Edmund Mueller, 
88 The Right also organised some families, most famously the Zippe1 family in Chemnitz. Prominent 
activists included: Vettermann, Kuehn, Hausding, Davidowski, Leske, Rips,Weber, Otto Wenzel, Fanny 
Zippe1, Edmund Mueller and Mally, see SAPMO 13/9/89, BL.Erzgebirge-Vogtland der KPD, Chemnitz, 
den, 13.11.1928. An das ZK, Sekretariat, Berlin, Bl.35f. 
89 SAPMO I 3/9/70, Entschliessung. Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 5.11.1928, 
B1.188; ibid, 'Brand1er organisiert Fraktionsarbeit. Die Parteispalter an der Arbeit', in Kaempjer, 
13.11.l928, B1.218; SAPMO I 3/9/81, An das ZK der KPdSU z. Haende des Generalsekretaers Genossen 
Stalin, Moskau. Chemnitz, den 27.11.1928, B1.6-10; SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-BL am 
11.11.1928, B1.423,427,429-30. 
90 SAPMO 13/8(25, Entsch1eissung. Protokoll der engeren BL yom 12.12.l928, B1.466. 
91 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (November 1928); ibid (March, 1929); SAPMO 13/9/81, An das 
ZK der KPdS U z. Haende des Generalsekretaers Genossen Stalin, Moskau. Chemnitz, den 27.11.1928, 
B1.6. 
92 Weber, Wandlung, p221. 
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required party organised violence to prevent Brandler speaking. The BL held a meeting of 
cellieaderships in Greater Chemnitz on 20 November, which voted 95 to three to occupy 
the meeting hall.93 This resulted in some 100 "party loyalists" flooding the meeting, which 
had attracted around 80 factory Communists to hear Brandler, Kuehn and Vetermann 
speak.94 After severe disruption, the meeting was transferred to another location. The 
meeting, however, ended in an intra-party brawl with the riot police intervening, while 
Brandler fled from a window to safety.95 The KPD leadership is also documented as 
having used similar methods against the Opposition in Dresden.96 
The purge of right-wing Communists took place after further developments in the 
Comintem. At the meeting of the Comintem's Political Secretariat, which dealt with the 
German question on 23 November, Meyer was completely isolated.97 Following the 
German delegation's return to Berlin, the Conciliators had one last opportunity to address 
the ZK on their objections to the party course.98 However, as Bukharin's star finally set in 
the Comintem, Stalin could act against his supporters in the KPD. At the ZK meeting of 
13-14 December the Right were given an ultimatum: either abandon all factional 
opposition to the party line by 20 December, or to be expelled.99 At the EeCI Plenum on 
19 December Bukharin made a final effort to mediate between the factions in the KPD. 
93 SAPMO I 3/9/81, An das ZK der KPdSU z. Haende des Generalsekretaers Genossen Stalin, Moskau. 
Chemnitz, den, 27.11.1928, B1.6. 
94 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (November 1929). 
9S 'b'd 1 1 . 
96 'b'd 1 1 • 
97 Weber, Wandlung, p214. Meyer was defended by Humbert-Droz and attacked by the KPD's delegates 
Ulbricht and Neumann and the Com intern secretaries Gusev and Kuusinen. 
98 Fowkes, Communism in Germany, p15l. 
99 SAPMO 13/9/70, Bericht von der ZK-Sitzung am 13-14.12.1928. Protokoll der engcren BL 
Erzgebirge-VogtIand vom 17.12.1928, B1.21O(Remmele). 
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Bukharin knew that to openly side with the Opposition would seal his own fate: his appeal 
to party dissidents was to acquiesce in the interests of helping the Soviet Union during a 
period of difficulties.10o Following the Right's refusal to capitulate, the ECCI -Plenum 
issued an "open letter" on the "right danger in the KPD" which called for the KPD to 
purge the leaders of the Opposition. lot Simultaneously a secret letter was sent to the KPD 
which stated that the Conciliators' criticisms of party policy should no longer be 
tolerated. 102 The "open letter", which was published in die Rote Fahne on 22 December, 
accused the Right of attempting to re-found a Spartacus Bund, of representing a "socialist 
current in the communist movement" and having broken with Leninism.103 At the end of 
December eight prominent leaders of the KPD were expelled; Brandler and Thalheimer, 
who were members of the CPSU, were also purged. At the beginning of January the ZK 
acted against the Right and Conciliators in the BLs.I04 
The formation of the KPD(O) as an independent party at the end of 1928 only organised 
between 4,000 and 6,000 former members of the KPD.105 The KPD(O)'s electoral success 
in Saxony was also marginal. In Saxony five of the 13 members of the KPD Landtag 
faction defected to the KPD(O) after Boettcher's speech on 15 January.106 However, in 
100 Weber, Wandlung, pp216-7. 
101 Ba.K., R 134/61/145-193. 
102 Weber, Wandlung, pp218-9. 
103 Die Rote Fahne Nr.301, 22.12.1928. 
104 Weber, Wandlung, pp219-20; Ba.K. R134/61/145-193. The eight expelled Right communists were: 
J.Walcher, A. Schreiner, Max Koehler, P.Froehlich, A.Enderle, Hans Tittel, A.Schmidt and Karl 
Rehbein. 
105 Tjaden, Struktur und Funktion, p100; Weber, Wandlung, p17. In February 1931 the KPD(O)'s 
membership was estimated at 6,000 in the report compiled by the police authorities, see Ba.K., R 
134/61/194-242. 
106 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (December 1928). The other four were Lieberasch, Roetzschcr, 
Schreiber and Siewert. 
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the elections to the Saxon Landtag on 12 May, despite the KPD losing two seats and the 
SPD gaining two seats, the KPD(O) did not receive a single mandate. 107 The ZK acted 
against supporters of the Right who remained in the KPD by imposing a solidarity 
declaration, which most of them signed, perhaps in the expectation that they could ride 
out another tum to the left in party policy. lOS What the purge of these right-wing 
communist activists did mark was the KPD's break with its roots in the German workers' 
movement, which had been maintained in certain important localities. The Right 
opposition comprised full-time trade-union officials, party union functionaries and factory 
councillors; councillors in the local government, including Buergermeister, such as 
Bachmann in Oelsnitz i. V. and Fedgenbaufen in Bernsgruen; and Communists involved in 
social-political work, such as the sick pay official Kurt Wenzel in Chemnitz.109 It was 
these communists' finn location within the wider militant workers' movement which 
determined their conviction that communist objectives were best served by contact with 
left-wing Social Democrats and which led them to regard SPD colleagues as potential 
Communists rather than the social basis of "social fascism". The ZK's policy, however, 
was to eliminate all factors which produced opposition to the party line as a result of local 
conditions. Now that the Comintern had finally sanctioned a purge of the Right, the KPD 
leadership began to prepare for the 12th Reich Party Congress, with the intention of 
107 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen Nr.48 (Dresden, 1930), pp304-5. For the SPD's 
evaluation, see Vorwaerts, Nr.219, 13.5.1929; B.a.P. RKO 15.07 Nr. 243/1, Politischer Bericht der 
Landtagswaehlen, B1.79ff. 
lOS Wuenderlich, Kommunalpolitik, p57. Wuenderlich explains the signing of the "loyalty declaration" in 
term of the "plausibility" of the KPD's anti-SPD policies by 1929. 
109 SAPMO I 3/9/79, Bericht ueber die Fraktionstaetigkeit der Rechten im Bezirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland, 
BUO-II; SAPMO 13/9/81, An das ZK der KPdSU z. Haende des Generalsekretaers Genosscn Stalin, 
Moskau. Chemnitz, den 27.11.1928, B1.9. 
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replacing functionaries known to be sympathetic to right -wing communism with 
afficianados for ultra-Leftism.110 
The Preparations for the 12th Reich Party Congress: A Farewell to Right Communism. 
The preparations for the Reich Party Congress began, in the same manner as the earlier 
conferences, after support for the "left-tum" was guaranteed. In the party districts of East 
Saxony and Erzgebirge Vogtland control of the BLs made it possible to filter out all 
voices of dissent during the process of "electing" delegates to the Reich Congress. The 
District Party Congresses, which took place in April 1929, had compliant pro-ZK 
majorities. Both districts gave their "unanimous" support to the ZK's and the Comintem's 
General Line. lll It was in West Saxony that the ZK required to take a series of measures 
against the Opposition: not because the Right had predominant influence at grass roots 
level, but because of its remaining positions throughout the district apparatus, in particular 
the Trade Union Division. 
In West Saxony two District Party Congresses were convened in order to bring the 
district into line before the Reich Congress. In February an extraordinary Congress 
confirmed the removal of the Right and Conciliators from their positions of power.112 At 
the Congress Thaelmann made a six-hour speech on factionalism and its consequences in 
the KPD.113 Thaelmann's motion was then accepted by 165 votes to 17, with two 
110 Claudin, F., The Communist Movementfrom Comintern to Cominform (penguin, 1975), ppI58-9. 
111 SAPMO 13/9/64, Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, B1.1-9; SAPMO I 3/9/64, 
'Bezirksparteitag des Bezirkes Erzgebirge-Vogtland. Innen geeignt, aussen gestaerkt', Kaempfer, 
15.4.1929, B1.190; SAPMO 13/8/21, Bericht der Bezirksleitung an den 18. Bezirksparteitag der KPD 
Ostsachsen (6-7.4.1929), B1.3ff. 
112 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (February 1929). 
113 SAPMO 13/10/109, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 16-17.2.1929, B1.2ff. 
Page 291 
abstentions.114 However, this result was only possible because of the ruthless use of the 
party apparatus at the meetings and conferences of the lower party organisations which 
had delegated representatives to the Congress. Representative of this manipulation was 
the Mandate Commission's refusal to accept Right delegates elected from Taucha and 
Leipzig City Districts "A" and "F" because of an allegedly "disorderly" election process. 115 
The Right would not have gained a majority at the Congress even under genuinely 
democratic conditions: the purpose was, however, to create the communist monolith 
which excluded all voices of dissent. A factional side-effect in eliminating the Opposition 
was the re-emergence of the Vogt Group which, although in support of the party's "left-
turn", wanted the return of their factional leader, Arthur Vogt, from Stuttgart, where he 
was acting as the ZK's Kommissar against the locally strong Right. The vote on the Vogt 
Group's motion was narrowly defeated by 74 votes to 65.116 The vote indicates how 
strongly the ZK now depended on the support of these former left -communist dissidents 
to carry the new policy. This, however, did not detract from the main objective of the 
Congress: Schumann's dismissal as Political Leader was given a semblance of district 
approval, as was his replacement by the Thaelmann supporter, Winterich, who was 
appointed to head a provisional "ZK loyal" BL.117 
With the Right and Conciliators removed from the BL, the Opposition's struggle was not 
only taken into the factories and trade unions but also into the RH, in the same manner as 
114 A condition of delegation to the Congress was that party members had paid their dues and were 
organised in the appropriate trade-union, Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729 Monatsbericht (February 1929). 
115 ibid; SAPMO 13/10/109, Bezirksparteitag Westsachsen am 16-17.2.1929, B1.5. 
116 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (Februar 1929). 
117 During the Wittorf Affair Winterich was of one of the ZK members most quickly returning to support 
Thaelmann. St.a.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (February 1929). 
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the Vogt Group had done in mid 1927.118 In 1927 the Right had been installed in the 
District Executive of the RH by the ZK in order to sideline the influence of the Vogt 
Group. Now the tables had turned and the ZK wanted to remove the Right from the RH's 
leadership.119 At a meeting of the RH in Leipzig, the ZK was able to gain a small majority, 
enabling the appointment of its factional adherent, Drews, as District Leader.120 
Immediately after the meeting, the ZK's supporters removed the Right from the RH's 
premises by smashing the windows and doors in a violent clash, which again saw the 
police being called to break up an intra-communist brawl. 121 A subsequent District 
Congress of the West Saxon RH in Leipzig, on 16 June, confirmed the appointment of the 
new leadership. Winterich's speech dropped all pretence that the organisation had a non-
party character stating that: "There is no such thing as non-party in the proletariat's 
struggle for liberation. ,,122 This was only stating the obvious: the leadership was being 
passed from Right to Left depending on which faction the ZK wanted to eliminate. The 
ZK aimed to close off all avenues of opposition inside the party, not least as organisations 
like the RH could provide a gathering point for the wider Saxon Right. The KPD's ability 
to impose a new leadership contrasted with the ability to maintain a effective auxiliary 
organisation: by autumn 1929 the district RH was 4,000 marks in debt and could no 
I . fi 'a1 . 123 onger meet Its Inancl comrmtments. 
At the District Congress in West Saxony in April 1929 the Conciliators were able to 
present a minority resolution, which supported the ZK minority around Eberlein and 
118 ibid,(March 1929). 
119 ibid.; Arbeiterpolitik, Nr.l1, 1929. 
120 ibid, Monatsbericht (March 1929), 
121 ibid 
122 ibid, Monatsbericht (June 1929). 
123 ibid, Monatsbericht (October 1929). 
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Ewert. The resolution continued to warn of the KPD's loss of influence by disregarding 
the united front policy and active trade-union work.124 However, with the complete 
exclusion of the Right, the Conciliators"motion was voted down by 165 votes to four. l25 
The Conciliator's did remain an organised faction until the 12th Party Congress, 
expressing a minority view in the ZK and publishing their political views in die 
Internationale. 126 It was clear, however, that their days as a faction were numbered. In 
March the Conciliators lost control of the BL in their stronghold of Halle-Merseburg, 
which was now headed by the ZK's Kommissar, Wilhelm Koenen. 127 With poetic justice 
the Conciliators, an apparatus faction, were removed from influence on the KPD's policy 
by absorbing their leading figures, such as Ewert and Hans Eisler, into the Comintem's 
apparatus to work for a policy they opposed.128 The Right and Conciliators had been 
ousted as organised factions with positions in the party leadership. 
The internal party preparations for the 12th Party Congress had gone a very considerable 
way towards ending organised factional challenges to the party line: the monolith had few 
political cracks. Opposition to the decisions of the 6th Congress of the Comintem, which 
had furiously burned inside the KPD after the Wittorf Affair, had succeeded in causing a 
party debate and convening a party congress. The crucial aspect of the KPD's political 
development was the further refinement of the party machine, against which the 
Opposition could not compete. Weber pointed out that the purge of the Right had been 
124 SAPMO I 3/10/109, Resolution zum 6. Weltkongress zur Lage und den Aufgaben der Partei im Bezirk 
Westsachsen, BI.11-14. The resolution was signed by: Erich Bartsch, Georg Schumann, Alfred Simon 
and Karl Heft. 
125 'Nach dem Bezirksparteitag mit verstaerkter Kraft an der Arbeit', in Sozialistische Arbeiterzeitung 
(SAZ), Nr.99, 29.4.1929. 
126 Weber, Wandlung, p222; The Conciliators' platform is in, Die internationale, XII (1.7.1929), pp431-6. 
127 Bericht 9. Parteitag, p366, quoted in Fowkes, German Communism, p151. 
128 Fowkes, German Communism, ppI52-3. 
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carried out in six weeks in contrast to the one-and-a-half years required to oust the ultra-
Left.129 New documentation, however, indicates certain important modifications to the 
earlier studies: the campaign against the Right began in early 1928 and lasted until spring 
1929; Moscow was unable to prevent a factional feud breaking out in the KPD; and the 
ZK was unable to prevent another "party discussion" on Comintern policy. There is no 
doubt, however, that the KPD's party machine, which drove the party's Stalinisation, had 
been more finely tuned: organisational control could install the leaderships and channels 
for carrying out political policy. Institutionalising the Comintern's "3rd Period" policies in 
Saxony had not been achieved by harnessing a "left trend" in the party at large: the 
communist movement left nothing to chance. Instead, loyalty to the Comintern, the 
Bolshevik Revolution and opposition to reformism, comprised a propaganda campaign 
which sought to conceal the KPD's political developments rather than inform members of 
a coherent policy. The District Congresses in Saxony could proclaim that all those who 
did not accept the political line were guilty of a "cowardly retreat before the enemy" and 
that where the KPD had "bravely and decisively carried out the party line against 
reformism" the party "enjoyed great successes.,,130 The reality in the Saxon KPD, 
however, was not the mobilisation of the membership by a frontal attack on reformism, 
but passive resistance to the policy among the party's membership and lower functionaries 
who came in contact with the SPD. If the "3rd Period" was to have any meaning at all it 
would have to be implemented by party members who could identify with its claims. 
Because German society in 1928/9 did not provide such conditions, the KPD tried to 
create a mood inside the party which would be receptive to party policy. In order to 
129 Weber, Wandlung, p220. 
130 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (Februar 1929). 
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achieve such a mood in the party the KPD focused on the strikes and factory council 
elections of 1928/9, the campaign for a referendum on the SPD-sanctioned construction 
of Panzerkreutzer "A", and the events surrounding the so-called Blutmai of 1929 in 
Berlin. 
6.3 Forcing the Party Line: The" 3rd Period" and Communist Campaigning. 
The RGO-politik and Trade Union Communists 
The policy of open confrontation with the SPD found its equivalent in trade-union policy. 
The 4th Congress of the RILU, held in Moscow between mid March and early April 1928, 
introduced a policy which emphasised the organisation of the "revolutionary" workforce, 
under communist leadership, in opposition to the reformist policies of the SPD-dominated 
ADGB.131 In Germany by late 1927 the Left leadership in the KPD's ZK became 
increasingly concerned about the role of the SPD's left-wing in Saxony leading a range of 
strikes over pay and conditions. The so-called RGO-politik (revolutionary policy of the 
trade-union Opposition) was regarded as a central component in the KPD's conflict with 
"reformism". According to the KPD's ideology, the ADGB had become an integral part in 
maintaining the well-being of the capitalist state. The SPD's policy of "economic 
democracy", it was claimed, was based on improving the efficiency of German capitalism, 
while dressing this up as a policy to achieve improvements in living standards. Much of 
the debate in the communist movement during the introduction of the "3rd Period" 
General Line was concerned with assessing the role of industrial rationalisation in 
advancing the efficiency of the West's economy, while the Soviet Union continued to 
131 For the resolutions of the 9th ECCI Plenum on the trade-union question see, Degras, Commwzist 
International, pp432-36. 
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endure economic dislocation. 132 The thesis of social revolution riding on a communist 
political tide was largely based on the traditional Marxist concept that capitalist hubris 
would be followed by its final nemesis: world revolution. The KPD's task in Gennany was 
to make voluminous propaganda that reformism was no longer willing or able to lead the 
proletariat's struggles in the factories.133 
The 4th RGI Congress had re-defined not only the KPD's political tactic, but also re-
defined communism's target sociological recruitment group: no longer were the 
unorganised workers regarded as "politically backwards", but, as they were "free" of 
social democratic traditions, their growing social impoverishment would make them the 
most "radicalised and revolutionised" layers of the working class. 134 For this reason the 
KPD, jointly with the RGO, was to take on the "independent leadership" of economic 
struggles by electing "strike leaderships", which were to include all workers under 
communist leadership, leading strikes "against the will" of the reformist union leaders. 135 
The KPD's policy was based on an abstract political interpretation of the role of strikes as 
an expression not merely of economic interest, but against the capitalist state system itself: 
the larger the strike the stronger its anti-state character. 136 
There is no empirical evidence in either left-wing party districts, like the Ruhr, or 
traditionally right-wing districts, like in southwestern Saxony, that the membership had 
132 ibid, p455. 
133 Weiszt, KPD-Politik, pp53-7; Bahne, S., 'Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik' in 
Reulccke,1. (ed.), Arbeiterbewegung am Rhein und Ruhr. Beitrag zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 
in Rheinland-Westfalen (Wuppertal, 1974), p333; Rosa Meyer-Levine accepts this interpretation despite 
the fact that Ernst Meyer was hostile to this position at the time, Inside German Communism, ppI58-60. 
134 Wieszt, KPD-Politik, pp35-6,341-2; Wuenderlich, Kommunalpolitik, pp56-8. 
135 Eisner, F., Das Verhaeltniss der KPD zu den Gewerkschaften in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 
Frankfurt/M, 1977), p222. 
136 Weiszt, KPD-Politik, pp58-9. 
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forced the new line from below.137 In Saxony, the fonnation of the ROO as a separate 
communist organisation was not the corollary of a wave of expUlsions of Communists 
triggered by local union officials nervous at their radicalism. The pressure for the policy 
came from a different direction in the KPD: the Thaelmann leadership was petitioning the 
ECCI to sanction a full blown ultra-Left tactic.138 
It was one thing for the ZK to make political pronouncements on the KPD's trade-union 
policy, but quite another to have this policy carried out in the factories. This was the real 
test of how the party membership viewed the policy. During the first half of 1928 the 
Right conducted a dispute with the leader of the RILU, Alexander Losowsky, in the pages 
of die Kommunistische Internationale. Representative of this dispute was Arthur 
Lieberasch's warning that in practice the RILU's policy in Germany was not functioning as 
a "strike strategy" but as an isolation tactic, like during the Ruth Fischer period, and was 
eroding the wider influence which was required to defeat reformism. 139 This debate was 
continued at district level. In West Saxony Boettcher and Lieberasch warned against the 
implications of prioritising organising the unorganised workers in "strike leaderships" and 
re-defining what was an "employers' offensive" on pay and conditions as a "workers' 
offensive~ Boettcher and Lieberasch stressed that the slogan "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" had never caused a wage struggle and for this reason the KPD needed to 
continue its day-to-day work in the unions for social and economic concessions as a path 
137 For the Ruhr, see Bahne, 'Ruhrgebiet', p335. 
138 Wieszt, KPD-Politik, p351. Neumann and Ulbricht represented this view in the ECCI. For an example 
of the factional use of the trade-union tactic, see SAPMO I 8/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-BI am 11.11.1928, 
B1.422-3 (Saefkow). 
139 Lieberasch, A., Fragen der Streikstrategie', in, Die Kommunistische Internationale', IX (1928), 
pp658-63; Losowsky, A., 'Antwort einem aengstlichen Kommunist', ibid, pp664-67. 
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to communism 140 Much of the KPD's policy emphasis was concentrated on the workers in 
the massive factories of the heavy industrial sector, which was almost completely absent 
from the Saxon economy. However, communist union activists in Saxony infonned the 
BLs that the policy had no hold in either large or small factories. 141 
The KPD's trade-union policy experienced a credibility crisis during the strikes which 
took place in Saxony. After the rash of strikes throughout the winter of 1927/8, the next 
significant wage movement in Saxony was the lock out of 200,000 workers in the metal 
working industries following the employers' rejection of the DMV's pay demands. 142 
These developments clearly put the KPD's claims that reformism could not lead 
movements to achieve workers' demands into difficulties: all the more so as many left-
wing Social Democrats, who ran the union's local branches, were openly calling for 
reform of the system of compulsory state arbitration. 143 Rank -and-file members of the 
KPD continued to stand side-by-side in industrial disputes with their social democratic 
colleagues. In the suburbs of Chemnitz Communists in the metal trades rejected the BL's 
strike strategy in a dispute culminating in their expulsion in early 1929.144 The KPD's 
propagandistic response to the role of radical reformism in Saxony was typified by 
140 SAPMO 13/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
B1.462-3(Boettcher); ibid, B1.465(Lieberasch). 
141 SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten BL Westsachsen am 21.11.1928, 
B1.464 (Engert). 
142 DMV called for a wage rise of 15pf per hour in each of the three Saxon wage districts. The employers 
stated that this would damage international competativeness see, St.Ha.D. (Staatshauptarchiv Dresden), 
MdI, Nr.l1126/2, Monatsbericht (April 1928), B1.62; From a parteilich perspective, see Reschwamm, D., 
'Der saeschische Metallarbeiterkampf im April/Mai 1928', in Saechsische Heimatsblaetter 30 (5) (1984), 
pp209-212. 
143 SAPMO 13/9/64, Zum Bericht der BL der BL an den Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 13-
14.4.1929, B1.5. 
144 ibid, B1.5-6. 
Page 299 
statements such as the reformists had "allowed the strike as a manoeuvre" to win workers' 
votes during the 1928 Reichstag elections.145 This not only contradicted party ideology, 
but did nothing to "win over the majority of the working class" in a struggle against 
binding state arbitration.146 
When further wage agreements expired at the turn of 1928/9, industrial disputes again 
increased in Saxony.147 In the Saxon printing trades and textile industries mid level union 
functionaries informed the ZK's representatives that they would not carry out the policy 
adopted at the 4th Congress of the RILU because there was no "right development" of 
reformist union leaders nor was there a "left development" in the masses, least of all 
among the non-unionised workers, whom the KPD set out to include in the election of 
"strike leaderships".148 In East Saxony the KPD's BL conceded that the reformist trade 
unions played a dominant role among the workforce. However, it asserted that: 
It is also possible in East Saxony, where the leadership of the struggle lies in the 
reformists hands, to snatch the leadership .. .!t is our task to build up strike 
leaderships to show the workers that there is a way other than the reformists' 
h· l' 149 scotc lng po ICy. 
The central issue in the policy debate throughout the party was the Ruhr lock -out. At the 
meeting of the ECCrs Political Secretariat on 28 November, the Left in the ZK used the 
Ruhr struggle to justify an ultra-Leftist policy in Germany. Ulbricht presented events as a 
145 ibid, B1.6. 
146 State arbitration under the SPD's Labour Minister, Rober Wissel, awarded a pay increase of between 5 
and 7 pf per hour. The KPD claimed that this represented a "defeat" because price rises wiped out any 
gain. See Reschwamm, 'Metal1arbeiterkampf, p212. 
147 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsberichte (October 1928-Januar 1929). 
148 SAPMO I 8/8/25, Protokoll der Voll-B1 am 11.11.1928, B1.422(Saefkow). 
149 ibid, B1.427(Schneider). 
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working-class offensive, signifying an upswmg of the revolutionary wave. 150 In 
characteristic style the KPD used events in another part of the country as a policy paragon 
for what would be possible if the leadership's instructions were carried out. The Ruhr 
lock-out's function as internal party propaganda for the new political line was viewed as 
more important than the reality that local Communist activists in the Ruhr refused to carry 
out the policy and had openly opposed the leadership's position at public meetings. 151 The 
issue of the Ruhr conflict was taken into the factories using communist factory papers and 
convening meetings on the strike, which alleged the SPD's betrayal of workers' objectives. 
Communist factory papers claimed that events in the Ruhr proved that workers could 
"strike" in contravention of the SPD's policy of compulsory state arbitration, but the 
SPD's "secret diplomacy" with trust capital, the bourgeoisie and the military, threatened 
the movement's success. The SPD workers in Saxony, however, were aware of the actual 
course of developments in the Ruhr lock-out; many of them were even contributing to a 
social-democrat -run solidarity fund. 152 
The decline of communist influence in the factories as a result of the new trade-union 
policy was made clear in the 1929 factory council elections, which were the first since 
1925 with independent Communist candidates. In Leipzig, which had been a centre of 
support for the KPD's left wing, party members and union activists also rejected the 
official party line. This was shown by the lack of interest in a regional conference on 
trade-union policy in mid 1928 in Dresden; only eight delegates were sent from the 
ISO Watlin, Die Komintern, ppI83-4. 
151 The Ruhr lock-out is dealt with in detail by Peterson, L., 'Labour and the End of Weimar: The Case of 
the KPD in the November 1928 Lockout in the Rheinish-Westphalian Iron and Steel Industry, in Central 
European History (CEll) 15 (1) (1982), pp57-94; Bahne, 'Ruhrgebiet', pp332-9. 
152 These events are examined in the documentary collection in, St.Ha.D." MdI, Nr.19019, B1.1-68. 
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functionary conferences in Leipzig.153 The annual report of the West Saxon Trade Union 
Division for 1928-29 also records a decline in the election of Communist factory 
councillors in 1929 on the previous year.154 In the exceptional cases where the KPD's vote 
held up, such as among the Leipzig tram workers, Communist union functionaries had 
refused to carry out the party line. 155 In former KPD strongholds a significant 
consequence of the party's tactic was the loss of union payment offices to the SPD. In 
Chemnitz the payment office of the carpenters' union, which had been in communist hands 
since 1919, went over to the SPD for the first time during the Weimar Republic. 156 In the 
Right stronghold of Solingen, the DMV payment office also went from communist control 
to the SPD for the first time since 1918 as a result of the KPD's union policy:57 Often 
Communist union functionaries, as well as rank-and-file members, simply ignored party 
directives for drawing up independent candidate lists in the factory council elections.158 
The party centre was unable to impose its position as the district and local trade-union 
divisions were still under the control of Right Communists or under caretaker Kommissar 
leadership.159 During the campaigns for the factory council elections, the factional struggle 
153 SAPMO I 3/10/116, lahresbericht der Bezirksgewerkschafts-Abteilung des Bezirk Westsachsens 1928-
29, B1.616-7. 
154 ibid, B1.617. 
155 The factory council vote was 2,197 for the KPD and 2,336 for the SPD, see ibid, B1.618. 
156 SAPMO I 3/9/64, Zum Bericht der BL an den Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, 
BLlO. 
157 Wuendelich, Kommunalpolitik, pp58; Stolle, U., Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb: Frauen und Maenner, 
ReJormisten und Radikale, Fach und Massenarbeiter bei Bayern, BASF, Borsch und in Solingen (1900-
1933) (Frankfurt/M, New York, 1980), p260. 
158 SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht der Gewerkschafts-Abteilung der Bezirk Westsachsens fuer die Monate 
Dezember bis Mitte Maerz 1929, Bl.596; ibid, lahresbericht der Bezirksgewerkschafts-Abteilung des 
Bezirk Westsachsens, 1928-29, B1.618. 
159 ibid, Bericht der Gewerkschafts-Abteilung der Bezirk Westsachsens fuer die Monate Dezember bis 
Mitte Maerz 1929, B1.587. 
Page 302 
was paralysing the KPD's ability to carry out the "left-turn" in the factories. l60 Crucial to 
the KPD's marginalisation in the Saxon factories during the late twenties and early thirties 
was the refusal of even left-wing Communists in the factories to carry out a policy of 
organisational isolation from the SPD, which could neither win the party wider influence 
nor achieve any tangible gains. 
In Saxony, explanations for the adoption of the RGO-politik as a product of socio-
economic and political developments in Germany do not hold up in the light of 
documentary evidence. Indeed, to accept this thesis is to accept that the Comintern and 
the Thaelmann faction in the KPD had a valid political interpretation. Trade-union 
Communists, who were familiar with the condition in the factories, rejected the tactic as 
an "isolation" policy: a one way ticket for the KPD out of the factories, rather than to the 
head of a movement of political strikes. Communist factory policy did, however, have a 
function in the Gennan political system. The RGO-politik was intended to push the gulf 
between the SPD and KPD at national level into the parties' social bases. The KPD 
wanted to end the internal party political consequences of contact with the wider workers' 
movement, even calling on the replacement of long serving Communists, who were 
frequently fonner Social Democrats, by "new fresh strength" which would be "capable" of 
carrying out party policy. 161 The KPD tried to give its new factory policy a sense of 
160 SLHa.D." Md!, Nr.11126/3, Monatsbericht (April 1928), B1.21; SAPMO I 3/10/116, Bericht der 
Gewerkschafts-Abteilung der Bezirk Westsachsens fuer die Monate Dezember bis Mitte Maerz 1929, 
B1.596; ibid, lahresbericht der Bezirksgewerkschafts-Abteilung des Bezirk Westsachsens 1928-29, 
B1.618. In West Saxony all the KPD's political energy was taken up by the preparations for the Extra-
Ordinary District Party Congress (16-17.2.1929) and the exclussion of the Right from its remaining 
district positions. 
161 On what the Comintem saw as the advantages of unorganised workers see, Wieszt, KPD-Politik, 
pp341; On the Stalinist campaign to end "socialist traditions" in the KPD, see, \Vebcr, H., 'Zur Ideologic 
der KPD in der Weimarer Republik. Neue Literatur', in Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz 
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urgency by connecting the "strike strategy" to defence of the Soviet Union against the 
alleged threat of an imperialist war of intervention. However, at local level the 
involvement of the wider social democratic movement in anti-war protests gave this 
method little plausibility.162 The RGO-politik, it can be concluded, did not make an impact 
in Saxony because even the KPD's membership in the factories could not identify with its 
methods. 
Panzerkreuzer "A": A Missed Opportunity? 
The KPD's campaign for a referendum against the SPD-Ied Reich government's proposed 
building of "Pocket Battleship A" was an opportunity to place the new anti- SPD party 
line at the forefront of an extra-parliamentary campaign. In the autumn of 1928 the issue 
of war featured prominently in campaigning across the spectrum of German political 
movements: the voelkisch movement, including the Saxon DNVP and DVP, 
commemorated the battles of Sedan and Tannenberg; the SPD and the ADGB 
commemorated the Great War, with a pacifist accent; the KPD focused on the alleged 
danger of a new imperialist war and the "betrayals" of the SPD in August 1914.163 In this 
political climate the KPD intended to exploit the role of the SPD in government to give 
credibility to its "3rd Period" propaganda. The KPD's propaganda was helped by the fact 
that during the 1928 Reichstag election the SPD had campaigned against the building of 
zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (IWK) 2 (1985), p206; For an appraisal of Frankfurt-am-
Main, see Wickham, 'Working-Class Life', p199; Claudin, Communist Movement, ppI58-9. 
162 The KPD's use of propaganda in the factories on the threat of an imperialist war was prolific, see for 
example Der Scheinwerfer. Betreibszeitung der Firma Siedel und Neumann (October,1928), in St.Ha.D." 
MdI, Nr.19091, BI.2-6. 
163 SLHa.D." MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (August 1928), B1.87; ibid (October 1928), B1.94. 
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Panzerkreuzer A with the slogan: "Food for Children not a Pocket Battleship! ,,164 The so-
called reannament issue was a seeming gift to the KPD's new General Line, which placed 
at its centre the defence of the Soviet Union from an imperialist war, and the SPD's 
alleged active role in preparing such an attack.165 
The SPD was placed in the classic dilemma of a reformist party: the party leadership 
wanted to achieve its objectives through participation in the institutions of state, but the 
party's grass roots political movement often rejected the compromises required to 
maintain a coalition government. Above all the SPD's Reich Executive came into conflict 
with the Class War faction, organised around the eponymous journal, and centred in 
Saxony. In August 1928 a furious dispute erupted at a proliferation of SPD membership 
meetings, many of which not only endorsed resolutions against the national leadership's 
policies, but even called for the expulsion of the four SPD Ministers from the party.166 The 
Reich Executive, however, was able to prevent co-operation with the KPD in the 
campaign for a referendum by means of a "loyalty declaration". Central to the SPD 
leadership's compromise with the party membership was the assurance that the next party 
congress would address the issue of defence policy.167 
During the KPD's campaign for a referendum the party's tactic continued to prioritise 
collecting the signatures of SPD workers rather than shifting the emphasis to the 
164 Wickham, 'Social Fascism', p17. 
165 For an example of this form of propaganda in the Saxon factories, see SAPMO I 3/8/31, An den 
Betriebsrat der Firma. Dresden, den 15.9.1928, Bl.183. 
166 SLHa.D." MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (August 1928), Bl.89. 
167 SAPMO 13/10/136, 'Volksbegehren in Westsachsen', in Die Parteiarbeiter. Discussions-und-
Mitteilungsblatt der KPD Bezirk West Sachsens, vol. 1, Nr.ll (November 1928), B1.23; When the 1931 
SPD Congress met in Leipzig the radical left wing split-off to form the SAP after being reproached by the 
majority for their policies, see Winkler, H. A., 'Choosing the Lesser Evil: The German Social Democrats 
and the Fall of the Weimar Republic', in JC1I25 (2-3) (1990) (pp205-27), p210. 
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"unorganised" workers that the 6th Congress of the Comintern identified as the social 
basis for revolution in Gennany. Indeed, the KPD found the "broad masses" of 
unorganised workers to be largely "unpolitical" during the whole campaign.168 The 
organisation of the campaign for a referendum took the form of building so-called Unity 
Committees at regional, district and local level, which aimed at the organisational 
inclusion of non-communists from all working-class organisations and the factories, with 
the exception of SPD leaders.169 Despite all the radical pronouncements about factory 
workers forming the quintessential element of the KPD's "3rd Period" line, the party's 
wider propaganda again appealed to the "Working People", which was defined to include 
small traders, peasants and those living from pensions.170 However, in practice it was 
above all the RFB, which was disposed to the radicalism of new line, which carried out 
much of the campaign. l71 Communist agitation in rural areas would have collapsed but for 
the role of the RFB's "Red Rural Sundays".I72 For example, in East Saxony the KPD was 
unable to carry out any rural propaganda for the referendum campaign as the party's rural 
168 The leftist Political Secretary in Erzgebirge-Vogtland, Mapitz, stressed collecting the signatures of 
social democrats, see SAPMO 13/9/70, Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 24.9.1928, 
B1.116; SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten BL vom 18.10.1928, B1.345(Jakob). 
169 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der engeren BL am 29.8.1928, B1.332(Hoop); SAPMO I 3/9nO, Protokoll 
der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 24.9.1928, B1.116; SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung 
der erweiterten BL vom 18.10.1928, B1.343(Schumann). 
170 SAPMO I 3/8/31, An den Betriebsrat der Firma. Dresden, den 15.9.1928, B1.183. The BL meeting, 
however, did not go into details about the "Working People". 
171 St.Ha.D."MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (August 1928), B1.87. In Chemnitz, a centre of right-wing 
communism, a meeting beginning the district committee's campaign collapsed when the RFB left for a 
"Red Meeting" in Nuremberg, see SAPMO I 3/9nO, Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland vom 
24.9.1928, BI.I17-8 
172 SAPMO 13/8/47, Protokoll der Sitzung der Abteilung Land am 30.9.1928, B1.8. 
Page 306 
division had all but collapsed: both district secretaries and party members were disinclined 
to carry out campaigns which got nowhere.173 
The question in the Saxon district parties became how strictly to implement the united 
front from below tactic? The "purest", or most restrictive form of the united front from 
below, was advocated by Raedel who, in close association with the ZK, wanted the 
campaign to prioritise the use of letters to individual SPD workers and factory meetings 
on the "Battleship Question".174 Other district secretaries, such as Martin Schneider, 
believed that it was necessary to "unmask" the District SPD Executive by calling on it to 
join the Referendum Campaign's Unity Committee, in what would have constituted a 
district level united front from above. Schneider's policy proposal was conceived of as a 
tactic to win over "radicalised" Social Democrats, rather than "moderating" the political 
assault on the SPD.175 The debate concluded in an agreement that local Unity Committees 
could address the SPD's District Executive, but under no circumstances was an appeal for 
participation to come from the KPD. 176 In practice what the KPD's tactic served to do 
was reinforce the dividing line between the SPD and the KPD at local level as well as 
regionally and nationally. The KPD's tactics were limiting the scope of the extra-
parliamentary campaign at a time when the policies of an SPD-Ied government lent some 
plausibility to communist propaganda concerning the need for an ultra-Left policy.I77 
173 At the East Saxon rural conference in February 1928 only 23 communists turned up. By September the 
number had dropped to six. Many of the small peasants were extremely poor wendisch speakers, who 
could not have read propaganda in German even if they could have afforded to by it from the KPD, see 
ibid, Protokoll der Berzirks-Land-Konferenz am 22.9.1928, B1.7. 
174 SAPMO I 3/8/25, Protokoll der engeren BL am 29.8.1928, B1.333(Raedel). 
175 ibid, BI.333,335(Schneider) 
176 ibid, B1.336. M. Schneider and Kurt Froehlich favoured this option. Other district secretaries such as, 
Martin Hoop, favoured strictly no contact with local SPD leaders. 
177 Wuenderlich, Kommunalpolitik, p66; Wickham, 'Social Fascism', pI7. 
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The limits of the KPD's radius of influence, when working in isolation, became clear in 
the course of the campaign. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the BL knew that the readership of 
der Kaempfer was too small to reach the target numbers of petition signatories. To 
overcome this the KPD undertook street propaganda, such as distributing leaflets in busy 
thoroughfares, and the KJ performed short theatre pieces in front of selected factories. 178 
In Western Saxony, where the numbers signing the KPD's petition amounted to almost 50 
per cent of the party's vote in the 1928 Reichstag election, representing the most 
successful campaign outside of Berlin, the limitations of the campaign were clear. Local 
peace societies remained under the SPD's leadership, only 20 factories and ten union 
meetings adopted resolutions for participation in the KPD's campaign: from these only 
four factory committees co-operated with the Leipzig Unity Committee; and only ten 
sport and leisure organisations adopted resolutions supporting the KPD. 179 Of the 19 
organisations represented in the Unity Committee for Greater Leipzig only the Leipzig 
local branch of the painters' trade union, which was dominated by the KPD, could be 
presented as anything but a communist front organisation.180 In a manner similar to the 
campaign to expropriate the German Princely Houses in 1926, the division between the 
SPD and KPD in 1928 remained less rigid in the small towns and industrial villages. For 
example, the collection of signatures ill the wider administrative area 
(Kreishauptmannschaft) of Borna, including the lignite industry outside the town, reached 
the equivalent of 32.1 per cent of the communist vote in the Reichstag election, while it 
178 SAPMO I 3/9nO, Protokoll der engeren BL Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 24.9.1928, B1.116-9. 
179 ibid, Bl.116; SAPMO I 3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten BL yom 18.10.1928, B1.342-
3(Schumann); SAPMO 13/10/136, 'Volksbegehren in Westsachsen', in Die Parteiarbeiter, Nr.II 
(November 1928), Bl.23. The city of Leipzig produced signatures equivallent to 51.1 per cenl of the KPD 
vote at the 1928 Reichstag election. 
180 ibid, 'Volksbegehren in Westsachsen', Bl.23. 
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dropped to 24.4 per cent in the town itself. 181 Although the fonnation of Unity 
Committees had almost no success in including SPD workers, the resolutions taken in nine 
local groups of the SPD came from the small towns of the Saxon provinces.182 In the 
factories, including those with a significant communist presence, and in the sports and 
cultural organisations, party members simply did not carry out the campaign in the context 
of identifying even local social democratic office holders as "social fascists".183 The inner 
leadership of the KPD, which issued the BLs with policy directives, appears to have been 
party to a policy conceived firstly in the interests of separating the SPD's and KPD's social 
constituencies and only secondly with a political objective per se. 
The KPD's leadership never abandoned its claim that there was a "left-development" in 
the German workforce. Instead, the inability to give the campaign a high political profile 
was blamed on the lower party organisations' "failure" to carry out the policy 
"correctly".184 The party leadership also constantly stated that if the KPD was organised 
on the basis of factory cells, then the ZK's policies would successfully turn a "mood" of 
sympathy for communism into a stream of new recruits.18S The KPD leadership also began 
to stress that the KPD must be organised on the basis of factory cells in order to continue 
party work during a period of illegality.186 The restrictive nature of the ZK's ultra-Left 
181 "bOd 1 1 " 
182 SAPMO 13/9/70, Protokoll der engeren BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 24.9.1928, B1.116; SAPMO I 
3/10/114, Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten BL yom 18.10.1928, B1.342(Schumann). 
183 ibid, Protokoll der engeren BLS. Erzgebirge-Vogtland yom 24.9.1928, B1.116; SAPMO I 3/10/114, 
Protokoll der Sitzung der erweiterten BL yom 18.10.1928, B1.344(Boettcher); SAPMO I 8{25, Protokoll 
der engeren BLS. am 29.8.1928, B1.334(Koch); For the KPD in the sports organisations, see St.Ha.D." 
MdI Nr.l1126/2, Monatsbericht (August 1928), B1.87. 
184 SAPMO I 2/2/12, Die politische Lehren der Mai-Kaempfe, B1.4. 
185 "bOd 1 1 . 
186 The topic of the KPD's preparations for illegality is dealt with in detail by, Wachtler, 1., Zwischen 
Revolutionserwartung und Untergang" Die Vorbereitung der KPD auf die lliegalitaet in den lahren 
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policies went beyond what even left-wing Communists in Saxony could understand as a 
valid political tactic. In September 1928 the East Saxon district secretary, and enthusiastic 
leftist, Goldhammer, declared that, "This nonsense about illegality ought to be stopped 
whereby SPD functionaries are left in their organisations to carry out work for the SPD's 
.• ,,187 decompOSItiOn. 
The KPD's immersion in the power struggle, which had erupted after the "Thaelmann 
Affair" , impeded the organisation of the referendum campaign. The late delivery of 
propaganda material, a constant problem, had become worse. The Saxon KPD was even 
delayed in the collection of signatures because of a failure to issue the necessary forms. 188 
By 16 October, the cut-off point in the collection of signatures, the KPD had the support 
of only three per cent of the German electorate. The Right used this to illustrate their 
criticisms of the KPD's tactics, pointing out that the political influence of the SPD among 
the German workers was still too widespread for the KPD to live in isolation from this 
reality.189 The KPD leadership's response to the Right's statements on the failure of the 
party's tactic in the Panzerkreuzer campaign was to insist that the expectation of gaining 
four million votes, like in the campaign to expropriate the former monarchies, was 
"reformist thinking".190 The RGO-politik and the campaign for a referendum on the issue 
of building Panzerkreuzer A had indicated that if the "social fascist" thesis was to be given 
sufficient plausibility to mobilise the KPD against the SPD, at local level as well as 
1929-1933 (Frankfurt/M, Bern, New York, 1983); SAPMO I 3/10/109, 'Nach dem Bezirksparteitag mit 
verstaerkter Kraft an der Arbeit', in, SAZ, Nr.99, 29.4.1929, B1.20. 
187 SAPMO 18/25, Protokoll der engeren BL am 29.8.1928, B1.333(Goldhammer). 
188 ibid, B1.335(Raedel). 
189 St.Ha.D."MdI Nr.11126/2, Monatsbericht (September 1928), B1.90. 
190 SAPMO I 3/9/64, Zum Bericht der BL an den Bezirksparteitag Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, 
B1.7. 
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nationally, the membership would have to be given a sense of the policy's immediate 
relevance. 
Blutmai: A Contrived Confrontation. 
The KPD had used the "3rd Period" party line since the May 1928 Reichstag election 
campaign. However, apart from the pages of the communist press and party circulars, the 
term "social fascist" had found little wider resonance in the membership. 191 More 
importantly, the "left-turn" had re-ignited the party's power struggle over the correct 
tactics for a communist party in Gennany, drawing the actual focus of party activity 
inwards again. In Right communist strongholds, such as the industrial suburbs of 
Chemnitz, the KPD's membership in the factories fought the implications of the 
Kampfbegriff "social fascist" more than their social democratic colleagues.192 The scene 
was set for a confrontation between the KPD and the SPD-Ied Prussian government when 
the Minister of the Interior, Albert Grzinski, refused to lift a ban on outdoor 
demonstrations, even for the highly symbolic May Day celebrations in Berlin.193 The 
refusal of Grzinski, and his social democratic Police President Zoergiebel, to yield was 
matched by the highly confrontational language of the Communist press, internal 
191 Bahne described the use of the tenn "social fascist" as "reserved" until the events of Blutmai, see, 
Bahne, S., "Sozialfascismus' in Deutschland. Zur Geschicht eines politischen Begriffs', in International 
Review o/Social History (IRSH) 10 (2) (1965) (pp2II-45), pp223-4; Schirmann, L., Blutmai Berlin 1929. 
Dichtung und Wahrheit (Berlin,I99I), pp82-I68. The Saxon Reichstag election campaign is detailed in, 
B.a.P., RKO 15.07, Nr. 25175-9. 
192 See section 6.2 above. 
193 For the sequence of events producing the ban on outdoor celebrations and the KPD's response, see 
Bowlby, C., 'Blutmai 1929: Police, Parties and Proletarians in a Berlin Confrontation', in Historical 
Journal (/1J) 29 (1) (1986), ppI37-40. 
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directives and factory papers.194 The KPD's attack on the SPD was not only against its 
leaders in the Prussian government, but included a tirade against ordinary party members; 
the left-wing of the SPD was singled out for particularly hostile treatment. 195 The KPD's 
intention was to "demonstrate" that there was no community of interest between 
Communists and Social Democrats at any level. 
The ZK's preparations for an illegal demonstration in Berlin on May Day 1929 had 
reckoned with the probability of a confrontation with the police ending in the deaths of 
participants.196 However, the scale of events took on a dynamic of their own. The SPD's 
leadership in Prussia had adopted the mantle of respectable members of the establishment: 
public order became a priority above the tradition of street demonstrations, which 
stemmed from the party's years of exclusion and opposition during the Kaiserreich. The 
KPD was identified as the principal threat to Ruhe und Ordnung. 197 The KPD intended to 
present the imminent confrontation with the SPD-administered Prussian police as a 
justification for its propaganda that the SPD served as an arm of an oppressive capitalist 
state. The Prussian police, despite ten years of SPD administrative control, remained, 
especially in the officer corps, a centre of monarchism. If the working-class movement 
was seen as an "enemy" in general, then the Communists were seen as the worst and most 
"criminal" elements in society.198 During the three days of conflict the excessive response 
of the police, and its role in producing a blood bath, was criticised from the left-wing of 
194 Bowlby, 'Blutmai', ppI39-40. 
195 Rosenfeld, K., 'Berliner Blutmai', in, Klassenkampj, 3 (10) (15.5.1929), p291. 
196 This is explicity dealt with in the ZK meeting with the Political Secretaries of the party districts. A ZK 
circular to the party leadership in Hamburg got into the hands of the SPD and was then published in 
Vorwaerts. See, SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Berlin, den 10.5.1929, B1.2. 
197 Bowlby, 'Blutmai', p 155. 
198 Liang, H-H., The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic (Berkeley, 1970), p84. 
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the SPD into the ranks of the liberal bourgeois press. 199 Of the 33 dead and some 160 
wounded only one was a Communist, two were Social Democrats, while the vast majority 
were residents, even passers by, who were not involved in the events organised by the 
KPD?OO Blutmai, however, did not become the "moral victory" for the KPD, which 
Bowlby writes the KPD had hoped for?Ol Indeed, the KPD leadership's policy of isolating 
the membership from the influences of the wider workers' movement was well known to 
contemporary radical socialists. The "Class War" group in the Saxon SPD, which 
advocated "proletarian unity" despite the positions of the party leaderships, wrote that: 
There can be no doubt that the KPD leadership has heavy responsibility for this 
loss of blood. The workers were almost led into police fire. To the KPD's Zentrale 
it was irrelevant whether people died or not. For them it was only about creating 
facts from which their poisoned agitation against the SPD could be supplied with 
new poison ... The events of May Day in Berlin have filled the gulf between Social 
Democrats and Parteikommunisten with workers' blood. The fissure in the 
working class is even greater than before?02 
The role of the SPD leadership after the events of May Day 1929 did, however, have an 
impact on opinion among the KPD's membership. A combination of factors lent credibility 
199 For press extracts from the Berliner Tageblatt of 10.5.1929 and the Frankfurter Zeitung of 5.5.1929 
see, 'Meinungsaeusserungen ueber die Berliner Vorgaenge', in Klassenkampj, 3 (10) (15.5.1929), pp317-
8. How the police could have acted without causing a blood bath was illustrated with reference to the 
events of May Day in Paris: the police "got out of bed earlier than the communists", arrived at the 
meeting points published in L'Humanite and held the prospective demonstraters in custody untill the 
evening, ibid, p292. 
200 Winkler, H. A., Der Weg in der Katastrophe. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer 
Republik 1930-33 (Berlin, Bonn, 1987), p777. 
201 Bowlby, 'Blutmai', p140. 
202 Rosenfeld, 'Berliner Blutmai', in Klassenkampj, 3 (10) (15.5.1929), pp292-3. 
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to an inherent antipathy towards the SPD leadership. Not only did Grzinski and 
Zoergiebel resolutely defend the actions of the Prussian police, but the SPD was party to 
the banning of the communist daily newspaper, die Rote Fahne, for three weeks, the 
pennanent ban on the RFB throughout the Reich, and it was known that a ban on the 
KPD itself had been contemplated. All this took place against a background in which it 
appeared that a blind eye was being turned to the violence of the right-wing paramilitary 
organisations, and the speaking ban, imposed on Hitler after the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, 
had been repealed in the German Laender.203 
The KPD's leadership in Saxony was able to respond rapidly to Blutmai, not least 
because they had been put on stand-by in anticipation of events in Berlin: in the night of 1-
2 May leaflets were distributed and meetings of functionaries held.204 In the major Saxon 
cities the protest demonstrations held on 2 May were larger than those held by the KPD 
on the May Day itself. Around 3,000 people participated in a demonstration on the 
Reichsgericht in Leipzig. In Dresden some 5,000 demonstrators converged on the city 
centre. Both events passed without notable incident.205 However, a demonstration in 
Chemnitz, numbering some 2,400, culminated in a violent clash with the police?06 The 
KPD acted to further incite confrontation when functionaries told the crowd that there 
should be no retreat from the police charge. Max Hoelz stated that: 
203 MaIlmann, K-M., 'Milieu, Radikalismus und lokaIe Gesellschaft. Zur SoziaIgeschichte des 
Kommunismus in der Weimarer republik', in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 21 (1) (1995), p17. For the 
lifting of Hitlers's speaking ban, Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1728, Monatsbericht (November 1927). 
204 SAPMO 13/10/116, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der KPD, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
24.5.1929. Bericht der BL Westsachsen ueber die Maikaempfe, B1.654; SAPMO 13/10/114, Bericht von 
der erweitcrtcn BLS am 16.5.1929, B1.593(Winterich); Eisner, Gewerkschaften, p230. 
205 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (April-Mai 1929). 
206 'b'd 1 I . 
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If you scram from these dozen Greens (ie police officers) I will not hit them but 
you instead. If you are so cowardly, then you are not worthy of the Berlin 
workforce, who struggled at the barricades where workers' blood flowed. If you 
stand and march then they will scram.207 
A continued level of tension was maintained in Saxony throughout May in a number of 
street demonstrations against the ban of the RFB, which had been sanctioned by the 
Saxon state authorities on 5 May.208 
The KPD's leaflets in the Saxon factories called for the arming of the proletariat and 
urged workers to demonstrate against Zoergiebel's "social fascist police terror. ,,209 The 
public propaganda, however, contrasted with the discussions in the ZK. The disparity 
between the KPD's verbal radicalism and reluctance to actively organise an escalation of 
events became a hallmark evaluating the KPD's "3rd Period" General line.210 The ZK 
meeting of 10 May, which discussed the events of Blutmai, clearly indicates that despite 
the radical language used by the communist leadership, there was no intention of calling a 
May Uprising to rival the events of January 1919?11 
More significant for the development of the KPD during the 1930s was the failure of the 
call for a general strike in protest at events in Berlin. In Berlin itself the call was taken up 
207 'b'd 1 1 . 
208 'b'd 1 1 . 
209 ibid; SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Berlin, den 10.5.1929, B1.1 
210 No plans were ever made for revolution in Gennany, Weber, Haupt/eind, p18; For the role of 
Manuilsky in putting Soviet trade with Gennany above revolution in Germany, Pogge von Strandmann, 
H., 'Industrial Primacy in German Foreign Policy? Myths and Realities in German-Russian Relations at 
the End of the Weimar Republic', in Bessel, R., and Feuchtwanger, EJ. (eds.), Social Change and 
Political Developments in Weimar Germany (London, 1981), pp241-67. 
211 SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Berlin, den 10.5.1929, B1.1 
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by a handful of building sites, a sweet meats factory and a few cigarette factories. 212 In 
Saxony too, despite the KPD's "central task" of preparing for May Day in the factories, 
the party showed its chronic weakness. Resolutions condemning the role of Zoergiebel's 
"social fascist police terror" were limited to factories which already had prominent 
communist influence.213 The KPD leadership, however, turned this apparent defeat into 
internal party advantage by justifying the need to re-organise the party on the basis of 
factory cells to achieve its political objectives. The ZK meeting of 10 May adopted a 
resolution which stated that: "There is still a certain discrepancy between the workers' 
instinctive feelings for communism and carrying out a real active communist policy. ,,214 
This was put down to the KPD's inadequate roots in the factories, above all the large 
factories, and the continued refusal of many party members and local functionaries to be 
organised in factory cells.215 The KPD leadership concluded that the main lesson from 
Blutmai was that the party's political role could only be successful if the membership was 
comprehensively organised on the basis of factory cells; to work towards this aim the ZK 
instructed the BLs to form a body of Communist shop stewards (Vertrauensleuts) to co-
212 ibid, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Die politische Lehren der Mai-Kaempfe, B1.3; 
Walter Rist, the pen-name of a former party functionary, does not include the cigarette factories in an 
otherwise similar account, see Id., 'Die KPD in der Krise', Neue Blaetter fuer den Sozialismus, 11(1931) 
(pp345-45), p437. 
\. 
213 SAPMO I 3/10/116, KPD Bezirk Westsachsen. An das ZK der KPD, Sekretariat. Leipzig, den 
24.5.1929. Bericht der BL Westsachsen ueber die Maikaempfe, B1.655. Internal party documents indicate 
that resolutions were taken in West Saxony in nine metal working factories, one textile factory and a 
brewery, eight building sites and some tram stations and workshops, most notably the Heiterblick tram 
workshop which was strongly leftist and associated with Otto Vogt 
214 SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Die politische Lehren der Mai-Kaempfe. 
Berlin, den 10.5.1929, B1.3. 
215 ibid, B1.4-5. An unnamed party district, which can be taken as representative, was stated to have only 
3.67 per cent of its factory membership organised in factory cells while 5.12 per cent of the factory 
employed membership served as factory or works councillors. 
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ordinate factory policy.216 The party leadership planned to purge all factory cell 
leaderships which refused to carry out party policy and to replace them with personnel 
who would do so. A sweeping purge of street cells leaderships was also to be conducted 
to enable "stronger supervision" of party work and a greater "politicisation" of the party 
members and sympathisers.217 The events of Blutmai clearly had a prominent role in 
eliminating internal party opposition to the KPD's ultra-Leftism. Bowlby observed that: 
It was no coincidence that one of the Thaelmann group's main initiatives was to 
shift the focus of KPD organisation away from the street cells, which played such a 
vital role in an area such as Wedding, and which were seen as obstacles to the 
creation of a truly Bolshevik discipline.218 
One interpretation of the outcome of the events of May Day 1929 is that the ban imposed 
on the RFB by the Reich government constituted a "defeat" for the KPD's tactics.219 The 
RFB had not only carried out much of the KPD's propaganda in the 1928 Reichstag 
election, but had traditionally conducted communist work in rural areas, which was 
unpopular with the KPD's membership.220 Equally, the RFB was a militant and activist 
organisation disposed towards ultra-Leftism. It could have been anticipated that left-wing 
party members, who had submerged themselves in the RFB to avoid the political paralysis 
induced by the factional struggle, would resurface in the KPD itself to carry the "3rd 
Period" party line.221 However, to borrow a phrase from present day political journalism, 
216 ibid, B1.6-7; 
217 'b'd 1 1 , 
218 Bowlby, 'Blutmar, p154, 
219 Weber, Wandlung, p225, 
220 St.Ha.D." MdI, Nr.11126{2, Monatsbericht (April-Mai 1929), BI.64(April 1928). 
221 Reuter, G., KPD-Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammenstellung der KPD in Hannover zur zeit der Weimarer Republik (Hannover, 1982), p21f. 
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the KPD by 1929 was a party dominated by "control freaks": despite the RFB's activism, 
its assertive independence was regarded by the ZK as a minus not a political plus; as a 
reservoir of potential opposition to the party line not a generator of enthusiasm for ultra-
Leftism. 
Erich Wollenberg, head of the KPD's Military League in 1931/2, wrote in his memoirs 
that the KPD was unperturbed by the RFB's ban and had even considered its 
dissolution,z22 Bahne's qualifying observation that there is no documentary evidence for 
Wollenberg's assertion remains true today, despite access to the former central party 
archive.223 However, the weight of evidence runs in Wollenberg's favour. In April 1928 
the Reich Ministry of the Interior had proposed a ban of the RFB which was overruled by 
the Reich Constitutional Court in May of that year.224 Initially the KPD leadership planned 
to overcome a ban on the RFB by organising members who were not actual party 
members in the KPD itself.225 However, by 1929 the RFB's reputation for resistance to 
ideological, organisational and disciplinary schooling tipped the scales against its role as a 
vehicle for carrying out agitation and propaganda.226 The KPD then began unsuccessful 
efforts to convert the RFB from a residentially based organisation to an organisation of 
factory groupS.227 At the ZK meeting of 10 May, which discussed the RFB's ban, 
Thaelmann insisted that the KPD no longer considered it appropriate to organise "non-
party" RFB members in the KPD. 228 Instead the ZK decided that the RFB membership 
222 Wollenberg, quoted in Bahne, Scheitern, p21. 
223 Bahne, Scheitern, p21. 
224 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1729, Monatsbericht (April-May 1928). 
225 SLHa.D." MdI, Nr.l1126/2, Monatsbericht (May 1928), B1.76. 
226 For example few members of the RFB in East Saxony attended the Gau schooling programme at the 
beginning of January 1929, see St.Ha.D." MdI, Nr.11126/3, Monatsbericht (January 1929), B1.16. 
227 SLHa.D." MdI, Nr.l1126/3, Monatsbericht (January 1929), B1.16. 
228 SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD, Berlin, den 1O.5.l929, Bl.l. 
Page 318 
was to be transferred into "the most varied types of cover organisations. ,,229 The RFB ban 
was followed by the creation of defence (Abwehr) organisations, including organisations 
which could function during a period of illegality. The ZK wanted to ensure that these 
successor organisations to the RFB would be built up on the basis of factory cells: this 
explicitly meant small units instructed by the centre without a forum for discussion on 
party policy.230 Rosenhaft's thesis that these Abwehr organisations represented in practice 
a "lively and vibrant response to the NSDAP" must therefore, at least in Saxony, be 
I d · dif£ 231 Th . pace m a erent context. e ZK dId not present the construction of ersatz-
organisations for the RFB in terms of a response the rise of the NSDAP, which in 1929 
remained on the periphery of the internal party discussion.232 The ZK aimed to control the 
RFB more closely as part of the communist movement's Stalinisation.233 The later 
response of the Abwehr organisations to the Nazis was conditioned by the violence of 
grass roots Nazism against the organised working class on the streets. 
The KPD also used the events of Blutmai for internal party organisational and ideological 
considerations relating to the power struggle on the correct tactics for a communist party 
in Germany. The failure of the "factory strategy" in the events of May Day 1929 was 
blamed on the activities of the Right and the Conciliators in the factories and the role of 
229 ·b·d 1 1 . 
230 For the creation of the Abwehr organisations in Saxony, see in particular, St.Ha.D." MdI, Nr.11126/3, 
Monatsbericht (August 1929) B1.51. 
231 Rosenhaft, E., Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence 1929-33 
(Cambridge, 1983), pix. 
232 The Saxon District Party Congresses gave very little attention to the rise of the Nazis, even in the 
south eastern region of Vogtland and the textile city of Plauen, where the NSDAP was already very active, 
well organised and attracting notable support. See, SAPMO 13/9/64, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Berirk 
Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, Bl.1ff. At the 12th Reich Party Congress the emphasis was also 
predominantly on the SPD and "social fascism", see Fowkes, German Communism, ppI54-5. 
233 SAPMO I 3/9/64, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Berirk Erzgebirge-Vogtland am 13-14.4.1929, Bl.I ff 
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Zoergiebel's "police terror", The ZK could point to the SPD's change from a social 
democratic to a "social fascist" party to justify ending the united front policy and trade-
union work as carried out in the mid twenties.234 Immediately before the KPD's 12th 
Reich Congress met in Berlin, the term "social fascist" had finally entered every-day 
. I 235 commumst anguage. 
Organisation is more Reliable than Ideology. 
When the KPD's 12th Reich Party Congress met in June 1929, its function was to give a 
post facto veneer of democratic consent to the policies imposed by the Comintem and 
RILU. The Congress, originally planned for Dresden, was relocated to Berlin Wedding, 
where the party atmosphere was immersed in the after shocks of Blutmai.236 In terms of 
the KPD's internal party development, the greatest significance of the Reich Congress was 
its ability to formally proscribe the organisation of factions as a means of challenging the 
party line.237 In future no faction was able to present a political platform to a party 
meeting at variance with that handed down from Moscow: the coalition of communist 
views in the "course of concentration" had been replaced by the "course of the 
monolith".238 However, at least in the case of Saxony, the Congress did not reflect a 
universal endorsement of party policy. The ZK did not trust in an ideological mobilisation 
of the membership to carry out the party's "left-turn", Instead, the policy was coordinated 
234 SAPMO 2/2/12, Reichskonferenz der Polsekretaere der KPD. Die politische Lehren der Mai-Kaempfe, 
Berlin, den 10.5.1929, BI.5-6; Rosenberg, German RepUblic, pp289-90; Weber, Wandlung, pp234-S. 
235 Wuenderlich, Kommunalpolitik, p6S. 
236 Flechtheim, Die KPD, pp203-4. 
237 Weber, Wandlung, p225ff. 
238 There were cliques in the leadership with specific political views. However, the membership was kept 
in the dark until any policy debate had been resolved. There is no evidence of nation wide factions which 
were actively challenging the KPD leadership from within the party, see Weber, Hauptfeind, pp86f. 
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by the organisational channels of the party machine. The re-organisation of the three 
Saxon party districts into a single party district in December 1929 directly related to the 
use of organisational centralisation to overcome the membership's reluctance to implement 
the party line. The ZK's response to the membership's lack of political motivation was to 
tighten the central control over lower party organisational units. To organisational 
centralisation was added the political presence of a staff of Instructors, who coordinated 
the party's official line on the ground.239 
Local political tendencies continued to express themselves in relation to the environment 
party members operated in. In the Saxon factory council elections of 1929/30 there was 
no enthusiasm among Communists in the factories to draw up independent communist 
candidate lists. By 1929/30 the number of strikes in Saxon industry had already passed the 
peak of 1927/8; more importantly for the KPD, it was unable to have "independent strike 
leaderships" elected to displace the leadership of the SPD.240 Few members of the Saxon 
KPD wanted to take an active role in the development of the RGO-politik. At the 
campaign of meetings which elected delegates to the First Reich RGO Congress, which 
was held in Berlin in late 1929, almost all of the 150 delegates from Saxony were 
unemployed.241 The Saxon KPD was also unable to attract sympathisers to purely party-
political events, such as demonstrations to show solidarity with the Soviet Union.242 There 
appears much truth in the criticisms of expelled right-wing Communists that the KPD's 
239 Extensive details are contained in, SAPMO 13/8-10/142, Vorbereitung der Vereiningung der 
saechsischen Bezirken. Dezember,1929, Bl.lff. 
240 Ba.K., R45 IV/16, Vorwaerts zur Gewinnung der Mehrheit des Proletariats. Bericht der 
Gewerkschaftsabteilung (Dresden, 1929), B1.16ff. 
241 St.Ha.D."MdI, Nr.11126j3, Monatsbericht (November 1929), B1.65. This figure undoubtedly included 
many unemployed workers whom the KPD wanted to organise in the ROO. 
242 St.Ha.D."MdI, Nr.11126/3, Monatsbericht (August 1929), B1.51; 'Rundschreiben des KPD(O) von 
17.8.1929', (Manuscript, Leipzig), ppl-2. 
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ultra-Leftist policy was not primarily concerned with winning the support of a majority of 
the working, but instead prioritised absolute control over the party membership.243 
In the neighbouring party district of North Bavaria, there was also grass roots opposition 
from right-inclined party activists in the local parliament. In mid 1929 the party leadership 
dealt with these "old" Communists' reluctance to put the "social fascist" doctrine into 
practice by purging them.244 Gert Reuter also concluded, on the basis of interviews with 
former party members, that, although the leaders of the factions were purged, the currents 
that they had represented continued to exist latently as a basic tendency within the 
party.245 Where Communists came from a social democratic family background, there was 
also a reluctance to accept that rank-and-file SPD members were "social fascists".246 
There had always been, and remained, limits to what directives from the KPD leaderships 
could achieve, if they contradicted the reality of the local conditions. The ultra-Left party 
line in Saxony, and in the Reich, was pushing the KPD away from its social constituency: 
between late 1928 and mid 1930 membership continued to contract.247 The KPD's "left-
turn" also did little to increase the communist vote before the electorate realised that the 
Great Depression was no ordinary cyclical down-turn.248 Crucially, the Landtag elections 
of 1929/30 were more significant in identifying a "right-turn" in the electorate: the 
NSDAP was beginning its rise to political prominence.249 Without the rise of the Nazis, 
243 'b'd 1 1 . 
244 Neuhaeusser-Wespy, Nordbayern, pp223f. 
245 Reuter, KPD-Politik, pl03. 
246 'b'd 1 1 • 
247 See section 6.4 below. 
248 'Zu den Ergebnissen der Landtags und Gemeindewahlen',Die Internationale, XII (23) (23.12.1929), 
pp50-2. 
249 SLa.D.,MdI, Nr.11126/3, Monatsbericht (Oktober- November 1929), B1.60. 
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and the mass unemployment of the Great Depression, the KPD's ultra-Leftism would have 
continued to push the party to the political margins. 
6.4 A Tale of Two Parties?: The "Sociological Echo" and Party Support for ultra-
Leftism. 
At the KPD's 12th Reich Congress Thaelmann presented a sociological justification for 
the policies of the "3rd Period". The Weimar state's rationalisation of the productive 
process was alleged to have divided the working class into a "workers' aristocracy", the 
social basis of "social fascism", and the growing numbers of deskilled and impoverished 
workers who were "radicalising and revolutionising" on their way to the KPD. The KPD 
should consequently harness the unorganised workers, women and youths who 
represented the revolutionary component of the working class, to carry out the policies of 
the 6th Congress of the Comintem.250 Among historians who pointed to the role of 
Gennan social and economic conditions in explaining the KPD's "social fascist" political 
line, a broad consensus emerged: it was accepted that changes in the social composition of 
the KPD, towards the unskilled and unemployed sectors of the working classes, gave the 
KPD's policies a "structural echo" (Winkler), making the General Line relatively easy to 
carry OUt.251 In the factories the RGO-politik was theoretically justified on the basis of 
winning over workers outside of the SPD's sphere of organisational influence, principally 
in heavy industry, to enable the KPD's policy of "independent" politically motivated 
strikes. 
250 Protokoll des 12. Parteitages der KPD, Berlin,1929, pp72,74-8, quoted in Fowkes, German 
Communism, p155. 
251 Winkler, Schein der Normalitaet, pp438-9; Schoeck, Arbeitsiosigkeit, 172ff; Heer-Kleiner, 
Gewerkscha/tspolitik, p360. Stolle's case studies rejected these findings, see Stolle, Betriebspoiitik, 
pp262ff. 
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The new General Line was a policy worked out by the Comintem for all Communist 
Parties. But what effect did this have on Saxony where the regional economy was based 
not on heavy industry but on the light industries of the finished consumer goods sector for 
the export market?252 Did the KPD's political line attract the non-organised workers, 
women who featured prominently in the textile industry, and youths to a communist style 
industrial militancy? Did these social groups change as a proportion of the KPD's 
membership? Crucially, why should a party obsessed with organisation and discipline look 
to workers who were not part of the German workers' movement? 
During the middle years of Weimar the KPD's inability to organise youth (ie 18 to 25 
years of age) is illustrated by the statistics: only two per cent of party members had first 
been organised in the KJVD and only 12.3 per cent of the party membership had this age 
profile.253 In Saxony the available figures are in broad agreement with the Reich trend: 2.3 
per cent of members had been in the KJ and 15.72 per cent of members were between 18 
and 25 years 01d.254 The KPD's pulse beat in the 25 to 40 age group, which accounted for 
some 50 per cent of the Reich figure and 49.17 per cent of the figure in Saxony.255 By 
spring 1932 the proportion of party members in Saxony aged between 25 and 40 years 
had increased to almost 70 per cent of the total membership.256 The proportion of youths 
252 See chapter 2.2 above. 
253 Unless otherwise stated all statistics for the Reich KPD come from the Re ichskontro lie of 1927 which 
was published in, Die kommunistische Internationale, IX (19) (9.5.1928) by, Kaas, W., 'Die sozialc 
Struktur der KPD', ppl050-67. 
254 SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927, B1.98. 
255 "bOd 1 1 . 
256 SAPMO 13/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.23; Social structure of new 
recruits in April 1932, in SAPMO 13/8-10/158, Strukture und Mitgliederbewegung 1926-32, B1.82: 
SAPMO I 3/8-10/145, Bericht der 3. Bezirksparteikonferenz 3-4.12.1932, Bl.l08. 
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probably also increased.257 Importantly, the KJ was highly resistant to both carrying out 
the party line in the factories and joining factory cells: in 1927 six per cent of the Reich 
KJVD membership was organised in factory cells; by 1932 in Saxony the figure had, if 
yth. ~ 11 258 an mg,la en. 
In the Reich an average of one in four women were in employment. In Saxony the figure 
rose to one in three.259 Explanation for this lies in the predominance of the textile industry 
in Saxony, which accounted for 26.5 per cent of all regional employment in the 1925 
census (424,133), of which 47.6 per cent were women (236,695).260 However, women, 
who made up over 50 per cent of the electorate, were strongly under-represented in the 
KPD. In 1929, the Reich figure was 16.5 per cent; the figure for East Saxony in 1928 was 
15.55 per cent and 13.29 per cent in West Saxony in 1927.261 Women's relative non-
politicisation was also reflected in the elections of factory councillors in the Saxon textile 
industry: by 1925 already 70 per cent of textile factories had no factory councillors who 
257 A statistical problem arises from the KPD imposing conditions on who was delegated to the 
conferences to meet targets set by the ZK. In this respect the influx of new members aged between 18-25 
years in the sample for April 1923 was 8.1 per cent, see SAPMO I 3/8-10/158, Strukture und 
Mitgliederbewegung 1926-32, B1.82. However, youths amounted to 21.8 per cent of conference delegates 
in March 1932, see SAPMO 13/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.23. 
258 There is no actual figure given. However, there were 72 factory cells in Saxony in May 1932 and 6,979 
members of the KJ. At an average of five members per cell the figure would be 5.1 per cent, see SAPMO I 
3/8-10/145, Bericht der 3. Bezirksparteikonferenz 3-4.12.1932, B1.73. 
259 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', Ph.D. thesis (University of California, 1991), p12. 
260 Zeitschrift des Saechsischen Statistischen Landesamt (ZSSL), 80/81 (Dresden, 1934/5), p116; ibid, 
72/73 (Dresden, 1926127), p248. 
261 Weber, Wandlung, p282. The figure of 15.5 per cent is given in, SAPMO I 3/8{l1, Bericht der 
Bezirksleitung der KPD an den Bezirksparteitag Ostsachsen (April 1929), B1.35; SAPMO I 3/10/108, 
The figure of 13.29 per cent is given in, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927, B1.80. 
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were members of the Free Trade Unions. 262 During the early 1930s the proportion of 
women party members remained broadly unchanged at 16-17 per cent of the total.263 
More relevantly to the KPD's proclaimed political ambitions, at most only ten per cent of 
the female membership was made up of employees, the remainder were housewives.264 At 
the end of 1931 there were some 5,389 female members of the Saxon KPD. Even if all of 
these women had worked in the Saxon textile industry, then only 0.6 per cent of the 
female workforce during the Great Depression would have been Communists.265 
In 1927 68 per cent of the Reich KPD's membership were industrial workers: 39.92 per 
cent in skilled trades and 28.18 per cent were unskilled workers. The figure of 
unemployed members was not given. The figures for West Saxon indicate that 69.7 per 
cent of the district party membership were industrial workers: 37.2 per cent of the 
membership worked in skilled trades and 32.5 per cent were unskilled workers; 16.4 per 
cent were unemployed.266 By January 1932 10.7 per cent of the Saxon KPD were 
employed full-time, a further 8.3 per cent were employed part time, and 81 per cent were 
unemployed.267 In 1927 62 per cent of the Reich KPD belonged to a trade-union. In West 
Saxony the figure was 74.63 per cent and in East Saxony 74.11 per cent.268 Nationally the 
metal workers' union (DMV) accounted for 30 per cent of the membership followed by 
the building workers' union with 12 per cent, then a diversity of trades. In West Saxony 
262 Peterson, B., 'The Politics of Working-Class Women in the Weimar Republic', in CEH 10 (2) (1977), 
p108. 
263 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.38-9. 
264 Wuendelich, Kommunalpolitik, p262. 
265 Calculated from statistics in, ZSSL 72/73 (Dresden, 1926/27), p248. 
266 SAPMO 13/10/108, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927, B1.99. 
267 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.20. 
268 SAPMO 13/8/21, Bericht der BL an den Bezirksparteitag der KPD Ostsachsen (April 1929), B1..~5: 
SAPMO I 3/10/108, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927, Bl.lOO. 
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trade union membership broke down into the following groups: metal: 24.9 per cent; 
building workers: 17.51 per cent; transport: 6.62 per cent; wood working trades: 6.06 per 
cent; factory workers: 4.88 per cent; miners: 3.58 per cent; textile workers: 3.23 per cent; 
railways: 2.53 per cent; the printing trades: 7.19 per cent. 269 Metal workers were 
proportionately over represented in the KPD by some 4.9 per cent, while textile workers 
were massively under-represented by some 23.27 per cent.270 The disinclination of textile 
workers for communism had been a feature since the foundation of the VKPD in 1920.271 
Exact figures for Saxony during the Oreat Depression are unavailable. However, at the 
District Party conference in March 1932, which had union membership, wherever 
possible, as a condition for delegation, only some 37.29 per cent of delegates did belong 
to a trade union.272 
In Saxony, by late 1932 only 28 union payment offices had communist majorities.273 
Although the KPD during the 1930s never fully decided whether to leave the trade unions 
or to "destroy" them from within, the role of the ROO was given considerable weight. 
However, ROO also continued to organise skilled workers, who had been traditionally 
disposed towards organisation in a union. Nationally, the strength of the ROO according 
to industrial branch in January 1931 was: metal (78,000); building (42,000), local 
authority, transport and dock workers (42,000); post and city authorities (6,500); 
chemical industries (8,000); textiles (10,800); printing trades (6,500); railways (15,000); 
food and luxury goods (17,2000); leather (2,500); rural economy (4,500); mining 
269 ibid, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927. 
270 ZSSL, 72n3 (Dresden, 1926/27), p248. 
271 Wheeler, R.F., USPD und Internationale. Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der Revolution 
(Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Vienna, 1976), pp239ff. 
272 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.9. 
273 ibid, B1.9. 
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(54,000).274 In Saxony there is no figure for the numerical strength of the RGO. However, 
the number of factory groups of the RGO is given. These were: textiles (150); metal (70); 
mining (14); post and state authorities (12); rural and forestry (14); wood working trades 
(6); warehouses (12); leather (2); local authorities and transport (60); railways (38); 
factory (35); food and luxury goods (24); printing trades (16).275 In the factory council 
elections strong results for the KPD's "red unity lists" were the result of targeting factories 
in which it was possible to draw up lists. In 1931, the last full year of factory council 
elections, the KPD targeted 185 factories with independent candidate lists in Saxony 
gaining 526 factory councillors.276 In the heavy industrial sector of mining only one KPD 
list was drawn up?n The inclination of Communist factory workers to be organised in 
factory cells was weaker still. The implantation of factory cells in Saxon industry 
accounted for: 0.35 per cent of metal workers; 0.19 per cent of textile workers; 0.31 per 
cent of chemical workers; and 0.32 per cent of mine workers.278 The figures indicate that 
the KPD had not been significantly re-molded as a party of the "mass workers" sector of 
the economy, which in Saxony was very slight. Instead the RGO-politik was restricting 
the party's radius of action within those (skilled) workers, who were traditionally disposed 
to political and trade-union organisation. This was compounded by the fact that the KPD 
was a party of the unemployed. As 75 per cent of the RGO membership was unemployed, 
it is quite conceivable that it served as a form of ersatz-organisation for unionised workers 
who now felt abandoned by reformism. The KPD's obsession with the large factories was 
274 Ba.K. R 134/67/1-48. 
275 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.8. 
276 ibid, B1.9. 
277 ibid 
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also not modified to account for Saxony's industrial structure, in which only one in ten 
factories employed over 1,000 workers, and industrial production was overwhelmingly 
located in small and medium sized factories?79 
The membership growth of the Saxon KPD was also crisis related rather than an a 
product of enthusiasm for ultra-Leftism. In Saxony membership contracted from 22,884 in 
1928 to 18,396 at the end of 1930. In the 1930s the merger of the three Saxon party 
districts into a single regional party, made Saxony the largest KPD district organisation 
after Berlin-Brandenburg. The take-of point for the KPD's membership was autumn 1930: 
by April 1931 membership had increased by 57 per cent.280 Comparable figures for the 
Reich and Saxony indicate the following organisational developments. The membership of 
the Reich party rose from the first quarter of 1931 to the last quarter from 195,063 to 
246,515 members. The growth in factory cells was from 1,524 to 1,983; street cells 
increased from 3,395 to 6,193; and local groups declined from 7,736 to 5,437. In Saxony 
factory cells fell from 249 to 201; street cells remained constant at 355; and local groups 
expanded from 456 to 668.281 Despite the absolute emphasis on the slogan that "The 
conquering of the factory is the beginning of all organisational work", the KPD was 
increasingly a residentially based party.282 No significant numbers of unemployed party 
members could be mobilised for work which did not have relevance to their daily lives. 
The KPD's ultra-Leftism between 1928 and 1933 did not express a dynamic mobilisation 
278 Calculated from statistical infonnation in, ibid, B1.8. There were 245 factory cells organising 2,135 
members. Statistics relating to branch of production in, ZSSL 80/81 (Dresden, 1934/5), p116; ibid, 72n3 
(Dresden, 1926/27), p248. 
279 Lapp, 'Political polarisation', ppll-12. 
280 Statistics in, SAPMO I 3/8-10/158, Struktur und Mitgliederbewegung der KPD 1926-32, B1.81-3. 
281 BaK. NSDAP Hauptarchiv 26/810. 
282 Bahne, Scheitern, p16. 
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from below: the party machine found few members with an enduring commitment to the 
fuel the policy. The KPD's functionary core of Instructors operated like are-chargeable 
battery: as the membership resistance to the policy wore out one cadre of regional 
functionaries, another was connected up to a weak Saxon supply. By December 1932, 50 
per cent of all Saxon functionaries had joined the KPD in the course of 1931.283 The rate 
of membership fluctuation, reaching in excess of 80 per cent in 1932, also made the open 
door policy more of a revolving door policy, as thousands simply momentarily passed 
through the KPD, leaving when their expectations of communism were disappointed. 
Indeed, by March 1932 only 55 of the 1,314 delegates to the 2nd District Congress had 
been in the KPD since it was founded, while 463 had joined in the last 15 months.284 
Support for the KPD grew as the legitimacy of the Weimar state declined among broad 
sections of the working-class population. However, the KPD did not respond to 
conditions in Germany, anchoring itself as a social as well as a political movement, 
reflecting the needs of its wider constituency. Without these bonds between the party and 
the membership, the KPD became like a huge red balloon: bloated, but with only a thin 
membrane holding it together. At the 2nd District Conference of the Saxon KPD the BL 
stated that: "the first prerequisite to fulfil the party's tasks is to ruthlessly break with social 
democratic traditions. ,,285 However, the more the KPD tried to build up a party politically 
and socially isolated from the political developments of German society, the more the 
KPD weakened its roots in Germany?86 
283 SAPMO 13/8-10/145, Bericht der 3. Bezirksparteikonferenz 3-4.12.1932, B1.57. 
284 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht der 2. Bezirksparteitag am 25-7.3.1932, B1.23. 
285 ibid, B1.21. 
286 In 1927 (ie before the ultra-Left General Line) the figures indicate that a total of 69.9 per cent of the 
Saxon KPD had at one time been organised in a socialist party: 34.88 per cent in the SPD and 35.02 per 
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The revolutionary upswing declared by the KPD at its 12th Congress, if measured by the 
traditional indicator of industrial radicalism, strikes, in reality began a period of an 
"employers' offensive". In Saxony during the years of "relative stability" strikes peaked in 
1928 with a total of 810,245 day lost to industrial action; by 1929 the number had fallen 
to 335,531.287 Ute Stolle's case studies of skilled (metal) workers and unskilled (chemical) 
workers points out that the demand for skilled labour remained above that of unskilled 
labour, with the consequence that strikes during the Great Depression were undertaken in 
the skilled trades rather than by "mass workers".288 It seems reasonable to conclude that 
there was no industrial militancy based on "mass workers" in heavy industry, which could 
be channelled into the KPD's RGO-politik. 
If the "structural echo" in the KPD for the ultra-Left General Line is measured in terms of 
the party's ability to mobilise and organise unorganised workers in heavy industry, 
women and youths, those who did not have a past political socialisation in the SPD, then 
the "echo" was more a signal lost in the void of the Great Depression. The policies of the 
"3rd Period" cannot be explained as a political response to changes in German socio-
economic developments. The KPD itself pushed the boat out: not on a rising communist 
wave but with Moscow's helmsmen at the rudder and a course mapped by Soviet state 
interests. 
cent in the USPD, see SAPMO 13/10/108, Bezirksparteitag der KPD Westsachsen am 10-11.12.1927, 
B1.98. 
287 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen, Nr.49 (Dresden, 1931), pI83. 
288 Stolle, Bertiebspolitik, 213f. 
Page 331 
6.5 The Saxon KPD and ultra-Leftism: A Conclusion. 
This case study of the origins and reception of the "left-turn" changes the emphasis of 
explanation from why the policy was accepted by the membership to why it quickly came 
up against so many political obstacles. Above all Saxony is an example of a region in 
which the "3rd Period" party policy was not welcomed as a "way out" of the earlier united 
front policy. Newly available documentation confinns the "Stalinisation" thesis that the 
change of policy was a product of political synchronisation: throughout the Comintern 
communist parties were brought into line with developments in the CPSU.289 However, 
the documentation also modifies the traditional interpretation of developments inside the 
KPD. The "Thaelmann Affair" indicates that the factional struggle could still run against 
the grain of democratic centralism: once known to the membership it was transmitted 
through the lower organisations, finally forcing the convening of the 12th Reich Party 
Congress. The Comintern had learned from the head-on collision with the independent 
left-wing Communists during the mid twenties. The initial (secret) negotiation between the 
ECCI and the KPD's leadership anticipated a rolling "left-turn", taking the "course of 
concentration" coalition in the ZK on the way. However, the Thaelmann Group's 
acceleration and intensification of the "left-turn", and the unease inside the Left at the 
development of a Thaelmann entourage, ended the precarious balance in the KPD. The 
"Thaelmann-Affair" was less a "palace coup" than the last serious uprising in the 
membership against Moscow's domination. The "left-turn" was not a relatively frictionless 
289 Draper, T., 'The Strange Case of the Comintern', in Survey 19 (1972), pp91-137; Kozlov, N. N. and 
Weitz, E. D., 'Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third Period': Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political 
Economy of Weimar Germany', in Journal oj Contemporary History (JCH) 24 (1989), pp387--l1O. 
Page 332 
transition, taking only six week to oust the dissidents among the factional leaders: it was 
another one-and-a-half year feud in a different fonn?90 
By the KPD's Reich Congress in 1929, which formally proscribed the organisation of 
factions, the main aim in Gennany was not to win over the majority of the workforce for 
revolution, but political control over the whole party. Even the RFB, which had played a 
central role in carrying out political campaigning during the factional feuds, was regarded 
as too independent. The RFB's successor organisations were built up on the principle of 
central control rather than communist dynamism. The formation of the "ZK Cheka" was 
to ensure the separation between radical policy pronouncements and the reality of serving 
the CPSU cause first. 
During the seventies and eighties historians developed histories from below: accounting 
for the KPD's "left-tum" in terms of socio-economic changes effecting political tendencies 
inside the working c1asses.291 However, in Saxony the socio-economic and political 
prerequisites necessary to sustain the "left-turn" between 1928 and 1930 were absent. To 
overcome this, the party leadership looked to creating a mood among the membership 
which could accept the ideology of the "social fascist" thesis. The "3rd Period" policy 
was, however, not well received in Saxony. Many left-wing Communists in senior 
positions in the regional party criticised the tactic for placing too great a constraint on the 
party's political campaigns. During the campaign against the SPD-Ied Reich government's 
plans to build Panzerkreuzer "A", the leadership's rejection of local "co-operation" 
between Communists and Social Democrats, pushed the KPD into a policy ghetto. In 
Saxony the KPD was faced with the reality that the left wing of the SPD was an 
290 Cf. Weber, Wandlung, p220. 
291 See chapter 1.2 above. 
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alternative vehicle for the expression of workers' radicalism in these years. If the events of 
Blutmai in Berlin confirmed Saxon Communists in their antipathy towards the "betrayals" 
of the SPD leadership, it did not convince local Communists that all Social Democratic 
officials were also "social fascists". The immediate influences of local conditions 
continued to outweigh the ideology of the party leadership. Political opinion in the grass 
roots communist membership continued to reflect the locality, even after the leading 
exponents of right-wing communism were purged. The KPD's General Line was, in the 
words of Sigrid Bahne, an "ultra-Left isolationist" policy.292 However, ideology and 
organisational centralisation could not shut out the world around the ordinary 
membership. 
In explaining the inception of the RGO-politik, Schoeck argued that the KPD's isolation 
from the reformist -led workforce necessitated an independent communist organisation. 
Schoeck's documentation focused on heavy industry in the Ruhr.293 In Saxony, however, 
the split in the workers' movement ran through the KPD. The policy was imposed from 
above, not inspired from below as an organisational answer to a communist conundrum in 
factory policy. The KPD membership after 1928 was not recast in the mold of "mass 
workers" in heavy industry, women and youths.294 There was no "structural echo" among 
rank-and-file Communists for the "left turn" in Saxony. There could, however, have been 
a natural frequency integrating the political wings of Saxon communism; a left-wing 
variant of the united front policy as a radical protest against the structural unemployment 
and deskilling created as a product of the Weimar state's social and economic policies. In 
the factories there was a mood among Communists for industrial militancy: for a 
292 Bahne, Scheitern, p 12. 
2'l.~ Schoeck, Arbeitslosigkeit, pp 172ff. 
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communist style radical trade unionism. However, flanked by the left-wing Saxon SPD, 
which dominated the local branches of most unions, there was no space for an 
"independent strike tactic". Saxon trade-union Communists wanted to push from within 
the ADGB, not subscribe to an untenable theoretical position claiming that "reformism" 
was a monolith in the service of the employers. In extra-parliamentary politics the Saxon 
KPD's heart beat in a left-wing interpretation of the united front policy. There was no love 
lost between the Saxon KPD's membership and the Reich leadership of the SPD: a policy 
of outright criticism of the SPD's national leadership, coupled with offers of "co-
operation" addressed to the regional and local social democratic movement, could have 
provided some tactical flexibility. However, by 1929 at the latest, the KPD leadership 
identified with the "course of the monolith": a party in which control stretched from the 
centre in a bureaucratic spider's web, treating all local and regional autonomy as a fly in its 
parlour. The flagship policy of "international communism", introduced in the calm of 
1928, became the KPD's white elephant in the crisis of the early thirties. The implications 
of the KPD's General Line during the rise of the Nazis is the subject of the concluding 
chapter. 
294 Stolle's case studies in the chemical industry and metal trades also reached this conclusion, Stolle, 
Betriebspolitik, pp262ff. 
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7. Doppelgaenger or Deadly Enemies?: The Saxon KPD and the Nazis, 
1930-1933. 
7.1 Introduction 
Hennann Weber's study of the political role of the KPD during the early thirties details the 
party's strategy and the nuances of tactical techniques used in working towards communist 
objectives in Gennany.l While indicating that the KPD's German-policy was set in 
Moscow, Weber assumes that the "social fascist" policy would have been impossible 
without the support of the membership, functionaries and the electorate.2 Later studies of 
the KPD focused more strongly on the conditions in Germany which made possible the 
party's General Line. Schoeck and Stolle began their examinations of the KPD's political 
strategy by asking: why was it possible for the NSDAP to come to power in Germany 
without resistance from the working class in the form of a general strike and civil war?3 
This case study of the KPD in Saxony does not regard the KPD as an explosive political 
charge that failed to go off. Instead, the chapter's starting point is the question: to what 
extent could a General Line, which identified the SPD as the "main enemy" of communist 
objectives, be carried out at grass roots level in the face of the meteoric rise of the 
NSDAP and its use of escalating street violence? In this respect it will also be asked: to 
what extent did the role of the Saxon SPD and Free Trade Unions at local level 
complicate the implementation of the KPD's attack on "social fascism"? The Reich 
leadership of the SPD and ADGB held to a strict legalism, which failed to appreciate that 
1 See chapter 1.2 above. 
2 ibid, p78. 
3 Stolle, U., Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb: Frauen und Maenner, Reformisten und Radikale, Fach und 
Massenarbeiter bei Bayern, BASF, Bosch und in Solingen (1900-1933) (Frankfurt/M,1980), p2; 
Schoeck,E.C., Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung. Die Lage der Arbeiter und die kommunistische 
Gewerksschaftpolitik 1920-1928 (Frankfurt/M, 1977), p15. 
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the parliamentary "toleration" of Chancellor Bruenning's deflationary economic policies 
would not bring the return of Weimar democracy when the crisis again abated.4 But did 
this policy hold at local level in Saxony?5 
Central to Eve Rosenhaft's study of the KPD in Berlin is the thesis that, while ideological 
interpretation limited the KPD's understanding of the Great Depression, in practice its 
response was "tremendously vibrant and surprisingly responsive to the shifting needs of its 
actual and potential constituency".6 This meant treating the NSDAP as the "main enemy" 
in the neighbourhoods, which, following the onset of mass unemployment, had become 
the environment replacing the factory as the actual location of political conflict.7 Although 
Rosenhaft regarded the KPD's attitude to physical violence as "ambivalent", the party is 
presented as developing a response to the NSDAP's penetration of what the KPD believed 
to be its strongholds after 1929: both physical defence (Abwehr) and "ideological 
discussion" were used to beat back and win over the Nazi threat.s The Berlin KPD's 
treatment of the NSDAP as the "main enemy" is not, however, presented as marking a 
significant break with the policy of "social fascism". Instead the General Line's validity for 
4 Dorpalen, A., 'SPD und KPD in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik', in Vierteljahrshefte Jure 
Zeitgeschicht (VfZ) 31 (1988) (pp77-103), plOOf; Aviva, A., 'The SPD and KPD at the End of the Weimar 
Republic: Similarity Within Contrast', Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte 
der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (IWK) 14 (2) (1978) (pp171-86), pp172ff. 
5 In Saxony the strongest opposition to the SPD leadership's policy of "tolerating" the Bruening 
government was located in Erzgebirge-Vogtland. The SPD in Leipzig, comprising many former USPD 
members, was also critical but remained firmly within the party fold. The SPD Landtag faction, however, 
held to party discipline and voted for the Saxon administration's budget cuts in 1931{2. See, Schaefer, R., 
SPD in der Aera Bruening: Tolerierung oder Mobilisierung? Handlungsspielraeum und Strategien 
sozialdemokratischer PoUtik 1930-1932 (Frankfurt/M, New York, 1990), pp85ff. 
6 Rosenhaft, E., Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence 1929-1933 
(Cambridge, 1983), ppx-xi. 
7 ibid, pp7ff, 18ff, 26. 
8 ibid, pp15ff. 
Page 337 
rank-and-file activists is explained in terms of a response to the role of the SPO in the 
institutions of state: party members' every day experience of the SA, the police and the 
Sozialstaat, the later two under SPD control, made a united front extending from the 
Nazis to the SPD seem possible.9 In Saxony, where the SPD had left the regional 
government in the mid twenties, it will be asked: did the KPO respond to mass 
unemployment and the rise of political conflict and violence in the neighbourhoods, or was 
the party's principal concern to hold the General Line against the SPO at local level? 
Conan Fischer has developed an explanation for the KPO's relationship and response to 
the NSDAP in terms of working-class nationalism within the Communists' own ranks and 
an overlap in the constituencies of the seeming polar opposites of German politics. to The 
following chapter will ask whether any such interaction between the political extremes 
took place and how the non-proletarian "working people" (ie peasants, the white collar 
and independent lower middle classes) responded to the KPO's nationalist policy? An 
attempt will also be made to assess what type of party activist would carry out a policy 
which saw the "Nazi workers" as potential communist recruits? Did long term structural 
unemployment produce a floating radical, who alternated between Bolshevism and the 
Third Reich, as a "way out" of the crisis? 
The chapter is structured to place the Saxon KPD in the context of existing explanations 
for the party's political behaviour. Firstly the chapter outlines changes in the political and 
economic system in Saxony during the Great Depression: the impact of sustained mass 
unemployment in Saxony; the rise of the NSDAP; and the appointment of a cabinet of 
technocrats, which had no majority basis in the Landtag. The main body of the chapter 
9 ibid, p211. 
10 See chapter 1.2 above. 
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begins by assessing whether the KPD's appeal to the nationalist lower middle classes could 
proselytise the social basis of the NSDAP. The following section deals with the so-called 
"Anti-Fascist Action" campaign, in which the KPD felt forced to modify its tactics in the 
face of the NSDAP's challenge. The chapter then deals with the KPD's attempt to re-
impose a rigid interpretation of the "social fascist" party line after the 12th Plenum of the 
ECCI in autumn 1932. Finally, the chapter concludes by placing the experience of the 
Saxon KPD in the context of the historical debate. Above all it will be asked: to what 
extent could the KPD-Ieadership focus the party's fire on the SPD during the rise of the 
Nazis? 
7.2 Saxony and the Crisis of the "System". 
The final crisis of the Weimar Republic was induced by the coincidence of two turning 
points; one domestic: a crisis in the democratic party-state; the other international: the 
Great Depression and mass unemployment. An already underlying crisis of legitimacy in 
the Republic became an outright rejection of it by a majority of the electorate by the July 
1932 Reichstag elections. 
The Economy 
By the end of 1929 the German economy showed key indicators of financial crisis: GNP 
had stagnated; unemployment rose on average by 35 per cent; and public revenues fell by 
the second half of the year. 11 The industries hardest hit by the collapse in world demand, 
II For details of the German economy, see, Petzina, D., 'Germany and the Great Depression', in, JCH (4) 
(1969) (pp59-74); For Saxony's structural economic problems, see, Bramke, W., 'Die Industrieregion 
Sachsen. Ihre Herausbildung und Entwicklung bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, in Schulz, R. (ed.), 
Industrieregion im Umbruch. Historische Voraussetzungen und Verlaufsmunster des regionalen 
Strukturwandels im europaeischen Vergleich (Essen,1993), pp311-13. In Germany as a whole the ratio of 
consumer goods production to production goods was 50:50 while in Saxony the ratio was 63:27, see, 
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textiles and machine building, were precisely those industries which dominated production 
in Saxony.12 The social cost of the dramatic fall in demand and production was mass 
unemployment: in Saxony the level of unemployment was the highest in Germany. If white 
collar workers are excluded from the figure, in May 1932, from a working population of 
2.1 million, only 1.4 million remained in unemployment. 13 These underlying economic 
problems and their de-stabilizing effects on German society cannot be underestimated as 
factors reinforcing the political rejection of the Weimar compromise: their most prominent 
political product was the transformation of the NSDAP from a splinter party to the largest 
party in the Reich and in Saxony. 
The Breakthrough of the NSDAP: An Extremist Current loins the Mainstream. 
The NSDAP in Saxony grew into a mass party out of the political seeds of a scattering of 
radical voelkisch organisations.14 The foundation of the first Saxon local group of the 
NSDAP was in Zwickau in October 1921; it drew support from the Deutschsozialistische 
Partei and the Voelkischer Schuetz und Trutzbund; the two prominent Nazis, Martin 
Heyse, H., 'Das Problem der Arbeitslosigkeit in Sachsen', Dissertation (Dresden University, 1938), p27; 
For a summary on the debate on the "health" of the Weimar economy from the mid-20s, see, Lee, 1. 1., 
'Policy and Performance in the German Economy: a Comment on the Borschardt Thesis' (pp131-50), in, 
Laffan, M. (ed.) The Burden of German History 1919-45. Essays for the Goetha Institute (London, 
1988). 
12 Heyse, ibid, p32. The dependence of Saxony on textile and related production is underlined by the 
machine building industry's share in the manufacture of machines for textile production. This reached 63 
per cent of the total production in machine building. 
13 Boelke, B., 'Wirtschafts und Sozialegeschichte Sachsens', in Gerlach, S. (ed.), Eine POlilische 
Landeskunde (Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, 1993), p155. 
14 The rise of the NSDAP in Saxony is dealt with in detail by, Szejnmann, C-c. W., 'The Rise of the 
Nazi Party in Saxony between 1921 and 1933', Ph.D. thesis (King's College, London University), 
esp. pp32-164. 
Page 340 
Mutschmann and Fritz Tittmann, began their political activities in the latter party. By 1922 
the NSDAP had extended into the neighbouring Vogtland towns of Plauen and 
Markneukirchen.15 The Saxon NSDAP also benefited from the region's radical right-wing 
youth movement under Kurt Gruber, which formed the basis of the Hitler Youth (HJ) by 
the mid twenties.16 The first surge of wider support for the Nazis in Saxony came during 
the social crisis of the hyper-inflation in 1923: the area of greatest party activity was in the 
southwestern areas close to the border with neighbouring Bavaria.1? In the May 1924 
Reichstag elections the Deutschvoelkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP), which was allied with 
the NSDAP, received 7.9 per cent of the vote in the Leipzig electoral district, 7.5 per cent 
in Chemnitz-Zwickau and 4 per cent in Dresden-Bautzen. 18 However, the level of support 
for the voelkisch right fell in the December 1924 Reichstag elections to a national average 
of 3 per cent and in Saxony to 2.4 per cent. 19 
After the near political implosion of the NSDAP in 1924, the party was reconstituted to 
win wider electoral support. Between 1926 and 1928 the Nazis adopted what Orlow 
called the "urban plan": a policy of recruiting support among working people in the 
industrial centres of Saxony, Thuringia, Berlin, Hamburg and the Ruhr.20 However, 
Szejnmann's recent study of the NSDAP in Saxony indicates that, although the Nazis were 
very active in both urban and rural areas after 1925, the movement found it considerably 
easier to recruit in the countryside.21 Despite the "urban plan's" inability to win the support 
15 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Germany: The Saxon Buergertum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', PhD thesis (University of California, 1991), p249. 
16 Stachura, P.D., Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic (Santa Barbara, 1975), pp13-23. 
17 Gross, R., 'Die Politische Geschichte Sachsens', in Gerlach (ed.), Landeskunde, pl16. 
18 Falter, J, et. al., Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1986), p69. 
19 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p249. 
20 Orlow, D., The History oj the Nazi Party, 1919-1933 (vol.1; Pittsburgh, 1969), pp76ff. 
21 Szejnmann, 'Nazi Party', p189. 
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of the organised working classes, the Saxon NSDAP by the mid 1920s had become the 
largest Gau in Germany, with 80 local groups in 1925.22 By the May 1928 Reichstag 
elections the NSDAP's main success was to have become the dominant party on the 
voelkisch right both nationally and in Saxony.23 Already in 1928, in the Nazi's south-
western Saxon stronghold, the NSDAP vote was above the national average in the six 
administrative districts they came to dominate in the early 1930s?4 
The Nazis' limited electoral impact in 1928 precipitated another policy shift: the party's 
tactics were adapted to make the NSDAP more "voter friendly" to the urban and rural 
Mittelstand, while by no means overlooking the need for support from the working-class 
electorate.25 In line with these tactical policy changes, Hitler acted to end the policy of 
abstention from regional Buergerblock coalitions. Following the Saxon Landtag elections 
of 1929 the NSDAP's four seats enabled the party to become the king-maker between the 
blocks of the Left and Right. The Saxon NSDAP became associated with facilitating a 
government carrying out a pro-Mittelstand policy of fiscal probity and cuts in government 
social expenditure, despite an upswing in unemployment.26 With this positioning on the 
political right-wing, the NSDAP, with its primed political machine and activist 
membership, was well placed to give expression to a growmg grass roots protest 
22 Fenske, H., Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Parteiengeschichte (Frankfurt, 
1972), p285. 
23 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Ba.K.) R 134/40/97-170. 
24 Walter, .F., 'Sachsen - Ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?, PVS 32 (2) (1991) (pp207-231), p224; 
Schlesinger, W. (ed.), Sachsen, (Stuttgart,1965), pLXVII. 
25 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p252; Winkler, H.A., 'From Social Protectionism to National Socialism: 
the German Small Business Movement in Comparative Perspective', Journal of Modern History (JMH) 
48 (1) (1976), ppl-18. 
26 For the example of Lower Saxony, see Noakes, J., The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933 
(Oxford, 1971), p207; For Saxony see, Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p254. 
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movement. The Nazis' political positioning as a forum for social protest was given greater 
latitude by the structure of the traditional parties of the Buergertum, which represented a 
"weak coterie" of individuals without a developed bureaucracy or tradition of political 
campaigning outside of election campaigns?? All of these factors provided the backdrop 
for the Nazis' decisive electoral breakthrough in the Saxon Landtag elections of June 
1930: the party gained 18.3 per cent of the regional vote, jumping from 5 seats to 14.28 In 
Saxony, by the Reichstag elections of July 1932, the NSDAP gained 41.2 per cent of the 
vote, the SPD received 28.4 per cent and the KPD 17.4 per cent; all of the parties of the 
traditional right held less than 2 per cent of the vote, except the DNVP which, with 4.6 
per cent of the vote, contracted to a narrowly based conservative party?9 By 1932 the 
NSDAP had also absorbed the votes of the "special interest" parties, which had 
maintained their influence in Saxony at the 1930 Landtag election. These developments 
led Lapp to conclude that in the early 1930s the NSDAP had become the party of 
"bourgeois concentration", overcoming the political fragmentation which had taken place 
along the lines drawn by economic particularism.30 
From Parliamentary Cabinet to Presidential Decree: Ein Systemswechsel. 
The year 1930 also marked the transfonnation of the political system from government 
based on a parliamentary majority to a series of presidential cabinets. In summarising the 
27 Hamilton, R. F., 'Hitler's Electoral Support: Recent Findings and Theoretical Implications', in 
Canadian lournal of Sociology (CIS) 2 (1) (1986) (Ppl-28), p13. 
28 For an assessment of the June 1930 Saxon Landtag election see, Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p273f; 
Sjenmann, 'Nazi Party', p96f. 
29 Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat Sachsen, 1931-1934 (Dresden, 1935) Nr.50, pp430-1. 
30 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p284. 
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debate on the breakdown of the Great Coalition in March 1930 and the change in the 
system of government Kolb wrote that: 
"Opinions vary as to the causes, scope and effects of the decision taken for the 
solution of the government crisis in the spring of 1930 but no one disputes the 
appointment of the "Hindenburg cabinet" under Bruening was a far-reaching and 
dangerous transformation of the governmental system. ,,31 
Saxony was the first of the German Laender to experience the crisis of the party system, 
resulting from the jamming of the machinery of parliamentary government. 32 The 
centralisation of the political-decision making process in the early 30s meant that the 
Saxon technocrat government under Wilhelm Schieck, in Kretschmar's words, 
"administered rather than governed.,,33 Political intransigence was endemic in Saxony in a 
process growing out of the Imperial era. The final phase in the demise of government by 
parliamentary consent in Saxony began to take shape by 1929. The 1929/30 Buergerblock 
government rested on the votes of a political spectrum ranging from the ASPD to the 
NSDAP. The administration fell when the Nazis withdrew their "toleration" after the 
Minister President, Buenger, a member of the DVP, signed the ratification of the Young 
Plan in the Reichsrat. 34 Thereafter no parliamentary basis for a coalition government could 
be found, and the SPD's motion of no confidence in the government, on 20 May, forced 
new elections in June 1930.35 
31 Kolb, E., The Weimar Republic (London, 1988), p179. 
32 Fenske, Wahlrecht, p304. 
33 Kretschmar, H., Saechsische Geschichte (Frankfurt/M, 1965), p247. 
34 Gross, 'Politische Geschichte Sachsens', pp 116-7. 
35 Kommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der oertlichen Arbeiterbewegung bei der SED in 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Sektionen Geschichte und Marxismus-Leninismus sowie dem Franz-Mehring-
lnstitut der Karl Marx Universitaet Leipzig: In der Revolution geboren - In der Klassenkaempfen 
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The outcome of the new Saxon elections did nothing to resolve the parliamentary 
stalemate. Instead, the regional upswing of the Nazis continued: the party increased its 
representation from five seats to 14. The increased political prominence of the Saxon 
NSDAP initiated an early trial run of the SPD's policy of "tolerating" a government which 
would exclude the Nazis from power.36 Before the Landtag election the Saxon SPD had 
offered to "tolerate" a centre-right coalition, on condition that it was headed by the DDP, 
and the WP excluded. After the Nazis' electoral success the SPD moderated this demand , 
offering parliamentary support for an administration including the WP but excluding the 
NSDAP.37 However, with the significant exception of the DDP, the parties of the Saxon 
Buergertum continued in their efforts to win the backing of the NSDAP. These intra-party 
negotiations collapsed after the failure to secure sufficient support for the appointment of 
Gregor Strasser as Minister of the Interior.38 The party-political impasse then paved the 
way for the so-called "non-party" administration under the senior Saxon civil servant 
Walter Schieck, who headed a technocratic state government until the Nazis' seizure of 
power in 1933.39 In assessing the causes of the breakdown of parliamentary government in 
Saxony, Lapp emphasised the culmination of a process of political polarisation which 
finally eliminated the common ground necessary for coalition government. 40 The 
contemporary DDP politician, Richard Seyfert, wrote that very significant sections of 
bewaehrt. Geschichte der KPD-Bezirksorganisation Leipzig -W estsachsen, Leipzig,1986, p255 
(henceforthe: In der Revolution geboren); Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p263f. 
36 Local left-wing functionaries in Leipzig also supported the Reich SPD leadership's policy. The ADGB 
in Saxony continued to advocate SPD governmental participation. See, Klenke, D., Die SPD-Linke in der 
Weimarer Republik (vol.l; Munster, 1983), p215. 
37 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', pp280ff. 
38 Kuehnl, R., Die Nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925-1930 (Meisenheim am GIan, 1966), pp29lff. 
39 Kretschmar, Geschichte Sachsens, p247. 
40 Lapp, 'Political Extremes', p282. 
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Saxon industry, the Mittelstand, the civil service and intellectuals could not see past the 
central objective of excluding the SPD from governmental power.41 
The Reich policy of deflation by emergency decree was also carried into the regions by 
price commissioners in the Laender, in a manner transferring much of the financial burden 
of mass unemployment onto the cities and local authorities. In Saxony the price 
commissioner since April 1930 was the monarchist Carl Goerdeler, who ensured the 
implementation of the Reich "savings programmes" at regional leve1.42 There remains 
historical debate on the range of policy options open to Chancellor Bruening in the 
financial and economic sphere.43 However, as Feldman points out: "While the precise role 
of unemployment in bringing Hitler to power remains a subject of debate, its major 
contribution to undermining the Weimar Republic and paving the way for its destruction is 
beyond doubt. ,,44 
7.3 Bolshevism and German Nationalism. 
The rise of the NSDAP to mass party status, and the KPD's response to it, took place 
under a General Line which above all consisted of an all out attack on the SPD.45 
However, by mid 1929 the KPD's ultra-Leftist policy was complicated by the return of the 
"National Question" to political prominence. In the second half of 1929 the German 
Nationalists and the Nazis initiated a campaign for a referendum to compel the national 
41 ibid, pp286-7. 
42 Czock, K. (ed.), Geschichte Sachsens (Weimar, 1989), p467. 
43 For a summary of the debate on whether Bruening's ecomomic policies served primarily economic or 
political objectives see, Kolb, Weimar RepUblic, ppI79ff. 
44 Feldman, G. D., 'Saxony, the Reich and the Problem of Unemployment in the German Inflation', in 
Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte (AfS) XXVII (1987)(Pp103-I44), pI03. 
4S For details of the formation of Com intern policy see, Weber, Hauptfeind, pp17ff. 
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government to reject the Young Plan (a revision of the Versailles Treaty's provisions on 
reparations payments and the demilitarisation of the western bank of the Rhineland). The 
10th Plenum of the ECCI interpreted the Young Plan as the worst of all foreign policy 
developments for the Soviet Union: a rapprochement between Germany and the Western 
Powers leading to Moscow being left out in the diplomatic cold.46 The use of quasi-
nationalistic propaganda was not new to the KPD's political campaigning: it had been 
exploited since the inception of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.47 However, the KPD's 
response to the negotiations surrounding the Young Plan were complicated by what 
Thaelmann conceded was "national fascism" having "got in first" and dominating the 
public debate. The Nazis joined the DNVP-Ied campaign for a referendum against the 
acceptance of the terms of the treaty.48 In 1929 the KPD leadership was still not prepared 
to participate in a campaign led by the voelkisch far Right, as this would appear to be a 
united front action with them. Nevertheless, the scene was set for the KPD's re-adoption 
of the language of National Bolshevism.49 One of the most enduring themes in communist 
ideology was the claim to represent the "true interests" of the whole nation.50 East 
German histories of the KPD in the early 1930s, written as late as the mid 1980s, also 
stated that German communism amalgamated "proletarian internationalism and German 
patriotism. ,,51 However, these explanations are unconvincing. The process of Stalinisation 
46 Degras, J., The Communist International, 1919-1943 (vo1.3; London, 1971), p40. 
47 Dorpalen, 'Endphase', p93. 
48 Degras, Communist International, pl00. 
49 ibid, pIOl. 
50 Dorpalen, A., 'Marxism and National Unity: The Case of Germany', in Review o/Politics 39 (1977) 
pp505-20. 
51 Schaller, K-H., 'Die Bezirksparteiorganisation Sachsen der KPD von ihrer Grundung im Dezember 
1929 bis zum zweiten Bezirksparteitag im Maerz 1932', Dissertation (Karl Marx University, Chemnitz, 
1984), p73. 
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completed the KPD's alienation from the German political scene: the party's first and 
foremost task was the defence of the Soviet Union; any countermanding influence from 
German political opinion through the membership had been excluded. In this respect 
Degras wrote that: 
It was the concentration of the KPD on Soviet affairs that largely explained the 
rise within its ranks of a "national bolshevist" trend, recalling in some respects the 
similar phenomenon of the early 1920s. These Communists argued that the object 
of the KPD appeared not to be to promote revolution, but to obstruct any anti-
Soviet movement; it was part of the Russian not the German political scene.52 
In other words, "national bolshevism" could be less ambiguously expressed as Bolshevik 
nationalism: the KPD's exploitation of the "National Question" in Germany to serve the 
interests of Soviet state policy. 53 
Rather than accepting the KPD's policy statements at face value, many historians have 
dismissed the party's revolutionary rhetoric by placing it in the context of events as they 
took place: the Soviet Union did not want a revolution in Germany because of the 
incalculable international implications and the possible interruption of the German 
industrial imports required for the First Five Year Plan. 54 Instead, the Comintern's German 
52 Degras, Communist International, pl00. 
53 This would also avoid confussion with the earlier, and more genuinely "National Bolshevist", 
movement under Laufenberg in 1918/19. 
54 Weber, Hauptfeind, pp64ff; Bahne, S., Die KPD und das Ende von Weimar. Das Scheitern einer Politik 
1932-35 (Frankfurt/M, 1976), pp70ff; Schueddekopf, O-E., Nationalbolshewismus in Deutschland 1918-
1933 (Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Vienna, 1973), p293; Depeux, L., National Bolschewismus in Deutschland 
1919-1933 (Munich, 1985), pp437ff; Pogge von Strandmann, R., 'Industrial Primacy in German Foreign 
Policy? Myths and Realities in German-Russian Relations at the End of the Weimar Republic', in Bessel. 
R., and Feuchtwanger, E.1. (eds.), Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany 
(London, 1981), pp241-67. The exception is Conan Fischer who accepts the KPD's official 
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policy was to de-stabilise the Weimar Germany. Winkler wrote that the Soviet Union's 
irmnediate objective was to smash the SPD and induce a shift in government to the right, 
including the possibility of a military dictatorship. 55 In this vein Duehnke convincingly 
argued that Stalin expected the collapse of the Weimar Republic and its replacement with 
some kind of national-military government which would favour Soviet foreign policy and 
domestic interests. 56 Niclaus identified the government under General Schleicher at the 
end of 1932 as Moscow's favoured German administration: it would ensure the best 
opportunities for trade, diplomatic and military relations. 57 These interpretations did not 
imply that Soviet Russia actually wanted to help bring the Nazis to power in Gennany: 
instead Moscow had counted on the belief that neither the Gennan military nor industry 
would tolerate such an administration, giving the Comintern leeway to exploit the 
movement's de-stabilising impact on Weimar. 58 
The KPD's "Programme for the National and Social Liberation of the German People", 
issued in Die Rote Fahne and the provincial communist press for the September 1930 
Reichstag elections, claimed that Soviet-led international socialism could resolve 
Germany's territorial and national problems.59 The Liberation Programme stated that in 
the event of the KPD coming to power in Germany the Versailles Treaty, the Young Plan 
pronouncements on a revolution launched from the factories and an armed uprising see, Fischer, German 
Communists, p 138. 
55 Winkler, H. A., Der Weg in die Katastrophe. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer 
Republik, 1930-1933 (Berlin, Bonn, 1987), pp734ff; Id., 'Choosing the Lesser Evil: The Gennan Social 
Democrats and the Fall of the Weimar Republic', in JCH 25 (1990) (pp205-27), p218. 
56 Duehnke, H., Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945 (Cologne, 1972), pp60-1. 
57 Niclauss, K., Die Sowjetunion und Hitlers Machtergreifung. Eine Studie ueber die deulsch-
sowjetischen Beziehungen der Jahre 1929 bis 1935 (Bonn, 1966), p80. 
58 Bahne, Scheitern, p40; Schueddekopf, Nationalbolshewismus, p289. 
59 Die Rote Fahne, 24.8.1930. 
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and all international debt and reparations payments would be tenninated; under the 
principal of "self-determination", with the co-operation of the working classes in Britain, 
France, Italy and Czechoslovakia, the German territories lost under the Versailles Treaty 
would have the right to return to the Reich; Germany would then establish a strong 
economic and political alliance with Soviet Russia. The Programme initiated an appeal to 
the "misled working people" (ie the urban Mittelstand and the peasantry) who supported 
National Socialism, to come to the KPD.60 It is, however, highly questionable whether an 
attempt to whip up German national indignation with the West, by a political movement 
so tied to a foreign power, could have had any real impact in transforming right-wing 
extremism into support for Soviet communism.61 
Instead of producing a communist re-think the rise of the NSDAP was integrated into the 
existing General Line, which identified the SPD as communism's "main enemy". The 
united front from below tactic was merely extended to the Nazis' "misled" supporters 
among the "working people" and nationalistic propaganda was pumped into the German 
body politic: not as an antidote to the attractions of Nazism to the working classes, but to 
corrode the fabric of Weimar democracy. The demands of the monolithic party meant that 
policy at national level must find its equivalent at local level, lest the seeds of dissent could 
grow into a widespread challenge to the leadership's authority. For this reason the KPD's 
grass roots organisations were instructed to win over Nazi support among the lower 
60 Schueddekopf, N ationalbolshewismus, p286-7. 
61 Weingartner, Stalin und der Au/steig Hitlers: Die Deutschland PoUtik der Sowjetunion und der 
Kommunistischen Internationale, 1929-1934 (Berlin, 1970), p42. At the 7th World Congress of the 
Comintem (1935) it was stated in the Materialen that the KPD had refused to take part in the Young Plan 
referendum on the basis that "it could only promote Fascism", Degras, Communist International, plOl. 
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middle classes and the peasantry: the threat of "Hitler-fascism" was to be overcome by 
turning its social basis from brown to red. 62 
The ZK's plenary meeting, which took place between the 15th and 17th of January 1931, 
set the KPD's political course during 1931. The policy declaration, Volksrevolution over 
Germany, was an appeal not to the proletariat, but instead addressed the "working 
people".63 The KPD's official pronouncements maintained that the collapse of the 
bourgeois ideology had acted as the catalyst for defections from the lower middle classes 
to the KPD: but the NSDAP functioned as the last barrier preventing an exodus en masse 
to communism. With party propaganda so strongly emphasising winning over the 
Mittelstand from the Nazis, the need to recruit among Social Democratic workers was 
under-played. The KPD's local membership was instructed not to "overestimate" the Nazi 
threat and to avoid making a false distinction between bourgeois democracy and fascism. 64 
During 1931, when the KPD's policy against the SPD peaked, calls to fight fascism as the 
"main enemy" disappeared from the party's press. The KPD even regarded parts of the 
middle classes as more suitable for a united front than social democratic workers.65 
However, it was one thing for communist leaders to make overtures to the NSDAP's 
"misled" supporters", but quite another to have this policy carried out at local level where 
Communists and Social Democrats exchanged blows rather than "ideological discussion" 
with an increasingly assertive Nazi movement. 66 For this reason the KPD by mid 1930 
62 Ward, 1. 1., "Smash the Fascists': German Communists' Efforts to Counter the Nazis, 1930-1931', 
CEH 14 (1) (1981) (pp30-62), p48. 
63 Thaelmann, E., Volksrevolution ueber Deutschland (Leipzig, 1931), pplff. 
64 Daycock, D. W., 'The KPD and the NSDAP: A Study in the Relationship between the Political 
Extremes in Weimar Germany 1923-1933', Ph.D. thesis (London School of Economics, 1980), p186. 
65 Fowkes, B., Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic (London, 1984), pl64. 
66 Degras, Communist International, pl00; Daycock, 'Political Extremes', 186f; Ward, 'Smash the 
Fascists', p38. 
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looked for a form of organisation to underpin party policy at local leveL The successor 
organisations to the RFB, the various Abwehr-organisations such as the Kampfbund 
gegen den Faschismus (KgdF) , were envisaged by the ZK as the vehicles enabling party 
policy to be carried out at local leveL 67 The KPD, as ever, tried to extend its influence by 
having non-communist delegates, elected at various meetings of the "working people", 
take part in the grass roots implementation of party actions. 
7.4 The Volksrevolution of 1931: Between the Sword and the Olive Branch. 
The Struggle Congress Against Fascism 
After the September Reichstag elections, and the introduction of the SPD's policy of 
"tolerating" the Bruening government, the KPD began its Volksrevolution policy. The 
Politburo meeting on 5 December issued both public statements and internal party 
circulars which detailed the Volksrevolution policy as a response to a change in the system 
of government: the radicalisation of the masses, as a result of the economic crisis and the 
disintegration of the traditional bourgeois parties, meant that "half fascism" was no longer 
enough to hold down the "working masses"; an early form of Fascism had arrived and the 
SPD had been the "midwife at the birth. ,,68 The Politburo instructed the regional party 
organisations that: 
67 This field of study has been covered in detail by Rosenhaft, Beating, p86ff. 
68 St.Ha.D.(Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden) MdI, Nr.19086 Reichsminister des Innero. An die 
Nachrichtenstellen der Laender, 19.1.1931. Abschrift. Runschreiben Nr.19 (KPD), Berlin 19.12.1930, 
B1.160-1. 
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The whole party must realise the changed situation. It is no longer a question of 
preventing the threatening Fascist dictatorship, but of unfolding a mass struggle 
for the overthrow of the existing, if not fully ripened, fascist dictatorship.69 
The "higher stage of fascism" was, at least implicitly, the NSDAP. At this point the KPD 
appeared to identify the Nazis, who had already joined regional governments in Thuringia 
and Braunschweig, as representing the greatest danger of a war of intervention against the 
Soviet Union.70 The party leadership now emphasised that, as the form of government 
depended on the constellation of forces outside of parliament, it was the communist 
movement's task to lead a broad mass struggle of the proletariat and the non-proletarian 
"working people. ,,71 At all levels of party activity the KPD's propaganda machine was to 
"unmask" not only the SPD as "social fascist", but in equal measure the NSDAP's claims 
to be "national and social", while presenting the KPD as the only party which struggled 
against capitalism, the Young Plan and reparations.72 
69 ibid, B1.162; Weber, Hauptfeind, p34. 
70 The Comintern, however, saw matters differently and intervened in the KPD's policy at the 11th ECCI 
Plenum. In early 1931 the Comintern believed that a Franco-German rapproachement was imminent and 
that the SPD would, accordingly, move nearer the Bruening government; the anti-western NSDAP would 
therefore be isolated from the Reich government. For this reason the KPD must focus its propaganda on 
the danger of social fascism. Weingartner, op.cit., p53ff; Weber, Hauptfeind, p34. This conflict of policy 
between the KPD and the Comintern provides a good example of the "re-writing" of history practiced in 
the GDR. This literature blames the KPD's "revolutionary impatience" (ie the objective of "overthrowing" 
the German government) on figures such as Heinz Neumann. Thaelmann, and in Saxony Rudolf Renner, 
were credited with countermanding this "deviation". In fact even Ulbricht at this point followed the line of 
the Politburo's directive from 5 December 1930, for example see, Schaller, K-H., 'Saechsischcr 
Kampfkongress gagen den Faschismus', in Beitraege zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 
(BzGdA), 28 (1986), p678. 
71 SLHa.D., MdI Nr.19086, Reichsminister des lnnem. An die Nachrichtenstellen der Laender, 
19.1.1931. Abschrift. Runschreiben Nr.19 (KPD), Berlin 19.12.1930, B1.162. 
72 Weber, Hauptfeind, p31f. 
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As part of a nation-wide campaign to implement the new policy, regional "Struggle 
Congresses Against Fascism" were to be convened. The function of these conferences was 
to apply the national party's policy at local level and to induce party meetings on the 
Volksrevolution policy in the lower party organisations. In Saxony preparations began at 
the BL Plenary Meeting on 7 December.73 The campaign, which was essentially to act as a 
boost to on-going party actions, was to begin with meetings in the factories, dole queues, 
in the countryside and among the urban lower middle classes and professional groups. The 
"delegate meetings" would then appoint representatives who would work, in co-operation 
with existing communist units, for the creation of local "Struggle Committees". These 
committees in turn would appoint delegates onto the "Action Committees" which, from 
local to regional level, would co-ordinate communist campaigns. Communist councillors 
in municipal councils would also use their position as a springboard for propaganda and 
assist in the organisation of meetings.74 This was the so-called "new higher form of the 
united front tactic". In theory, at least, the "delegate movement" was to function as the 
practical application of the united front policy, winning over non-communists and 
including them in the party's campaigns, reaching a high point at a District "Struggle 
Congress. ,,75 
The KPD's policy at local level aimed to reconcile the irreconcilable: party directives 
instructed the membership to organise the tactics of both the olive branch, winning over 
73 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO) I 3/8-10/160, BL Sachsen. 
Sekretariat (Org.). Vorbereitung des Kampfkongresses gegen den Fascismus. Dresden, den 9.12.1930, 
B1.122. 
74 ibid, BL Sachsen. Seler.Org. Vorbereitung des Kampfkongresses gegen den Fascismus. Dresden, den 
9.12.1930, BI.122-4. 
75 SLHa.D., MdI Nr.19086, Reichsminister des Innem. An die Nachrichtenstellen der Laender, 
19.1.1931. Abschrift. Runschreiben Nr.19 (KPD), Berlin 19.12.1930, B1.162. 
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opponents through "ideological discussion", and the sword, physically removing their 
presence from the factories and neighbourhoods.76 The road to Damascus through 
"ideological discussion" was to be organised by the factory cells and local groups who 
were instructed to establish contacts with social democratic workers and to force their 
way into the "misled" Nazi supporters among the working and lower middle classes; 
discussion speakers were to attend all other parties' public meetings; communist leaflets 
were to be distributed at political rallies; and non-communists were to be invited to 
"discussion evenings".77 However, despite the rise in street based politics, and violence, 
the KPD held to its factory-centred strategy. The fact that so many Communists were 
unemployed meant that most of this work was conducted from outside the factory gates. 
Inside the factories the KPD dissipated much of its energy trying, largely unsuccessfully, 
to enforce the "social fascist" party line of confrontation with the SPD.78 
The increasing prominence and presence of the NSDAP in areas regarded as "proletarian" 
districts, and the force of the SA's attacks on workers' organisations, meant that the KPD 
had to respond to the immediate local impact of the rise of the Nazis.79 After a short 
period during late 1929 of advocating street violence to "beat back" the Nazi movement, 
the KPD leadership presented such a policy as an inappropriate means of dealing with a 
mass party and a distraction from the main task of organising a general strike: the 
76 For the Reich KPD see, Ward, 'Smash the Fascists', pp38ff. 
77 St.Ha.D., Mdl Nr.19086, Reichsminister des Innero. An die Nachrichtenstellen der Laender, 
19.1.1931. Abschrift. Runschreiben Nr.19 (KPD), Berlin 19.12.1930, B1.164-5; SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, 
Referentenmaterial zur Discussion mit SPD Arbeitero. Liquidierung des Masseneinfluesses der SPD. 
KPD Bezirk Sachsen, den 15.4.1931, B1.71. 
78 Staatsarchiv Leipzig (Sta.L.) Kap.3. Nr.38. Bd2, Rueckblick auf das Jahr 1931, B1.25f. 
79 For the example of East Leipzig see, SAPMO I 3/8-10/154, Die Parteiarbeit. Funktionaerorgan des 
Stadtteils "D" (Maerz 1931), B1.73. 
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factories not the neighbourhoods were to remain central to communist policy. 80 
Rosenhaft's study of the Berlin KPD at street level also accounts for the KPD leadership's 
suspicion of all areas of political activity outside of the its control. 81 However, the scale of 
the street violence, detailed in the reports of the Saxon Ministry of the Interior as 
Zusammenstoesse, meant that if the KPD did not respond in kind it would risk losing all 
influence in residential areas.82 In Saxony the SPD's response to the rise of the NSDAP at 
local level, particularly after the September Reichstag elections, limited the plausibility of 
the KPD's "social fascist" policy. The Saxon SPD held public meetings and mass rallies, 
with well known speakers from Germany and abroad, who detailed the Nazi threat to the 
workers' movement. Furthennore, the Saxon SPD attracted considerably more workers to 
these events than attended the KPD's fratricidal meetings, which unconvincingly depicted 
the SPD as the principal danger to workers' rights. 83 The apparent passivity of the SPD's 
parliamentary policy of "tolerating" the Bruening government was parallelled on the 
streets of Saxony by an active policy to combat the growth of the NSDAP.84 In October 
1930 the Saxon SPD set up the Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Bekaempfung des Fascismus, an 
80 Rosenhaft, E., Working-Class Life and Working-Class Politics: Communists, Nazis and the Battle for 
the Streets', in Bessel and Feuchtwanger (eds.), Social Change (pp207-35), p234; Id., Beating, p66,86. 
81 Rosenhaft, E., 'The Unemployed in the Neighbourhood: Social Dislocation and Political Mobilisation in 
Germany 1929-33' (ppI94-227), in Evans, R.J., and Greary, D. (eds.), The German Unemployed. 
Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemploymentjrom the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich 
(London, 1987),p200. 
82 By late 1930 political violence was given individual attention in the files of the Ministry of the Interior 
see, Monatsberichte ueber die politische und wirtschaftliche Lage im Freistaat Sachsen (1930) 
(henceforth: Monatsbericht), St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.I1126/4. 
83 Details of these rallies are dealt with in, Monatsberichte (1930-1932), MdI, Nr.1l126/4-6. 
84 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.ll 126/4, Monatsbericht (November-Dezember 1930), B1.353; Zeigs, D., 'Die 
Leipziger SPD im Kampf urn die Republik' (pp318-29), pp325ff, in, Grebing, H., Mommsen, H. and 
Rudolf, K. (eds.), Demokratie und Emanzipation zwischen Saale und Elbe. Beitrag zur Geschichtc dcr 
sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterbewegung bis 1933 (Essen, 1993). 
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umbrella organisation uniting the party's auxiliary organisations, to systematise the party's 
response to the Nazis.85 It was not only the KPD which engaged in street fighting with the 
SA: the SPD and the Reichsbanner were also drawn into physical clashes.86 Political 
violence tended to occur largely when propaganda columns came in contact with their 
rivalS.87 Because the KPD's policy at local level continued to adhere to the united front 
from below tactic, whereby no organisational contact could be sanctioned between the 
SPD and KPD even at local level, when the scale of street violence surged the tide of 
united action often flowed in the SPD's direction. The BL of the Saxon KPD tried to 
present the readiness of the SPD's left wing, the SAP and the KPD(O) to co-operate with 
the KPD at local level as a "manoeuvre" to hold back radicalised workers from 
communism. 88 Crucially, however, a significant number of Communist activists in the 
neighbourhoods thought otherwise and joined the SPD's and Free Trade Unions' united 
actions, which were led by local militants, to counter Nazi terror against workers' 
organisations. One such prominent example was the co-operation between the SPD and 
KPD local party organisations in Radeberg in late January 1931.89 The KPD chastised the 
local party in Radeberg for allowing itself to be drawn into a "block with the 'left' SPD" 
instead of applying the united front from below to bring them under communist 
85 Already in October this included the Reichsbanner, which now had the affiliated Schuetz/ormation; the 
Jungbanner; the SAJ; and the Socialist Youth Cartel. See, St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.11126/4, Monatsbericht 
(Oktober-November 1930), B1.345. 
86 ibid, For a representative example see, Monatsberichte (November-Dezember 1930), B1.354. 
87 SLHa.D., MdI,Nr.I1126/4, Monatsbericht (Dezember 1930-Januar 1931), B1.385. 
88 SAPMO 13/8-10/160, BL (Sekretariat). An alle Ortsgruppen und Betreibsgruppen der Partei! Dresden, 
den 11.3.1931, B1.13-4. 
89 SLHa.D., MdI,Nr.11126/4, Monatsbericht (Dezember 1930-Januar 1931), B1.387. 
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leadership.90 As the KPD pennitted no input in policy making from below, these 
incidents were dealt with as a "deviation": when the use of "organisational means" failed 
to enforce the membership's isolation from the wider workers' movement, expulsions were 
used to maintain an unpopular party policy.91 
The unpopularity of the Volksrevolution policy meant that its was largely driven by the 
party machine. This was most particularly the case in the campaign to win over the 
"declassed" elements in the Mittelstand for Communism Members en masse simply 
ignored the leadership's instructions for a policy which they knew to be impracticable. 92 
The Saxon BL had set out to gear up the lower party units for the Volksrevolution policy 
by using the Party Workers' Conference of 13 and 14 December.93 After the conference 
Instructors were sent into the lower party organisations to set up Hit Squads 
(Stossgruppen) of activists, which carried out the policy in Instructor Areas 
(Instrukteurgebiete): using this method the party leadership hoped to demonstrate its 
claim that where policy was "correctly" applied it would produce positive results.94 
However, these measures of centralised party control over policy could not overcome the 
membership'S reluctance to become involved in policies which they felt to be unworkable. 
Nevertheless, the BL made no attempt to redress the direction of local party policy to take 
90 Zur Ueberpruefung der Arbeit. VB Konferenzen im Mai 1931. Bezirk Sachsen (Abteilung-Org.) 
(Manuscript, Leipzig, 1931), p9 [in the Former Dimitrov Museum Leipzig, Bestandnummer:12,383]. 
91 SAPMO I 3/8-10/160, Often these expulsions involved activists described as "older" party members see, 
BL (Sekretariat). An aile Ortsgruppen und Betreibsgruppen der Partei! Dresden, den 11.3.1931, Bl.18. 
92 Die Instrukteursystem der KPD, Ba.K., NS Hauptarchiv NS 26/810. 
93 SAPMO 13/8-10/160, BL Sachsen. Sekretariat (Org.). Vorbereitung des Kampfkongresses gegen den 
Fascismus. Dresden, den 9.12.1930, Bl.124. 
94 I 3/8-10/155, Stadttcil "F". Rundschreiben Nr.1, Leipzig, den 5.2.1931, Bl.332. 
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account of the membership's Vlews: it was merely asserted at party meetings and 
conferences that the policy was "correct" and those disagreeing held "anti-party" views.95 
When the "Struggle Congress Against Fascism" met in Dresden on 24 and 25 January its 
function was to provide a propaganda platform for the Volksrevolution policy. Rudolf 
Renner's main speech at the Congress presented the KPD's policy as the point of 
departure for a mass movement to "smash fascism and the Young Plan" by including the 
"broadest masses" of workers in a Communist -led united front. 96 Under the central 
direction of the District Action Committee, elected at the Congress, local Action 
Committees were expected to organise and carry out street rallies, tax strikes, preventing 
the unemployed from being evicted for non-payment of rent arrears, protecting small 
peasants from the state's compulsory auction of their land for tax debt, strikes of the 
unemployed in compulsory work schemes, and marches on Town Halls and other 
institutions of the state which were involved in the local implementation of welfare cutS.97 
The KPD's policy aimed at extending the party's sphere of influence on the streets.98 
95 SAPMO 13/8-10/153, KPD UBL Leipzig. Letzte Anweisungen zum Arbeitsplan bis Anfang Februar 
(An fang Januar 1931), B1.24. 
96 SAPMO 13/8-10/151, Gewinnt die Massen zum Kampf gegen den Fascismus! Der Dresdner 
Kampfkongress und seine Ziele. Referentenmaterial Nr.l. Herausgegeben vom Landesaktionsausschuss. 
Dresden, den 1.2.1931, B1.64f. 
97 SAPMO I 3/8-10/154, KPD UB Leipzig (Sekretariat). Rundschreiben fuer Betriebs und Strassenzellen 
und Ortsgruppen des UBs Leipzig. Auswertung des Kampfkongresses gegen den Fascismus (7.2.1931), 
B1.26. The District Action Committee comprised of 33 members and included: 14 non-party members; 4 
communists; four members of the SPD; two members of the Reichsbanner; one member of the SAJ; two 
peasants; the remainder were rural workers, the urban Mittelstand, and the intelligentsia. See, SAPMO I 
3/8-10/151, Gewinnt die Massen zum Kampf gegen den Fascismus! Der Dresdner Kampfkongress und 
seine Ziele. Referentenmaterial Nr.l. Herausgegeben vom Landesaktionsausschuss. Dresden, den 
1.2.1931, B1.63. 
98 For example, SAPMO I 3/8-10/154, KPD UB Leipzig (Sekretariat). Arbeitsplan fuer Mai bis Juni 1931. 
Leipzig, den 11.5.1931, B1.44. 
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However, the reality among the membership after the "Struggle Congress" was the same 
as before: increasing alienation produced by an inappropriate response to the rise of the 
NSDAP and the feeling of political apoplexy induced by a tactic reminiscent of a dog 
chasing its tail. This, however, did not deter the BL from continuing to organisationally 
anchor the policy by making it an integral part of the meetings in preparation for the sub-
district party conferences to be held in May.99 
The regional Communist press and internal party circulars presented the socio-political 
composition of the Congress as a testament to the policy's success. Out of 1,578 delegates 
only 354 were members of the KPD. The other delegates were made up of 42 members of 
the SPD; six from the SAJ; one anarchist; two anarcho-syndicalists; six members of the 
KPD(O); and one member of the DDP; the remainder were so-called "non-party 
workers". In social composition 187 delegates were women; 109 youths; 25 peasants and 
rural workers; 27 white collar workers; and one member of the urban Mittelstand. 1OO 
However, even these figures are improbably high: in mid January the District leadership 
had registered only 500 delegates, 90 per cent of whom were unemployed, and, despite 
quotas being issued to predetennine the composition of the Congress, the "delegate 
movement" could not achieve its targets. IOI The KPD's policy of "ideological discussion" 
to win over the Nazis' social basis had failed to result in the delegation of a single "Nazi 
worker". Despite the KPD's inability to attract Saxon Nazis to change their political 
99 I 3/8-10/155, Stadtteil "F". Rundschreiben Nr.l, Leipzig, den 5.2.1931, B1.332. 
100 SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Gewinnt die Massen zum Kampf gegen den Fascismus! Der Dresdner 
Kampfkongress und seine Ziele. Referentenmaterial Nr.l. Herausgegeben vom 
Landesaktionsausschuss. Dresden, den 1.2.1931, B1.63; Monatsbericht (January-February 1931 ) MdI, 
Nr.l1126/5, B1.380. 
101 SAPMO I 3/8-10/160, For example the BL had wanted one-third of delegates to be women see, BL 
Sachsen (Sekr-Org.) Dringende Anweisungen zum Kampfkongress. An die UBL, Betriebszellcn und 
Ortsgruppen. Dresden, den 19.1.1931, B1.24. 
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clothes, the policy continued to pervade the leadership's policy directives. 102 The prospect 
does, however, beg the question: what would have happened if Nazis had attended a 
Communist party conference as invited guests, not least as the SPD already made much 
political capital out of presenting the KPD as "Kozis" (KOlnmunazis).103 
The impact of the Saxon KPD's policies continued to exhibit sub-regional variations. In 
general, the higher the degree of organisation in the SPD the more the wider party was 
resistant to the KPD's overtures to take part in its "Struggle Congresses." In the Leipzig 
area almost no delegates to communist conferences were organised in the SPD.104 In the 
southwestern Saxon sub-region the NSDAP made its earliest and deepest penetration of 
political life. 105 However, despite the BL's advocacy of a policy of winning over these 
Nazi supporters for participation in communist campaigns, there is absolutely no evidence 
it had any results or was even actively carried out by the membership or lower 
functionaries. Where the organisational hold of the KPD and SPD was weaker, the 
independent mindedness of the membership was greater. Erzgebirge-Vogdand was a 
centre of the SAP, a left-wing split-off from the SPD in spring 1931.106 In this 
environment the KPD's rank-and-file membership became involved with other left-wing 
workers because of a common need to defend themselves against the overwhelming 
102 Zur Ueberpruefung der Arbeit. Unterbezirkskonferenzen im Mai 1931. Bezirk Sachsen. Abteilung-
Org, pp3-4, ibid. 
103 The KPD's internal party meetings countered the accusation of being "Kozis" with the counter charge 
of the SPD's "toleration" for Bruening. See, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Gewinnt die Massen zum Kampf 
gegen den Fascismus! Der Dresdner Kampfkongress und seine Ziele. Referentenmaterial Nr.l. 
Herausgegeben vom Landesaktionsausschuss. Dresden, den 1.2.1931, Bl.66. 
104 Monatsbericht (Januar-Februar 1931), St.a.D., MdI, Nr.11126/5, Bl.381. 
105 SlFS, 1931-34, Nr.50, pp430-1; Walter, 'Stammland', p221. 
106 Tubbesing, 1., 'NKVD _ Antifascistischer Block-Einheitspartei. Aspekte der Geschichtc dcr 
antifascistischen Bewegung in Leipzig', Magisterarbeit (University of Bielefeld, 1993), p24. 
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strength of the Nazis in the industrial towns and villages which peppered the landscape.107 
However, despite the membership'S reluctance to carry out the KPD leadership's 
Volksrevolution policy, it continued to be forced through by means of the party apparatus 
during 1931 and early 1932. Above all this applied to the Saxon KPD's Sisyphusian task 
of winning over rural workers and small peasants, in a region where these sociological 
groups were strongly under-represented.108 
Volksrevoultion in the Saxon Countryside? 
At the ECCrs 11 th Plenum, in the spring of 1931, the European communist parties were 
informed of the need to pay greater attention to winning over rural workers and peasant 
farmers. 109 The KPD tried to mobilise the party for this rural campaigning by announcing a 
Peasants' Aid Programme in May 1931. Thaelmann's national policy declaration, in the 
strongly rural state of Oldenburg where the NSDAP was in a coalition government, was 
complemented by declarations by Communist parliamentary factions in the Landtage and 
Town Halls throughout Germany. The KPD leadership envisaged party work in the 
countryside being carried out by "peasant committees", which would hold conferences to 
mobilise party workers. These committees would then publicise the KPD's Peasants' Aid 
Programme and undertake the organisation of communist campaigning. 110 At local level as 
well as nationally, the KPD's propaganda targeted the "wage cutting policy of the 
Bruening-Schiele government" and its SPD "lackeys", who continued to advocate 
"arbitration fascism. ,,111 In a blueprint of the KPD's policies in all other areas, rural policy 
107 For example, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Liquidierung des Masseneinflusses der SPD. KPD Bczirk 
Sachsens, B1.77. 
108 Only 8 per cent of the Saxon workforce was employed in the rural economy; the national average was 
22 per cent, see Zeitschrift der saechsischen statististischen Landesamt (ZSSL), 87/88. Jg., 1941/42, p85. 
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was also a recruitment drive punctuated by Reich Congresses: the "delegate movement" in 
the countryside was to culminate in a Reich Congress of Peasants in January 1932 in 
B 1· 112 erill. 
The impact of the economic crisis produced differing results in the Gennan countryside. 
In northwestern Gennany the radicalisation of the Landvolk movement brought with it 
bombing attacks on local tax offices. One of the movement's prominent leaders was Bruno 
von Salomon, who joined the KPD's rural campaign.113 In Saxony, however, the KPD 
gained no such assistance from any prominent rural political leaders. The radicalisation of 
the Saxon rural population benefited the NSDAP, at the expense of the DNVP and the 
Saechsische Landvolk (SL V).lI4 The NSDAP's decisive political penetration of the Saxon 
countryside was reflected in the outcome of the elections to the Rural Economic Chamber 
(Landwirtschaftskammer). In the spring of 1930 the KPD's BL was involved in the 
reconstruction of the party's League of Working Farmers (Bund schaffender Wirte) as a 
vehicle to challenge the traditional organisations of the rural population, the SL V and 
after 1930 the NSDAP. However, by the KPD's own admission, the League of Working 
Farmers made no impact in Saxony. lIS The KPD's whole rural organisational structure 
109 Depeux, National Bolshevismus, p462; SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht des 2. KPD Sachsens an der 2. 
Bezirksparteitag vom 25-17.3.1932, pp106-8, Bl.55. 
110 I 3/8-10/155, Bericht von der Landarbeiterkonferenz am 3.5.1931 in Leipzig, den 6.5.1931, B1.79. 
111 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.19092, Abschrift. Rundschreiben an alle BL Sekretaire und Landabteilung, Berlin 
den 7.10.1931, B1.91. 
112 Dcpeux, National Bolschevismus, p463. Institutfuer Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Bd.4: 1924-33; Berlin (Ost), 1966), p315. 
113 Ward, 'Smash the Fascists', p53. 
114 Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', p227. 
115 Bericht des KPD Sachsens an der 2. Bezirksparteitag yom 25-17.3.1932, pp 105-6, SAPMO I 3.1932, 
B1.55. 
Page 363 
was a skeleton staff of party functionaries. 116 In connection with the elections to the Rural 
Economic Chamber, the KPD's Saxon leadership criticised the lower party organisations 
for "turning their face away from the village".117 Out of 40 election districts the KPD was 
only able to put forward candidates in three: Bautzen, Chemnitz and Annaberg-
Marienberg-Stollenberg-Schwarzenberg.118 Even in areas where the local rural population 
did seasonal work in cottage industries, such as in Vogdand, their connection to craft 
workers did not lead them to the KPD.119 In the elections to the Economic Chamber the 
NSDAP won 22 of the 40 seats, the remainder went to the SL V.120 
The BL also began an internal party campaign to revive the village sponsorship schemes 
(Patenscha!tssystem), which had been used in the mid 1920s, whereby party organisations 
in industrial areas "adopted" a rural area in which to conduct party work. 121 The 
sponsorship scheme, in theory at least, was charged with organising meetings in the 
villages; distributing literature and general agit-prop campaigns; and identifying areas in 
which party and RGO cells could be built up as "bases" from which to launch communist 
116 'b'd I I , 
117 SAPMO I 3/8-10/163, BL der KPD (Landabteilung). Rundschreiben. An alle verantwortlichen Leiter 
der UBL, Ortsgruppen und Betreibszellen der KPD Sachsens, Dresden den 5.5.1931, Bl.l. 
118 SAPMO I 3/8-10/163, BL der KPD (Landabteilung). Rundschreiben. An alle verantwortlichen Leiter 
der UBL, Ortsgruppen und Betreibszellen der KPD Sachsens, Dresden den 5.5.1931, Bl.l. 
119 On the employment of small-scale rural producers in the handicrafts industries as a second seasonal 
job see, Lobmeier, K., 'Die sozialoekonomische Lage und das politische Verhalten der "alten" 
Mittelschichten in Kreishauptmannschaft Chemnitz 1927 bis 1935', Dissertation (Leipzig University, 
1989), p32. 
120 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.11126/5, Monatsbericht (Mai-Juni 1931), Bl.416. In these elections only 
landowners could vote. It is possible, but difficult to establish beyond a small number of exceptional cases, 
that the KPD's gained occasional support from rural labourers who were already involved in disputes with 
small-scale land owners. 
121 This system had been used during the Congress of the Working People campaign in 1927, see chapter 
5.3 above. 
Page 364 
campaigns.122 However, the Politburo's circulars indicate that central instructions rarely 
left the printed page: few members took part in the policy and there were insufficient 
., . 123 I I funcHonanes to orgamse events. twas c early apparent that the KgdF was no 
substitute for the RFB: if the membership was less independent minded, they were also 
less politically motivated. The BL dealt with the crisis of confidence in the KPD's rural 
policy by using Instructors to enforce the party line.124 The role of the Instructors was to 
extend the party's organisation and influence into the countryside. For these ends the 
lower party organisations were instructed that: "The main task is not the meeting itself but 
the creation of committees ... Always remember that the party has not just sent you as an 
. b . ,,125 Th KPD' . h . agItator ut as an orgamser. e s tacHcs, owever, failed to take account of 
different interest groups in the rural population. The policy of causing both strikes among 
rural labourers and preventing forced evictions did not address the conflict of interests 
between rural labourers, small farmers and medium scale producers. Instead, party 
propaganda simplistically presented Chancellor Bruening, the "Green Front" which was 
associated with the political interests of "big agriculture", and the Nazis as a unified 
grouping which opposed the interests of the "ordinary" rural population.126 The KPD's 
rural agitation, which was intended to act as a political solvent dissolving the barrier 
between the rural population and the party, only pushed them further into the arms of the 
122 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, BL Sachsen. An die VB und Ortsgruppenleitungen des VB Leipzig. Betr. 
Landarbeiterkonferenz in Leipzig am 21.3.1931, B1.76; ibid, Der Bolshevik. Organ fuer die Mitglieder 
der KPD. Bezirk Sachsen, Nr.l,Jg.3, Leipzig, Anfang Januar 1932, B1.212. 
123 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.19092, Abschrift. Rundschreiben an alle BL Sekretaire und Landabteilung, Berlin 
den 7.10.1931, B1.91. 
124 Ba.K, Hauptarchiv der NSDAP, NS 26/810, Die Instruktursystem der KPD. 
125 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.19092, Abschrift. Sonderrundschreiben an alle Bezirks und UBen Leitungen. 
Bereitet den Bauerntag gruendlich vor, Berlin den, 15.10.1931, B1.97. 
126 A typical example is, SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.19092, Deutsche Bauem Zeitung, Nr.7, Berlin,1931, B1.102f. 
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NSDAP.127 In Saxony there is no evidence of the KPD attracting "fanners' sons", whom 
Muehlberger identified as the strongest supporters of the NSDAP in western Oermany.128 
During the spring and harvest months of 1931 the ROO tried to unfold a campaign of 
wage strikes among rural workers, whose pay had been cut by emergency decree. 
Instructions from the district and sub-district rural divisions called on the party's lower 
organisations to distribute pamphlets demanding wage strikes, which were to be followed 
up by a campaign of meetings electing "struggle committees".129 In the sub-district of 
Greater Leipzig the first campaign of meetings since the mid 1920s was held in the 
countryside. In April 1931 some 33 meetings were held on rural estates, the ROO was 
active in six strikes involving a total of 80 rural labourers. 13o Not only was this an 
exception to the rural rule of disgruntled acquiescence to wage cutting, but the ROO had 
only become involved in strikes post facto, rather than organising and leading them. 131 
More importantly, the organisation of strikes was not only impeded by heavy handed 
policing and the employers' ability to replace strikers with seasonal Polish workers, but 
party members living in close proximity to the striking estates rejected the party's 
"alliance-policy" as fundamentally misconceived. 132 The KPD's ideology devoted 
considerable space to the concept of mutual solidarity between industrial and rural 
workers. However, the reality of the policy's failure was conceded at the Saxon KPD's 
second regional conference in March 1932: only in the solitary case of a textile strike in 
127 ibid, An die Nachrichtenstellen der Laender. Betr. KPD Landarbeit, B1.74. 
128 Muehlberger, D., Hitler's Followers. Studies in the Sociology o/the Nazi Movement (London, 1991), 
pp205-6. 
129 I 3/8-10/155, Rundscheiben. Der Landarbeiterstreik in Westsachsen (undated: 1931), Bl.80. 
130 ibid, An die BL Sachsen Abteilung-Land. KPD VB Leipzig, den 10.4.1931, Bl.77. 
131 'b'd I 1 • 
132 ibid, Rundscheiben. Der Landarbeiterstreik in Westsachsen (undated: 1931), BI.82-3. 
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Floeha in 1931 had peasants acted in solidarity by supplying food to strikers.133 In no 
instance was the KPD able to broaden rural strikes by causing snowballing solidarity 
strikes in industrial areas. 134 Rural employers also settled disputes by payment in kind, in 
the form of milk and food: when hunger was abated so too was the inclination to strike. 
Furthermore, the SA and Nazis' tactic of achieving "class compromise" also appears to 
have been more attractive to all concerned, while the KPD's policy pushed small-and 
medium-scale rural employers more sharply towards their political rivalS.135 
Rural workers' antipathy towards communism was also reflected in the RGO's campaign 
to cause strikes during the harvest months. While the party's daily press proclaimed a 
wave of Communist-led activity, the reality was in stark contrast: frequently communist 
meetings had to be cancelled as only party organisers turned Up.136 The KPD also had too 
few speakers who were trained to address rural audiences.137 The NSDAP, by contrast, 
had a cadre of activists who were well trained speakers and party propaganda took 
account of specific local peculiarities.138 During 1931 the KPD experienced difficulties 
campaigning among industrial workers who were employed in factories in small industrial 
villages (Siedlungen), which were surrounded by the Saxon countryside.139 The inability to 
133 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht des KPD Sachsens an der 2. Bezirksparteitag Yom 25-17.3.1932, 
pp106-8, B1.55. 
134 'b'd 1 1 . 
135 I 3/8-10/155, Rundscheiben. Der Landarbeiterstreik in Westsachsen (undated: 1931), B1.80. 
136 Staatsarchiv Bremen (Sta.B) 4,65-1729 Monatsbericht (June-July 1931). 
137 St.Ha.D., Md!, Nr.11192, An das MdI, Dresden. Betr. Landarbeiter-Versammlungskampagne der 
RGO. Kh Leipzig, den 20.6.1931, B1.23-4. 
138 Noakes, Nazi Party, ppl4lff. 
139 SAPMO 13/8-10/155, Der Bolshevik. Organfuer die Mitglieder der KPD. Bezirk Sachsen, Nr.l, Jg.3, 
Leipzig, Anfang Januar 1932, Bl.212. This stressed to functionaries the rural location of some large 
factories, especially in paper processing and wood working sectors of the Saxon economy. 
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include these workers in the KPD's campaigns further prevented the KPD from building 
up "bases" from which to agitate in the countryside. Despite the impact of the fourth 
emergency decree, which cut wages by some 10-15 per cent from January 1932, the ZK 
Rural Division's renewed policy drive in December failed to take Off.140 The greatest 
activity was in the Landtag and Town Halls, where Communist deputies forwarded 
motions for the amelioration of the poverty of the rural popUlation. This was, 
unsuccessfully, intended to function as a propaganda focus for a wider extra-parliamentary 
. 141 
campaIgn. 
The KPD's role in preventing farmers' property from being subject to compulsory 
auctions to clear tax arrears also feature prominently in the communist daily press, which 
claimed that a "small war" had been unleashed in the countryside under Communist 
leadership.142 In this area of party activity, as in all others, "mass action" was stressed: the 
prevention of forced auctions was to involve village communities in Communist -led 
actions against the state as opposed to local Communists' acting to prevent the auctioning 
of an individual's possessions. This was made clear in the KPD's organ for functionaries, 
Der Bolschevik, which criticised party members who had acted as "individuals" by 
preventing a peasant's cow being sold to pay of his tax arrears. Party functionaries were 
told that the idea was not to "take struggles away from the peasants" but to use them to 
organise villagers in communist campaigns.143 The only incidences of the Saxon KPD 
140 St.Ha.D., Md!, Nr.19092, Abschrift. Anweisungen an alle Bezirkslandesabteilungen!, Berlin, den 
4,1.1932, B1.116. Thaelmann's policy speech was published in the December issue of Die Internationale, 
ibid. 
141 'b'd 1 1 . 
142 Die Rote Fahne, Nr.5, 7.1.1932. 
143 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolshevik. Organ fuer die Mitglieder der KPDs. Bezirk Sachsen, Nr.l ,Jg,3, 
Leipzig, Anfang Januar 1932, B1.212. 
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fonning "peasants' committees" to carry out the leadership's policy against forced auctions 
were in the localities of Bennsgruene, Gelenau and Hainichen. l44 Of the fifteen forced 
auctions which the KPD claimed to have prevented during the winter of 1931/2, only in 
one documented case did a "mass action" take place.145 The incident occurred in the 
outskirts of Hainichen where some 100 local Communists turned up to prevent a fellow 
party member, a small peasant, from having his belongings auctioned.146 Although the 
levels of rural indebtedness increased in the course of 1932, the KPD was involved in few 
"mass actions" to prevent forced auctions.147 Later studies conducted by East German 
historians blamed the failure of the KPD's campaign on the negative propaganda made by 
the SPD and "bourgeois parties" which presented the forced collectivization of the Soviet 
rural economy as a state expropriation en masse.148 However, the KPD was unable to 
present itself as a political hybrid, protecting the property of the rural population in 
Germany while enthusiastically supporting all thing Soviet. 
The KPD also set out to maintain a visible presence m rural areas usmg what 
contemporaries called "propaganda journeys": columns of party activists on foot or in 
lorries taking propaganda to outlying areas.149 This principally took the form of "Rural 
Sundays", which were another case of pouring old communist tactics into the new bottles 
of the early 1930s. After the second deflationary emergency decree of 5 June 1931 
144 SAPMO 13/8-10/144, Berichtdes KPD Sachsens an der2. Bezirksparteitag vom 25-17.3.1932, 
pp106-8, B1.55. 
145 'b'd I I . 
146 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.19092, "Hundete von Arbeitem verhindem Zwangsversteigerung eines 
Kleinbauems", Saechsische Arbeiterzeitung (SAZ), Nr.49, 2.3.1932, B1.163; ibid, Stadtrat Hainichen, 
Polizeiwache, den 21.3.1932, B1.165. 
147 SAPMO 13/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsen an der 3. Parteitag vom 3-4.12.1932, B1.8, 
148 In der Revolution geboren, p293. 
149 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.19097, An das MdI Sachsens. Dresden, am 20.7.1932, B1.152. 
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increased general political tensions, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior detailed how 
scarcely a Sunday went by without these "propaganda journeys" from the NSDAP and to 
a lesser extent the SPD, in addition to the KPD. These events were conceived of as a 
political fanfare for the common man using music and marches adorned by flags, banners 
and placards to attract attention. 150 The transfer of urban political violence to the 
countryside, particularly when political rivals collided while spreading their message, 
brought with it the condemnation of the majority of the population. The Saxon state 
authorities cited this in its appeal for the use of the presidential decree of 28 March 1931 
on preventing political excesses, thereby aiming to prevent the influx of non-locals into the 
proliferation of Saxon villages. 151 The KPD's reception in rural Saxony was more akin to a 
fox among the chickens than a harbinger of political revelation. This was all the more so 
when Communist activists trampled over peasants' crops, even playing football on them, 
and then asked the hard-pressed peasantry to buy their literature and discuss an "alliance" 
with the urban proletariat.1S2 
The KPD's so-called Reich Peasants' Day, to be held on 15 November, illustrates the 
problems of a monolithic Bolshevised party presenting itself as housing a hyphenated 
political identity: advocating revolution on the model of the Russian Revolution while 
simultaneously representing the German nationalist interests of the "working people". The 
ZK in Berlin decided that the anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution were too 
confined to urban industrial areas: the KPD should therefore take its celebrations to the 
150 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.I1126/5, Monatsbericht (June-July 1931), Bl.416,B1.423. 
151 ibid, Monatsbericht (May-June 1931), B1.423; An das MdI Sachsens. Dresden, am 20.7.1932, SLa.D., 
MdI, Nr.19097,B1.152. 
152 Party functionaries were asked to prevent party workers from antagonising peasants' sensibilities. Sec, 
SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolshevik. Organ fuer die Mitglieder der KPDs. Bezirk Sachsen, Nr.l ,Jg.3, 
Leipzig, Anfang Januar 1932, B1.212. 
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countryside and "popularise the socialist construction of the Soviet rural economy" (ie 
collectivization).153 The Reich Peasants' Day was viewed by the ZK as a means of 
breathing life into the party's rural campaign and mobilising the City Districts, local groups 
and cells to carry party policy into their sponsored villages.154 However, despite a flurry of 
directives from the rural divisions, the meetings in preparation for the event itself sunk like 
a lead weight in unfriendly political waters. The audience at Communist "peasants' 
meetings" frequent comprised only party members, who were often not from the locality, 
and in the small number of cases when farmers did come they often took issue with the 
KPD's speakers. The Saxon Ministry of the Interior concluded on the basis of local 
administrative district reports that the KPD's campaign had made no impact. 155 In the 
countryside around Chemnitz and Zwickau the membership made the greatest efforts to 
campaign in rural areas. However, here too meetings were more like a needle in a 
haystack than a concentrated campaign. These meetings were also organised by activists 
from neighbouring industrial areas, for example some 20-25 members of the KgdF walked 
out to agitate among the farmers in the environs ofOelsnits i.V. and Schneeberg.156 
The ZK had intended the Peasants' Aid Programme campaign to reach a high point at a 
Reich Peasants' Congress in Berlin. The Congress was finally held on 23-24 January 1932: 
the delay of more than six months indicates the difficulties experienced in having small-
153 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.19092, Abschrift. Rundschreiben an aIle BL Sekretaire und Landabteilung, Berlin 
den 7.10.1931, Bl.92. 
154 ibid, B1.94. 
155 ibid, An das MdI Dresden. Betr. KPD Landarbeit. Kh Bautzen, am 28.11.1931, Bl.1lO; ibid, An das 
MdI Dresden. Kh Zwickau, den 28.11.1931, Bl.111; ibid, An das MdI Dresden. Chemnitz, den 
28.11.1931, ibid,Bl.1l2; ibid, An das MdI Dresden. Dresden, den 28.11.1931, ibid, BU13. 
156 Sl.Ha.D., MdI,19092, An das MdI Dresden. Dresden, den 28.11.1931, Bl.l13; ibid, An das MdI 
Dresden. Kh Zwickau, den 28.11.1931, Bl.111; ibid, Abschrift. Anweisungen an aIle 
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and medium-scale peasant producers delegated to the Congress. The number of delegates 
at the Congress was 145, 14 of whom were members of the KPD. 157 The participants 
were addressed by Bruno von Salomon, who spoke on the importance of the "alliance 
policy". Johannes N au's speech detailed the reflections of peasants who had visited the 
Soviet Union.15S The KPD's central organ, Die Rote Fahne, claimed in triumphalist tones 
that the delegates represented a movement of hundreds of thousands of rural workers; 
careless editing, however, meant that the same edition carried the ZK's lamentations on 
the back pages.159 In Saxony the BL conceded that only 15 "peasant committees" had 
been founded during the immediate preparations for the Congress and the majority of 
these were "passive". 160 The campaign to elect delegates to the Congress was 
characterised throughout Saxony by a reluctance to participate.161 No figure is given for 
the number of delegates from Saxony; the number, however, was certainly small, perhaps 
a handful. 
The culmination of the Peasants' Aid Programme at the Reich Congress in Berlin gives 
the impression that the Saxon KPD's rural policy resembled pulling a lever which was 
connected to nothing: the internal party machinery was put in place but there were too 
few cogs to turn the wheels. The policy failed to win support among the rural popUlation, 
and the KPD was unable to build up the organisational "bases" from which to oppose the 
157 Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, p315. 
158 St.Ha.D., MdI, Nr.19092, An die Nachrichtenstellen der Laender. Betr. KPD Bauernpropaganda. 
Reichs MdI, B1.41. 
159 DorpaIen, 'Endphase', p95 and note 69, quoting,Die Rote Fahne, 24.1.1932. 
160 SAPMO I 3/8-10/144, Bericht des KPD Sachsens an der 2. Bezirksparteitag yom 25-17.3.1932, 
pp106-8, B1.55. 
161 SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.19092, An das MdI Dresden. Kh. Zwickau, den 28.11.1931, BUll; ibid, An das 
MdI Dresden. Chemnitz, den 28.11.1931, B1.112; ibid, Abschrift. Rundschreiben an aIle BL Sekretaire 
und Landabteilung, Berlin den 7.10.1931, B1.9lf. 
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NSDAP. From 14,112 new recruits in Saxony between April and December 1931, all but 
101 of them were industrial workers, the vast majority were unemployed; only 13 new 
recruits had defected from the Nazis. 162 The impact of the Volksrevolution campaign in 
the Saxon countryside gives no reason to believe that the KPD had any significant 
influence among the rural workforce or small producers. From Baden in the northwest to 
Saxony in the south east the countryside, to varying degrees, became a Nazi stronghold; 
the patent reality of this disinclined Communist activists from complying with a policy 
which was viewed at best as misconceived and at worst as damaging.163 The ZK in Berlin, 
the Saxony BL and, more importantly the rank-and-file membership and mid and lower 
level functionaries, all knew that the countryside had turned brown; party documentation 
stating otherwise was contradictory and served as internal party propaganda to justify 
continuing a failing policy. The rural campaign was a policy which was largely conducted 
on the pages of the party press and circulars from the KPD's rural divisions. In the 
propaganda war between the NSDAP and the KPD both parties claimed to represent the 
"working people" of white collar workers and lower civil servants, those injured in the 
First World War, peasants and industrial workers. l64 This was compounded by the 
increasingly similar language of the political extremes and the KPD's adoption of much of 
the Nazis' political image, such as a leadership cult and (verbal) ultra-nationalism The 
failure of the Volksrevolution policy to beat back the NSDAP by winning over its social 
basis among the "misled" working people did not correspond to the political reality in 
Saxony. It is only possible to explain why the policy was so enduring in terms of the 
162 Ba.K. NS 26/810, Hauptarchiv der NSDAP, Entwicklung der Mitgliederschaft der KPD. 
163 Watts, D., 'Electoral Success and Political Failure: The KPD in Mannheim in the Last Years of the 
Weimar Republic', EHQ, 18 (4) (1988) (pp439-54), p443. 
164 For a typical example of Nazi propaganda see, SLHa.D., MdI, Nr.19099, "Rucckblick auf das Jahr 
1931", Voelkischer Beobachter, NrA, 4.1.1932, B1.57. 
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Comintem's objective of harnessing Gennan nationalism in the interests of Soviet foreign 
policy. 
7.5 The Anti-Fascist Action: A Crisis Disguised as an Opportunity. 
Between the spring and autumn of 1932 the KPD carried out a tactical shift in emphasis, 
which became known as the "Anti-Fascist Action". Initially, the KPD leadership appeared 
to have finally seen the need to place the struggle against the rise of the Nazis at the 
centre of party policy. At first glance the KPD even seemed to be adopting a more flexible 
approach towards the SPD than the constraints of the "social fascist" policy had 
permitted.165 On 25 April the ZK stated publicly to the Reich Executives of the SPD and 
ADGB that it was ready to "fight together with any organisation in which workers were 
united, and genuinely wants to carry out the struggle against cuts in pay and 
unemployment benefits,,166 The publication of the "Anti-Fascist Action" appeal, on 25 
May 1932, continued to stress that the KPD's main aim was to prevent Hitler from coming 
to power. 167 However, already by 5 June the ZK insisted that the KPD's united front offers 
had been directed at the social democratic workers as individuals, not their "reformist" 
leaders. 168 What the Anti-Fascist Action did represent was an ephemeral episode in 
165 Weber, Hauptfeind, pp49ff; 'Rundschreiben des ZK am 4.6.1932' in, Weber, H. (ed.), Die 
Generallinie. Rundschreiben des Zentralkommittees der KPD an die Bezirke, 1929-1933 (Duesseldorf, 
1981), pp492ff. This circular emphasises "halting the rising wave of Hitler Fascism and beating it back". 
166 Bahne, Scheitern, p23. 
167 Weber, H., Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918-1945 (Ertraege der Forschung vo1.l98; Darmstadt, 
1983), p135. 
168 Bahne, Scheitern, pp23-4; Daycock, 'Political Extremes', pp285ff. The KPD's representatives, Torgier 
and Kasper, negotiated with the SPD during June 1932 on the possibility of "tolerating" an SPD-Centrc 
Party government in Prussia. 
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experimenting with the united front from above (ie winning over social democratic 
workers by using conditional offers of co-operation to their leaders).169 
Various factors had combined to trigger the KPD's change in tactics. The KPD leadership 
at national level had focused its fire on the SPD, but the violence on the streets made the 
membership identify the Nazis as the "main enemy".170 It is also possible that Stalin had 
been temporarily put on the defensive in Moscow in what Guenter Reimann, in a recently 
published memoir, called the "Moscow Spring" of 1932. This allowed a change in the 
Comintern's German policy which took greater account of the situation that the KPD was 
faced with. I71 Crucially, the KPD was dressing up what was a party crisis as a political 
opportunity. The inflexibility of the Comintern's General Line had intensified a dispute 
within the KPD leadership over the negative impact it was having on the party.172 The 
party conflagration culminated in the removal of two members of the three-man 
Secretariat, Neumann and Remmele, in the course of 1932.173 The Saxon BL was also 
wracked with disputes on the detrimental effects of party policy. In early summer 1931 
Renner was replaced as Political Secretary, and other prominent figures such as Herbert 
Wehner, were sidelined. The leadership of the Saxon KPD was put in the hands of the 
party apparatchik, Fritz Selbmann, who, as an outsider to the region, was less inclined to 
169 Flechtheim, Die KPD, pp22lff. 
170 For the KPD in Berlin see, Rosenhaft, Beating, pp7ff,18ff,21lff. 
171 This thesis is without documentary evidence. See, Reimann, G., Berlin-Moskau 1932. Das Jahr der 
Entscheidung (Hamburg, 1993). 
172 Bahne, S., "Sozialfascismus' in Deutschland. Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs', in 
International Review o/Social History (IRSH) 10 (2) (1965), p283; Bahne, somewhat strangely, identifies 
the prime policy mover as Wilhelm Pieck with the temporary co-operation of the Thaelmann Group. See 
Scheitern, p24 
173 Weber, Haupt/eind, pp79ff. 
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respond to Saxon political peculiarities.174 The changes in leading personnel were 
accompanied by a further centralisation in the Saxon KPD's organisation.175 Meetings of 
the lower party organisations had openly referred to their lack of trust in and enthusiasm 
for the upper party leadership.176 The Anti-Fascist Action was conceived of as a means of 
stabilising the party in the face of these wide-ranging difficulties. One example of the 
problems of rigidly continuing the Hauptfeind Sozialdemokratie General Line is 
illustrated by the campaign for a referendum against the Schieck administration in Saxony. 
The referenda, which parallelled policy in Prussia, were regionally distinct. In Prussia the 
referendum campaign aimed to oust the incumbent SPD-Ied administration, but in 
Brunswick, for example, the Communists were involved in trying to remove a regional 
government which was controlled by the Nazis.l77 In Saxony, however, the KPD's 
membership was disinclined to become actively involved in a de facto united front with 
the Nazis and DNVP, who also wanted to bring down the Schieck government. 178 If the 
ZK was to keep control of the membership some concession to the force of events on the 
streets was required. 
174 SLHa.D., Md!, Nr.11126/5, Monatsbericht (Juti-August 1931), B1.432f; Selbmann's and Wehner's 
memoirs also give accounts of this period in the Saxon KPD's history, see, Selbmann, F., Alternative-
Bilanz-Credo. Versuch einer Selbstdarstellung (Halle, 1975), esp. ppl89ff; Wehner, H., Zeugnis. 
Persoenliche Notizen, 1929-42 (Cologne, 1982), esp. pp30ff. 
175 ibid, Monatsbericht (March-April 1931), B1.399 
176 A representative example see, SAPMO I 3/8-10/154, Bericht ueber die Sitzung der erweiterten 
Stadtteilleitungssitzung A. Leipzig, den 9.4.1931, B1.149-51. 
177 Reuter, G., KPD-Politik in der Weimarer Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammensetzung der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik ~Hannover, 1982), pl19 and 
note 12. 
178 Sta.B., 4,65-1730, Monatsbericht (November-December 1931); ibid, (April 1932); B.A.P. RKO 15.07 
Bd.2, Nr. 26061, Politischer Bericht, Bl.13lff. 
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In Saxony at least the "social fascist" policy was beginning to burn out against the friction 
of internal party opposition.179 Furthennore, the "Anti-Fascist Action" was a necessary 
response to the formation of the SPD and ADGB's Iron Front, which had itself been 
founded as a response to the NSDAP-DNVP alliance, the Harzburg Front. 180 The SPD's 
united front offers to the KPD, such as that made by Rudolf Breitscheid in late 1931, 
while rejected as "manoeuvres" by the KPD's leadership, seemed increasingly relevant to 
many Saxon Communists.181 More significantly, in a whole range of areas, such as the 
Ruhr, Wuerttemberg, Hamburg, Oberhausen and Nurenberg, communist sub-district 
organisations and local groups had co-operated with local organisations of the SPD 
against the NSDAP. 182 Saxony's political history as a region with a strong left-wing SPD 
and the recent surge of Nazi campaigning and violence combined to give the policy 
urgency at local level. The KPD leadership was concerned that to fail to respond to Nazi 
violence risked allowing the dam between the KPD and SPD to burst, creating a fertile 
meadow of proletarian unity under the hegemony of the left-wing Saxon SPD.183 The 
pressure of political developments on the KPD, which threatened to implode many local 
party organisations, forced the KPD to present the crisis of party morale as an opportunity 
to combat "Nazi-terror". 
The KPD's technique of mobilising the party did not differ from the Volksrevolution 
policy: the "Antifa" was a "delegate movement" which was intended to function as a 
coveyor belt to Communist -led campaigns by including non-communists in the so-called 
179 For the impact of Nazi violence on the Berlin KPD's membership see, Rosenhaft, Beating, passim. 
180 Flechtheim, Die KPD, p223; Rosenhaft, Beating, pp79ff. 
181 Degras, Communist International, p213. 
182 Weber, H., 'Einleitung', in Flechtheim, Die KPD (2 edn; Frankfurt/M, 1969), p55ff; Bahne, Scheitern, 
p23. 
183 Ba.K, R 45 IV /22, Taetigkeitsbericht von Instrukteur Becker im UB IX (undated: probably July 1932). 
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"unity committees". The committees would then carry out "actions" as pan of the KPD's 
on-going work in the factories, on the streets, and in rural areas. I84 What had changed was 
that Social Democrats were to be attracted by the promise of physical defence against 
Nazi violence. The KPD's MSS (Mass Self-Defence) was given the task of setting up 
commissions to organise party work at grass roots level. It was hoped that agitation and 
propaganda against the impact of the Reich government's emergency decrees on workers 
and the unemployed would give the Antifa Action wider support. I8S In reality the "Antifa 
Action" in Saxony was carried out by a staff of Instructors. The Instructors not only 
brought directives to the local groups and party cells but stayed to organise the policy's 
implementation. However, the overwhelming mood of despondency and despair among 
the Saxon KPD members meant that much of the Instructors' efforts were consumed by 
trying to break up large and inactive residential party units into "groups of five", which 
d b . d l' 186 were expecte to e more actIve an comp lant. 
The subterfuge used in the KPD's calls to the SPD's membership for "joint" defence 
against the Nazis' street violence did not detract from the continued centrality of 
communist factory policy. The KPD's functionary core continued to dissipate vast 
amounts of energy in a campaign that the overwhelmingly unemployed party membership 
clearly regarded as both inappropriate and impracticable. At a meeting in Dresden 
between the BL and ROO factory functionaries, 22 of the 40 ROO officials were factory 
184 SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.12. Bezirk Sachsen. (undated: July 1932), Bl.I1O; 
B.aK. R 45 IV/28, Rundschreiben. An alle Strassen und Betreibszellen (undated: probably mid 1932); 
ibid, An die Ortsgruppen der KPD. Chemnitz, den 20.6.1932. 
185 Ba.K, R 45 IV {22, Taetigkeitsbericht von Instrukteur Becker im VB IX (undated: probably July 1932). 
186 B.aK. R 45 IV /28, Bericht ueber Grimmma von Instrukteur Rolf. Leipzig, den 30.5.1932; ibid, An die 
BL und VBL Riesa. Bericht vom Instrukteur Schiller ueber die Arbeit im Waldheim. Waldheim, den 
2.6.1932; ibid, Bericht an die BL ueber die Taetigteiten im VB Reisa vom Instrukteur Rolf. Radeberg, den 
15.6.1932. 
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187 A .. h S' d I Instructors. meetmg m t e Ie e and Neumann textile factory in Dresden, which held 
a meeting of some 100 workers and adopted a resolution in support of the "Antifa", was 
very much an exception to the rule.188 In the factories of Vogtland, which were dispersed 
throughout the region, the weakness of the SPD did not allow a communist breakthrough. 
For example in Treuen in the four large factories employing 800 workers the ROO had 
only five members.189 In Freital local party activists informed the Instructor that there 
would be no more strike calls until the RGO was strong enough.190 
During the "Antifa" the KPD's greatest successes remained in achieving benefit increases 
from Town Halls to the unemployed and pensioners. The Saxon KPD used the long tried 
and tested technique of organising demonstrations of the unemployed on Town Halls 
when the question of benefit cuts was being debated in the chamber. Normally a 
delegation would then be brought into the local councils to represent the interests of the 
unemployed. 191 In this manner the Saxon KPD in mid-1932 attained concessions for the 
unemployed in Brand Erbisdorf, Heidenau, Koetzschenbroda, Radebeul and Doebeln.192 
In the main cities, however, it seems likely that the use of exclusion zones around the 
187 SAPMO 13/8-10/157, An die BL (Sekr.). Bericht ueber die Duerchfuhrung dec Antifaschischen 
Aktion. UB Dresden, den 8.6.1932, B1.63. 
188 'b'd 1 1 . 
189 Ba.K. R 45 IV/22, Instrukteurbericht fuer die Zeit vom 27.6 bis 30.7.1932. Plauen (undated). 
190 Ba.K. R 45 IV (l8, Instrukteurbericht Freital. Sitzung der erweiterten Ortsgruppeleitung am 13.6.1932. 
191 Fischer, German Communists, pp138ff; Huber-Koller, R-M, 'Die kommunistische 
Erwerbslosenbewegung in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik', in Gesellschaft· Beitraege zur 
Marxistischen Theory, X (1977), pp89-140; McElligott, A., 'Mobilising the Unemployed: The KPD and 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement in Hamburg-Altona during the Weimar Republic', in Evans and 
Geary (eds.), The German Unemployed, pp228ff. 
192 Ba.K. R 45 IV/28, An die BL der KPD Sachsens. KPD UB4. Freiberg, den 3.6.1932; ibid, Infonnation 
ueber die Antifaschistische Aktion im UB 3 (19.7.1932). 
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Town Halls helped prevent this fonn of extra-parliamentary pressure.193 The wider picture 
is also complicated by the KPD's ability to attain these concessions by winning SPD votes, 
and in some places also the votes of local NSDAP councillors, who also wanted to 
influence the electoral predilections of the unemployed. 194 The KPD's work in this area 
also failed to crystalise into the creation of a significant number of Committees of the 
Unemployed; these continued to be run by a clutch of party members, sometimes by a 
single activist.195 The trend of research emphasises that the unemployed only took part in 
Communist actions when these were explicitly in their own interests. 196 Conan Fischer 
aptly described the KPD in this sense as a party but not a movement of the unemployed. 197 
In the other areas of party work, such as taking propaganda into the countryside, 
campaigning to prevent the eviction of tenants who were in rent arrears and organising 
payment strike against the utilities, there is no evidence of any campaign which made an 
impact in Saxony.198 
Despite the intentions of the KPD leadership, the organisation of defence against, and 
indeed attacks on, the NSDAP became central to the "Anti-Fascist Action". The 
ambiguous language of the policy's introduction produced a genuine uncertainty among 
lower party functionaries concerning the extent to which the party line had changed. 199 
193 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1730, Monatsberichte (1931-32). 
194 Ba.K. R 45 IV/28, Arbeitsplan zur Reichstagswahlkampagne des VB Dresden (undated). 
195 Ba.K. R 45 IV/28, Vorbereitung der Antifa Kampfwoche, Dresden (undated: July). 
196 Huber-Koller, 'Erwerbslosenbewegung', pp89ff. 
197 Fischer, German Communists, p144. 
198 In the files Ba.K. R 45 IV/22 and R 45 IV/22 there are extensive details on the Anti-Fascist Action in 
1932. Documentation in the SAPMO archive is surprisingly sparse. For cases of preventing eviction and 
the KPD's role in the neighbourhoods see, Rosenhaft, Beating, pp86ff. 
199 Ba.K. R 45 IV/22, Aufruf der Antifa Aktion (leaflet), Dresden, den 3.6.1932; Stadtarchiv Leipzig 
(Stad.L) Ah. Leipzig Nr.1720, Der Eiserne Besen. Zeitung der KPD Zwenkau (undated: 1932), B1.2. 
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One Political Leader of a local group wrote to the sub-district leadership asking whether 
the "Antifa" policy was a united front from above, including negotiations with the local 
leaders of the social democratic workers' movement, or continued the policy of addressing 
only the workers organised in the SPD and ADGB.200 Furthermore, in this particular case, 
the lower functionary made it clear that he believed there was a mood in the KPD and the 
wider workforce for genuine joint action.201 This type of uncertainty among rank-and-file 
members and local functionaries was intensified by widespread knowledge of 
developments in the Prussia Landtag, where the KPD had conducted negotiations with 
representatives of the SPD parliamentary fraction. The Berlin KPD had also called on the 
Iron Front to take part in a joint demonstration.202 Examples of genuine co-operation 
between the workers parties' were also being published in Klassenkampf. One such 
example was in the giant Leuna chemical plant in neighbouring Halle, where the 
Communists, Social Democrats and the Christian trade unionists had made a joint 
proclamation in the factory council.203 However, central to the response of local KPD 
organisations to the NSDAP in mid 1932 was the influence of immediate local conditions. 
In Saxon Town Halls, an earlier centre of right-wing Communism, "deviation" from the 
party line had followed on from the factionalism of the 1920s. Close proximity to the SPD 
200 Ba.K. R 45 IV /22, Bericht von der Einleitung der Antifaschistischen Aktion in Plauen. Plauen, den 
1.6.1932. 
201 ibid, Bericht von der Einleitung der Antifaschistischen Aktion in Plauen. Plauen, den 1.6.1932. 
202 Circulars of the Saxon BL, however, insisted that this was not possible in Saxony because the party did 
not have the same key position in the Landtag, which could be used to "exploit differences within the 
bourgeiosie". See, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.lO. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: July 
1932), B1.104-5. 
203 Klassenkampf(4.7.32) quoted in ibid, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.lO. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: July 
1932), B1.105. 
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and the identification of certain joint interests had, since the turn of the year, led to 
Communist deputies voting with the SPD?04 
The main cause of the increase in political violence in 1932 was Saxony's bombardment 
with one election campaign following another: two presidential elections, the referendum 
to dissolve the Landtag, two Reichstag elections and the communal elections in 
November.20s It was in the "small war" of political campaigning that the majority of 
clashes between the parties took place: in 1932 seven deaths occurred, four by gun shots 
and three by stabbings.206 If this did not represent a bloodbath, then the wider perception 
of civil society breaking down was heightened by the continual discovery of anns caches. 
Equally, when unemployment soared to its peak in 1932 and wages and benefits were cut 
by presidential decree, almost every Saxon citizen was affected either directly or 
indirectly.207 There was also a widespread anticipation that, if Hitler won the presidential 
election, the SA would "march on Berlin". The Iron Front and KPD were also reported to 
be on alert in case of a Nazi putsch?08 The NSDAP's campaign of violence did not 
discriminate between the SPD, KPD or the left-wing splinter parties. The SPD's Iron 
Front, which had been organised at Reich level to defend the system of parliamentary 
democracy, behaved at grass roots level as an Abwehr organisation in the face of Nazi 
attacks. On occasion, particularly in Leipzig, the Iron Front even undertook attacks on the 
NSDAP, especially when it campaigned in SPD strongholds.209 The Iron Front also gave 
204 ibid, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.l0. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: July 1932), B1.U)4. 
205 Stadtarchiv Leipzig (Stad.L) Kap.3. Nr.38. Bd.2, Rueckblick auf das Jahr 1932, B1.62. 
206 'b'd 1 1 . 
207 ibid, B1.62-3. 
208 St.Ha.D., MdI Nr.19088, An das Ministerium des lnnero, Dresden. Polizeipresidium Lcipzig. Lcipzig, 
den 19.3.1932, B1.277. 
209 Sta.L., Kh. Leipzig Nr.1721, An die Ah Leipzig. Polizeipresidium Engelsdorf, den 17.7.1932. 
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the Saxon SPD's opposition to the NSDAP a mass presence on the streets. The 
organisation's first demonstrations numbered some 18,000 participants in Leipzig, 11,000 
in Dresden and 10,000 in Chemnitz.210 It was in this climate of political violence that in 
the aftermath of the re-election of Hindenburg as Reich president, Chancellor Bruening 
imposed a ban on the SA and SS between 13 April and 16 June.211 However, although the 
Saxon Ministry of the Interior felt that the SA ban had done something to limit political 
violence, the NSDAP almost openly used the front organisation, the Notschuetz, to take 
over the SA's role?12 
The impact of the KPD's "Anti-Fascist Action" varied across Saxony in relation to local 
conditions. In Greater Leipzig the city's more concentrated industrial structure and the 
high degree of organisational stability in the social democratic workers' movement 
restricted the NSDAP's ability to dominate the streets. The SA blamed the limitations on 
its local influence on the activism of the Iron Front and its attraction to younger 
workers.213 The SPD in Leipzig also carried out demonstrations which were explicitly 
against the NSDAP. In July 1932 the Leipzig SPD marched through the centre of the city, 
a middle-class residential area, shouting anti-Nazi slogans into megaphones. According to 
210 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1730 Monatsbericht (February-March 1932); B.a.P., RKO 15.07, Nr. 25900, Bericht 
ueber Sachsen, B1.274. 
211 The deeper reasons for this lay in the National Opposition's campaign to unseat Chancellor Bruening. 
This belated measure, however, backfired giving amunition to General Schleicher'S behind the scenes 
intrigues to install a government of "national concentration" under Franz von Papen in June 1932. For the 
sequence of events see, Kolb, Weimar Republic, ppl16ff. 
212 SLHa.D., Nr.19088, Polizeipresidium Dresden am 6.7.1932, B1.250. 
213 SLHa.D., Md!, Nr.19088, Dienstbefeh1. Polizeipresidium Dresden (undated: Februar 1932), B1.270. 
Conditions in Leipzig also caused conflict between the sub-district (Gall) leadership and the Saxon 
leadership under Martin Mutschmcmn. There was no leadership of the Leipzig SA throughout most of 
1932 and control was exercised through a party commissioner. See, ibid, Freiheitskampj, Nr.53, 3.3.1932, 
B1.320; ibid, Freiheitskampj, Nr.197, 23.8.32, B1.331. 
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the police reports the uproar caused considerable alann among the residents?14 The 
Leipzig SPD's militant opposition to the NSDAP also greatly limited the KPD's ability to 
carry out the "Antifa" campaign by building up the MSS against Nazi violence in working-
class districts. There is also no evidence of organised co-operation between rank-and-file 
members of the KPD and the KPD(O), which comprised some 500 members in Leipzig's 
skilled textile and printing trades.215 Co-operation between Social Democrats and 
Communists did, however, happen on an ad hoc basis, spontaneously responding to the 
activities of the local NSDAP. One such example was in Leiberwolkwitz, where a local 
slater held a meeting of seven Nazis in his house on 27 JUly. Some 20 Communists and 
members of the Reichsbanner, who had been drinking together in the Schwarze Rose 
public house, prevented the Nazis leaving the meeting, which had ended at around 
midnight. It required the arrival of a police van with ten officers to clear the street.216 It 
must, however, be noted that Leipzig was not an exception to the Nazis' ability to hold 
political meetings in 1932, a year in which all political activity rose on a tide of one 
election campaign flowing into another. Nazi meetings in Greater Leipzig increased from 
1,157 in 1931 to 2,386 in 1932; meetings held by the SPD, and its affiliated organisations, 
increased from 240 to 1056; meetings held by the KPD, and its auxiliary organisations 
rose from 695 to 1,575.217 
SPD organisational predominance ill the administrative districts of Leipzig and 
neighbouring Grimma, and the activism of the Iron Front, the Reichsbanner, the Sport 
organisations and the Hammerschaften in the factories, prevented Nazi violence 
214 Stad.L., Ah. Leipzig Nr.1721, Polizeipresidium Leipzig Abteilung IV am 20.7.1932. 
215 Tubbesing, 'Antifaschistischer Block', p23. 
216 Of the 5 arrests four were communists and one was a Reichsbanner member. See, Stad.L., Ah. Leipzig 
Nr.1721, Polizeiwache Leibewolkwitz am 28.7.1932. 
217 Stad.L., Kap.3.Nr.38.Bd.2, Rueckblick auf das Jahr 1932, B1.63. 
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increasing Communist influence on the streets.218 However, in the smaller industrial towns 
of northwestern Saxony the KPD's campaign had a relatively greater impact. In the 
administrative districts of Oschatz, to the east of Leipzig, and Doebeln to the south, the 
KPD's Antifa rallies and demonstrations included the participation of members of the 
Reichsbanner and the SAJ. A small number of these Social Democrats were included in 
the KPD's Unity Committees, above all in small towns and industrial villages. The KPD 
leadership noted that it was the force of Nazi violence which had increased party 
activity?19 
In Dresden the strength of the SPD organisations also restricted the KPD's campaign. 
However, there was one significant difference from Leipzig: in the Dresden area the SAl 
had defected to the SAP's youth organisation, the SJV, almost en masse.220 In the context 
of the rise in Nazi violence, local conditions were created in which there was genuine co-
operation between the SJV and the KPD's youth organisation, the KJVD. This was not 
least because the SJV insisted that it wanted unity but not "under the ZK of the KPD. ,,221 
Developments took a similar shape in the smaller towns of central and eastern Saxony. In 
Freital the KJVD carried out direct negotiations with the SJV not to "unmask" the 
organisation's leadership, but to co-operate against the NSDAP and SA. In mid June the 
KJVD's local leadership refused to accept that this represented a "deviation" from party 
policy.222 In Meissen and Freital there was also some participation of Social Democrats in 
Antifa demonstrations and rallies. In Meissen three members of the SPD were included in 
the Unity Committee. It appears, however, that this co-operation was above all carried 
218 Ba.K. R 45 IV/28, Bericht ueber Grimmma von Instrukteur Rolf. Leipzig, den 30.5.1932. 
219 Ba.K. R45 IVf28, Information ueber die Antifaschistische Aktion im UB 3 (19.7.1932). 
220 Tubbesing, 'Antifaschistischer Block', p21. 
221 ibid, Berichterstattung der UB Sekretariat zur Antifaschistischen Aktion am 9.6.1932. 
222 ibid, Instrukteurbericht Freital. Sitzung der erweiterten Ortsgruppeleitung am 13.6.1932. 
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out by the unemployed and the KPD's official propaganda continued to attack the SPD 
leadership.223 The KPD's itinerant instructor in Freiberg infonned the BL that, with the 
exception of spontaneous responses to Nazi violence, "one gets the impression that there 
is no Antifa campaign".224 A similar report from Freiberg in late July observed that even 
party members who accepted the KPD's leading role regarded the SPD as a "big 
brother. ,,225 In Bautzen the local KPD informed the sub-district leadership in Dresden that 
because of the extent of Nazi violence they should be "spared from ideological discussion" 
with the SA, which remained part of the party's official pOlicy.226 In Dresden one Nazi 
worker actually took up the Antifa call to join the struggle against the Papen government, 
which communist propaganda described as a "fascist dictatorship. ,,227 Leading regional 
functionaries continued to report that the "worker elements" in the NSDAP were on the 
verge of defecting to the KPD. A small number of highly unrepresentative reports were 
made during the Antifa Action. For example, one Instructor detailed how two Nazis had 
informed a Communist that Hitler had betrayed 23 of the party's 25 point programme and 
if he abandoned the remaining two they would go over the Communists.228 However, the 
reality was that Nazi violence against organised workers was creating ad hoc co-operation 
between Social Democrats and Communists outside of the KPD leadership'S immediate 
223 ibid, An die BL der KPD Sachsens. KPD UB4. Freiberg, den 3.6.1932; ibid, An die BL (Org.). Bericht 
ueber Meissen von Instrukteur Rolf. Meissen, den 2.7.1932; ibid, Aufruf zur Antifa Aktion. Freiberg June 
1932 (leaflet). 
224 ibid, An die BL der KPD Sachsens. KPD UB4. Freiberg, den 3.6.1932. 
225 ibid, Bericht des UB 4 ueber die Antifaschistische Aktion und Reichstagswahl am 31.7.1931 auf 
Grund des Frage Bodens der BL (undated). 
226 ibid, Berichterstattung der UB Sekretariat zur Antifaschistischen Aktion am 9.6.1932. 
227 ibid, An die BL (Sekr.). Bericht ueber die Durchfuehrung der Antifaschistischen Aktion. Dresden, den 
8.6.1932. 
228 ibid, Berichterstattung der VB Sekretariat zur Anyifaschistischen Aktion am 9.6.1932. 
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control. Indeed, the extent of genuine cooperation on the streets led to the abandonment 
of the Antifa Action as anything more than an empty slogan?29 
Perhaps the most interesting KPD district was Erzgebirge-Vogtland. In this area the KPD 
suffered significant competition from the SAP. The SAP's strongholds were in the areas of 
small-scale production and cottage industry, which had been devastated during the Great 
Depression.230 In this Saxony sub-region the once vibrant textile industry was now in 
tenninal decline: the textile towns of Plauen and Chemnitz were the two cities worst hit by 
the impact of the world economic crisis.231 Below the level of the political overviews 
supplied by electoral results, left-wing activists in this area were frequently members of 
the SAP. Throughout the sub-region there were whole areas where the SAP had absorbed 
the SPD's membership and there were no KPD local groUp.232 Secondly, the NSDAP's 
political domination in these areas did not just preside over the small farmers in 
Erzgebirge but extended throughout the whole sub-region's small-scale and cottage 
industries. KPD reports show the strength of workers' support for the Nazis where there 
were no communist factory cells and few members of the RGO.233 In Markneukirsch and 
Klingenthal, where the textile workers had never been organisationally integrated into the 
workers' movement, the NSDAP became so strong that the KPD was unable to conduct 
agitation and propaganda for fear of being assaulted by the SA, which was over-
proportionately strong in these border regions.234 
229 ibid, Rundschreiben der BL Sachsen. An aIle Zellen und Ortsgruppen. Dresden, den 1.7.1932. 
230 Tubbesing, 'Antifascistischer Block', p21. 
231 Wuenderlich, V., Arbeiterbewegung und Selbstvervaltung. KPD und Kommunalpolitik in der 
Weimarer Republik. Mit dem Beispiel Solingen (Wuppertal, 1980), p19. Solingen rated directly behind 
these Saxon cities. 
232 Ba.K., R 45 IVj22, Bericht der Wahlinstrukteur (Becker). Sachsen UB 9, Plauen (undated: July). 
233 ibid, An die BL und UBL. Instrukteurbericht vom UB 9 am 21.7.1932. 
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The political domination of the NSDAP combined with the active presence of the SAP, 
and to a lesser extent the KPD(O) , to produce a disposition in the local KPD 
organisations in favour of genuine co-operation with the wider workers' movement to 
combat the Nazi threat. The driving force behind this came from Communists who had 
been long organised in the party but put in first place the immediate reality of the Nazis 
rather than the party leadership's convoluted ideological definition of the SPD left-wing 
and the socialist splinter groups as the most dangerous enemy of Communism. In other 
cases genuine confusion about the party line was responsible for the flurry of letters 
addressed to the leaderships of the local SPD and SAP which called on joint action.235 
These so-called "false" united fronts were constructed throughout the area, in places such 
as Plauen, Treuen, Chrischwitz, Falkenstein, Rodewitz and Klingenthal.236 The KPD's 
principal means of "correcting" these "deviations" in local party organisations was to send 
Instructors from Plauen and Chemnitz. The Instructors then had the thankless task of 
detailing that the tactic involved a mobilisation of the lower party units in the factories, on 
the streets, and in the countryside, with the objective of including non-communists in 
Communist-led campaigns: genuine co-operation against the NSDAP on a party political 
level had not been envisaged.237 In southwestern Saxony the dividing line between the 
SPD and the KPD remained strongest in the larger cities, such as Plauen, where Social 
Democrats remained suspicious of communist motives.238 The inclusion of social 
235 ibid, An die BL (pol.). Bericht ueber die Antifaschistische Aktion. Plauen, den 23.6.1932; ibid, 
Bericht von der Einleitung der Antifaschistischen Aktion in Plauen. Plauen, den 1.6.1932. 
236 ibid, An die BL und UBL. Instrukteurbericht vom UB 9 am 21.7.1932; ibid, Instrukteurbericht fuer die 
Zeit vom 27.6 bis 30.7.1932. Plauen (undated); ibid, An die BL Sachsen (Org.). Einschaetzung des 
Wahlergebnis der Reichstagwahl Juli 1932 im UB Plauen. Plauen, den 6.8.1932. 
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democrats in the KPD's MSS was predominantly in the smaller towns and industrial 
villages.239 The KPD's difficulties in including non-communist workers in the Antifa 
Action is illustrated by the District Anti-Fascist Conference in Chemnitz on 18 June: out 
of 264 delegates only three were members of the SPD, two were Reichsbanner members, 
five were in the SAP and three in the SN; one unemployed Nazi worker represented the 
other prong of Communist tactics.240 Attempts to organise similar conferences to mobilise 
the local party organisations in the Limbach area came to nothing.241 Crucially, in Plauen, 
a stronghold of the NSDAP, the urgency of political developments and the BL's 
sectarianism allowed the united front to come under the SAP's direction. Hundreds of 
Communists from Plauen and its environs attended SAP meetings, at which the SAP's 
local leadership derided the Saxon KPD's leader, Fritz Selbmann, as a "saboteur of the 
united front. ,,242 By early August the sub-district leadership was conducting party workers' 
conferences in Plauen, Oelsnitz and Falkenstein to impose the official party line?43 In 
Falkenstein the KPD's local groups continued to reject the upper leadership's insistence 
that their efforts to form united fronts had been "false" and that physical defence against 
the Nazi movement was less effective than "mass" action (ie work in the factories).244 The 
fear of genuine co-operation quickly became so acute that the leadership in Chemnitz 
instructed local groups to end their discussions with the KPD(O) and the SAP and to 
239 ibid, An die BL Sachsen (Org.). Einschaetzung des Wahlergebnis der Reichstagwahl Juli 1932 im UB 
Plauen. Plauen, den 6.8.1932. 
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concentrate on "unmasking" the SPD leadership. The KPD leadership even alleged that 
the KPD(O) were police spies who often acted as strike breakers.245 
The Antifa Action had failed to re-invigorate the KPD's political strategy by using a more 
direct response to the rise of the NSDAP as a gateway to the inclusion of Social 
Democrats in the party's campaigns. Furthermore, instead of putting cement back into the 
crumbling wall dividing the KPD locally from the wider German workers' movement, it 
had inadvertently brought about greater co-operation. This meant that for most of the 
campaign the KPD leadership concentrated on closing the stable door after the horse had 
bolted. The KPD's policies were also complicated by the Reichstag elections in July 1932, 
which followed the fall of the Bruening government and its replacement on 30 May by 
Chancellor Papen's "cabinet of barons": the SPD abandoned its policy of "tolerating" the 
system of government by emergency decree.246 Particularly after the election campaign 
had begun the KPD's directives to the lower party organisations insisted that the Antifa 
Action was addressed exclusively to socialist workers not their political organisations. For 
this reason all "letter writing" to the Iron Front, in order to bring about negotiations 
between the SPD and KPD at local level, were to stop.247 The tactic of treating the Nazis 
as the "main enemy" was abandoned because it threatened to dissolve the political border 
between KPD and SPD activists at local level. The BL's directives returned to a strict 
definition of the "social fascist" policy; above all the left-wing of the SPD, which favoured 
244 ibid, Bericht ueber die durchgefuebrte Parteiarbeiterkonferenz am 3.8.1932 in Falkenstein. 
245 Ba.K., R 45 IV/28, An die Ortsgruppen der KPD. Chemnitz, den 20.6.1932. 
246 Initially the KPD simply continued to accuse the SPD of "tolerating" the Papen government, despite 
the fact that the SPD administration in Prussia had been deposed by Papen. The KPD even claimed that 
the "Papen coup" had really been against the KPD and that the SPD now hoped that the KPD would be 
banned. See, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.10. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: July 
1932), B1.105. 
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co-operation against the Nazis, was singled out as Communism's "most dangerous 
opponent" .248 By the time of the announcement of the Papen government's emergency 
decree on "reanimating" the economy, the KPD had returned to a policy prioritising 
attacking the SPD at all levels of party work. The KPD's membership was instructed to 
oppose Papen's emergency decree by "taking the Anti-Fascist Action into the factories" , 
where few Communists were organised and fewer still were prepared to carry out party 
work.249 The change in the KPD's tactics acted like a soporific on an already drowsy 
membership. 
7.6 The Gotterdaemmerung 
The 12th Plenary meeting of the ECCI, held during August and September 1932, had not 
been called to deal with developments specific to the KPD. The meeting's function was to 
shore up the "social fascist" General Line throughout the Comintern. At the ECCI Plenum 
both Thae1mann and Manuilsky warned against "false" co-operation with the SPD, the 
Renegades (the SAP and KPD(O)) and the "counter-revolutionary" Trotskyists. 
According to ECCI resolutions the calls by non-communist organisations for united action 
at leadership level served only as a "manoeuvre" to give the "illusion" that the SPD was an 
anti-fascist party. The KPD was instructed to respond by "combating all tendencies for 
weakening the principal struggle against" 'social fascism' in all of its forms. ,,250 The ECCI 
gave no meaningful analysis of the course of developments in Germany: they were merely 
defined in the context of the General Line. The Papen government was part of the 
continued "fascist development" of the state, it was assisted by the Reichswehr, the 
248 ibid, Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.12. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: July 1932), BI.106. 
249 ibid Rundschreiben der KPD Nr.18. Bezirk Sachsens (undated: September 1932), BUll. , 
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Stahlhelm and the NSDAP; the SPD and the Catholic Centre Party had prepared the path 
for this fonn of "fascist dictatorship. ,,251 When the Schleicher government replaced the 
Papen administration on 2 December, Fowkes aptly stated that the "game with the word 
fascism" continued: this administration was said to be merely a further development of 
£ . 252 aSClsm. 
The tightening of the General Line was pumped through the KPD at the 3rd Reich Party 
Conference in mid October 1932. At the Reich Conference Thaelmann stated that: "Only 
if the main blow is directed against the SPD, the social mainstay of the bourgeoisie, can 
the main enemy of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, be beaten and destroyed".253 The 
KPD's leadership again played down the role of the Nazis, presenting them as only one 
form of fascism, denying that there was any "difference of principle" between bourgeois 
democracy and "Hitler Fascism".254 With the KPD's return to a policy of strict 
organisational isolation from the SPD, came a re-orientation in the social groups targeted 
for communist recruitment: without winning over the Nazis' mass basis among workers, 
small farmers, white collar workers and the lower middle classes, it was alleged that there 
could be no proletarian revolution in Gennany.255 
The national conference was followed up by conferences in the regional party 
organisations. At the 3rd Conference of the Saxon KPD (3-4 December) the leadership 
asserted that the struggle against the SPD's "left-wing" had particular significance because 
of the region's political traditions. The leftist "manoeuvres" of the Saxon SPD leadership 
were preventing the workers coming to the KPD, requiring an all out attack on "social 
251 Weber, Haupt/eind, pp57-9. 
252 Fowkes, German Communism, p 168. 
253 Weber, Haupt/eind, p58. 
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fascism".256 This policy continued to characterise the Saxon KPD's leadership up to and 
following Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933. In February 1933 Fritz 
Selbmann informed a public meeting that the SPD had "paved the way" for Hitler and the 
KPD rejected the SPD leadership's offer of a "non-aggression pact" to oppose the Third 
Reich as this would prevent struggles under communist leadership.257 
Central to the KPD's tactics after the 12th ECCI Plenum was a renewed effort to 
concentrate party work in the factories, where communist influence was weakest.258 By 
implication the policy aimed to overcome communist contact and co-operation with the 
wider workers' movement in residential districts. Internal party circulars were couched in 
terms of an "ideological offensive" to "win back" Nazi workers.259 The Anti-Fascist 
Action was increasingly depicted as a "struggling red united front", which placed 
particular emphasis on extending the united front from below to win over Nazi workers by 
including them in the KPD's actions.260 
A Saxon Strike Wave? 
In the autumn of 1932 the KPD's political line envisaged devoting considerable energy to 
causing economic and political strikes.261 The KPD leadership alleged that because the 
256 SAPMO I 3/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag vom 3-4.12.1932, p8, 
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trade union "bureaucracy" did everything possible to prevent strikes and to obstruct the 
communist trade-union opposition, the RGO's mobilisation against wage cuts must also be 
directed against the refonnist union leaderships.262 Behind the propaganda, however, the 
Saxon KPD knew only too well that the refonnist unions continued to dominate workers' 
.. 263 Th h' OppOSltIOn to wage cuts. e re-emp aSlS of the KPD's policy coincided with an 
increase in the NSBO's influence in factories throughout Germany.264 The Saxon KPD 
also noted an upsurge in activity by the NSBO in the factories. In Chemnitz there were 
NSBO cells in the metal industry, local authority factories, textile works and among 
warehouse workers. In Dresden the NSBO was strongest among tram drivers and local 
authority factory workers.265 Furthermore, by late 1932 the NSDAP had placed increasing 
stress on expanding its working-class electoral support. This included the NSBO's support 
for strikes and the creation of a strike fund.266 In the autumn of 1932 the KPD leadership's 
directives to lower party units also took on a significant change. In August Communists 
had been instructed to eject Nazi "strike-breakers" from the factories.267 However, at the 
3rd Reich Party Conference the RGO policy stated that: "Joint actions must be carried out 
with the Nazis' working-class supporters in the factories against cuts in pay and 
262 SAPMO 13/8-10/146, Bericht der BL an die Parteiarbeiterkonferenz ueber die Textilarbeiterbewegung 
(Oktober 1932), B1.4. 
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264 The industrial branches principally affected were metal working, mining and transport and the smaller 
factories on the "fringes" of industry, where the NSBO and ROO were relatively better represented. See, 
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265 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolschevik, Nr.20, Jg.3., Leipzig, Mitte Dezember 1932, p390-3, B1.231. 
266 It is likely that Hitler had convinced his supporters in industry that the NSBO policy was a tactical 
consideration. See, Daycock, 'Political Extremes', pp228ff. In NSDAP Gau, such as Upper Bavaria, the 
party threatened employers, who were party members, with expulsion if they cut workers' pay. At the 
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unemployment benefits and against the Papen dictatorship".268 At an agit-prop conference 
in September it was even suggested that the slogan, Anti-Fascist Action, should be 
changed to United Action to avoid deterring Nazi workers?69 
In Saxony the KPD set out to use the "strike strategy" in the textile industry, where wage 
agreements had expired in the course of the summer?70 However, the Saxon KPD had not 
responded to a mood within the party membership or the workforce and the 
"mobilisation" was imposed from the BL downwards using the party apparatus. In the 
course of August the BL decided to send a group of 30 Instructors into 26 Instructor 
Zones. These functionaries were to mobilise the lower party by organising, firstly 
functionary, and then delegate conferences, to broaden the KPD's influence in the 
factories.271 The functionary conferences involved a total of 159 functionaries from 53 
factories; the delegate movement attracted 188 delegates from 75 factories?72 According 
to the 1933 census there were 34,900 Saxon textile factories employing a total of 275,805 
workers?73 It was the KPD's weakness in the textile factories, where a large proportion of 
workers were women and youths, that forced the party to focus its work on 
"concentration points": namely the 246 factories which were likely to offer the best results 
267 SAPMO I 3/8-10/158, Saechsischer Betriebspressedienst, Mitte August 1932, B1.187; ibid, 
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from available resources.274 The KPD's campaign was overwhelmingly conducted from the 
streets using discussion troops made up of unemployed activists with placards, leaflets and 
megaphones, who paraded in front of the factories.275 Reports made by the Instructors 
indicate that in most "concentration areas" there were no factory cells in the textile 
industry?76 Functionaries from the BL informed party workers' conferences that: "A mood 
for struggle in the workforce cannot be expected if we are not convinced of the necessity 
of causing and mobilising struggles".277 However, in its report to the ZK the BL conceded 
that: "The mood in the individual factories is such that the workers are perhaps prepared 
to accept the wage cuts. ,,278 The BL blamed the KPD's inability to lead the 64 strikes, 
which took place between September and November in the textile industry, on the 
membership's refusal to "unmask the union bureaucracy's leftist manoeuvre", which 
"deceived" the workforce and aimed to limit the extent and objectives of any strike.279 
More seriously for the KPD's ability to carry out the official party line was the 
membership's refusal to organise joint struggles with the working-class members of the 
NSBO, while there continued to be a tendency to co-operate with left-wing Social 
Democrats against the Nazis.280 Indeed, where the KPD did have factory councillors, such 
274 SAPMO 13/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag yom 3-4.12.1932, p21-1. 
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as in Limbach, the leadership complained they behaved little differently from the social 
281 democrats. 
One departure from the Saxon trend of de facto co-operation between Communists and 
Socialists in the trade unions was a Nazi-led strike in the Leipzig textile factory Tittel and 
Kruger, which employed some 1,000 workers.282 When the strike broke out in late 
October there were only four Communists in the factory, while the NSBO organised 76 
workers. Directly before the strike the KPD was able to form an RGO factory group of 13 
members. Following this the BL instructed the factory group to act jointly with the NSBO 
at strike meetings and on the picket line, using "ideological discussion" to win them 
over.283 The admittedly limited documentation on the KPD's involvement in the strike 
points to the role of new party members, who had no political socialisation in the workers' 
movement, in accepting the policy vis a vis Nazi workers.284 Conan Fischer is technically 
correct that this type of incident demonstrates that the Berlin transport workers' strike in 
early November was not an isolated case.285 It is certainly correct that the KPD leadership 
did advocate co-operation with the Nazis. However, the important question is the extent 
to which the ZK could impose this policy on the membership. There are no exact figures 
detailing the extent of RGO-NSBO joint strikes for either Saxony or the Reich. However, 
the NSBO was involved in perhaps 26 strikes of note in 1932.286 The KPD, according to 
its own figures, was involved in 447 strikes, 138 of which were in Saxony?87 During 
281 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolschevik, Nr.15, Jg.3, Leipzig Anfang September 1932, p239, B1.219. 
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October and November 1932 the Saxon KPD won over 11 Nazi workers and three 
members of the SPD.288 In Saxony the manifest reality was that the BL could not impose 
either its strike strategy, or the campaign for an "ideological" conversion of the NSDAP's 
working-class supporters, on a reluctant membership. The KPD was able to make even 
less impact on a successful strike movement led by the Leipzig branch of the Metal 
Workers' Union (DMV) in late 1932, which ended with a three pfennig pay rise.289 One 
illustration of the policy's reception among Communists who were still employed and 
organised in the trade unions was in a strike of quarry workers in Luepitz, in the 
administrative district of Wurzen. At a union strike meeting Communists and Socialists 
acted together to throw Nazi workers out of the room.290 In a series of KPD party 
organisations in Meissen, Doebeln and Freitallocal groups continued to co-operate with 
the members of the SPD and socialist splinter groups against spiralling Nazi violence in 
workers' neighbourhoods, where the real focus of party work continued to be centred.291 
Despite the resistance of the Saxon KPD's membership the party fought to continue the 
"social fascist" policy into the Third Reich.292 At no point did the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior see the KPD as an economic threat.293 The policy, however, should not be seen as 
a failure in terms of isolating local Communists and Social Democrats: the ZK's and BLs' 
policy towards the NSDAP maximised the antagonisms between the two parties. 
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289 Stad.L., Kapp3. Nr.38. Bd.2, Rueckblick auf das Jahr 1932, B1.70; Kampferfahrung, Nr.1 
(undated:late 1932), p2, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151,B1.122. 
290 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolschevik, Nr,20, Jg.3., Leipzig, Mitte Dezember,1932, p392, B1.231. 
291 'b'd 1 1 . 
292 The campaign for the factory council elections in spring 1933 continued to adhere to the "social 
fascist" party line. See, SAPMO I 3/8-10/151, Kampferfahrung, Nr.3 (January 1933), p3-l, B1.138, 
293 Dorpalcn, 'Endphase', p98. 
Page 398 
Holding the Line in Communal Politics 
During 1932 the Saxon KPD was also burning up considerable energy in order to maintain 
the social fascist General Line in municipal politics. An open letter from the ZK to the 
party membership published in Die Rote Fahne on 5 January 1932 was a tirade against the 
lower party organisations' inclination to take up local SPD and SAP offers of united action 
again the NSDAP. The ZK dismissed these as an attempt to prevent unity under the KPD. 
The party leadership insisted that there could be no "moderation" of the party's attitude 
towards the SPD and criticised the lower party organisations' "false and undialectical" 
distinction between fascism and bourgeois democracy.294 In early 1932 the ZK acted 
against party organisations in Wuerttemberg which had gone into the municipal elections 
using "joint lists" with the SPD; in Leipzig a "group" had been expelled for continuing to 
stress the differences between the SPD and the NSDAP?95 In Maya series of party 
conferences for functionaries in municipal politics were held to enforce the party line, 
which explicitly precluded any co-operation with the SPD in local councils.296 The use of 
specifically local conditions as election issues was only to be conducted within the 
framework of the General Line.297 
The issue of co-operation with the SPD at local level against the Nazis came close to 
forcing a debate on policy in the membership. The motivation for a party discussion came 
from conditions on the ground in Saxony: from the 3,000 Saxon municipalities the 
NSDAP was the largest party in 1,597 localities, dominating especially the smaller 
294 Degras, Communist International, p214. 
295 'b'd 1 1 . 
296 SAPMO I 3/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag Yom 3-4.12.1932, B1.292-
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administrative areas, while the KPD had only 800 local groups in Saxony.298 The question 
of "joint lists" with the SPD in the municipal elections of November 1932 was discussed in 
the pages of the functionaries' organ, Der Bolschevik. An article by Leo Zimmermann, a 
party functionary in Wurzen, called for the use of "joint lists" with the SPD to prevent a 
NSDAP-Mittelstand majority in the local councils. Central to Zimmermann's argument 
was that if the Nazis ran the local administration the SPD would have effective 
propaganda against the KPD, but if the KPD agreed to "joint lists" it would be possible to 
d·· . SPD k 299 . use IScusslons to WID over wor ers. Fntz Selbmann, however, made clear that 
these views were regarded by the BL as part of an effort to revive factionalism in the 
KPD: the official party line precluded all co-operation with the SPD at local level and the 
policy of treating co-operation with the SPD as a "lesser evil" would make the KPD look 
like the SPD's "little brother". Selbmann emphasised that the ZK regarded the SPD and 
NSDAP as "two shades of one and the same social support for the bourgeois 
dictatorship".300 In order to prevent "deviation" from the party line the BL conducted a 
policy of close supervision of the process of drawing up the party lists for the local 
elections.301 
The BL's methods did restrict the extent of any electoral co-operation with the SPD. 
However, on 15 November the West Saxon SPD published an appeal for the KPD's co-
operation in the municipal elections to limit the rise of the Nazis.302 The SPD's united 
front offer made the crisis in the KPD acute. The core of opposition to the KPD's General 
Line was again among the "old" party functionaries, who acted out of a genuine 
298 SAPMO I 3/8-10/155, Der Bolschevik, Nr.15, Jg.3, Leipzig Anfang September 1932, p243, B1.219. 
299 SAPMO 13/8-10/155, Der Bolschevik, Nr.15, Jg.3, Leipzig Anfang September 1932, p255-6, B1.219. 
300 ibid, pp256-7. 
301 ibid, p258. 
302 Leipziger Volkszeitung (LVZ), 15.11.1932, quoted in Tubbesing, 'Antifaschistischer Block', P 11. 
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conviction that the rise of the NSDAP must be resisted In the administrative districts of 
Crimmitschau, Meerane, Wurzen and Aue, where the NSDAP was dominant, local party 
functionaries broke the party line and drew up "joint lists" with the local SPD 
leaderships.303 The tragic irony of the situation was that the KPD's vote continued to rise, 
in the November Reichstag elections as well as in the Saxon local elections, enabling the 
party leadership to justify their tactics.304 The "old" dissident party functionaries were 
expelled for breaking the party line with the admonition that their "errors" were the result 
of "social democratic traditions".305 At leadership level the continued gulf between the 
Saxon SPD and KPD meant that the new "left majorities" in a series of local parliaments, 
including Leipzig, Doebeln, Mittweida and Wurzen, were duds against the explosive 
charge of the NSDAP.306 
"New Functionaries/or Old": The Enemy Within in January 1933. 
Immediately before the Nazis' "seizure of power" on 30 January 1933, the Saxon KPD's 
highest profile action was the "Winter Aid Campaign", which involved demonstrations of 
the unemployed on Town Halls.307 During the KPD's "Week of Struggle against 
Unemployment", between 11-17 January, there were demonstrations on Town Halls 
throughout Saxony under the slogan "Salvation from Hunger and Frost".308 However, the 
actual centre of gravity of the Saxon KPD's activity was an internal mobilisation: the 
purge of those leading "old" functionaries who had opposed the rigid continuation of the 
303 SAPMO 13/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag vom 3-4.12.1932, p77. 
304 ibid, ppl2ff. 
305 Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag vom 3-4.12.1932, ibid, p77. 
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307 Sta.B., Sig. 4,65-1730, Monatsbericht (December 1932-January 1933). 
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General Line because of the threat to the party and its membership posed by the Nazis. 
The KPD's 3rd Reich Conference set in train the third centralisation of the Saxon KPD's 
party organisation, changing the structure of sub-districts from nine to 26.309 Although 
this was justified in tenns of the party's alleged impending illegality, it represented a 
renewed policy of bringing dissidents in the membership to heel310 The BL was also 
concerned that dissatisfaction with party policy was boiling over in many local party 
organisations; Chemnitz and Meissen were referred to specifically. The means used to 
overcome this restiveness in the membership was to atomise the concentrations of 
dissidents in the street cells, which often numbered some 50-60 members, into groups of 
five, which an Instructor could more easily supervise.311 Despite the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of party members were organised in residential districts, the BL 
insisted that they should act as a "way into the factories" by winning over new members 
from among those who were still in work.312 Crucially, in January 1933 the Saxon KPD 
initiated a campaign to re-elect the leaderships of all street and factory cells, local groups 
and city districts, which was to be completed by 30 January, the day Hitler was appointed 
Chancellor.313 The BL stressed that these were not elections on the model of the SPD but 
Bolshevik style elections: new functionaries could only be elected if they unconditionally 
supported the decisions of the 12th Plenum of the ECCI.314 One consequence of the 
continuation of the social fascist policy was that directives were simply not carried out 
309 SAPMO I 3/8-10/145, Bericht der BL der KPD Sachsens an der 3. Parteitag vom 3-4.12.1932, pp50ff. 
310 The functionaries and active membership were long since known to the police throughout Gennany: 
organisational changes would, and did, not prevent their arrest. See, Peukert, D., Die KPD im 
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when they did not correspond to what the influx of new party members experienced at 
local leve1.
315 
However, the purge of local dissidents was primarily concerned with 
removing the "old" functionaries who were actively opposing the party line. The BL's 
directives stated that the policy was not one of "new functionaries for old" but "old 
functionaries should only be elected on the basis of political quality" (ie compliance with 
party policy).316 During the rise of the NSDAP the "Stalin Letter" of late 1931 had 
lambasted the tradition of "Luxemburgism" in the KPD (ie a German strand of 
I . 'ali ) 317 Th I . revo utIonary SOC! sm. e u tImate consequence of the KPD's Stalinisation was that 
on the eve of the Third Reich the party in Saxony was involved in removing lower 
functionaries to maintain a General Line that ultimately led to the party's collapse and had 
prevented an adequate response to the Nazis' rise to power. 
7.7 Conclusion: Who was the "Main Enemy"? 
The consensus of previous research has been that during the Great Depression the KPD 
was able to carry out the "social fascist" General Line despite the meteoric rise of the 
NSDAP.318 In Saxony, however, the SPD at local level did not behave in the Reich 
leadership's detatched parliamentary manner. Consequently, the validity of the "social 
fascist" thesis was challenged by the experience of local political life. The ADGB was 
involved in paying out welfare benefits to unemployed members and leading strikes, 
whenever possible, in defence of workers' living and working conditions. On the streets of 
Saxony the SPD's local leaders and rank-and-file activists were also active in combating 
315 "bOd 81 1 1 ,p . 
316 ibid, pp82-3. 
317 Weber, H., 'Zur Ideologie der KPD in der Weimarer Republik. Neue Literatur', in lWK 2 (1985), p205" 
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the rise of the NSDAP. These conditions on the ground generated considerable tensions 
between the Saxon KPD's BL and party members, who frequently co-operated with 
members of the wider workers' movement against the NSDAP. The so-called "Anti-
Fascist Action" in mid-1932 was not just a response to the rise of the NSDAP; it was also 
an attempt to shore up the General Line against the SPD in the face of the creation of the 
Iron Front, which at grass roots level was proving to be popular and effective. It was 
when the policy failed to maintain the organisational wall between the two parties, as ad 
hoc co-operation developed against Nazi violence outside of the KPD's control, that the 
KPD leadership and the Comintern acted to isolate the party membership from local 
Social Democrats. The 12th ECCI Plenum rejected even a "non-aggression" pact with the 
SPD to combat the NSDAP. When the KPD advocated a rigid interpretation of the "social 
fascist" policy, the united front from below was presented as a tactic to beat back the 
Nazis by winning over its social support: the policy failed to win over the so-called "Nazi 
workers"; its actual purpose was to repel local co-operation with Social Democrats. By 
late 1932 the reality of the rise of the NSDAP meant that those who were still active in the 
KPD continued to co-operate with the wider workers' movement against the Nazis in the 
neighbourhoods. Where activists would no longer yield to the leadership's directives, the 
BL reacted by furiously rooting out all deviation using an ever tightening knot of 
organisational centralisation and purges of the "older" leaderships in the lower party units. 
While Weber identified seven phases of tactical re-orientation, the Saxon documentation 
indicates that these policies were only carried out if they corresponded to local 
conditions.319 The function of the General Line, which identified the SPD as the "main 
enemy", was to organisationally institutionalise the Comintem's policy at all levels of the 
319 Weber details the tactical changes of policy in, Haupt/eind, pp20ff. 
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KPD, from the Reichstag to the streets of Saxony. At national level the party line could be 
held more easily among senior party functionaries. However, Nazi violence in the 
neighbourhoods forced lower functionaries and rank-and-file members into co-operation 
with the SPD. The Stalinisation of the KPD meant that the experience of party members, 
who were at the front line of political campaigning, was ignored. Mallmann states that the 
KPD's "Stalinisation" was not merely the result of Stalin, but was a consequence of the 
, d··d 1 320 H hi d party s vanguar 1st 1 eo ogy. owever, t s oes not sufficiently emphasise that the 
decision-making process was located in a small group of leaders in Moscow, who used 
party organisation and purges to plaster over what were fault lines in the communist 
monolith running between the senior leadership and grass roots activists. In Saxony the 
membership did respond to the influences of immediate local conditions, but the emphasis 
must be placed on the limited life span of dissidents rather than the creation of a wider 
communist "milieu" within the party. 
Rosenhaft's study of the Berlin KPD deals with the KPD's response to political violence 
in the neighbourhoods. It is made clear that the topic illustrates and assesses an area of 
party work (ie the use of political violence) as another dimension to the leadership's 
central policy of agitating in the factories. Rosenhaft's work regards most Communists as 
reluctant to break the party line. The membership is depicted as continuing to accept the 
"social fascist" policy, while responding to the Nazis as the actual "main enemy" on the 
streets.321 In Saxony, however, "deviation", not party discipline, characterised the 
membership's relationship to a party line imposed from above, without regard to regional 
politics. The party machine continued to burn up huge reserves of energy trying to impose 
320 Mallmann, K-M., Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer Revolutionaercn 
Bewegung (Darmstadt, 1996), p67. 
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the centrality of work in the factories: but with almost 90 per cent of the Saxon 
membership unemployed there were no cogs to turn the policy's wheels. Rosenhaft 
explained this "false understanding" as a consequence of communist ideology, but 
contrasted the limitations of theory with the responsiveness of the KPD to the needs of its 
supporters in the neighbourhoods.322 In Saxony, however, the whole policy of Communist 
"committee building" and the construction of Abwehr organisations was related to 
preventing "deviation" from the party line and maintaining the KPD's ideological claim 
that "unity" could only occur under the KPD. The movement of delegating local 
representatives to communist conferences and constructing Abwehr organisations did not 
act as a conveyor belt to the KPD: only a handful of Social Democrats defected to the 
KPD. Instead the rank-and-file KPD membership often spontaneously co-operated with 
members of the SPD, SAP and KPD(O) in response to immediate events. The BL's 
response was to characterise this as "individual terror" (ie it was outside of the KPD's 
control) and to send directives calling on a "mass response", which meant including non-
Communists in the KPD's on-going party work. The membership's response to the ZK's 
instructions for "ideological discussion" to win over Nazis "workers" was minimal: in 
reality direct action not discussion characterised the Saxon KPD's relations with the 
NSDAP. Leading figures in the KPD spoke from the same platform as Nazis and attended 
their meetings, but they did not succeed in winning over "Nazi-workers" as party 
members: the political border between the Left and Right was not ready to burst in the 
manner claimed by the ZK, whose public statements served only to justify an otherwise 
untenable policy. The KPD responded to the onset of mass unemployment and the 
neighbourhood as a forum for political activity by trying to integrate it into the General 
322 ibid, pp x-xi,212ff. 
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Line: the main role of unemployed members was to support campaigns in the factories. 
The unemployed, however, saw things differently: the vast majority of those unemployed 
workers who were active in the KPD would only follow the Communist call if it directly 
addressed their needs. They would march on a Town Hall but not picket a factory. 
This case study of the Saxon KPD does not substantiate the "Fischer thesis" that 
working-class nationalism, present in the KPD's membership, conditioned the re-adoption 
of a "nationalist" policy in 1930. Nor does it find significant evidence of an overlap in the 
Communists' and Nazis' constituencies, whether electoral or, less still, in terms of 
membership.323 The studies of National Bolshevism by Schueddekopf, Depleux, Ward and 
Duehnke all concur with Fischer that the KPD did set out to implement a "nationalist" 
policy and this was presented to the membership as a response to the rise of the 
NSDAP.324 The crucial difference is that the other studies identify the roots of the 
"nationalist" policy in the Comintern, responding to Bolshevik rather that domestic 
German influences. Rather than the KPD merely taking on the policy as an expression of 
the membership's, or German working class', political predilections, Ward and Weber 
stress the conflict which developed between the KPD's leadership and the Comintern over 
the consequences of the policy.325 The party's Stalinisation was not to make the KPD 
responsive to nationalism in the German working class, but to impose the Comintern's 
General Line on the party membership using a policy of organisational control and purges 
of political dissidents. 
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Equally problematic is Fischer's thesis that a significant sociological overlap in the 
Communist and Nazi constituencies reinforced their political rivalries. All previous studies 
have viewed the cross-over as too limited to have realistically sustained the policy. 
Schueddekopfs detailed research into the KPD's nationalist line concluded that it had no 
significant results in winning new members except for individual, largely high profile, 
defections from the Nazis.326 The KPD did define the Mittelstand as part of its "potential 
constituency", which the membership should reach out to by means of the nationalist 
propaganda. However, Jones' research into the impact of the "Nationalism Question" on 
the Mittlestand and German Liberalism concluded that the downwardly mobile sections of 
the middle classes wanted to be protected from "proletarianisation": defence against the 
social and economic "threat of Marxism" conditioned their voting predilections. This was 
a rightward political path leading from the special "interest parties" of the mid 1920s to 
the Nazis by the 1930s.327 Hamilton's work stressed that after the rise of the NSDAP a 
broad spectrum of the M ittelstand, not just the lower middle classes, looked to the Nazis 
to defend their view of the German nation and society against a perceived Marxist 
threat.328 The Mittelstand's concept of the German nation did not endorse working-class 
organisation and culture let alone encourage voting for a party advocating the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat". The other side to the equation, the KPD's active 
membership, also largely ignored the ZK's and BL's instructions to win over the 
Mittelstand for communist revolution. 
Computer based studies of the Nazi vote by Childers, Hamilton and Falter demonstrate 
that Fischer is pushing at an open door by emphasising working-class support for the 
326 Schueddekopf, Nationalbolschewismus, p306. 
327 Jones, German Liberalism, pp4 76ff. 
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NSDAP, which reached as high as 40 per cent of the party's total electoral support.329 
Childers concluded that working-class Nazi support was not from the "organised 
Arbeiterschaft, but from the sizable body of workers in handicrafts and small-scale 
manufacturing ... (who) were rarely integrated into either the organised working-class or 
'al M' I d ,,330 Th . entrepreneun Ute stan . e cottage mdustry and small-scale manufacturing 
structure of Erzgebirge and Vogtland was precisely such a sub-region in Saxony. Social 
impoverishment during the depression, on top of a tradition of protest voting which had 
shot from left to right across the political spectrum since the late Imperial period, saw a 
pattern of voting which went from the SPD in Wilhelmine Germany, to the KPD in the 
early years of the Weimar Republic to the NSDAP by the late 1920s. In a relatively small 
number of cases the policy of contact, even co-operation, with the NSDAP was carried 
out. There is, however, little evidence of a "red-brown" hybrid-radicalism molded by years 
of long-term unemployment and a political motivation to overthrow the Weimar Republic 
by any means. The KPD's membership who did carry out the policy of co-operation with 
the Nazis, largely in the strikes of late 1932, comprised new members whose political 
socialisation was during the crisis. But, it was especially the "older" members, who had 
roots in the workers' movement, that refused to carry out the policy. It was the ultimate 
329 The figure of 40 per cent is given in Falter, J., Hitlers Waehler (Munich, 1991), pp225,371; 
Szejnmann believes that the NSDAP's vote in Saxony was in excess of 40 per cent, see, Id., 'Nazi Party', 
p211; Childers, T., The Nazi Vote. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany (Chapel Hill, 1983), 
pp260ff; For the different strengths of loyalty within the Nazis social basis also see, Id., 'The Social Basis 
of the Nazi Vote', JeR 11 (1) (1976), ppI7-42; Hamilton, Hitler's Electoral Support', p28; Falter, J., 
'Politische Konsequenzen von Massenarbeitslosigkeit', in PVS 25 (1984) (pp275-95), p288. On the 
working classes' relationship with the NSDAP see, Mason, T., 'National Socialism and the Working 
Classes, 1925 - May 1933', in New Ger~an Critique no. 11 (1977) (pp49-93); Muhlberger, D., The 
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consequence of Stalinisation that those Communist militants who identified the Gennan 
Communism's "main enemy" as the Nazis were being purged on the eve of the Nazi 
Machtergreifung in order to maintain the "social fascist" policy. 
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8. Factionalism, Fratricide and Political Failure: A Conclusion. 
The Stalinisation Thesis and its Critics: What were the limits of Stalinisation? 
At both national and district level the newly available documentation confinns the 
Stalinisation thesis and the central role of the factional struggles in the KPD's political 
development between 1924 and 1929. However, the documentation of local level 
developments, which before the fall of the Berlin Wall was unavailable in any quantity, 
also indicates the limits of Stalinisation. Between 1924 and 1925 the Left leadership, 
under Ruth Fischer, was unable to uproot right-wing Communism from its strongholds in 
southwestern Saxony. Compliant BLs could be installed in recalcitrant districts, but the 
membership's political behaviour could not be dictated from above.1 In West Saxony 
between 1925 and 1928 the Vogt Group refused to carry out the Comintern's "Right 
Turn". Instead a parallel apparatus was constructed to carry out a continuation of the left-
wing policies from before the Comintern's intervention. The faction was so firmly 
anchored among the membership, especially in Leipzig, that the ZK could not overcome 
its influence.2 This case study illustrates that in the mid-twenties where a faction was 
strong enough, it could replace central instructions with local responses. East Saxony, by 
contrast, indicates that where the party was weak, so too were the factions, and the 
control of party policy by the apparatus was firmer and faster.3 
The challenges to the Stalinisation thesis by Schoeck, Stolle, Heer-Kleinert, and more 
recently by Mallmann, are unable to convincingly demonstrate that the KPD's policies 
grew out of developments in Gennany. Admittedly, they do add interesting theories which 
1 See chapter three. 
2 See chapter four. 
3 See chapters three, four and six. 
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investigate the motivation and mental world of the different political tendencies within the 
party.4 However, Mallmann has gone too far in underplaying the importance of 
Stalinisation in the KPD's political development.s It is possible that the Saar region, which 
features strongly in Mallmann's documentary evidence, is an exception to the general 
course of the KPD's internal development. The Saxon case, however, reaffinns that 
Stalinisation was a means of imposing Moscow's line in Germany on an increasingly 
reluctant membership. The KPD's ties to the Comintern prevented it from becoming a 
social movement responding to the membership's political predilections. The present study 
places factionalism and political fratricide at the centre of the Saxon KPD's internal party 
life. In Saxony the KPD's ties to its membership were eroded in a caustic solution of an 
all-pervasive politicisation of every aspect of internal party life; witchhunts for the "enemy 
within" were a prominent feature of party meetings.6 Paradoxically, the connections with 
Moscow, which gave the KPD a wider electoral appeal, also brought political failure, as 
the party's policies failed to account for the needs of the local activists who would carry 
out communist campaigns. 
What Produced the Local Political Tendencies in the Saxon KPD: Local Conditions or 
Ideology? 
Previous historical explanations for the different political tendencies in the KPD reached a 
general consensus on certain social and economic factors. In areas which industrialised 
4 See chapter 1.2. 
5 MaIlmann, K-H., Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik: Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionaeren 
Bewegung (Darmstadt, 1996), pp54-83. 
6 In addition to the documentary evidence already presented see the memoirs of the fonner senior party 
functionary, Retzlaw, K., Spartakus. Au/stieg und Niedergang. Errinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters 
(Frankfurt/M, 1972), especially pp214ff. 
Page 412 
early, where a skilled workforce had developed traditions of political and trade-union 
organisation, Communists supported the united front policy of on-going day-to-day work 
for economic concessions in the social democratic dominated workers' movement. 
However, in areas of rapid and late industrialisation, which had not developed traditions 
of political and trade-union organisation, a "new" working class fonned the social basis 
for a more spontaneous form of communism which only became politically engaged when 
it was possible to achieve immediate objectives.? Reuter's study of party members' political 
thought in Hanover also pointed to the role of individuals' political socialisation, family 
backgrounds and position in the labour market.s Chapter two of this thesis, however, 
outlined the peculiarities of Saxony's social, economic and political development as an 
"old" industrial region with specific sub-regional variations. Franz Walter originally used 
these Saxon sub-regional differences to explain the different rates of erosion of the SPD's 
vote during the rise of the NSDAP: the stronger the degree of organisation in the SPD 
subculture, the less the Nazis could penetrate the wider electorate.9 Szejnmann further 
developed Walter's findings in relation to the rise of Saxon NSDAP. The present thesis 
has incorporated Walter's findings for the SPD into an investigation of the factors 
explaining the different political orientations within the Saxon KPD. 
It is possible to conclude that the political tendencies in the Saxon KPD responded to the 
following factors. In the party district of Erzgebirge-Vogdand, where the degree of 
organisation in the SPD and trade unions was weak in comparison with the eastern and 
northwestern districts, a far left-wing variant of the Saxon SPD developed. It was small-
7 See chapter 1.2. 
8 Reuter, G., KPD-Politik in der Weimare'-Republik. Politische Vorstellung und soziale 
Zusammenstellung der KPD in Hannover zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Hanover, 1982), pp24ff. 
9 Walter, F., 'Sachsen _ ein Stammland der Sozialdemokratie?', in P\'32 (2) (1991), pp207-31. 
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scale industrial structures, which were heavily hit by the Great Depression, that produced 
the strongest support for the SPD's far left.10 In this context local Communists took on a 
right-wing, or pro-contact, disposition because they felt able to work towards communist 
goals within the wider workers' movement. The KPD's ability to influence the wider 
workers' movement was also graphically illustrated in the crisis year of 1923.11 In West 
Saxony, however, the reverse of these factors applied. The left wing of the Saxon SPD 
remained loyal to the policies of the Reich Executive, if at times verbally critical. 12 With a 
strong organisational wall securing the SPD membership's loyalty, the local Communists, 
especially in Leipzig, felt unable to exert significant influence from within the reformist 
dominated workers' movement. In this environment the KPD retreated into a left-
isolationist variant of Communism.13 
In East Saxony the strength of the SPD tradition had prevented the KPD from developing 
a strong party organisation and exerting influence on the workers' movement. However, 
as in the other Saxon party districts, the political border between the KPD and SPD 
memberships was at its most rigid in larger cities and receded in the smaller towns and, 
especially, in industrial village settings. During the 1926 campaign to expropriate the 
former princely houses the SPD and KPD memberships both worked towards achieving 
what was regarded as a common objective. The everyday contact between the parties' 
activists in the cultural and sports Vereine acted to further dissolve the political border 
10 Drechsler, H., Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAPD). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung am Ende der Weimarer Republik (Meisenheim-am-Glan, 1965), pp 19ff. 
Other similar areas were: Thuringia, and localities in Frankfurt am Main, Breslau and Hagen. 
11 See chapters three, five and seven. 
12 Schaefer, R., SPD in der Aera Bruening: Tolerierung oder Mobilisierung? lIandlungsspielraeum und 
Strategien sozialdemokratischer PoUtik 1930-1932 (Frankfurt/M, New York, 1990), pp93tr. 
13 See chapter four. 
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between Communists and Socialists. Such developments, however, were an exception to 
the rule of separate political campaigning, which above all characterised developments in 
the larger cities.14 During the rise of the Nazis in the early thirties it was also in small town 
and industrial village settings that the greatest degree of co-operation between Social 
Democrats and Communists took place. The factor giving rise to political co-operation 
was above all the intensity of Nazi violence in these areas. This limited local co-operation 
between Saxon Social Democratic and Communist activists derived from the fact that the 
Saxon SPD at grass roots level was actively combating a political opponent which did not 
discriminate between SPD or KPD workers.1s 
It is the contention of this thesis that the nearer communist politics came to local level in 
Saxony, the greater the influence of the immediate political environment and the weaker 
the influence of ideology. The 12th Reich Party Congress in 1929 was able to proscribe 
the organisation of factions, and their challenges to the party line, and to end the 
cohabitation of different communist tendencies in the leadership; but local conditions 
continued to produce "deviation" from the party line when it did not accord with the 
reality of party militants' every-day life. 
Communist Tactics and their Influence on the Wider Political System. 
Each change in the KPD's political tactics was limited by the socio-economic context in 
which it was played out. During 1924 and 1925 the KPD, under the leadership of Ruth 
Fischer, tried to uproot right-wing communism from its Saxon strongholds. An ultra-Left 
policy was imposed using the party machine, and common points of contact with the 
14 See chapter five. 
15 See chapter seven. 
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wider workers' movement were limited by splitting the trade unions and rejecting any co-
operation with the SPD in local politics. This marked the temporary abandonment of the 
policy of trying to become a majority of the working class by winning over Social 
Democratic workers through including them in communist-led campaigns. Strongly 
emphasising the vanguardist elements of communist ideology, the KPD leadership 
believed that an influx of former Social Democrats would only dilute the party's 
ideological purity. The tactic, however, failed to connect with the wider political 
environment and saw the KPD turn in on itself in fratricidal feuding on the outer edges of 
working-class politicS.16 
One constant throughout each change in Communist tactics was the objective of 
destroying the influence of the SPD in German politics. The united front policy introduced 
by the Comintern's "open letter" of 1925 aimed to do so by increasing the KPD's influence 
in the workers' movement. The KPD again embarked on a policy of contact with the 
reformist dominated workers' movement in the trade unions and limited co-operation in 
municipal councils. However, the campaign to expropriate the former Gennan princes put 
the political spotlight on the conundrum of communist campaigning: to create a high 
profile movement in Gennany the KPD had to use the subterfuge of an issue of radical 
socialist reform; in Saxony this risked benefiting the left-wing SPD, which wanted to enlist 
the KPD's support for a policy of radical reforms in the Landtag. The KPD's left wing 
believed that the policy had "worked in reverse": in other words co-operation at local 
level with Social Democrats for refonns had taken place, and the campaign had not 
succeeded in eroding the SPD's social basis. The right wing of the KPD, in contrast, 
16 See chapter three. 
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believed that creating a positive profile in the workers' movement would benefit the party 
in the next crisis, as had happened in 1923.17 
In Saxony there is no evidence that the KPD's "left tum" of 1928 grew out of a leftist 
mood among the membership. 18 However, contrary to Moscow's intentions, the 
introduction of the leftist policy was intensified by Thaelmann's inner faction, which 
wanted to end the coalition of factions in the party leadership. The extremism of the left-
isolationist policy between 1928 and 1930 was not welcomed by the Saxon KPD. Many 
left-wing activists believed that the policy would excessively limit the impact of 
communist campaigning.19 However, the policy was not in the first instance concerned 
with increasing communist influence, but ending contact with the wider workers' 
movement and its influence on the membership's political predilections. The KPD could 
have found a policy with a common denominator in the membership, allowing some 
degree of regional and local flexibility within the context of an outright attack on the 
policies of the SPD's National Executive. However, the completion of the KPD's 
Stalinisation did not sanction flexibility to enable wider influence to be gained, but 
envisaged a method of maintaining strict conformity to the General Line and preventing a 
challenge to party policy motivated by local needs. 
The KPD's General Line had been set before the rise of the NSDAP, which became 
evident in Saxony from 1929. Rather than responding to a new variable in the political 
equation, the leadership tried to integrate its response to the Nazis into existing methods 
of campaigning. Particularly during 1931 and late 1932 the KPD claimed that it could beat 
back the Nazis by extending the united front from below to win over "Nazi-workers" and 
17 See chapter five. 
18 See chapter six. 
19 See chapter 6.3 
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the "misled" Mitte[stand?O In Saxony the KPD membership overwhelmingly ignored a 
policy which was unable to bring to a halt the Nazi penetration of Mittelstand politics. 
The political direction of protest voting in Saxony had switched around 180 degrees since 
the pre-war era, when the SPD had gained temporary support from those excluded by the 
limitations placed on the franchise. 21 In the 1922 Landtag elections the victory of the 
"Left" continued to be interpreted in influential governmental circles as an indication that 
the Saxon Mittelstand was "going with the Left".22 However, after the events of 1923, 
when the Saxon middle classes felt at the mercy of the working classes, who had the 
sanction and support of their state government, this decisively ended. It was the Nazis 
who increasingly drew on an explicitly anti-Marxist social protest movement, which had 
taken shape at grass roots level during the mid-twenties.23 The KPD's policy was like a 
communist fish drowning outside Soviet waters: it was maintained for so long, in both the 
mid-twenties and early thirties, because of Comintern policy, which hoped to use German 
national indignation with the Versailles Treaty and the Western powers to reinforce good 
German-Soviet relations.24 
In Saxony there was a specific regional context to the KPD's fear of contact with the 
SPD and socialist and revolutionary splinter groups: they were organising actions to 
combat Nazi violence against the workers' movement on the streets which were involving 
Communist activists. The KPD's Anti-fascist Action in mid-1932 was an attempt to 
20 See chapter 7.4. 
21 See chapter 2.2. 
22 Feldman, G. D., The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914-
1924 (New York, Oxford, 1993), p485. 
23 Lapp, B., 'Political Polarisation in Weimar Gennany: The Saxon Buergerlum and the Left, 1918/19-
1930', Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Cali fomi a, 1991), ppl69ff. 
24 Carr, E. H., The Twilight o/the Comintern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982), pp6ff. 
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prevent party members from taking part in SPD-Ied Abwehr actions on the streets of 
Saxony. The policy's rapid reversal, however, came after both Comintern intervention and 
the fact that it had actually promoted not prevented co-operation against the Nazis. 
The KPD and the Saxon Political System. 
A particular feature of the Weimar political system by the early thirties was the collapse of 
the parties of the so-called "bourgeois middle", the DDP and the DVP, and the 
contraction of the DNVP which rendered it a narrowly based conservative party. 
Explanations for these developments have emphasised certain contributory factors. Firstly, 
the process of rapid Gennan industrialisation, beginning in the late Imperial period, was 
identified as the cause of the dissolution of the "socio-moral milieu" which underpinned 
the political system.25 Secondly, the parties of German (economic) liberalism were 
identified as increasingly unable to address the needs of their diverse electoral basis, as 
organised industrial interests sat behind the scenes influencing policy-making.26 Finally, 
the Honoratorien structure of the traditional parties of the political Right did not adapt to 
the demands of a growing grass roots Mittelstand protest movement, which became 
evident in Saxony from the mid-twenties, forcing a search for a new form of politically 
expressing social and economic anxieties.27 
25 Lepsius, R.M., 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der 
Gesellschaft' (pp58-80), in Ritter, G. A. (ed.), Deutsche Parteien vor 1918 (Cologne, 1973). For the 
application of this trend of research in Saxony see, Szejnmann, C-c. H., 'The Rise of the Nazi Party in 
Saxony between 1921 and 1933', Ph.D. thesis (King's College, University of London, 1994), piS. 
26 Jones, L. E., 'The Dissolution of the Bourgeois Party System' (pp268-88), in Bessel, R. and 
Feuchtwanger, E. 1. (eds')JSocial Change and Poiitical Development in Weimar Germany (London, 
1981), pp27lff. 
27 For Saxony, Lapp, 'Political Polarisation', passim. 
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The KPD's policies also failed to adequately respond to the social basis of communism in 
Saxony. However, by contrast, the party was able to sustain itself both electorally and in 
tenDS of its membership. Certain key factors facilitated the further development of the 
KPD. The KPD had an extensive bureaucracy and press, which gave the party a political 
profile from national to local level. However, despite the party's self-image as a movement 
of permanent political campaigning, its factional feuds and inappropriate policies greatly 
limited the numbers of activists. Most of the membership's campaigning was limited to 
periods of electoral campaigns and referenda, which they believed could make an positive 
impact on their daily lives. The concept of a modern "party of total integration", as 
presented by Neumann, must, therefore, be modified.28 By the early thirties the KPD's 
campaigns in Saxony were ahnost entirely driven by the party machine, which frequently 
found that its policies could not be fuelled by the membership's enthusiastic 
participation.29 Even in the KPD's "inner core" (Kriegel) of full-time functionaries few 
remained in the KPD throughout the Weimar period. Borkenau estimated that 5 per cent 
of all those who passed through the party stayed the course, surviving changing policies 
and party purges.30 
During the early thirties an already high rate of membership turnover rocketed. The new 
mass membership of the early thirties was qualitatively different from the smaller numbers 
of the mid-twenties: these people were temporary recruits from among the unemployed, 
28 Neumann, S., Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik (4.edn.; Stuttgart, 1977), pp87ff. 
29 For the national party see, Weber, H., Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der 
KPD in der Weimarer Republik (vol. 1; Gekuerzte Studentenausgabe; Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971), p12. 
30 Borkenau, F., World Communism. A History o/the Communist International (2 edn.; Michigan, 1962), 
p371. 
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who quickly left a party which saw them as means to its own ends.31 By 1932 at least half 
of the Saxon KPD's membership had been "Communists" for no longer than one year.32 
Despite the electoral successes between 1930 until 1932, political failure and final defeat 
characterised a movement which was unable to develop specific German solutions to a 
specifically German crisis: the rise of Hitler to power. However, the KPD did take on one 
feature endemic in the German and Saxon party system: it became a vehicle to express 
electorally the "anti-system" politics of those within the working classes who suffered 
structural unemployment, chronic poverty and social marginalisation. 
31 On the political apathy of the working-class unemployed and their relations with the KPD see, Fischer, 
C., 'The Unemployed and Left-Wing Radicalism in Weimar Germany, 1930-1933' (pp21O-221), in 
Stachura (ed.), Umemployment in Germany. 
32 see chapter 6.4. 
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10. Appendix 
10.1 KPD Membership: Saxony and the Reich In Comparison, 1919-1932 
Yr. Reich. Erzgebirge/ West Saxony East Saxony Saxony (Total) 
Voetland 
M'ship M'ship %0/ M'ship %0/ M'ship %0/ M'ship %0/ 
Reich Reich Reich Reich 
M'ship M'ship M'ship M'ship 
1919 106,656 14,000 13.1 - - 6,500 6.1 - -
1920 72,519 17,500 24.1 - - 1,000 1.4 
- -
1921 359,000 23,798 6.6 14,338 3.9 4,453 1.3 42,589 11.9 
1922 224,689 19,432 8.6 12,054 5.4 4,152 1.8 35,638 15.9 
1923 294,230 30,584 10.4 9,594 3.3 5,334 1.8 45,512 15.5 
1924 120,098 - - - - - - - -
1925 125,394 12,500 10.0 - - 3,000 2.4 - -
1926 131,641 - - 8,509 6.5 - - - -
1927 133,951 - - 7,021 5.3 - - - -
1928 130,000 11,800 9.1 - - - - - -
1929 114,446 9,000 7.9 7,320 6.4 4,080 3.6 20,400 17.8 
1930 135,417 - - - - - - - -
1931 223,740 - - - - - - 27,447 12.3 
1932 266,393 - - - - - - - -
Source:- Calculated from, Weber, Wandlung, pp361-95; B.a.K., NSDAP Hauptarchiv 
NS 26/810; 'Struktur und Mitgliederbewegung, 1926-31', in SAPMO I 3/8-10/158, 
BL41,81-4. 
10.2 KPD Membership Strength: Saxon Representation Relative to National 
Representation (1929) 
Party District Reich Membership DistrictlReich Relaive Representation :-
Share (%) Poulation Ratio (% ) District Party: Reich 
Erzgebirge/ Voetland 7.9 2.8 2.8: 1 
West Saxony 6.4 2.0 3.2: 1 
East Saxony 3.6 2.9 1.2: 1 
Source:- Calculated from, Weber, Wandlung, pp367-8. 
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10.3 Membership Variation in the Reich and Saxon KPD 
Reich KPD 
Year Membership High Membership Low % Variation on 
ave. membership 
1926 134,172 112,300 18% 
1927 143,172 124,729 14% 
1928 130,000 130,000 
-
1929 135,160 98,527 31% 
1930 176,000 120,000 38% 
1931 246,513 190,182 26% 
1932 260,000 252,000 3% 
Source:- Weber, Wandlung, pp362-4. Note: There is only one figure for the year 1928. 
S KPD axonv 
Year Membership High Membership Low % Variation on 
ave. membership 
1926 14,333 9,750 38% 
1927 13,000 7,750 51% 
1929 24,102 16,715 36% 
1930 23,271 18,907 21% 
Source:-'Struktur und Mitgliederbewegung, 1926-31', in SAPMO 13/8-10/158, B1.83-4. 
No figures obtained to define values for recognised definition of ' fluctuation". 
10.4 Reichstag Elections, 1920-33. Saxony and the Reich In Comparison 
Year Reich Erzgebirge/ West Saxony East Saxony Saxony 
Vogtland 
Vote %of Vote %of Vote %of Vote %of Vote 
(OOOs) total (OOOs) total (OOOs) total (OOOs) total (Ooos) 
Vote Vote Vote Vote 
6.1920 589 2.1 79.6 9.4 12.8 2 9.52 1.1 101 
5.1924 3,746 12.6 182 19.8 109 15.7 80.9 8.4 373 
12.1924 2,709 9.0 138 14.8 90 12.5 64.6 6.5 294 
5.1928 3,263 10.6 154 16.2 121 16.1 105 10.3 381 
9.1930 4,590 13.1 204 18.5 142 17.2 139 12.4 486 
7.1932 5,297 14.3 228 19.6 156 18.7 165 14.3 550 
12.1932 5,980 16.9 242 21.4 175 20.7 189 17.0 608 
5.1933 4,848 12.3 233 19.0 158 17.4 165 13.4 556 
Source:- Weber, Wandlung, pp361-95; Statistisches lahrbuchfuer den Freistaat 
Sachsen, Nr50, 1931/4 (Dresden, 1935), pp430-1. 
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